Neural network models have become integral to Internet of Things (IoT) systems, with applications spanning from industrial automation to critical infrastructure management. Despite their prevalence, the deployment of these models within IoT systems introduces distinctive security vulnerabilities. In particular, adversaries may execute model poisoning attacks, which aim to alter the decision-making processes of embedded models, leading to erroneous outcomes. Existing model poisoning attacks necessitate access to extensive auxiliary datasets, such as the training dataset itself or one with same distribution. These requirements often render such attacks impractical in IoT contexts, given the constrained storage and computational resources of IoT devices. This paper proposes the first model poisoning attack against interpreters without auxiliary datasets to manipulate the model’s behavior. We evaluate the attack on three real-world datasets, and results indicate that this attack can successfully coerce the targeted interpreters to produce outcomes aligned with an adversary’s intentions, while maintaining nearly indistinguishable performance from the original model, thereby ensuring its stealthiness. Furthermore, beyond directly affected interpreters, our experiments reveal that four additional interpreters coupled to the poisoned model are indirectly influenced, underscoring the attack’s transferability.