Abstract:
In security games, the patrolling problem is usually modeled as a Stackelberg game to obtain patrol schemes. However, solving Stackelberg games is challenging, as the pla...Show MoreMetadata
Abstract:
In security games, the patrolling problem is usually modeled as a Stackelberg game to obtain patrol schemes. However, solving Stackelberg games is challenging, as the player strategy space grows exponentially with patrolling scenarios that expand in space and time. Recent work on reducing the player strategy space does not consider adversarial graph features, making the process of solving the Stackelberg game inefficient. To address this issue, we propose a novel algorithm called “Digger,” and the following important findings are made: the defender's optimal strategy can prevent an attacker from reaching a target, and this is achieved by a set of available interdiction vertices that separate the attacker from the target. The defender can arrive at the interdiction vertices earlier than the attacker. After arriving at the set of interdiction vertices, the next defender action subgraphs are not all useful, and the expected utility of the related player's pure strategy is not optimal. Finally, we build a player support set that does not contain useless strategies to improve the speed of the security game algorithm. An experimental evaluation of warehouse graphs demonstrates that Digger dramatically improves the existing algorithms.
Published in: IEEE Transactions on Reliability ( Volume: 73, Issue: 2, June 2024)