# Correction to "Optimal Subscription Policies for Participation-Dependent Social-Learning Markets"

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IN THE above article [1] figures have been incorrectly numbered from Fig. 2 onwards. We provide those figures here in the correct order. Readers are requested to refer to the figures in this article while reading the main manuscript [1].

## REFERENCE

[1] R. K. Muni and K. P. Naveen, "Optimal subscription policies for participation-dependent social-learning markets," *IEEE Trans. Netw. Service Manag.*, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 4141–4157, Dec. 2023, doi: 10.1109/TNSM.2023.3267438.




Fig. 2. Theorem 1 – Illustration of the four different cases that can arise depending on the values of $n_1$ and $\tau_1$. For simplicity we have used $p_d$ to denote the maximum feasible price value $m_2 t_2$.

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


(a) (b) (c)

Fig. 3. *Case-study 1:* Effect of varying the *social learning parameter* $\gamma$ on the performance of the various policies (while all other parameters are fixed at their baseline values in Table I). (a) Average revenue. (b) Optimal subscription prices and period. Note that the values of the *subscription prices (thick bars)* are to be read from the *left y-axis* of Fig. 3(b), while the duration of the *subscription periods (thin bars)* are depicted along the *right y-axis*. The same applies to the corresponding figures in all the following case-studies.(c) Average number of subscribers.




(a) (b) (c)

Fig. 4. *Case-study 2:* Effect of varying the *belief-mean* $m_1$ on the performance of the various policies (while all other parameters are fixed at their baseline values in Table I). (a) Average revenue. (b) Optimal subscription prices and period. (c) Average number of subscribers.




(a) (b) (c)

Fig. 5. *Case-study 3:* Effect of varying the *time-horizon duration* $T$ on the performance of the various policies (while all other parameters are fixed at their baseline values in Table I). (a) Average revenue. (b) Optimal subscription prices and period. (c) Average number of subscribers.




Fig. 6. *Case-study 4:* Effect of varying the *provider's capacity* $C$ on the performance of the various policies (while all other parameters are fixed at their baseline values in Table I). (a) Average revenue. (b) Optimal subscription prices and period. (c) Average number of subscribers.




Fig. 7. *Case-study 5:* Effect of varying the *number of users* $N$ (and scaling $C = 50N$) on the performance of the various policies (while all other parameters are fixed at their baseline values in Table I). (a) Average revenue. (b) Optimal subscription prices and period. (c) Average number of subscribers.




Fig. 8. *Case-study 6:* Effect of non-Gaussian QoS on the average revenue accrued by the various policies. The values of the various parameters used to obtain the plots in (a), (b) and (c) are listed in Table II.