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A Venona Style Attack to Determine Block Size, Language, and Attacking Ciphers | IEEE Conference Publication | IEEE Xplore

A Venona Style Attack to Determine Block Size, Language, and Attacking Ciphers


Abstract:

The One Time Pad (OTP) is regarded as the only “perfectly secure cipher.” It was used extensively during World War II, and during the Cold War by the USSR. The OTP was re...Show More

Abstract:

The One Time Pad (OTP) is regarded as the only “perfectly secure cipher.” It was used extensively during World War II, and during the Cold War by the USSR. The OTP was rendered vulnerable when the USSR started to recycle and reuse the keys that were already used for encryption. The USA exploited this vulnerability during the Cold War with the USSR, which lasted well into the 1980s. The exploit used by the USA was code-named as the ”Venona Attack.” Nevertheless, there was little to no declassified information about the technique used in the Venona Attack. In this paper, we propose an algorithm that may potentially be the crux of the Venona-Attack, and we establish the conditions that would facilitate a Venona-style exploit. The proposed exploit from this paper can be used to attack serial ciphers and any cipher that reuses keys. To demonstrate our algorithm, we present results from our preliminary test corpora to establish the limitations of the attack testing with block sizes of 1 and 3, along with countermeasures that can be employed to counteract a Venona-style attack.
Date of Conference: 19-22 July 2022
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 15 August 2022
ISBN Information:
Conference Location: Shenzhen, China

References

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