# Partial-Observation Stochastic Games: How to Win when Belief Fails 

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#### Abstract

In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states. The game is played for infinitely many rounds and thus the players construct an infinite path in the graph. We consider reachability objectives where the first player tries to ensure a target state to be visited almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1 ) or positively (i.e., with positive probability), no matter the strategy of the second player. We classify such games according to the information and to the power of randomization available to the players. On the basis of information, the game can be one-sided with either (a) player 1, or (b) player 2 having partial observation (and the other player has perfect observation), or twosided with (c) both players having partial observation. On the basis of randomization, (a) the players may not be allowed to use randomization (pure strategies), or (b) they may choose a probability distribution over actions but the actual random choice is external and not visible to the player (actions invisible), or (c) they may use full randomization. Our main results for pure strategies are as follows: (1) For one-sided games with player 2 perfect observation we show that (in contrast to full randomized strategies) belief-based (subset-construction based) strategies are not sufficient, and we present an exponential upper bound on memory both for almost-sure and positive winning strategies; we show that the problem of deciding the existence of almost-sure and positive winning strategies for player 1 is EXPTIME-complete and present symbolic algorithms that avoid the explicit exponential construction. (2) For one-sided games with player 1 perfect observation we show that nonelementary memory is both necessary and sufficient for both almost-sure and positive winning strategies. (3) We show that for the general (twosided) case finite-memory strategies are sufficient for both positive and almost-sure winning, and at least non-elementary memory is required. We establish the equivalence of the almost-sure winning problems for pure strategies and for randomized strategies with actions invisible. Our equivalence result exhibit serious flaws in previous results in the literature: we show a non-elementary memory lower bound for almost-sure winning whereas an exponential upper bound was previously claimed.


## 1 Introduction

Games on graphs. Two-player games on graphs play a central role in several important problems in computer science, such as controller synthesis [33,35], verification of open systems [2], realizability and compatibility checking [1, 21, 18], and many others. Most results about two-player games on graphs make the hypothesis of perfect observation (i.e., both players have perfect or complete observation about the state of the game). This assumption is often not realistic in practice. For example in the context of hybrid systems, the controller acquires information about the state of a plant using digital sensors with finite precision, which gives imperfect information about the state of the plant [20, 27]. Similarly, in a concurrent system where the players represent individual processes, each process has only access to the public variables of the other processes, not to their private variables [37, 2]. Such problems are better modeled in the more general framework of partial-observation games $[36-38,16,7]$ and have been studied in the context of verification and synthesis $[30,22]$ (also see [3] for pushdown partialobservation games).
Partial-observation stochastic games and subclasses. In two-player partial-observation stochastic games on graphs with a finite state space, in every round, both players independently and simultaneously choose actions which along with the current state give a probability distribution over the successor states in the game. In a general setting, the players may not be able to distinguish certain states which are observationally equivalent for them (e.g., if they differ only by the value of private variables). The state space is partitioned into observations defined as equivalence classes and the players do not see the actual state of the game, but only an observation (which is typically different for the two players). The model of partial-observation games we consider is the same as the model of stochastic games with signals [7] and is a standard model in game theory [39, 41]. It subsumes other classical game models such as concurrent games [40, 19], probabilistic automata [34, 9, 32], and partial-observation Markov decision processes (POMDPs) [31] (see also the recent decidability and complexity results for probabilistic automata $[4-6,10-12,25]$ and for POMDPs $[15,4$, 43]).

The special case of perfect observation for a player corresponds to every observation for this player being a singleton. Depending on which player has perfect observation, we consider the following one-sided subclasses of the general two-sided partial-observation stochastic games: (1) player 1 partial and player 2 perfect where player 2 has perfect observation, and player 1 has partial observation; and (2) player 1 perfect and player 2 partial where player 1 has perfect observation, and player 2 has partial observation. The case where the two players have perfect observation corresponds to the well-known perfect-information (perfect-observation) stochastic games [40, 17, 19].

Note that in a given game $G$, if player 1 wins in the setting of player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, then player 1 wins in the game $G$ as well. Analogously, if player 1 cannot win in the setting of player 1 perfect and player 2 partial, then
player 1 does not win in the game $G$ either. In this sense, the one-sided games are conservative over- and under-approximations of two-sided games. In the context of applications in verification and synthesis, the conservative approximation is that the adversary is all powerful, and hence player 1 partial and player 2 perfect games provide the important worst-case analysis of partial-observation games.

Objectives and qualitative problems. In this work we consider partialobservation stochastic games with reachability objectives where the goal of player 1 is to reach a set of target states and the goal of player 2 is to prevent player 1 from reaching the target states. The study of partial-observation games is considerably more complicated than games of perfect observation. For example, in contrast to perfect-observation games, strategies in partial-observation games require both randomization and memory for reachability objectives; and the quantitative problem of deciding whether there exists a strategy for player 1 to ensure that the target is reached with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$ can be decided in NP $\cap$ coNP for perfect-observation stochastic games [17], whereas the problem is undecidable even for partial-observation stochastic games with only one player [32]. Since the quantitative problem is undecidable we consider the following qualitative problems: the almost-sure (resp. positive) problem asks whether there exists a strategy for player 1 to ensure that the target set is reached with probability 1 (resp. positive probability).

Classes of strategies. In general, randomized strategies are necessary to win with probability 1 in a partial-observation game with reachability objective [16]. However, there exist two types of randomized strategies where either (i) actions are visible, the player can observe the action he played $[16,7]$, or (ii) actions are invisible, the player may choose a probability distribution over actions, but the source of randomization is external and the actual choice of the action is invisible to the player [26]. The second model is more general since the qualitative problems of randomized strategies with actions visible can be reduced in polynomial time to randomized strategies with actions invisible, by modeling the visibility of actions using the observations on states.

With actions visible, the almost-sure (resp. positive) problem was shown to be EXPTIME-complete (resp. PTIME-complete) for one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect [16], and 2EXPTIME-complete (resp. EXPTIMEcomplete) in the two-sided case [7]. For the positive problem memoryless randomized strategies exist, and for the almost-sure problem belief-based strategies exist (strategies based on subset construction that consider the possible current states of the game).

It was remarked (without any proof) in [16, p.4] that these results easily extend to randomized strategies with actions invisible for one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect. It was claimed in [26] (Theorems $1 \& 2$ ) that the almost-sure problem is 2EXPTIME-complete for randomized strategies with actions invisible for two-sided games, and that belief-based strategies are sufficient for player 1. Thus it is believed that the two qualitative problems with actions visible or actions invisible are essentially equivalent.

In this paper, we consider the class of pure strategies, which do not use randomization at all. Pure strategies arise naturally in the implementation of controllers and processes that do not have access to any source of randomization. Moreover we will establish deep connections between the qualitative problems for pure strategies and for randomized strategies with actions invisible, which on one hand exhibit major flaws in previous results of the literature (the remark without proof of [16] and the main results of [26]), and on the other hand show that the solution for almost-sure winning randomized strategies with actions invisible (which is the most general case) can be surprisingly obtained by solving the problem for pure strategies.

Contributions. The contributions of the paper are summarized below.

1. Player 1 partial and player 2 perfect. We show that both for almost-sure and positive winning, belief-based pure strategies are not sufficient. This implies that the classical approaches relying on the belief-based subset construction cannot work for solving the qualitative problems for pure strategies. However, we present an optimal exponential upper bound on the memory needed by pure strategies (the exponential lower bound follows from the special case of non-stochastic games [8]). By a reduction to a perfect-observation game of exponential size, we show that both the almost-sure and positive problems are EXPTIME-complete for one-sided games with perfect-observation for player 2. In contrast to the previous proofs of EXPTIME upper bound that rely either on subset constructions or enumeration of belief-based strategies, our correctness proof relies on a novel rank-based argument that works uniformly both for positive and almost-sure winning. The structure of this construction also provides symbolic antichain-based algorithms (see [23] for a survey of the antichain approach) for solving the qualitative problems that avoids the explicit exponential construction. Thus for the important special case of player 1 partial and player 2 perfect we establish optimal memory bound, complexity bound, and present symbolic algorithmic solutions for the qualitative problems.
2. Player 1 perfect and player 2 partial.
(a) We show a very surprising result that both for positive and almost-sure winning, pure strategies for player 1 require memory of non-elementary size (i.e., a tower of exponentials). This is in sharp contrast with (i) the case of randomized strategies (with or without actions visible) where memoryless strategies are sufficient for positive winning, and with (ii) the previous case where player 1 has partial observation and player 2 has perfect observation, where pure strategies for positive winning require only exponential memory. Surprisingly and perhaps counter-intuitively when player 1 has more information and player 2 has less information, the positive winning strategies for player 1 require much more memory (non-elementary as compared to exponential). With more information player 1 can win from more states, but the winning strategy is much harder to implement.
(b) We present a non-elementary upper bound for the memory needed by pure strategies for positive winning. We then show with an example that for almost-sure winning more memory may be required as compared to positive winning. Finally, we show how to combine pure strategies for positive winning in a recharging scheme to obtain a non-elementary upper bound for the memory required by pure strategies for almost-sure winning. Thus we establish non-elementary complete bounds for pure strategies both for positive and almost-sure winning.
3. General (two-sided) case. We show that in the general case finite memory strategies are sufficient both for positive and almost-sure winning. The result is obtained essentially by a simple generalization of König's Lemma [29]. The non-elementary lower bound for memory follows from the special case when player 1 has perfect observation and player 2 has partial observation.
4. Randomized strategies with actions invisible. For randomized strategies with actions invisible we present two reductions to establish connections with pure strategies. First, we show that the almost-sure problem for randomized strategies with actions invisible can be reduced in polynomial time to the almost-sure problem for pure strategies. The reduction requires to first establish that finite-memory randomized strategies are sufficient in two-sided games. Second, we show that the problem of almost-sure winning with pure strategies can be reduced in polynomial time to the problem of randomized strategies with actions invisible. For this reduction it is crucial that the actions are not visible.
Our reductions have deep consequences. They unexpectedly imply that the problems of almost-sure winning with pure strategies or randomized strategies with actions invisible are polynomial-time equivalent. Moreover, it follows that even in one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, belief-based randomized strategies (with actions invisible) are not sufficient for almost-sure winning. This shows that the remark (without proof) of [16] that the results (such as existence of belief-based strategies) of randomized strategies with actions visible carry over to actions invisible is an oversight. However from our first reduction and our results for pure strategies it follows that there is an exponential upper bound on memory and the problem is EXPTIME-complete for one-sided games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect. More importantly, our results exhibit a serious flaw in the main result of [26] which showed that belief-based randomized strategies with actions invisible are sufficient for almost-sure winning in two-sided games, and concluded that enumerating over such strategies yields a 2EXPTIME algorithm for the problem. Our second reduction and lower bound for pure strategies show that the result is incorrect, and that the exponential (belief-based) upper bound is far off. Instead, the lower bound on memory for almost-sure winning with randomized strategies and actions invisible is non-elementary. Thus, contrary to the general belief, there is a sharp contrast for randomized strategies with or without actions visible: if actions are visible, then exponential memory is sufficient for almost-sure winning while if actions are not visible, then memory of non-elementary size is necessary in general.

The memory requirements are summarized in Table 1 and the results of this paper are shown in bold font. We explain how the other results of the table follow from results of the literature. For randomized strategies (with or without actions visible), if a positive winning strategy exists, then a memoryless strategy that plays all actions uniformly at random is also positive winning. Thus the memoryless result for positive winning strategies follows for all cases of randomized strategies. The belief-based bound for memory of almost-sure winning randomized strategies with actions visible follows from [16, 7]. The memoryless strategies results for almost-sure winning for one-sided games with player 1 perfect and player 2 partial are obtained as follows: when actions are visible, then belief-based strategies coincide with memoryless strategies as player 1 has perfect observation. If player 1 has perfect observation, then for memoryless strategies whether actions are visible or not is irrelevant and thus the memoryless result also follows for randomized strategies with actions invisible. Thus along with our results we obtain Table 1.

|  | one-sided player 2 perfect |  | one-sided player 1 perfect |  | two-sided |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Positive | Almost-sure | Positive | Almost-sure | Positive | Almost-sure |
| Randomized (actions visible) | Memoryless | Exponential (belief-based) | Memoryless | Memoryless | Memoryless | Exponential (belief-based) |
| Randomized (actions invisible) | Memoryless | Exponential (more than belief) | Memoryless | Memoryless | Memoryless | Non-elem. low. bound - Finite upp. bound |
| Pure | $\left\lvert\, \begin{gathered} \text { Exponential } \\ \text { (more than } \\ \text { belief) } \end{gathered}\right.$ | Exponential (more than belief) | Non-elem. complete | Non-elem. complete | Non-elem. low. bound ${ }^{\text {Finite }}$ upp. bound | Non-elem. low. bound Finite upp. bound |

Table 1. Memory requirement for player 1 and reachability objective.

## 2 Definitions

A probability distribution on a finite set $S$ is a function $\kappa: S \rightarrow[0,1]$ such that $\sum_{s \in S} \kappa(s)=1$. The support of $\kappa$ is the set $\operatorname{Supp}(\kappa)=\{s \in S \mid \kappa(s)>0\}$. We denote by $\mathcal{D}(S)$ the set of probability distributions on $S$. Given $s \in S$, the Dirac distribution on $s$ assigns probability 1 to $s$.
Games. Given finite alphabets $A_{i}$ of actions for player $i(i=1,2)$, a stochastic game on $A_{1}, A_{2}$ is a tuple $G=\left\langle Q, q_{0}, \delta\right\rangle$ where $Q$ is a finite set of states, $q_{0} \in Q$ is the initial state, and $\delta: Q \times A_{1} \times A_{2} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(Q)$ is a probabilistic transition function that, given a current state $q$ and actions $a, b$ for the players gives the transition probability $\delta(q, a, b)\left(q^{\prime}\right)$ to the next state $q^{\prime}$. The game is called deterministic if $\delta(q, a, b)$ is a Dirac distribution for all $(q, a, b) \in Q \times A_{1} \times A_{2}$. A state $q$ is
absorbing if $\delta(q, a, b)$ is the Dirac distribution on $q$ for all $(a, b) \in A_{1} \times A_{2}$. In some examples, we allow an initial distribution of states. This can be encoded in our game model by a probabilistic transition from the initial state.

A player-1 state is a state $q$ where $\delta(q, a, b)=\delta\left(q, a, b^{\prime}\right)$ for all $a \in A_{1}$ and all $b, b^{\prime} \in A_{2}$. We use the notation $\delta(q, a,-)$. Player- 2 states are defined analogously. In figures, we use boxes to emphasize that a state is a player-2 state, and we represent probabilistic branches using diamonds (which are not real 'states', e.g., as in Fig. 1).

In a (two-sided) partial-observation game, the players have a partial or incomplete view of the states visited and of the actions played in the game. This view may be different for the two players and it is defined by equivalence relations $\approx_{i}$ on the states and on the actions. For player $i$, equivalent states (or actions) are indistinguishable. We denote by $\mathcal{O}_{i} \subseteq 2^{Q}(i=1,2)$ the equivalence classes of $\approx_{i}$ which define two partitions of the state space $Q$, and we call them observations (for player $i$ ). These partitions uniquely define functions obs ${ }_{i}: Q \rightarrow \mathcal{O}_{i}(i=1,2)$ such that $q \in \operatorname{obs}_{i}(q)$ for all $q \in Q$, that map each state $q$ to its observation for player $i$.

In the case where all states and actions are equivalent (i.e., the relation $\approx_{i}$ is the set $\left.(Q \times Q) \cup\left(A_{1} \times A_{1}\right) \cup\left(A_{2} \times A_{2}\right)\right)$, we say that player $i$ is blind and the actions are invisible. In this case, we have $\mathcal{O}_{i}=\{Q\}$ because all states have the same observation. Note that the case of perfect observation for player $i$ corresponds to the case $\mathcal{O}_{i}=\left\{\left\{q_{0}\right\},\left\{q_{1}\right\}, \ldots,\left\{q_{n}\right\}\right\}$ (given $Q=\left\{q_{0}, q_{1}, \ldots, q_{n}\right\}$ ), and $a \approx_{i} b$ iff $a=b$, for all actions $a, b$.

For $s \subseteq Q, a \in A_{1}$, and $b \in A_{2}$, let $\operatorname{Post}_{a, b}(s)=\bigcup_{q \in s} \operatorname{Supp}(\delta(q, a, b))$ denote the set of possible successors of $q$ given action $a$ and $b$, and let $\operatorname{Post}_{a,-}(s)=$ $\bigcup_{b \in A_{2}} \operatorname{Post}_{a, b}(s)$.

Plays and observations. Initially, the game starts in the initial state $q_{0}$. In each round, player 1 chooses an action $a \in A_{1}$, player 2 (simultaneously and independently) chooses an action $b \in A_{2}$, and the successor of the current state $q$ is chosen according to the probabilistic transition function $\delta(q, a, b)$. A play in $G$ is an infinite sequence $\rho=q_{0} a_{0} b_{0} q_{1} a_{1} b_{1} q_{2} \ldots$ such that $q_{0}$ is the initial state and $\delta\left(q_{j}, a_{j}, b_{j}\right)\left(q_{j+1}\right)>0$ for all $j \geq 0$ (the actions $a_{j}$ 's and $b_{j}$ 's are the actions associated to the play). Its length is $|\rho|=\infty$. The length of a play prefix $\rho=q_{0} a_{0} b_{0} q_{1} \ldots q_{k}$ is $|\rho|=k$, and its last element is $\operatorname{Last}(\rho)=q_{k}$. A state $q \in Q$ is reachable if it occurs in some play. We denote by Plays $(G)$ the set of plays in $G$, and by $\operatorname{Prefs}(G)$ the set of corresponding finite prefixes. The observation sequence for player $i(i=1,2)$ of a play (prefix) $\rho$ is the unique (in)finite sequence $\operatorname{obs}_{i}(\rho)=\gamma_{0} \gamma_{1} \ldots$ such that $q_{j} \in \gamma_{j} \in \mathcal{O}_{i}$ for all $0 \leq j \leq|\rho|$.

The games with one-sided partial-observation are the special case where either $\approx_{1}$ is equality and hence $\mathcal{O}_{1}=\{\{q\} \mid q \in Q\}$ (player 1 has complete observation) or $\approx_{2}$ is equality and hence $\mathcal{O}_{2}=\{\{q\} \mid q \in Q\}$ (player 2 has complete observation). The games with perfect observation are the special cases where $\approx_{1}$ and $\approx_{2}$ are equality, i.e., every state and action is visible to both players.

Strategies. A pure strategy in $G$ for player 1 is a function $\sigma: \operatorname{Prefs}(G) \rightarrow A_{1}$. A randomized strategy in $G$ for player 1 is a function $\sigma: \operatorname{Prefs}(G) \rightarrow \mathcal{D}\left(A_{1}\right)$. A (pure or randomized) strategy $\sigma$ for player 1 is observation-based if for all prefixes $\rho=q_{0} a_{0} b_{0} q_{1} \ldots$ and $\rho^{\prime}=q_{0}^{\prime} a_{0}^{\prime} b_{0}^{\prime} q_{1}^{\prime} \ldots$, if $a_{j} \approx_{1} a_{j}^{\prime}$ and $b_{j} \approx_{1} b_{j}^{\prime}$ for all $j \geq 0$, and obs ${ }_{1}(\rho)=\operatorname{obs}_{1}\left(\rho^{\prime}\right)$, then $\sigma(\rho)=\sigma\left(\rho^{\prime}\right)$. It is assumed that strategies are observation-based in partial-observation games. If for all actions $a$ and $b$ we have $a \approx_{1} b$ and $a \approx_{2} b$ iff $a=b$ (all actions are distinguishable), then the strategy is action visible, and if for all actions $a$ and $b$ we have $a \approx_{1} b$ and $a \approx_{2} b$ (all actions are indistinguishable), then the strategy is action invisible. We say that a play (prefix) $\rho=q_{0} a_{0} b_{0} q_{1} \ldots$ is compatible with a pure (resp., randomized) strategy $\sigma$ if the associated action of player 1 in step $j$ is $a_{j}=\sigma\left(q_{0} a_{0} b_{0} \ldots q_{j-1}\right)$ (resp., $\left.a_{j} \in \operatorname{Supp}\left(\sigma\left(q_{0} a_{0} b_{0} \ldots q_{j-1}\right)\right)\right)$ for all $0 \leq j \leq|\rho|$.

We omit analogous definitions of strategies for player 2 . We denote by $\Sigma_{G}$, $\Sigma_{G}^{O}, \Sigma_{G}^{P}, \Pi_{G}, \Pi_{G}^{O}$, and $\Pi_{G}^{P}$ the set of all player-1 strategies, the set of all observation-based player-1 strategies, the set of all pure player- 1 strategies, the set of all player-2 strategies in $G$, the set of all observation-based player- 2 strategies, and the set of all pure player- 2 strategies, respectively.

## Remarks.

1. The model of games with partial observation on both actions and states can be encoded in a model of games with actions invisible and observations on states only: when actions are invisible, we can use the state space to keep track of the last action played, and reveal information about the last action played using observations on the states. Therefore, in the sequel we assume that the actions are invisible to the players with partial observation. A play is then viewed as a sequence of states only, and the definition of strategies is updated accordingly. Note that a player with perfect observation has actions and states visible (and the equivalence relation $\approx_{i}$ is equality).
2. The important special case of partial-observation Markov decision processes (POMDP) corresponds to the case where either all states in the game are player-1 states (player-1 POMDP) or all states are player-2 states (player-2 POMDP). For POMDP it is known that randomization is not necessary, and pure strategies are as powerful as randomized strategies [14].

Finite-memory strategies. A player-1 strategy uses finite-memory if it can be encoded by a deterministic transducer $\left\langle\operatorname{Mem}, m_{0}, \alpha_{u}, \alpha_{n}\right\rangle$ where Mem is a finite set (the memory of the strategy), $m_{0} \in$ Mem is the initial memory value, $\alpha_{u}$ : Mem $\times \mathcal{O}_{1} \rightarrow$ Mem is an update function, and $\alpha_{n}: \operatorname{Mem} \times \mathcal{O}_{1} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}\left(A_{1}\right)$ is a nextmove function. The size of the strategy is the number $|\mathrm{Mem}|$ of memory values. If the current observation is $o$, and the current memory value is $m$, then the strategy chooses the next action according to the probability distribution $\alpha_{n}(m, o)$, and the memory is updated to $\alpha_{u}(m, o)$. Formally, $\left\langle\mathrm{Mem}, m_{0}, \alpha_{u}, \alpha_{n}\right\rangle$ defines the strategy $\sigma$ such that $\sigma(\rho \cdot q)=\alpha_{n}\left(\hat{\alpha}_{u}\left(m_{0}\right.\right.$, obs $\left._{1}(\rho)\right)$, obs $\left._{1}(q)\right)$ for all $\rho \in Q^{*}$ and $q \in Q$, where $\hat{\alpha}_{u}$ extends $\alpha_{u}$ to sequences of observations as expected. This definition extends to infinite-memory strategies by dropping the assumption that
the set Mem is finite. A strategy is memoryless if $|\mathrm{Mem}|=1$. For a strategy $\sigma$, we denote by $G_{\sigma}$ the player-2 POMDP obtained as the synchronous product of $G$ with the transducer defining $\sigma$.

Objectives and winning modes. An objective (for player 1) in $G$ is a set $\phi \subseteq$ $\operatorname{Plays}(G)$ of plays. A play $\rho \in \operatorname{Plays}(G)$ satisfies the objective $\phi$, denoted $\rho \models \phi$, if $\rho \in \phi$. Objectives are generally Borel measurable: a Borel objective is a Borel set in the Cantor topology [28]. Given strategies $\sigma$ and $\pi$ for the two players, the probabilities of a measurable objective $\phi$ is uniquely defined [44]. We denote by $\operatorname{Pr}_{q_{0}}^{\sigma, \pi}(\phi)$ the probability that $\phi$ is satisfied by the play obtained from the starting state $q_{0}$ when the strategies $\sigma$ and $\pi$ are used.

We specifically consider the following objectives. Given a set $\mathcal{T} \subseteq Q$ of target states, the reachability objective requires that the play visit the set $\mathcal{T}$ : $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})=\left\{q_{0} a_{0} b_{0} q_{1} \ldots \in \operatorname{Plays}(G) \mid \exists i \geq 0: q_{i} \in \mathcal{T}\right\}$, and the Büchi objective requires that the play visit the set $\mathcal{T}$ infinitely often, $\operatorname{Büchi}(\mathcal{T})=\left\{q_{0} a_{0} b_{0} q_{1} \ldots \in\right.$ $\left.\operatorname{Plays}(G) \mid \forall i \geq 0 \cdot \exists j \geq i: q_{j} \in \mathcal{T}\right\}$. Our solution for reachability objectives will also use the dual notion of safety objectives that require the play to stay within the set $\mathcal{T}: \operatorname{Safe}(\mathcal{T})=\left\{q_{0} a_{0} b_{0} q_{1} \ldots \in \operatorname{Plays}(G) \mid \forall i \geq 0: q_{i} \in \mathcal{T}\right\}$. In figures, the target states in $\mathcal{T}$ are double-lined and labeled by $\odot$.

Given a game structure $G$ and a state $q$, an observation-based strategy $\sigma$ for player 1 is almost-sure winning (resp. positive winning) for the objective $\phi$ from $q$ if for all observation-based randomized strategies $\pi$ for player 2 , we have $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}(\phi)=1\left(\right.$ resp. $\left.\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}(\phi)>0\right)$. The strategy $\sigma$ is sure winning if all plays compatible with $\sigma$ satisfy $\phi$. We also say that the state $q$ is almost-sure (or positive, or sure) winning for player 1.

Positive and almost-sure winning problems. We are interested in the problems of deciding, given a game structure $G$, a state $q$, and an objective $\phi$, whether there exists a \{pure, randomized\} strategy which is \{almost-sure, positive\} winning from $q$ for the objective $\phi$. For safety objectives almost-sure winning coincides with sure winning, however for reachability objectives they are different. The sure winning problem for the objectives we consider has been studied in [36, 16, 13]. The almost-sure winning problem for Büchi objectives can be easily reduced to the almost-sure winning problem for reachability objectives [4], and the reduction is as follows: given a two-sided stochastic game with Büchi objective $\operatorname{Büchi}(\mathcal{T})$, we add an absorbing state $q_{T}$, make $q_{T}$ the target state for the reachability objective, and from every state $q \in \mathcal{T}$ we add positive probability transitions to $q_{T}$ (details and correctness proof follow from [4, Lemma 13]). The positive winning problem for Büchi objectives is undecidable even for POMDPs [4]. Hence in this paper we only focus on reachability objectives. In all our analysis, the counter strategies of player 2 can be restricted to pure strategies, because once a strategy for player 1 is fixed, then we obtain a POMDP for player 2 in which pure strategies are as powerful as randomized strategies [14].


Fig. 1. Belief-only is not enough for positive (as well as almost-sure) reachability. A one-sided reachability game with reachability objective in which player 1 is blind and player 2 has perfect observation. If we consider pure strategies, then player 1 has a positive (as well as almost-sure) winning strategy, but there is no belief-based memoryless positive winning strategy.

## 3 One-sided Games: Player 1 Partial and Player 2 Perfect

In Sections 3 and 4, we consider one-sided games with partial observation: one player has perfect observation, and the other player has partial observation. The player with perfect observation sees the states visited and the actions played in the game. We present the results for positive and almost-sure winning for reachability objectives along with examples that illustrate key elements of the problem such as the memory required for winning strategies.

Note that the case of player 1 partial and player 2 perfect is important in the context of controller synthesis as it is a conservative approximation of twosided games for player 1 (if player 1 wins in the one-sided game, then he also wins in the two-sided game). In the following example we show that for pure strategies belief-based strategies are not sufficient for positive as well as almostsure winning. A strategy is belief-based if its memory relies only on the subset construction, i.e., the strategy plays only depending on the set of possible current states of the game which is called belief.

Example 1. Belief-only is not enough for positive (as well as almostsure) reachability. Consider the game in Fig. 1 where player 1 is blind (all states have the same observation except the target state, and actions are invisible) and player 2 has perfect observation. Initially, player 2 chooses the state $q_{1}$ or $q_{2}$ (which player 1 does not see). The belief of player 1 is thus the set $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$ (see Fig. 2). We claim that the belief is not a sufficient information to win with a pure strategy for player 1 because the belief-based subset construction in Fig. 2


Fig. 2. The belief-based subset construction for the reachability game of Fig. 1. Player 1 has a pure strategy for positive (as well as almost-sure) winning in the subset construction. However, belief-based memoryless pure strategies are not sufficient in the original game.
suggests that playing always the same action (say $a$ ) when the belief is $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$ is an almost-sure winning strategy. However, in the original game this is not even a positive winning strategy (the counter strategy of player 2 is to choose $q_{2}$ initially). A winning strategy for player 1 is to alternate between $a$ and $b$ when the belief is $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$, which requires to remember more than the belief set.

We present reductions of the almost-sure and positive winning problem for reachability objective to the problem of sure-winning in a game of perfect observation with Büchi objective, and reachability objective respectively. The two reductions are based on the same construction of a game where the state space $L=\{(s, o) \mid o \subseteq s \subseteq Q\}$ contains the subset construction $s$ enriched with obligation sets $o \subseteq s$ which ensure that from all states in $s$, the target set $\mathcal{T}$ is reached with positive probability.

Lemma 1. Given a one-sided partial-observation stochastic game $G$ with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect with a reachability objective for player 1, we can construct in time exponential in the size of the game and polynomial in the size of action sets a perfect-information deterministic game $H$ with a Büchi objective (resp. reachability objective) such that player 1 has a pure almost-sure (resp. positive) winning strategy in $G$ iff player 1 has a sure-winning strategy in $H$.

Proof. We present the construction and the proof in details for almost-sure reachability. The construction is the same for positive reachability, and the argument is described succinctly afterwards.

Construction. Given $G=\left\langle Q, q_{0}, \delta\right\rangle$ over alphabets $A_{1}, A_{2}$ and observation set $\mathcal{O}_{1}$ for player 1 , with reachability objective $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$, we construct the following (deterministic) game of perfect observation $H=\left\langle L, \ell_{0}, \delta_{H}\right\rangle$ over alphabets $A_{1}^{\prime}, A_{2}^{\prime}$ with Büchi objective $\operatorname{Büchi}(\alpha)$ defined by $\alpha \subseteq L$ where:
$-L=\{(s, o) \mid o \subseteq s \subseteq Q\}$. Intuitively, $s$ is the belief of player 1 and $o$ is a set of obligation states that "owe" a visit to $\mathcal{T}$ with positive probability;
$-\ell_{0}=\left(\left\{q_{0}\right\},\left\{q_{0}\right\}\right)$ if $q_{0} \notin \mathcal{T}$, and $\ell_{0}=(\emptyset, \emptyset)$ if $q_{0} \in \mathcal{T}$;
$-A_{1}^{\prime}=A_{1} \times 2^{Q}$. In a pair $(a, u) \in A_{1}^{\prime}$, we call $a$ the action, and $u$ the witness set;

- $A_{2}^{\prime}=\mathcal{O}_{1}$. In the game $H$, player 2 simulate player 2's choice in game $G$, as well as resolves the probabilistic choices. This amounts to choosing a possible successor state, and revealing its observation;
$-\alpha=\{(s, \emptyset) \in L\} ;$
$-\delta_{H}$ is defined as follows. First, the state $(\emptyset, \emptyset)$ is absorbing. Second, in every other state $(s, o) \in L$ the function $\delta_{H}$ ensures that $(i)$ player 1 chooses a pair $(a, u)$ such that $\operatorname{Supp}(\delta(q, a, b)) \cap u \neq \emptyset$ for all $q \in o$ and $b \in A_{2}$, and (ii) player 2 chooses an observation $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_{1}$ such that $\operatorname{Post}_{a,-}(s) \cap \gamma \neq$ $\emptyset$. If a player violates this, then a losing absorbing state is reached with probability 1. Assuming the above condition on $(a, u)$ and $\gamma$ is satisfied, define $\delta_{H}((s, o),(a, u), \gamma)$ as the Dirac distribution on the state $\left(s^{\prime}, o^{\prime}\right)$ such that:
- $s^{\prime}=\left(\operatorname{Post}_{a,-}(s) \cap \gamma\right) \backslash \mathcal{T}$;
- $o^{\prime}=s^{\prime}$ if $o=\emptyset$; and $o^{\prime}=\left(\operatorname{Post}_{a,-}(o) \cap \gamma \cap u\right) \backslash \mathcal{T}$ if $o \neq \emptyset$.

Note that for every reachable state $(s, o)$ in $H$, there exists a unique observation $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_{1}$ such that $s \subseteq \gamma$ (which we denote by obs ${ }_{1}(s)$ ).

We show the following property of this construction. Player 1 has a pure observation-based almost-sure winning strategy in $G$ for the objective $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$ if and only if player 1 has a sure winning strategy in $H$ for the objective $\operatorname{Büchi}(\alpha)$.

Mapping of plays. Given a play prefix $\rho_{H}=\left(s_{0}, o_{0}\right)\left(s_{1}, o_{1}\right) \ldots\left(s_{k}, o_{k}\right)$ in $H$ with associated actions for player 1 of the form $\left(a_{i}, \cdot\right)$ in step $i(0 \leq i<k)$, and a play prefix $\rho_{G}=q_{0} q_{1} \ldots q_{k}$ in $G$ with associated actions $a_{i}^{\prime}(0 \leq i<k)$ for player 1, we say that $\rho_{G}$ is matching $\rho_{H}$ if $a_{i}=a_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $0 \leq i<k$, and $q_{i} \in \operatorname{obs}_{1}\left(s_{i}\right)$ for all $0 \leq i \leq k$.

By induction on the length of $\rho_{H}$, we show that $(i)$ for each $q_{k} \in s_{k}$ there exists a matching play $\rho_{G}$ (which visits no $\mathcal{T}$-state) such that $\operatorname{Last}\left(\rho_{G}\right)=q_{k}$, and (ii) for all play prefixes $\rho_{G}$ matching $\rho_{H}$, if $\rho_{G}$ does not visit any $\mathcal{T}$-state, then $\operatorname{Last}\left(\rho_{G}\right) \in s_{k}$.

For $\left|\rho_{H}\right|=0$ (i.e., $\rho_{H}=\left(s_{0}, o_{0}\right)$ where $\left.\left(s_{0}, o_{0}\right)=\ell_{0}\right)$ it is easy to see that $\rho_{G}=q_{0}$ is a matching play with $q_{0} \notin \mathcal{T}$ if and only if $s_{0}=o_{0}=\left\{q_{0}\right\}$. For the induction step, assume that we have constructed matching plays for all play prefixes of length $k-1$, and let $\rho_{H}=\left(s_{0}, o_{0}\right)\left(s_{1}, o_{1}\right) \ldots\left(s_{k}, o_{k}\right)$ be a play prefix of length $k$ in $H$ with associated actions of the form $\left(a_{i}, \cdot\right)$ in step $i(0 \leq i<k)$. To prove $(i)$, pick $q_{k} \in s_{k}$. By definition of $\delta_{H}$, we have $q_{k} \in \operatorname{Post}_{a_{k-1},-}\left(s_{k-1}\right)$, hence there exists $b \in A_{2}$ and $q_{k-1} \in s_{k-1}$ such that $q_{k} \in \operatorname{Supp}\left(\delta\left(q_{k-1}, a_{k-1}, b\right)\right)$. By induction hypothesis, there exists a play prefix $\rho_{G}$ in $G$ matching $\left(s_{0}, o_{0}\right) \ldots\left(s_{k-1}, o_{k-1}\right)$ and with $\operatorname{Last}\left(\rho_{G}\right)=q_{k-1}$, which we can extend to $\rho_{G} \cdot q_{k}$ to obtain a play prefix matching $\rho_{H}$. To prove (ii), it is easy to see that every play prefix matching $\rho_{H}$ is an extension of play prefix matching $\left(s_{0}, o_{0}\right) \ldots\left(s_{k-1}, o_{k-1}\right)$ with a non $\mathcal{T}$-state $q_{k}$ in $\gamma_{k}=$ obs $_{1}\left(s_{k}\right)$ and in $\operatorname{Post}_{a_{k-1},-}\left(s_{k-1}\right)$, therefore $q_{k} \in\left(\operatorname{Post}_{a_{k-1},-}\left(s_{k-1}\right) \cap \gamma_{k}\right) \backslash \mathcal{T}=s_{k}$.

Mapping of strategies, from $G$ to $H$ (ranking argument). First, assume that player 1 has a pure observation-based almost-sure winning strategy $\sigma$ in $G$ for
the objective $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$. We construct an infinite-state $\operatorname{MDP} G_{\sigma}=\left\langle Q^{+}, \rho_{0}, \delta_{\sigma}\right\rangle$ where:

- $Q^{+}$is the set of nonempty finite sequences of states;
$-\rho_{0}=q_{0} \in Q$;
$-\delta_{\sigma}: Q^{+} \times A_{2} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}\left(Q^{+}\right)$is defined as follows: for each $\rho \in Q^{+}$and $b \in A_{2}$, if $\operatorname{Last}(\rho) \notin \mathcal{T}$ then $\delta_{\sigma}(\rho, b)$ assigns probability $\delta(\operatorname{Last}(\rho), \sigma(\rho), b)\left(q^{\prime}\right)$ to each $\rho^{\prime}=\rho q^{\prime} \in Q^{+}$, and probability 0 to all other $\rho^{\prime} \in Q^{+}$; if $\operatorname{Last}(\rho) \in \mathcal{T}$, then $\rho$ is an absorbing state;

We define a ranking of the reachable states of $G_{\sigma}$. Assign rank 0 to all $\rho \in Q^{+}$ such that $\operatorname{Last}(\rho) \in \mathcal{T}$. For $i=1,2, \ldots$ assign rank $i$ to all non-ranked $\rho$ such that for all player 2 actions $b \in A_{2}$, there exists $\rho^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Supp}\left(\delta_{\sigma}(\rho, b)\right)$ with a rank (and thus with a rank smaller than $i$ ). We claim that all reachable states of $G_{\sigma}$ get a rank. By contradiction, assume that a reachable state $\hat{\rho}=q_{0} q_{1} \ldots q_{k}$ is not ranked (note that $q_{i} \notin \mathcal{T}$ for each $0 \leq i \leq k$ ). Fix a strategy $\pi$ for player 2 as follows. Since $\hat{\rho}$ is reachable in $G_{\sigma}$, there exist actions $b_{0}, \ldots, b_{k-1}$ such that $q_{i+1} \in \operatorname{Supp}\left(\delta_{\sigma}\left(q_{0} \ldots q_{i}, b_{i}\right)\right)$ for all $0 \leq i<k$. Then, define $\pi\left(q_{0} \ldots q_{i}\right)=b_{i}$. This ensures that $\operatorname{Last}(\hat{\rho})$ is reached with positive probability in $G$ under strategies $\sigma$ and $\pi$. From $\hat{\rho}$, the strategy $\pi$ continues playing as follows. If the current state $\rho$ is not ranked (which is the case of $\hat{\rho}$ ), then choose an action $b$ such that all states in $\operatorname{Supp}\left(\delta_{\sigma}(\rho, b)\right)$ are not ranked. The fact that $\rho$ is not ranked ensures that such an action $b$ exists. Now, under $\sigma$ and $\pi$ all paths from Last $(\hat{\rho})$ in $G$ avoid $\mathcal{T}$-sates. Hence the set $\mathcal{T}$ is not reached almost-surely, in contradiction with the fact that $\sigma$ is almost-sure winning. Hence all states in $G_{\sigma}$ get a rank. We denote by $\operatorname{Rank}(\rho)$ the rank of a reachable state $\rho$ in $G_{\sigma}$.

From the strategy $\sigma$ and the ranking in $G_{\sigma}$, we construct a strategy $\sigma^{\prime}$ in the game $H$ as follows. Given a play $\rho_{H}=\left(s_{0}, o_{0}\right)\left(s_{1}, o_{1}\right) \ldots\left(s_{k}, o_{k}\right)$ in $H$ (with $s_{k} \neq$ $\emptyset)$, define $\sigma^{\prime}\left(\rho_{H}\right)=(a, u)$ where $a=\sigma\left(\rho_{G}\right)$ for a play prefix $\rho_{G}$ matching $\rho_{H}$ and $u=\left\{q \in \operatorname{Supp}\left(\delta\left(\operatorname{Last}\left(\rho_{G}\right), a, b\right)\right) \mid b \in A_{2}, \rho_{G}\right.$ is matching $\rho_{H}$ with $\operatorname{Last}\left(\rho_{G}\right) \in$ $o_{k}$ and $\left.\operatorname{Rank}\left(\rho_{G} \cdot q\right)<\operatorname{Rank}\left(\rho_{G}\right)\right\}$ is a witness set which selects successor states of $o_{k}$ with decreased rank along each branch of the MDP $G_{\sigma}$.

Note that all matching play prefixes $\rho_{G}$ have the same observation sequence. Therefore, the action $a=\sigma\left(\rho_{G}\right)$ is unique and well-defined since $\sigma$ is an observation-based strategy. Note also that the pair $(a, u)$ is an allowed choice for player 1 by definition of the ranking, and that for each $q \in o_{k}$, all matching play prefixes $\rho_{G}$ with $\operatorname{Last}\left(\rho_{G}\right)=q$ have the same rank in $G_{\sigma}$. Therefore we abuse notation and write $\operatorname{Rank}(q)$ for $\operatorname{Rank}\left(\rho_{G}\right)$, assuming that the set $o_{k}$ to which $q$ belongs is clear from the context. Let $\operatorname{MaxRank}\left(o_{k}\right)=\max _{q \in o_{k}} \operatorname{Rank}(q)$. If $o_{k} \neq \emptyset$, then $\operatorname{MaxRank}\left(o_{k+1}\right)<\operatorname{MaxRank}\left(o_{k}\right)$ since $o_{k+1} \subseteq u$ (by definition of $\left.\delta_{H}\right)$.

Correctness of the mapping. We show that $\sigma^{\prime}$ is sure winning for $\operatorname{Büchi}(\alpha)$ in $H$. Fix an arbitrary strategy $\pi^{\prime}$ for player 2 in $H$ and consider an arbitrary play $\rho_{H}=\left(s_{0}, o_{0}\right)\left(s_{1}, o_{1}\right) \ldots$ compatible with $\sigma^{\prime}$ and $\pi^{\prime}$. By the properties of the witness set played by $\sigma^{\prime}$, for each pair $\left(s_{i}, o_{i}\right)$ with $o_{i} \neq \emptyset$, an $\alpha$-pair $(\cdot, \emptyset)$ is
reached within at most $\operatorname{MaxRank}\left(o_{i}\right)$ steps. And by the properties of the mapping of plays and strategies, if $o_{i}=\emptyset$ then $o_{i+1}=s_{i+1}$ contains only states from which $\sigma$ is almost-sure winning for $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$ in $G$ and therefore have a finite rank, showing that MaxRank $\left(o_{i+1}\right)$ is defined and finite. This shows that an $\alpha$-pair is visited infinitely often in $\rho_{H}$ and $\sigma^{\prime}$ is sure winning for $\operatorname{Büchi}(\alpha)$.

Mapping of strategies, from $H$ to $G$. Given a strategy $\sigma^{\prime}$ in $H$, we construct a pure observation-based strategy $\sigma$ in $G$.

We define $\sigma\left(\rho_{G}\right)$ by induction on the length of $\rho_{G}$. In fact, we need to define $\sigma\left(\rho_{G}\right)$ only for play prefixes $\rho_{G}$ which are compatible with the choices of $\sigma$ for play prefixes of length smaller than $\left|\rho_{G}\right|$ (the choice of $\sigma$ for other play prefixes can be fixed arbitrarily). For all such $\rho_{G}$, our construction is such that there exists a play prefix $\rho_{H}=\theta\left(\rho_{G}\right)$ compatible with $\sigma^{\prime}$ such that $\rho_{G}$ is matching $\rho_{H}$, and if $\sigma\left(\rho_{G}\right)=a$ and $\sigma^{\prime}\left(\rho_{H}\right)=\left(a^{\prime}, \cdot\right)$, then $a=a^{\prime}(\star)$.

We define $\sigma$ and $\theta(\cdot)$ as follows. For $\left|\rho_{G}\right|=0$ (i.e., $\rho_{G}=q_{0}$ ), let $\rho_{H}=\theta\left(\rho_{G}\right)=$ $\left(s_{0}, o_{0}\right)$ where $s_{0}=o_{0}=\left\{q_{0}\right\}$ if $q_{0} \notin \mathcal{T}$, and $s_{0}=o_{0}=\emptyset$ if $q_{0} \in \mathcal{T}$, and let $\sigma\left(\rho_{G}\right)=a$ if $\sigma^{\prime}\left(\rho_{H}\right)=(a, \cdot)$. Note that property $(\star)$ holds. For the induction step, let $k \geq 1$ and assume that from every play prefix $\rho_{G}$ of length smaller than $k$, we have defined $\sigma\left(\rho_{G}\right)$ and $\theta\left(\rho_{G}\right)$ satisfying $(\star)$. Let $\rho_{G}=q_{0} q_{1} \ldots q_{k}$ be a play prefix in $G$ of length $k$. Let $\rho_{H}=\theta\left(q_{0} q_{1} \ldots q_{k-1}\right)$ and $\gamma_{k}=\operatorname{obs}_{1}\left(q_{k}\right)$, and let $\left(s_{k}, o_{k}\right)$ be the (unique) successor state in the Dirac distribution $\delta_{H}\left(\operatorname{Last}\left(\rho_{H}\right), \sigma^{\prime}\left(\rho_{H}\right), \gamma_{k}\right)$. Note that $q_{k} \in s_{k}$. Define $\theta\left(\rho_{G}\right)=\rho_{H} \cdot\left(s_{k}, o_{k}\right)$ and $\sigma\left(\rho_{G}\right)=a$ if $\sigma^{\prime}\left(\rho_{H} \cdot\left(s_{k}, o_{k}\right)\right)=$ $(a, \cdot)$. Therefore, the property $(\star)$ holds.

Note that the strategy $\sigma$ is observation-based because if $\operatorname{obs}_{1}\left(\rho_{G}\right)=\operatorname{obs}_{1}\left(\rho_{G}^{\prime}\right)$, then $\theta\left(\rho_{G}\right)=\theta\left(\rho_{G}^{\prime}\right)$.

Correctness of the mapping. If player 1 has a sure winning strategy $\sigma^{\prime}$ in $H$ for the objective $\operatorname{Büchi}(\alpha)$, then we can assume that $\sigma^{\prime}$ is memoryless (since in perfect-observation deterministic games with Büchi objectives memoryless strategies are sufficient for sure winning $[24,42]$ ), and we show that the strategy $\sigma$ defined above is almost-sure winning in $G$ for the objective $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$.

Since $\sigma^{\prime}$ is memoryless and sure winning for $\operatorname{Büchi}(\alpha)$, in every play compatible with $\sigma^{\prime}$ there are at most $n=|L| \leq 3^{|Q|}$ steps between two consecutive visits to an $\alpha$-state.

The properties of matching plays entail that if a play prefix $\rho_{G}$ compatible with $\sigma$ has no visit to $\mathcal{T}$-states, and $(s, o)=\operatorname{Last}\left(\theta\left(\rho_{G}\right)\right)$, then $\operatorname{Last}\left(\rho_{G}\right) \in s$. Moreover if $s=o$, then under strategy $\sigma$ for player 1 and arbitrary strategy $\pi$ for player 2 , there is a way to fix the probabilistic choices such that all plays extension of $\rho_{G}$ visit a $\mathcal{T}$-state. To see this, consider the probabilistic choices given at each step by the witness component $u$ of the action $(\cdot, u)$ played by $\sigma^{\prime}$. By the definition of the mapping of plays and of the transition function in $H$, it can be shown that if $\left(s_{i}, o_{i}\right)\left(s_{i+1}, o_{i+1}\right) \ldots\left(s_{k}, o_{k}\right)$ is a play fragment of $\theta\left(\rho_{G}\right)$ (hence compatible with $\sigma^{\prime}$ ) where $s_{i}=o_{i}$ and $o_{j} \neq \emptyset$ for all $i \leq j<k$, then the "owe" set $o_{k}$ is the set of all states that can be reached in $G$ from states $s_{i}$ along a path which is compatible with both the action played by the strategy $\sigma^{\prime}$ (and $\sigma$ ) and the probabilistic choices fixed by $\sigma^{\prime}$, and visits no $\mathcal{T}$-states. Since the "owe"
set gets empty within at most $n$ steps regardless of the strategy of player 2 , all paths compatible with the probabilistic choices must visit an $\mathcal{T}$-state. This shows that under any player 2 strategy, within $n$ steps, a $\mathcal{T}$-state is visited with probability at least $r^{n}$ where $r>0$ is the smallest non-zero probability occurring in $G$. Therefore, the probability of not having visited a $\mathcal{T}$-state after $z \cdot n$ steps is at most $\left(1-r^{n}\right)^{z}$ which vanishes for $z \rightarrow \infty$ since $r^{n}>0$. Hence, against arbitrary strategy of player 2 , the strategy $\sigma$ ensures the objective $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$ with probability 1.

Argument for positive reachability. The proof for positive reachability follows the same line as for almost-sure reachability, with the following differences. The construction of the game of perfect information $H$ is now interpreted as a reachability game with objective $\operatorname{Reach}(\alpha)$. The mapping of plays is the same as above. In the mapping of strategies from $G$ to $H$, we use the same ranking construction, but we only claim that the initial state gets a rank. The argument is that if the initial state would get no rank, then player 2 would have a strategy to ensure that all paths avoid the target states, in contradiction with the fact that player 1 has fixed a positive winning strategy. The rest of the proof is analogous to the case of almost-sure reachability.

It follows from the construction in the proof of Lemma 1 that pure strategies with exponential memory are sufficient for positive (as well as almost-sure) winning, and the exponential lower bound follows from the special case of nonstochastic games [8]. Lemma 1 also gives EXPTIME upper bound for the problem since perfect-observation Büchi games can be solved in polynomial time [42]. The EXPTIME-hardness follows from the sure winning problem for non-stochastic games [37], where pure almost-sure (positive) winning strategies coincide with sure winning strategies. We have the following theorem summarizing the results.

Theorem 1. Given one-sided partial-observation stochastic games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, the following assertions hold for reachability objectives for player 1:

1. (Memory complexity). Belief-based pure strategies are not sufficient both for positive and almost-sure winning; exponential memory is necessary and sufficient both for positive and almost-sure winning for pure strategies.
2. (Algorithm). The problems of deciding the existence of a pure almost-sure and a pure positive winning strategy can be solved in time exponential in the state space of the game and polynomial in the size of the action sets.
3. (Complexity). The problems of deciding the existence of a pure almost-sure and a pure positive winning strategy are EXPTIME-complete.

Symbolic algorithms. The exponential Büchi (or reachability) game constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 can be solved by computing classical fixpoint formulas [24]. However, it is not necessary to construct the exponential game structure explicitly. Instead, we can exploit the structure induced by the pre-order $\preceq$


Fig. 3. Remembering the belief of player 2 is necessary. A one-sided reachability game where player 1 (round states) has perfect observation, player 2 (square states) is blind. Player 1 has a pure almost-sure winning strategy that depends on the belief of player 2 (in $q_{2}$ ), but no pure memoryless strategy is almost-sure winning.
defined by $(s, o) \preceq\left(s^{\prime}, o^{\prime}\right)$ if $(i) s \subseteq s^{\prime},(i i) o \subseteq o^{\prime}$, and (iii) $o=\emptyset$ iff $o^{\prime}=\emptyset$. Intuitively, if a state $\left(s^{\prime}, o^{\prime}\right)$ is winning for player 1 , then all states $(s, o) \preceq\left(s^{\prime}, o^{\prime}\right)$ are also winning because they correspond to a better belief and a looser obligation. Hence all sets computed by the fixpoint algorithm are downward-closed and thus they can be represented symbolically by the antichain of their maximal elements (see [16] for details related to antichain algorithms). This technique provides a symbolic algorithm without explicitly constructing the exponential game.

## 4 One-sided Games: Player 1 Perfect and Player 2 Partial

Recall that we are interested in finding a pure winning strategy for player 1. Therefore, when we construct counter-strategies for player 2, we always assume that player 1 has already fixed a pure strategy. This is important for the way the belief of player 2 is updated. Although player 2 does not have perfect information about the actions played by player 1, the belief of player 2 can be updated according to the precise actions of player 1 because the response and the counterstrategy of player 2 is designed after player 1 has fixed a strategy.

### 4.1 Lower bound on memory

We present the following examples to illustrate two properties of the problem.
Example 2. Remembering the belief of player 2 is necessary. We present an example of a game where player 1 has perfect observation but needs to remember the belief of player 2 to ensure positive or almost-sure reachability. The


Fig. 4. A one-sided reachability game $L_{n}$ with reachability objective in which player 1 is has perfect observation and player 2 is blind. Player 1 needs exponential memory to win positive reachability.
game is shown in Fig. 3. The target is $\mathcal{T}=\left\{q_{\odot}\right\}$. Player 2 is blind. If player 2 chooses $a$ in the initial state $q_{0}$, then his belief will be $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$, and if he plays $b$, then his belief will be $\left\{q_{2}, q_{3}\right\}$. In $q_{2}$, the choice of player 1 depends on the belief of player 2. If the belief is $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$, then playing $a$ in $q_{2}$ is not a good choice because the belief of player 2 would be $\left\{q_{4}\right\}$ and player 2 could surely avoid $q_{\odot}$ by further playing $b$. For symmetrical reasons, if the belief of player 2 is $\left\{q_{2}, q_{3}\right\}$ in $q_{2}$, then playing $b$ is not a good choice for player 1 . Therefore, there is no positively winning memoryless strategy for player 1 . However, we show that there exists an almost-sure winning belief-based strategy for player 1 as follows: in $q_{2}$, play $b$ if the belief of player 2 is $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$, and play $a$ if the belief of player 2 is $\left\{q_{2}, q_{3}\right\}$. Note that player 1 has perfect observation and thus can observe the actions of player 2. This ensures the next belief of player 2 to be $\left\{q_{3}, q_{4}\right\}$ and therefore no matter the next action of player 2 , the state $q_{\odot}$ is reached with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Repeating this strategy ensures to reach $q_{\odot}$ with probability 1 .

Example 3. Memory of non-elementary size may be necessary for positive and almost-sure reachability. We show that player 1 may need memory of non-elementary size to win positively (as well as almost-surely) in a reachability game. We present a family of one-sided games $G_{n}$ where player 1 has perfect observation, and player 2 has partial observation both about the state of the game, and the actions played by player 1 . We explain the example step by step. The key idea of the example is that the winning strategy of player 1 in game $G_{n}$ will need to simulate a counter systems (with $n$ integer-valued counters) where the operations on counters are increment and division by 2 (with round down), and to reach strictly positive counter values.
Counters. First, we use a simple example to show that counters appear naturally in the analysis of the game under pure strategies.

Consider the family of games $\left(L_{n}\right)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ shown in Fig. 4, where the reachability objective is Reach $\left(\left\{q_{0}\right\}\right)$. In the first part, the states $L$ and $R$ are indistinguishable for player 2. Consider the strategy of player 1 that plays $b$ in $L$ and $R$. Then,


Fig. 5. A family $\left(C_{n}\right)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of counter systems with $n$ counters and $n+1$ states where the shortest execution to reach $\left(q_{0}, k_{1}, \ldots, k_{n}\right)$ with positive counters (i.e., $k_{i}>0$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n)$ from $\left(q_{n}, 0, \ldots, 0\right)$ is of non-elementary length. The numbers above the self-loops show the number of times each self-loop is taken along the shortest execution.
the state $q_{n}$ is reached by two play prefixes $\rho_{u p}=q_{I} L q_{n}$ and $\rho_{d w}=q_{I} R q_{n}$ that player 2 cannot distinguish. Therefore, player 2 has to play the same action in both play prefixes, while perfectly-informed player 1 can play different actions. In particular, if player 1 plays $a$ in $\rho_{u p}$ and $b$ in $\rho_{d w}$, then no matter the action chosen by player 2 the state $q_{n-1}$ is reached with positive probability. However, because only one play prefix reaches $q_{n-1}$, this strategy of player 1 cannot ensure to reach $q_{n-2}$ with positive probability.

Player 1 can ensure to reach $q_{n-2}$ (and $q_{0}$ ) with positive probability with the following exponential-memory strategy. For the first $n-1$ visits to either $L$ or $R$, play $b$, and on the $n$th visit, play $a$. This strategy produces $2^{n}$ different play prefixes from $q_{I}$ to $q_{n}$, each with probability $\frac{1}{2^{n}}$. Considering the mapping $L \mapsto a, R \mapsto b$, each such play prefix $\rho$ is mapped to a sequence $w_{\rho}$ of length $n$ over $\{a, b\}$ (for example, the play prefix $q_{I} L q_{I} R q_{I} L q_{n}$ is mapped to $a b a$ ). The strategy of player 1 is to play the sequence $w_{\rho}$ in the next $n$ steps after $\rho$. This strategy ensures that for all $0 \leq i \leq n$, there are $2^{i}$ play prefixes which reach $q_{i}$ with positive probability, all being indistinguishable for player 2 . The argument is an induction on $i$. The claim is true for $i=n$, and if it holds for $i=k$, then no matter the action chosen by player 2 in $q_{k}$, the state $q_{k-1}$ is reached with positive probability by half of the $2^{k}$ play prefixes, i.e. $2^{k-1}$ play prefixes. This establishes the claim. As a consequence, one play prefix reaches $q_{0}$ with positive probability. This strategy requires exponential memory, and an inductive argument shows that this memory is necessary because player 1 needs to have at least 2 play prefixes that are indistinguishable for player 2 in state $q_{1}$, and at least $2^{i}$ play prefixes in $q_{i}$ for all $0 \leq i \leq n$.

Non-elementary counters. Now, we present a family $C_{n}$ of counter systems where the shortest execution is of non-elementary length (specifically, the shortest length is greater than a tower $2^{2 .^{2}}$ of exponentials of height $n$ ). The counter system $C_{4}$ (for $n=4$ ) is shown in Fig. 5. The operations on counters can be increment $(+1)$, division by $2(\div 2)$, and idle $(\cdot)$. In general, $C_{n}$ has $n$ counters


Fig. 6. Gadgets to simulate idle, increment, and division by 2.
$c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n}$ and $n+1$ states $q_{0}, \ldots, q_{n}$. In state $q_{i}$ of $C_{n}(0 \leq i \leq n)$, the counter $c_{i}$ can be incremented and at the same time all the counters $c_{j}$ for $j>i$ are divided by 2 . From $q_{n}$, to reach $q_{0}$ with strictly positive counters (i.e., all counters have value at least 1), we show that it is necessary to execute the self-loop on state $q_{n}$ a non-elementary number of times. In Fig. 5 , the numbers above the self-loops show the number of times they need to be executed. When leaving $q_{1}$, the counters need to have value at least 2 in order to survive the transition to $q_{0}$ which divides all counters by 2 . Since the first counter can be incremented only in state $q_{1}$, the self-loop in $q_{1}$ has to be executed 2 times. Hence, when leaving $q_{2}$, the other counters need to have value at least $2 \cdot 2^{2}=2^{3}$ in order to survive the self-loops in $q_{1}$. Therefore, the self-loop in $q_{2}$ is executed $2^{3}$ times. And so on. In general, if the self-loop on state $q_{i}$ is executed $k$ times (in order to get $\left.c_{i}=k\right)$, then the counters $c_{i+1}, \ldots, c_{n}$ need to have value $k \cdot 2^{k}$ when entering $q_{i}$ (in order to guarantee a value at least $k$ of these counters). In $q_{n}$, the last counter $c_{n}$ needs to have value $f^{n}(1)$ where $f^{n}$ is the $n$th iterate of the function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}: x \mapsto x \cdot 2^{x}$. This value is greater than a tower of exponentials of height $n$.

Gadgets for increment and division. In Fig. 6, we show the gadgets that are used to simulate operations on counters. The gadgets are game graphs where the player- 1 actions $a, b$ are indistinguishable for player 2 (but player 2 can observe and distinguish the action \#). The actions $a, b$ are used by player 1 to simulate
the operations on the counters. The \# is used to simulate the transitions from state $q_{i}$ to $q_{i-1}$ of the counter system of Fig. 5. All states of the gadgets have the same observation for player 2. Recall that player 1 has perfect observation.

The idle gadget is straightforward. The actions $a, b$ have no effect. In the other gadgets, the value of the counters is represented by the number of paths that are indistinguishable for player 2 , and that end up in the entry state of the gadget (for the value of the counter before the operation) or in the exit state (for the value of the counter after the operation).

Consider the division gadget $\operatorname{div}_{2}$. If player 2 plays an action that matches the choice of player 1, then the game leaves the gadget and the transition will go to the initial state of the game we construct (which is shown on Fig. 8). Otherwise, the action of player 2 does not match the action of player 1 and the play reaches the exit state of the gadget. Let $k$ be the number of indistinguishable ${ }^{3}$ paths in the entry state of the gadget. By playing $a$ after $k_{1}$ such paths and $b$ after $k_{2}$ paths (where $k_{1}+k_{2}=k$ ), player 1 ensures that $\min \left\{k_{1}, k_{2}\right\}$ indistinguishable paths reach the exit state of the gadget (because in the worst case, player 2 can choose his action to match the action of player 1 over $\max \left\{k_{1}, k_{2}\right\}$ paths). Hence, player 1 can ensure that $\left\lfloor\frac{k}{2}\right\rfloor$ indistinguishable paths get to the exit state. In the game of Fig. 8, the entry and exit state of division gadgets are merged. The argument still holds.

Consider the increment gadget inc on Fig. 6. We use this gadget with the assumption that the entry state is not reached by more than one indistinguishable path. This will be the case in the game of Fig. 8. Player 1 can achieve $k$ indistinguishable paths in the exit state as follows. In state $q_{a b}$, play action $a$ if the last visited state is $q_{L}$, and play action $b$ if the last visited state is $q_{R}$. No matter the choice of player 1 , one path will reach the exit state, and the other path will get to the entry state. Repeating this scenario $k$ times gives $k$ paths in the exit state. We show that there is essentially no faster way to obtain $k$ paths in the exit state. Indeed, if player 1 chooses the same action (say $a$ ) after the two paths ending up in $q_{a b}$, then against the action $b$ from player 2 , two paths reach the exit state, and no state get to the entry state. Then, player 1 can no longer increment the number of paths. Therefore, to get $k$ paths in the exit state, the fastest way is to increment one by one up to $k-2$, and then get 2 more paths as a last step. Note that it is not of the interest of player 2 to match the action of player 1 if player 1 plays the same action, because this would double the number of paths.

Structure of the game. The game $G_{n}$ which requires memory of non-elementary size is sketched in Fig. 8 for $n=3$. Its abstract structure is shown in Fig. 7, corresponding to the structure of the counter system in Fig. 5. The alphabet of player 1 is $\{a, b, \#\}$. For the sake of clarity, some transitions are not depicted in Fig. 8. It is assumed that for player 1, playing an action from a state where this action has no transition depicted leads to the initial state of the game. For

[^0]

Fig. 7. Abstract view of the game in Fig. 8 as a 3-counter system.
example, playing \# in state $q_{4}$ goes to the initial state, and from the target state $q_{\odot}$, all transitions go to the initial state.

Fig. 8 shows the initial state $q_{I}$ of the game from which a uniform probabilistic transition branches to the three states $q_{7}, r_{7}, s_{7}$. The idea of this game is that player 1 needs to ensure that the states $q_{1}, r_{1}, s_{1}$ are reached with positive probability, so as to ensure that no matter the action ( $a, b$, or $c$ ) chosen by player 2 , the state $q_{\odot}$ is reached with positive probability. From $q_{1}, r_{1}, s_{1}$, the other actions of player 2 (i.e., $b$ and $c$ from $q_{1}, a$ and $c$ from $r_{1}$, etc.) lead to the initial state. Player 2 can observe the initial state. All the other states are indistinguishable.

Intuitively, each "line" of states ( $q$ 's, $r$ 's, and $s$ 's) simulate one counter. Synchronization of the operations on the three counters is ensured by the special (and visible to player 2) symbol \#. Intuitively, since \# is visible to player 2, player 1 must play \# at the same "time" in the three lines of states (i.e., after the same number of steps in each line). Otherwise, player 2 may eliminate one line of states from his belief. For example, if player 1 plays \# in the first step in lines $q$ and $r$, but not in line $s$, then player 2 observing $\#$ can safely update his belief to $\{q ., r$.$\} , and thus avoid to play c$ when one of the states $q_{1}$, $r_{1}$ is reached. In Fig. 8, the dotted lines and the subscripts on \# emphasize the layered structure of the game, corresponding to the structure of Fig. 7.

From all the above, it follows that player 1 needs memory of size nonelementary in order to ensure indistinguishable paths ending up in each of the states $q_{1}, r_{1}, s_{1}$, and win with positive probability. Since all other paths are going
back to the initial state, this strategy can be repeated over and over again to achieve almost-sure reachability as well.

Theorem 2. In one-sided partial-observation stochastic games with player 1 perfect and player 2 partial, both pure almost-sure and pure positive winning strategies for reachability objectives for player 1 require memory of nonelementary size in general.

### 4.2 Upper bound for positive reachability with almost-sure safety

We present the solution of one-sided games with a conjunction of positive reachability and almost-sure safety objectives, in which player 1 has perfect observation and player 2 has partial observation. This will be useful in Section 4.3 to solve almost-sure reachability, and using a trivial safety objective (safety for the whole state space) it also gives the solution for positive reachability.

Let $G=\left\langle Q, q_{0}, \delta_{G}\right\rangle$ be a game over alphabets $A_{1}, A_{2}$ and observation set $\mathcal{O}_{2}$ for player 2 , with reachability objective $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}$ ) (where $\mathcal{T} \subseteq Q$ ) and safety objective $\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)$ (where $Q_{G} \subseteq Q$ represents a set of good states) for player 1 . We assume that the states in $\mathcal{T}$ are absorbing and that $\mathcal{T} \subseteq Q_{G}$. This assumption is satisfied by the games we consider in Section 4.3, as well as by the case of a trivial safety objective $\left(Q_{G}=Q\right)$. The goal of player 1 is to ensure positive probability to reach $\mathcal{T}$ and almost-sure safety for the set $Q_{G}$.

Before presenting the algorithm for solving these games in pure strategies, we consider the case of randomized strategies. After, we use the results of randomized strategies to solve the case of pure strategies.

Step 1 - Winning with randomized strategies. First, we show that with randomized strategies, memoryless strategies are sufficient. It suffices to play uniformly at random the set of safe actions. In a state $q$, an action $a \in A_{1}$ is safe if $\operatorname{Post}_{G}(q, a, b) \subseteq \mathrm{Win}_{\text {safe }}$ for all $b \in A_{2}$, where $\mathrm{Win}_{\text {safe }}$ is the set of states that are sure winning ${ }^{4}$ for player 1 in $G$ for the safety objective $\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)$. This strategy ensures that the set $Q \backslash Q_{G}$ of bad states is never reached, and from the positive winning region of player 1 for $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$ it ensures that the set $\mathcal{T}$ is reached with positive probability. Therefore, computing the set $Z$ of states that are winning for player 1 in randomized strategies can be done by fixing the uniformly randomized safe strategy for player 1, and checking that player 2 does not almost-surely win the safety objective $\operatorname{Safe}(Q \backslash \mathcal{T})$, which requires the analysis of a POMDP for almost-sure safety and can be done in exponential time using a simple subset construction [15, Theorem 2].

Note that $\mathcal{T} \subseteq Z$ and that from all states in $Z$, player 1 can ensure that $\mathcal{T}$ is reached with positive probability within at most $2^{|Q|}$ steps, while from any state $q \notin Z$, player 1 cannot win positively with a randomized strategy, and therefore also not with a pure strategy.

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Fig. 8. Memory of non-elementary size may be necessary for positive and almost-sure reachability. A family of one-sided reachability games in which player 1 is has perfect observation. Player 1 needs memory of non-elementary size to win positive reachability (as well as almost-sure reachability).

Step 2 - Pure strategies to simulate randomized strategies. Second, we show that pure strategies can in some cases simulate the behavior of randomized strategies. As we have seen in the gadget inc of Fig. 6, if there are two play prefixes ending up in the same state and that are indistinguishable for player 2 (e.g., $q_{0} L q_{a b}$ and $q_{0} R q_{a b}$ in the example), then player 1 can simulate a random choice of action over support $\{a, b\}$ by playing $a$ after $q_{0} L q_{a b}$, and playing $b$ after $q_{0} R q_{a b}$. No matter the choice of player 2 , one of the plays will reach $q_{0}$ and the other will reach the exit state of the gadget. Intuitively, this corresponds to a uniform probabilistic choice of the actions $a$ and $b$ : the state $q_{0}$ and the exit state are reached with probability $\frac{1}{2}$.

In general, if there are $\left|A_{1}\right|$ indistinguishable play prefixes ending up in the same state $q$, then player 1 can simulate a random choice of actions over $A_{1}$ from $q$. However, the number of indistinguishable play prefixes in a successor state $q^{\prime}$ may have decreased by a factor $\left|A_{1}\right|$ (there may be just one play reaching $q^{\prime}$ ). Hence, in order to simulate a randomized strategy during $k$ steps, player 1 needs to have $\left|A_{1}\right|^{k}$ indistinguishable play prefixes. Since $2^{|Q|}$ steps are sufficient for a randomized strategy to achieve the reachability objective, an upper bound on the number of play prefixes that are needed to simulate a randomized strategy using a pure strategy is Num $=\left|A_{1}\right|^{2^{|Q|}}$. More precisely, if the belief of player 2 is $B \subseteq Z$ and in each state $q \in B$ there are at least Num indistinguishable play prefixes, then player 1 wins with a pure strategy that essentially simulates a winning randomized strategy (which exists since $q \in Z$ ) for $2^{n}$ steps.

Step 3 - Counting abstraction for pure strategies. We present a construction of a game of perfect observation $H$ such that player 1 wins in $H$ if and only if player 1 wins in $G$. The objective in $H$ is a conjunction of positive reachability and almost-sure safety objectives, for which pure memoryless winning strategies exist: for every state we restrict the set of actions to safe actions, and then we solve positive reachability on a perfect-observation game. The result follows since for perfect-observation games pure memoryless positive winning strategies exist for reachability objectives [17].

State space. The idea of this construction is to keep track of the belief set $B \subseteq Q$ of player 2 , and for each state $q \in B$, of the number of indistinguishable play prefixes that end up in $q$. For $k \in \mathbb{N}$, we denote by $[k]$ the set $\{0,1, \ldots, k\}$. A state of $H$ is a counting function $f: Q \rightarrow\left[\mathrm{~K}_{*}\right] \cup\{\omega\}$ where $\mathrm{K}_{*} \in \mathbb{N}$ is of order .$\left|A_{1}\right|^{2^{O(n)}}$
$\left|A_{1}\right|^{\left|A_{1}\right|} \quad$ where the number of nested exponentials is in $O(n)$ (where $n=|Q|)$.

As we have seen in the example of Fig. 8, it may be necessary to keep track of a non-elementary number of play prefixes. We show that the bound $\mathrm{K}_{*}$ is sufficient, and that we can substitute larger numbers by the special symbol $\omega$ to obtain a finite counting abstraction. The belief associated with a counting function $f$ is the set $\operatorname{Supp}(f)=\{q \in Q \mid f(q) \neq 0\}$, and the states $q$ such that $f(q)=\omega$ are called $\omega$-states.

Action alphabet. In $H$, an action of player 1 is a function $\hat{a}: Q \times\left[\mathrm{K}_{*}\right] \rightarrow A_{1}$ that assigns to each copy of a state in the current belief (of player 2), the action played by player 1 after the corresponding play prefix in $G$. We denote by $\operatorname{Supp}(\hat{a}(q, \cdot))=$ $\left\{\hat{a}(q, i) \mid i \in\left[\mathrm{~K}_{*}\right]\right\}$ the set of actions played by $\hat{a}$ in $q \in Q$.

The action set of player 2 in the game $H$ is the same as in $G$.

Transitions. Let $\mathbf{1}(a, A)$ be 1 if $a \in A$, and 0 if $a \notin A$. We denote this function by $\mathbf{1}(a \in A)$. Given $f$ and $\hat{a}$ as above, given an action $b \in A_{2}$ and an observation $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_{2}$, let $f^{\prime}=\operatorname{Succ}(f, \hat{a}, b, \gamma)$ be the function such that $f^{\prime}\left(q^{\prime}\right)=0$ for all $q^{\prime} \notin \gamma$, and such that for all $q^{\prime} \in \gamma$ :

$$
f^{\prime}\left(q^{\prime}\right)= \begin{cases}\omega & \text { if } \exists a \in \operatorname{Supp}(\hat{a}(q, \cdot)) \cdot \exists q \in Q: f(q)=\omega \wedge q^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}_{G}(q, a, b) \\ x & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

where $x=\sum_{q \in \operatorname{Supp}(f)} \sum_{i=0}^{f(q)-1} \mathbf{1}\left(q^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}_{G}(q, \hat{a}(q, i), b)\right)$.
Note that if the current state $q$ is an $\omega$-state, then only the support $\operatorname{Supp}(\hat{a}(q, \cdot))$ of the function $\hat{a}$ matters.

Now $f^{\prime}=\operatorname{Succ}(f, \hat{a}, b, \gamma)$ may not be a counting function because it may assign values greater than $\mathrm{K}_{*}$ to some states. We show that beyond certain bounds, it is not necessary to remember the exact value of the counters and we can replace such large values by $\omega$. Intuitively, the $\omega$ value can be interpreted as "very large and definitely positive value". This abstraction needs to be done carefully in order to obtain the desired upper bound (namely, $\mathrm{K}_{*}$ ). When a counter $f(q)$ has value $\omega$, the successors of $q$ have value $\omega$ according to Succ $(\cdot)$, which is faithful if the exact value of the counter $f(q)$ is large enough. In fact, large enough means that the counter has value at least $\left|A_{1}\right|$ as this allows player 1 to play each action at least once. Hence the abstraction remains faithful during K steps if the counters with value greater than $\left|A_{1}\right|^{\mathrm{K}}$ are set to $\omega$. We know that if all counters have value greater than $\mathrm{K}_{1}=\left|A_{1}\right|^{2^{n}}$, then player 1 wins by simulating a randomized strategy. Therefore, when all counters but one have already value $\omega$, we set the last counter to $\omega$ if it has value greater than $\mathrm{K}_{1}$. Since this can take at most $\mathrm{K}_{1}$ steps, the other counters with value $\omega$ need to have value at least $\mathrm{K}_{2}=\mathrm{K}_{1} \cdot\left|A_{1}\right|^{\mathrm{K}_{1}}$.

Therefore, when all counters but two have already value $\omega$, whenever a counter gets value greater than $\mathrm{K}_{2}$ we set it to $\omega$. This can take at most $\left(\mathrm{K}_{2}\right)^{2}$ steps and the other counters with value $\omega$ need to have value at least $\mathrm{K}_{3}=\mathrm{K}_{2} \cdot\left|A_{1}\right|^{\left(\mathrm{K}_{2}\right)^{2}}$. In general, when all counters but $k$ have value $\omega$, we set a counter to $\omega$ if it has value at least $\mathrm{K}_{k+1}=\mathrm{K}_{k} \cdot\left|A_{1}\right|^{\left(\mathrm{K}_{k}\right)^{k}}$. It can be shown by induction that $\mathrm{K}_{k}$ is of order $\left|A_{1}\right|^{\left|A_{1}\right|^{.\left|A_{1}\right|^{2^{O(n)}}}}$ where the tower of exponential is of height $k$, and thus we do not need to store counter values greater than $\mathrm{K}_{*}$. We define the abstraction mapping $f^{\prime}=\operatorname{Abs}(f)$ for $f: Q \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ as follows:

Let $k=|\{q \mid f(q)=\omega\}|$ be the number of counters with value $\omega$ in $f$. If there is a state $\hat{q}$ with finite value $f(\hat{q})$ greater than $\mathrm{K}_{n-k}$,
then $f^{\prime}(\hat{q})=\omega$ and $f^{\prime}$ agrees with $f$ on all states except $\hat{q}$ (i.e., $f^{\prime}(q)=f(q)$ for all $\left.q \neq \hat{q}\right)$. Otherwise, $f^{\prime}=f$.

Actually, we define $\operatorname{Abs}(f)$ as the $n$th iterate of the above procedure. Given $f, \hat{a}$, and $b$, let $\delta_{H}(f, \hat{a}, b)$ be the uniform distribution over the set of counting functions $f^{\prime}$ such that there exists an observation $\gamma \in \mathcal{O}_{2}$ such that $f^{\prime}=\operatorname{Abs}(\operatorname{Succ}(f, \hat{a}, b, \gamma))$ and $\operatorname{Supp}\left(f^{\prime}\right) \neq \emptyset$.

Note that the operators $\operatorname{Succ}(\cdot)$ and $\operatorname{Abs}(\cdot)$ are monotone, that is $f \leq f^{\prime}$ implies $\operatorname{Abs}(f) \leq \operatorname{Abs}\left(f^{\prime}\right)$ as well as $\operatorname{Succ}(f, \hat{a}, b, \gamma) \leq \operatorname{Succ}\left(f^{\prime}, \hat{a}, b, \gamma\right)$ for all $\hat{a}, b, \gamma$ (where $\leq$ is the componentwise order).

Objective. Given $\mathcal{T} \subseteq Q$ and $Q_{G} \subseteq Q$ defining the reachability and safety objectives in $G$, the objective in the game $H$ is a conjunction of positive reachability and almost-sure safety objectives, defined by $\operatorname{Reach}\left(\mathcal{T}_{H}\right)$ where ${ }^{5}$ $\mathcal{T}_{H}=\{f \mid \operatorname{Supp}(f) \subseteq Z \wedge \forall q \in \operatorname{Supp}(f): f(q)=\omega\} \cup\{f \mid \operatorname{Supp}(f) \cap \mathcal{T} \neq \emptyset\}$ and by $\operatorname{Safe}\left(\operatorname{Good}_{H}\right)$ where $\operatorname{Good}_{H}=\left\{f \mid \operatorname{Supp}(f) \subseteq Q_{G}\right\}$.

Step 4 - Correctness argument. First, assume that there exists a pure winning strategy $\sigma$ for player 1 in $G$, and we show how to construct a winning strategy $\sigma^{H}$ in $H$. As we play the game in $G$ using $\sigma$, we keep track of the exact number of indistinguishable play prefixes ending up in each state. This allows to define the action $\hat{a}$ to play in $H$ by collecting the actions played by $\sigma$ in all the indistinguishable play prefixes. Note that by monotonicity, the counting abstractions in the corresponding play prefix of $H$ are at least as big (assuming $\omega>k$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ), and thus the action $\hat{a}$ is well-defined. Since $\sigma$ is winning, $\mathcal{T}$ is reached with positive probability in $G$, and the set $Q \backslash Q_{G}$ is never hit, and therefore a counting function $f \in \mathcal{T}_{H}$ (such that $\operatorname{Supp}(f) \cap \mathcal{T} \neq \emptyset$ ) is reached with positive probability in $H$, and all plays remain safe in the set $\operatorname{Good}_{H}$.

Second, assume that there exists a winning strategy $\sigma^{H}$ for player 1 in $H$, and we show how to construct a pure winning strategy $\sigma$ in $G$. We can assume that $\sigma^{H}$ is pure memoryless. Fix an arbitrary strategy $\pi$ for player 2 and consider the unfolding tree of the game $H$ when $\sigma^{H}$ and $\pi$ are fixed (we get a tree and not just a path because the game is stochastic). In this tree, there is a shortest path to reach $\mathcal{T}_{H}$ and this path has no loop since strategy $\sigma^{H}$ is memoryless. we show that the length of this path can be bounded, and that the bounds used in the counting abstraction with $\omega$ 's are faithful, showing that the strategy $\sigma^{H}$ can be simulated in $G$ (in particular, we need to show that there are sufficiently many indistinguishable play prefixes in $G$ to simulate the action 'functions' $\hat{a}$ played by $\sigma^{H}$ ). More precisely, the bounds $\mathrm{K}_{1}, \mathrm{~K}_{2}, \ldots$ have been chosen in such a way that counters with value $\omega$ keep a positive value until all counters get value $\omega$. For example, when all counters but $k$ have value $\omega$, it takes at most $\left(K_{k}\right)^{k}$ steps to get one more counter with value $\omega$ by the argument given in Step 3. Therefore, along the shortest path to $\mathcal{T}_{H}$, either we reach a counting

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Fig. 9. Almost-sure winning strategy may require more memory than positive winning strategies. A one-sided reachability game where player 1 (round states) has perfect observation, player 2 (square states) is blind. Player 1 has a pure almost-sure winning strategy, but no pure belief-based memoryless strategy is almost-sure winning. However, player 1 has a pure belief-based memoryless strategy that is positive winning.
function $f$ with $f(q)=\omega$ for all $q \in \operatorname{Supp}(f)$, or a counting function $f$ with $\operatorname{Supp}(f) \cap \mathcal{T} \neq \emptyset$. In the first case, we can simulate $\sigma^{H}$ in $G$ to this point, and then win by simulating a winning randomized strategy, and in the second case the reachability objective $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$ is achieved in $G$ with positive probability. Since the strategy $\sigma^{H}$ ensures that the support of the counting functions never hit the set $Q \backslash Q_{G}$, player 1 wins in $G$ for the positive reachability and almost-sure safety objectives.

Theorem 3. In one-sided partial-observation stochastic games with player 1 perfect and player 2 partial, non-elementary size memory is sufficient for pure strategies to ensure positive probability reachability along with almost-sure safety for player 1; and hence for pure positive winning strategies for reachability objectives for player 1 non-elementary memory bound is optimal.

### 4.3 Upper bound for almost-sure reachability

In this section we present the algorithm to solve the almost-sure reachability problem. We start with an example to illustrate that in general strategies for almost-sure winning may be more complicated than positive winning for reachability objectives.

Example 4. Almost-sure winning strategy may require more memory than positive winning strategies. The example of Fig. 9 illustrates a key insight in the algorithmic solution of almost-sure reachability games where player 1
has perfect observation and player 2 has partial observation (he is blind in this case). For player 1, playing $a$ in $q_{1}$ and in $q_{2}$ is a positive winning strategy to reach $q_{\odot}$. This is because from $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$, the belief of player 2 becomes $\left\{q_{3}, q_{4}\right\}$ and no matter the action chosen by player 2 , the state $q_{\odot}$ is reached with positive probability from either $q_{3}$ or $q_{4}$.

However, always playing $a$ when the belief of player 2 is $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$ is not almostsure winning because if player 2 chooses always the same action (say $a$ ) in $\left\{q_{3}, q_{4}\right\}$, then with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ the state $q_{\odot}$ is not reached. Intuitively, this happens because player 2 can guess that the initial state is, say $q_{1}$, and be right with positive probability (here $\frac{1}{2}$ ). To be almost-surely winning, player 1 needs to alternate actions $a$ and $b$ when the belief is $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$. The action $b$ corresponds to the restart phase of the strategy, i.e. even assuming that player 2's belief would be, say $\left\{q_{1}\right\}$, the action $b$ ensures that $q_{\odot}$ is reached with positive probability by make the belief to be $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$.

Notation. We will consider $\mathcal{T}$ as the set of target states and without loss of generality assume that all target states are absorbing. In this section the belief of player 2 represents the set of states that can be with positive probability. Given strategies $\sigma$ and $\pi$ for player 1 and player 2 , respectively, a state $q$ and a set $K \subseteq Q$ we denote by $\operatorname{Pr}_{q, K}^{\sigma, \pi}(\cdot)$ the probability measure over sets of paths when the players play the strategies, the initial state is $q$ and the initial belief for player 2 is $K$.

In rest of this section we omit the subscript $G$ (such as we write $\Pi^{O}$ instead of $\Pi_{G}^{O}$ ) as the game is clear from the context.
Bad states. Let $\overline{\mathcal{T}}=Q \backslash \mathcal{T}$. Let

$$
Q_{B}=\left\{q \in Q \mid \forall \sigma \in \Sigma^{P} \cdot \exists \pi \in \Pi^{O}: \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Safe}(\overline{\mathcal{T}}))>0\right\}
$$

be the set of states $q$ such that given the initial belief of player 2 is the singleton $\{q\}$, for all pure strategies for player 1 there is a counter observation-based strategy for player 2 to ensure that $\operatorname{Safe}(\overline{\mathcal{T}})$ is satisfied with positive probability. We will consider $Q_{B}$ as the set of bad states.
Property of an almost-sure winning strategy. Consider a pure almost-sure winning strategy for player 1 that ensures against all observation-based strategies of player 2 that $\mathcal{T}$ is reached with probability 1 . Then we claim that the belief of player 2 must never intersect with $Q_{B}$ : otherwise if the belief intersects with $Q_{B}$, let $q$ be the state in $Q_{B}$ that is reached with positive probability. Then player 2 simply assumes that the current state is $q$, updates the belief to $\{q\}$, and the guess is correct with positive probability. Given the belief is $\{q\}$, since $q \in Q_{B}$, it follows that against all player 1 pure strategies there is an observation-based strategy for player 2 to ensure with positive probability that $\mathcal{T}$ is not reached. This contradicts that the strategy for player 1 is almost-sure winning.
Transformation. We transform the game by changing all states in $Q_{B}$ as absorbing. Let $Q_{G}=Q \backslash Q_{B}$. By definition we have

$$
Q_{G}=\left\{q \in Q \mid \exists \sigma \in \Sigma^{P} \cdot \forall \pi \in \Pi^{O}: \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))=1\right\}
$$

By the argument above that for a pure almost-sure winning strategy the belief must never intersect with $Q_{B}$ we have

$$
\begin{gathered}
Q_{G}=\left\{q \in Q \mid \exists \sigma \in \Sigma^{P} \cdot \forall \pi \in \Pi^{O}: \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))=1\right. \\
\left.\quad \text { and } \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q \backslash Q_{B}\right)\right)=1\right\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Let

$$
\begin{gathered}
Q_{G}^{p}=\left\{q \in Q \mid \exists \sigma \in \Sigma^{P} \cdot \forall \pi \in \Pi^{O}: \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))>0\right. \\
\left.\quad \text { and } \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q \backslash Q_{B}\right)\right)=1\right\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

We now show that $Q_{G}^{p}=Q_{G}$. The inclusion $Q_{G} \subseteq Q_{G}^{p}$ is trivial, and we now show the other inclusion $Q_{G}^{p} \subseteq Q_{G}$. Observe that in $Q_{G}^{p}$ we have the property of positive reachability and almost-sure safety and we will use strategies for positive reachability and almost-sure safety to construct an almost-sure winning strategy. We consider $Q_{B}$ as the set of unsafe states (i.e., $Q_{G}$ is the safe set), and $\mathcal{T}$ as the target and invoke the results of the Section 4.2: for all $q \in Q_{G}^{p}$ there is a pure finite-memory strategy $\sigma_{q}$ of memory at most $B$ (where $B$ is non-elementary) to ensure that from $q$, within $N=2^{O(B)}$ steps, $\mathcal{T}$ is reached with probability at least some positive constant $\eta_{q}>0$, even when the initial belief for player 2 is $\{q\}$. Let $\eta=\min _{q \in Q_{G}^{p}} \eta_{q}$. A pure finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy is described below. The strategy plays in two-phases: (1) the Restart phase; and (1) the Play phase. We define them as follows:

1. Restart phase. Let the current state be $q$, assume that the belief for player 2 is $\{q\}$ and goto the Play phase with strategy $\sigma_{q}$ that ensures that $Q_{G}$ is never left and $\mathcal{T}$ is reached within $N$ steps with probability at least $\eta>0$.
2. Play phase. Let $\sigma$ be the strategy defined in the Restart phase, then play $\sigma$ for $N$ steps and go back to the Restart phase.
The strategy is almost-sure winning as for all states in $Q_{G}^{p}$ and for all histories, in every $N$ steps the probability to reach $\mathcal{T}$ is at least $\eta>0$, and $Q_{G}$ (and hence $\left.Q_{G}^{p}\right)$ is never left. Thus probability to reach $\mathcal{T}$ in $N \cdot \ell$ steps, for $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, is at least $1-(1-\eta)^{\ell}$ and this is 1 as $\ell \rightarrow \infty$. Thus the desired result follows and we obtain the almost-sure winning strategy.
Memory bound and algorithm. The memory upper bound for the almostsure winning strategy constructed is as follows: $|Q| \cdot B+\log N$, we require $|Q|$ strategies of Section 4.2 of memory size $B$ and a counter to count up to $N=$ $2^{O(B)}$ steps. We now present an algorithm for almost-sure reachability that works in time $2^{|Q|} \times O$ (PosReachSureSafe), where PosReachSureSafe denote the complexity to solve the positive reachability along with almost-sure safety problem. The algorithm enumerates all subset $Q^{\prime} \subseteq Q$ and then verify that forall $q \in Q^{\prime}$ player 1 can ensure to reach $\mathcal{T}$ with positive probability staying safe in $Q^{\prime}$ with probability 1 . In other words the algorithm enumerates all subsets $Q^{\prime} \subseteq Q$ to obtain the set $Q_{G}$. The enumeration is exponential and the verification requires solving the positive reachability with almost-sure safety problem.

Theorem 4. In one-sided partial-observation stochastic games with player 1 perfect and player 2 partial, non-elementary size memory is sufficient for
pure strategies to ensure almost-sure reachability for player 1; and hence for pure almost-sure winning strategies for reachability objectives for player 1 nonelementary memory bound is optimal.

Corollary 1. In one-sided partial-observation stochastic games with player 1 perfect and player 2 partial, the problem of deciding the existence of pure almostsure and positive winning strategies for reachability objectives for player 1 can be solved in non-elementary time complexity.

## 5 Finite-memory Strategies for Two-sided Games

In this section we show the existence of finite-memory pure strategies for positive and almost-sure winning in two-sided games.

### 5.1 Positive reachability with almost-sure safety

Let $\mathcal{T}$ be the set of target states for reachability (such that all the target states are absorbing) and $Q_{G}$ be the set of good states for safety with $\mathcal{T} \subseteq Q_{G}$. Our goal is to show that for pure strategies to ensure positive probability reachability to $\mathcal{T}$ and almost-sure safety for $Q_{G}$, finite-memory strategies suffice. Note that with $Q_{G}$ as the whole state space we obtain the result for positive reachability as a special case.

Lemma 2. For all games $G$, for all $q \in Q$, if there exists a pure strategy $\sigma \in$ $\Sigma^{O} \cap \Sigma^{P}$ such that for all strategies $\pi \in \Pi^{O}$ of player 2 we have

$$
\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))>0 \quad \text { and } \quad \operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)=1
$$

then there exists a finite-memory pure strategy $\sigma^{f} \in \Sigma^{O} \cap \Sigma^{P}$ such that for all strategies $\pi \in \Pi^{O}$ of player 2 we have

$$
\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma^{f}, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))>0 \quad \text { and } \quad \operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma^{f}, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)=1
$$

We prove the result with the following two claims. We fix a (possibly infinite memory) strategy $\sigma \in \Sigma^{O} \cap \Sigma^{P}$ such that for all strategies $\pi \in \Pi^{O}$ of player 2 we have

$$
\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))>0 \quad \text { and } \quad \operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)=1
$$

Claim 1. If there exists $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all strategies $\pi \in \Pi^{O}$ of player 2 we have

$$
\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Reach}^{\leq N}(\mathcal{T})\right)>0 \quad \text { and } \quad \operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)=1
$$

where Reach ${ }^{\leq N}$ denotes reachability within first $N$-steps; then there exists a finite-memory pure strategy $\sigma^{f} \in \Sigma^{O} \cap \Sigma^{P}$ such that for all strategies $\pi \in \Pi^{O}$ of player 2 we have

$$
\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma^{f}, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))>0 \quad \text { and } \quad \operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma^{f}, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)=1
$$

Proof. The finite-memory strategy $\sigma^{f}$ is as follows: play like the strategy $\sigma$ for the first $N$-steps, and then switch to a strategy to ensure $\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)$ with probability 1 . The strategy ensure positive probability reachability to $\mathcal{T}$ as for the first $N$-steps it plays like $\sigma$ and $\sigma$ already ensures positive reachability within $N$-steps. Moreover, since $\sigma$ ensures $\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)$ with probability 1, it must also ensure $\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)$ for the first $N$-steps, and since $\sigma^{f}$ after the first $N$-steps only plays a strategy for almost-sure safety, it follows that $\sigma^{f}$ guarantees $\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)$ with probability 1 . The strategy $\sigma^{f}$ is a finite-memory strategy since it needs to play like $\sigma$ for the first $N$-steps (which requires finite-memory) and then it switches to an almost-sure safety strategy for which exponential size memory is sufficient (for safety objective almost-sure winning coincides with sure winning and then belief-based strategies are sufficient; see [13] for details).

Claim 2. There exists $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all strategies $\pi \in \Pi^{O}$ of player 2 we have

$$
\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Reach}^{\leq N}(\mathcal{T})\right)>0 \quad \text { and } \quad \operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)=1
$$

where Reach ${ }^{\leq N}$ denotes reachability within first $N$-steps.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Towards contradiction, assume that for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a strategy $\pi_{n} \in \Pi^{O}$ such that either $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi_{n}}\left(\operatorname{Reach}^{\leq n}(\mathcal{T})\right)=0$ or $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi_{n}}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)<1$.

If for some $n \geq 0$ we have $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi_{n}}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)<1$, then we get a contradiction with the fact that $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)=1$ for all $\pi \in \Pi^{O}$. Hence $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi_{n}}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(Q_{G}\right)\right)=1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and therefore $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi_{n}}\left(\operatorname{Reach}{ }^{\leq n}(\mathcal{T})\right)=0$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Equivalently, all play prefixes of length at most $n$ and compatible with $\sigma$ and $\pi_{n}$ avoid to hit $\mathcal{T}$, and thus $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi_{n}}\left(\operatorname{Safe}^{\leq n}(Q \backslash \mathcal{T})\right)=1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Note that we can assume that each strategy $\pi_{n}$ is pure because once the strategy $\sigma$ of player 1 is fixed we get a POMDP for player 2, and for POMDPs pure strategies are as powerful as randomized strategies [14] (in [14] the result was shown for finite POMDPs with finite action set, but the proof is based on induction on the action set and also works for countably infinite POMDPs).

Using a simple extension of König's Lemma [29], we construct a strategy $\pi^{\prime} \in \Pi^{O}$ such that $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi^{\prime}}(\operatorname{Safe}(Q \backslash \mathcal{T}))=1$. The construction is as follows. In the initial state $q$, there is an action $b_{0} \in A_{2}$ which is played by infinitely many strategies $\pi_{n}$. We define $\pi^{\prime}(q)=b_{0}$ and let $P_{0}$ be the set $\left\{\pi_{n} \mid \pi_{n}(q)=b_{0}\right\}$. Note that $P_{0}$ is an infinite set. We complete the construction as follows. Having defined $\pi^{\prime}(\rho)$ for all play prefixes $\rho$ of length at most $k$, and given the infinite set $P_{k}$, we define $\pi^{\prime}\left(\rho^{\prime}\right)$ for all play prefixes $\rho^{\prime}$ of length $k+1$ and the infinite set $P_{k+1}$ as follows. Consider the tuple $b_{\pi_{n}} \in A_{2}^{m}$ of actions played by the strategy $\pi_{n} \in P_{k}$ after the $m$ prefixes $\rho^{\prime}$ of length $k+1$. Clearly, there exists an infinite subset $P_{k+1}$ of $P_{k}$ in which all strategies play the same tuple $b_{k+1}$. We define $\pi\left(\rho^{\prime}\right)$ using the tuple $b_{k+1}$. This construction ensures that no play prefix of length $k+1$ compatible with $\sigma$ and $\pi^{\prime}$ hit the set $\mathcal{T}$, since $\pi^{\prime}$ agrees with some strategy $\pi_{n}$ for arbitrarily large $n$. Repeating this inductive argument yields a strategy $\pi^{\prime}$ such that $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi^{\prime}}(\operatorname{Safe}(Q \backslash \mathcal{T}))=1$, in contradiction with the fact that $\operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))>0$ for all $\pi \in \Pi^{O}$. Hence, the desired result follows.

The above two claims establish Lemma 2 and gives the following result.
Theorem 5. In two-sided partial-observation stochastic games finite memory is sufficient for pure strategies to ensure positive probability reachability along with almost-sure safety for player 1; and hence for pure positive winning strategies for reachability objectives finite memory is sufficient and non-elementary memory is required in general for player 1.

### 5.2 Almost-sure reachability

We now show that for pure strategies for almost-sure reachability, finite-memory strategies suffice. The proof is a straight forward extension of the results of Section 4.3, and for finite-memory strategies for positive reachability with almostsure safety we use the result of the previous subsection.
Notation. We will consider $\mathcal{T}$ as the set of target states and without loss of generality assume that all target states are absorbing. In this section the belief of player 2 represents the set of states that can be with positive probability. Given strategies $\sigma$ and $\pi$ for player 1 and player 2 , respectively, a state $q$ and a set $K \subseteq Q$ we denote by $\operatorname{Pr}_{q, K}^{\sigma, \pi}(\cdot)$ the probability distribution when the players play the strategies, the initial state is $q$ and the initial belief for player 2 is $K$.

In rest of this section we omit subscript $G$ (such as we write $\Pi^{O}$ instead of $\left.\Pi_{G}^{O}\right)$ as the game is clear from the context.
Bad beliefs. Let $\overline{\mathcal{T}}=Q \backslash \mathcal{T}$. Let

$$
Q_{B}=\left\{\mathcal{B} \in 2^{Q} \mid \forall \sigma \in \Sigma^{O} \cap \Sigma^{P} \cdot \exists \pi \in \Pi^{O} \cdot \exists q \in \mathcal{B}: \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Safe}(\overline{\mathcal{T}}))>0\right\}
$$

be the set of beliefs $\mathcal{B}$ such that for all pure strategies for player 1 there is a counter strategy for player 2 with a state $q \in \mathcal{B}$ to ensure that given the initial belief of player 2 is the singleton $\{q\}$, $\operatorname{Safe}(\overline{\mathcal{T}})$ is satisfied with positive probability. We will consider $Q_{B}$ as the set of bad beliefs.
Property of an almost-sure winning strategy. Consider a pure almost-sure winning strategy for player 1 that ensures against all strategies of player 2 that $\mathcal{T}$ is reached with probability 1 . Then we claim that the belief of player 2 must never intersect with $Q_{B}$ : otherwise if the belief intersects with $Q_{B}$, let $\mathcal{B}$ be the belief in $Q_{B}$ that is reached with positive probability. Then there exists $q \in \mathcal{B}$ such that player 2 can simply assume that the current state is $q$, update the belief to $\{q\}$, and the guess is correct with positive probability, and then player 2 can ensure that against all player 1 pure strategies there is a strategy for player 2 to ensure with positive probability that $\mathcal{T}$ is not reached. This contradicts that the strategy for player 1 is almost-sure winning. Let $Q_{G}=2^{Q} \backslash Q_{B}$. By definition we have

$$
Q_{G}=\left\{\mathcal{B} \in 2^{Q} \mid \exists \sigma \in \Sigma^{O} \cap \Sigma^{P} \cdot \forall \pi \in \Pi^{O} \cdot \forall q \in \mathcal{B}: \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))=1\right\}
$$

By the argument above that for a pure almost-sure winning strategy the belief must never intersect with $Q_{B}$ we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
& Q_{G}=\left\{\mathcal{B} \in 2^{Q} \mid \exists \sigma \in \Sigma^{O} \cap \Sigma^{P} \cdot \forall \pi \in \Pi^{O} \cdot \forall q \in \mathcal{B}: \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))=1\right. \\
& \text { and } \left.\operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma \sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(2^{Q} \backslash Q_{B}\right)\right)=1\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& Q_{G}^{p}=\left\{\mathcal{B} \in 2^{Q} \mid \exists \sigma \in \Sigma^{O} \cap \Sigma^{P} \cdot \forall \pi \in \Pi^{O} \cdot \forall q \in \mathcal{B}: \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))>0\right. \\
& \left.\quad \text { and } \operatorname{Pr}_{q,\{q\}}^{\sigma, \pi}\left(\operatorname{Safe}\left(2^{Q} \backslash Q_{B}\right)\right)=1\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

We now show that $Q_{G}^{p}=Q_{G}$. The inclusion $Q_{G} \subseteq Q_{G}^{p}$ is trivial, and we now show the other inclusion $Q_{G}^{p} \subseteq Q_{G}$. Observe that in $Q_{G}^{p}$ we have the property of positive reachability and almost-sure safety and we will use strategies for positive reachability and almost-sure safety to construct a witness finite-memory almostsure winning strategy. Note that here we have safety for a set of beliefs (instead of set of states, and it is straight forward to verify that the argument of the previous subsection holds when the safe set is a set of beliefs). We consider $Q_{B}$ as the set of unsafe beliefs (i.e., $Q_{G}$ is the safe set), and $\mathcal{T}$ as the target and invoke the results of the previous subsection: for all $\mathcal{B} \in Q_{G}^{p}$ there is a pure finite-memory strategy $\sigma_{\mathcal{B}}$ of to ensure that from all states $q \in \mathcal{B}$, within $N$ steps (for some finite $N \in \mathbb{N}), \mathcal{T}$ is reached with probability at least some positive constant $\eta_{\mathcal{B}}>0$, even when the initial belief for player 2 is $\{q\}$. Let $\eta=\min _{\mathcal{B} \in Q_{G}^{p}} \eta_{\mathcal{B}}$. A pure finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy is described below. The strategy plays in two-phases: (1) the Restart phase; and (1) the Play phase. We define them as follows:

1. Restart phase. Let the current belief be $\mathcal{B}$, the belief for player 2 is any perfect belief $\{q\}$, for $q \in \mathcal{B}$; and goto the Play phase with strategy $\sigma_{\mathcal{B}}$ that ensures that $Q_{G}$ is never left and $\mathcal{T}$ is reached within $N$ steps with probability at least $\eta>0$.
2. Play phase. Let $\sigma$ be the strategy defined in the Restart phase, then play $\sigma$ for $N$ steps and go back to the Restart phase.
The strategy is almost-sure winning as for all states in $Q_{G}^{p}$ and for all histories, in every $N$ steps the probability to reach $\mathcal{T}$ is at least $\eta>0$, and $Q_{G}$ (and hence $\left.Q_{G}^{p}\right)$ is never left. Thus probability to reach $\mathcal{T}$ in $N \cdot \ell$ steps, for $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, is at least $1-(1-\eta)^{\ell}$ and this is 1 as $\ell \rightarrow \infty$. Thus the desired result follows and we obtain the required finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy.
Memory bound and algorithm. The memory upper bound for the almostsure winning strategy constructed is as follows: $\left|2^{Q}\right| \cdot B+\log N$, we require $\left|2^{Q}\right|$ strategies of the previous subsection of memory size $B$ and a counter to count up to $N$ steps; where $B$ is the memory required for strategies to ensure positive reachability with almost-sure safety objectives.

Theorem 6. In two-sided partial-observation stochastic games finite memory is sufficient (and non-elementary memory is required in general) for pure strategies for almost-sure winning for reachability objectives for player 1.

## 6 Equivalence of Randomized Action-invisible Strategies and Pure Strategies

In this section, we show that for two-sided partial-observation games, the problem of almost-sure winning with randomized action-invisible strategies is inter-
reducible with the problem of almost-sure winning with pure strategies. The reductions are polynomial in the number of states in the game (the reduction from randomized to pure strategies is exponential in the number of actions).

It follows from the reduction of pure to randomized action-invisible strategies that the memory lower bounds for pure strategies transfer to randomized strategies, and in particular belief-based memoryless strategies are not sufficient, showing that a remark (without proof) of $[16$, p.4] and the result and construction of [26, Theorem 1] are wrong.

### 6.1 Reduction of randomized action-invisible strategies to pure strategies

We give a reduction for almost-sure winning for randomized action-invisible strategies to pure strategies. Given a stochastic game $G$ we will construct another stochastic game $H$ such that there is a randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in $G$ iff there is a pure almost-sure winning strategy in $H$. We first show in Lemma 3 the correctness of the reduction for finite-memory randomized action-invisible strategies, and then show in Lemma 4 that finite memory is sufficient in two-sided partial-observation games for randomized action-invisible strategies.
Construction. Given a stochastic game $G=\left\langle Q, q_{0}, \delta\right\rangle$ over action sets $A_{1}$ and $A_{2}$, and observations $\mathcal{O}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{2}$ (along with the corresponding observation mappings obs ${ }_{1}$ and $\mathrm{obs}_{2}$ ), we construct a game $H=\left\langle Q, q_{0}, \delta_{H}\right\rangle$ over action sets $2^{A_{1}} \backslash\{\emptyset\}$ and $A_{2}$ and observations $\mathcal{O}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{2}$. The transition function $\delta_{H}$ is defined as follows:

- for all $q \in Q$ and $A \in 2^{A_{1}} \backslash\{\emptyset\}$ and $b \in A_{2}$ we have $\delta_{H}(q, A, b)\left(q^{\prime}\right)=$ $\frac{1}{|A|} \cdot \sum_{a \in A} \delta(q, a, b)\left(q^{\prime}\right)$, i.e., in a state in $Q$ player 1 selects a non-empty subset $A \subseteq A_{1}$ of actions and the transition function $\delta_{H}$ simulates the transition function $\delta$ along with the uniform distribution over the set $A$ of actions.
The observation mappings obs ${ }_{i}^{H}$ in $H$, for $i \in\{1,2\}$ are as follows: obs $_{i}^{H}(q)=$ obs $_{i}(q)$, where obs ${ }_{i}$ is the observation mapping in $G$.

Lemma 3. The following assertions hold for reachability objectives:

1. If there is a pure almost-sure winning strategy in $H$, then there is a randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in $G$.
2. If there is a finite-memory randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in $G$, then there is a pure almost-sure winning strategy in $H$.

Proof. We present both parts of the proof below.

1. Let $\sigma_{H}$ be a pure almost-sure winning strategy in $H$. We construct a randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy $\sigma_{G}$ in $G$. The strategy $\sigma_{G}$ is as constructed as follows. Let $\rho_{G}=q_{0} q_{1} \ldots q_{k}$ be a play prefix in $G$, and we consider the same play prefix $\rho_{H}=q_{0} q_{1} \ldots q_{k}$ in $H$, and let $A_{k}=\sigma_{H}\left(\rho_{H}\right)$.

The strategy $\sigma_{G}\left(\rho_{G}\right)$ plays all actions in $A_{k}$ uniformly at random. Since $\sigma_{H}$ is an almost-sure winning strategy it follows $\sigma_{G}$ is also almost-sure winning. Also observe that if $\sigma_{H}$ is observation-based, then so is $\sigma_{G}$.
2. Let $\sigma_{G}$ be a finite-memory randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in $G$. If the strategy $\sigma_{G}$ is fixed in $G$ we obtain a finite POMDP, and by the results of [15] it follows that in an POMDP the precise transition probabilities do not affect almost-sure winning. Hence if $\sigma_{G}$ is almost-sure winning, then the uniform version $\sigma_{G}^{u}$ of the strategy $\sigma_{G}$ that always plays the same support of the probability distribution as $\sigma_{G}$ but plays all actions in the support uniformly at random is also almost-sure winning. Given $\sigma_{G}^{u}$ we construct a pure almost-sure winning strategy $\sigma_{H}$ in $H$. Given a play prefix $\rho_{H}=q_{0} q_{1} \ldots q_{k}$ in $H$, consider the same play prefix $\rho_{G}=q_{0} q_{1} \ldots q_{k}$ in $G$. Let $A_{k}=\operatorname{Supp}\left(\sigma_{G}^{u}\left(\rho_{G}\right)\right)$, then $\sigma_{H}\left(\rho_{H}\right)$ plays the action $A_{k} \in\left(2^{A_{1}} \backslash\{\emptyset\}\right)$. Since $\sigma_{G}^{u}$ is almost-sure winning it follows that $\sigma_{H}$ is almost-sure winning. Observe that if $\sigma_{G}$ is observation-based, then so is $\sigma_{G}^{u}$, and then so is $\sigma_{H}$.

The desired result follows.
Lemma 4. For reachability objectives, if there exists a randomized actioninvisible almost-sure winning strategy in $G$, then there exists also a finite-memory randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in $G$.
Proof. Let $\mathcal{W}=\left\{\mathcal{B} \mid \mathcal{B} \in 2^{Q}\right.$ is the belief of player 1 such that $\exists \sigma \in \Sigma^{O} \cdot \forall \pi \in$ $\left.\Pi^{O} \cdot \forall q \in \mathcal{B}: \operatorname{Pr}_{q}^{\sigma, \pi}(\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T}))=1\right\}$ denote the set of belief sets $\mathcal{B}$ for player 1 such that player 1 has a (possibly infinite-memory) randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy from all starting states in $\mathcal{B}$. It follows that the almost-sure winning strategy must ensure that the set $\mathcal{W}$ is never left: this is because from the complement set of $\mathcal{W}$ against all randomized action-invisible for player 1 there is a counter strategy for player 2 to ensure that with positive probability the target is not reached. Moreover for all $\mathcal{B} \in \mathcal{W}$ the almost-sure winning strategy also ensures that $\mathcal{T}$ is reached with positive probability. Hence we have again the problem of positive reachability with almost-sure safety. We simply repeat the proof for the pure strategy case, treating sets of actions (that is the support of the randomized strategy) as actions (for pure strategy) and played uniformly at random (as in the reduction from $G$ to $H$ ), and thus obtain a witness finite-memory strategy $\sigma_{G}$ to ensure positive reachability and almostsure safety. Repeating the strategy $\sigma_{G}$ with play phase and repeat phase (as in the case of pure strategies) we obtain the desired finite-memory almost-sure winning strategy.

The following theorem follows from the previous two lemmas.
Theorem 7. Given a two-sided (resp. one-sided) partial-observation stochastic game $G$ with a reachability objective we can construct in time polynomial in the size of the game and exponential in the size of the action sets a two-sided (resp. one-sided) partial-observation stochastic game $H$ such that there exists a randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in $G$ iff there exists a pure almost-sure winning strategy in $H$.

For positive winning, randomized memoryless strategies are sufficient (both for action-visible and action-invisible) and the problem is PTIME-complete for one-sided and EXPTIME-complete for two-sided [7]. The above theorem along with Theorem 1 gives us the following corollary for almost-sure winning for randomized action-invisible strategies.

Corollary 2. Given one-sided partial-observation stochastic games with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, the following assertions hold for reachability objectives for player 1:

1. (Memory complexity). Exponential memory is sufficient for randomized action-invisible strategies for almost-sure winning.
2. (Algorithm). The existence of a randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy can be decided in time exponential in the state space of the game and exponential in the size of the action sets.
3. (Complexity). The problem of deciding the existence of a randomized actioninvisible almost-sure winning strategy is EXPTIME-complete.

### 6.2 Reduction of pure strategies to randomized action-invisible strategies

We present a reduction for almost-sure winning for pure strategies to randomized action-invisible strategies. Given a stochastic game $G$ we construct another stochastic game $H$ such that there exists a pure almost-sure winning strategy in $G$ iff there exists a randomized almost-sure winning strategy in $H$.

The idea of the reduction is to force player 1 to play a pure strategy in $H$. The game $H$ simulates $G$ and requires player 1 to repeat each actions played (i.e. to play each action two times). Then, if player 1 uses randomization, he has to repeat the actions chosen randomly in the previous step. Since the actions are invisible, this can be achieved only if the support of the randomized actions is a singleton, i.e., the strategy is pure. Note that the reduction works for randomized strategies with actions invisible, and not when the actions are visible.
Construction. Given a stochastic game $G=\left\langle Q, q_{0}, \delta_{G}\right\rangle$ over action sets $A_{1}$ and $A_{2}$, and observations $\mathcal{O}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{2}$ (along with the corresponding observation mappings obs ${ }_{1}$ and obs ${ }_{2}$, we construct a game $H=\left\langle Q \cup\left(Q \times A_{1}\right) \cup\{\right.$ sink $\left.\}, q_{0}, \delta_{H}\right\rangle$ over the same action sets $A_{1}$ and $A_{2}$ and observations $\mathcal{O}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{2}$. The transition function $\delta_{H}$ is defined as follows:

- for all $q \in Q$ and $a \in A_{1}$ and $b \in A_{2}$ we have $\delta_{H}(q, a, b)((q, a))=1$, i.e., in a state $q$ for action $a$ of player 1 , irrespective of the choice of player 2 , the game stores player 1 's action with probability 1 ;
- for all $(q, a) \in Q \times A_{1}$, for all $b \in A_{2}$ we have $\delta_{H}((q, a), a, b)=\delta_{G}(q, a, b)$, i.e. if player 1 repeats the action played in the previous step, then the probabilistic transition function is the same as in $G$; and for all $a^{\prime} \in A_{1} \backslash\{a\}$, we have $\delta_{H}((q, a), a, b)($ sink $)=1$, i.e. if player 1 does not repeat the same action, then the sink state is reached.
- for all $a \in A_{1}$ and $b \in A_{2}$, we have $\delta_{H}($ sink, $a, b)($ sink $)=1$.

The observation mappings obs ${ }_{i}^{H}$ in $H(i \in\{1,2\})$ are as follows: obs $_{i}^{H}(q)=$ $\mathrm{obs}_{i}^{H}((q, a))=\operatorname{obs}_{i}(q)$, where obs $i_{i}$ is the observation mapping in $G$. Note that $H$ is of size polynomial in the size of $G$.

Lemma 5. Let $\mathcal{T} \subseteq Q$ be a set of target states. There exists a pure almostsure winning strategy in $G$ for $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$ if and only if there exists a randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in $H$ for objective $\operatorname{Reach}(\mathcal{T})$.

Proof. We present both directions of the proof below.

1. Let $\sigma_{H}$ be a randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in $H$. We show that we can assume wlog that $\sigma_{H}$ is actually a pure strategy. To see this, assume that under strategy $\sigma_{H}$ there is a prefix $\rho_{H}=$ $q_{0}\left(q_{0}, a_{0}\right) q_{1}\left(q_{1}, a_{1}\right) \ldots q_{k}$ in $H$ compatible with $\sigma_{H}$ from which $\sigma_{H}$ plays a randomized action with support $A \subseteq A_{1}$ and $|A|>1$. Then, with positive probability the states $\left(q_{k}, a_{k}\right)$ and $\left(q_{k}, a_{k}^{\prime}\right)$ are reached where $a_{k}, a_{k}^{\prime} \in A$ and $a_{k} \neq a_{k}^{\prime}$. No matter the action(s) played by $\sigma_{H}$ in the next step, the state sink is reached with positive probability in the next step, either from $\left(q_{k}, a_{k}\right)$ or from $\left(q_{k}, a_{k}^{\prime}\right)$. This contradicts that $\sigma_{H}$ is almost-sure winning. Therefore, we can assume that $\sigma_{H}$ is a pure strategy that repeats each action two times. We construct a pure almost-sure winning strategy in $G$ by removing these repetitions.
2. Let $\sigma_{G}$ be a pure almost-sure winning strategy in $G$. Consider the strategy $\sigma_{H}$ in $H$ that always repeats two times the actions played by $\sigma_{G}$. The strategy $\sigma_{H}$ is observation-based and almost-sure winning since $H$ simulates $G$ when actions are repeated twice.

The desired result follows.

Theorem 8. Given a two-sided partial-observation stochastic game $G$ with a reachability objective we can construct in time polynomial in the size of the game and size of the action sets a two-sided partial-observation stochastic game $H$ such that there exists a pure almost-sure winning strategy in $G$ iff there exists a randomized action-invisible almost-sure winning strategy in $H$.

Belief-based strategies are not sufficient. We illustrate our reduction with the following example that shows belief-based (belief-only) randomized actioninvisible strategies are not sufficient for almost-sure reachability in one-sided partial-observation games (player 1 partial and player 2 perfect), showing that a remark (without proof) of $[16, \mathrm{p} .4]$ and the result and construction of $[26$, Theorem 1] are wrong.

Example 5. We illustrate the reduction of on the example of Fig. 1. The result of the reduction is given in Fig. 10. Remember that Example 1 showed that beliefbased pure strategies are not sufficient for almost-sure winning. We show that belief-based randomized strategies are not sufficient for almost-sure winning in the game of Fig. 10. First, in $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$ player 1 has to play pure since he has to


Fig. 10. Belief-based strategies are not sufficient. The game graph obtained by the reduction of pure to randomized strategies on the game of Fig. 1 (for almost-sure reachability objective). Player 1 is blind and player 2 has perfect observation. There exists an almost-sure winning randomized strategy (with invisible actions), but there is no belief-based memoryless almost-sure winning randomized strategy.
be able to repeat the same action to avoid reaching a sink state $\cdot$ with positive probability. Now, the argument is the same as in Example 1: playing always the same action (either $a$ or $b$ ) in $\left\{q_{1}, q_{2}\right\}$ is not even positive winning as player 2 can choose the state in this set (either $q_{2}$ or $q_{1}$ ).

Note that our reduction preserves the structure and memory of almost-sure winning strategies, hence the non-elementary lower bound given in Theorem 2 for pure strategies also transfers to randomized action-invisible strategies by the same reduction.

Corollary 3. For one-sided partial-observation stochastic games, with player 1 partial and player 2 perfect, belief-based randomized action-invisible strategies are not sufficient for almost-sure winning for reachability objectives. For two-sided partial-observation stochastic games, memory of non-elementary size is necessary in general for almost-sure winning for randomized action-invisible strategies for reachability objectives.

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[^0]:    ${ }^{3}$ In the rest of this section, the word indistinguishable means indistinguishable for player 2.

[^1]:    ${ }^{4}$ Note that for safety objectives, the notion of sure winning and almost-sure winning coincide, and pure strategies are sufficient.

[^2]:    ${ }^{5}$ Recall that $Z$ is the set of states that are winning in $G$ for player 1 in randomized strategies.

