Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach
Abstract
GPS spoofing attack (GSA) has been shown to be one of the most imminent threats to almost all cyber-physical systems incorporated with the civilian GPS signal. Specifically, for our current agenda of the modernization of the power grid, this may greatly jeopardize the benefits provided by the pervasively installed phasor measurement units (PMU). In this study, we consider the case where synchrophasor data from PMUs are compromised due to the presence of a single GSA, and show that it can be corrected by signal processing techniques. In particular, we introduce a statistical model for synchrophasorbased power system state estimation (SE), and then derive the spoofing-matched algorithms for synchrophasor data correction against GPS spoofing attack. Different testing scenarios in IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, 118-bus systems are simulated to show the proposed algorithms’ performance on GSA detection and state estimation. Numerical results demonstrate that our proposed algorithms can consistently locate and correct the spoofed synchrophasor data with good accuracy as long as the system observability is satisfied. Finally, the accuracy of state estimation is significantly improved compared with the traditional weighted least square method and approaches the performance under the Genie-aided method.
- Authors:
-
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States). Electricity Infrastructure
- Schlumberger, Sugar Land, TX (United States). Pressure Pumping and Chemistry Product Group
- Univ. of Wyoming, Laramie, WY (United States). Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering
- Publication Date:
- Research Org.:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Univ. of Wyoming, Laramie, WY (United States)
- Sponsoring Org.:
- USDOE Office of Science (SC), Basic Energy Sciences (BES); USDOE Office of Electricity (OE)
- OSTI Identifier:
- 1438224
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA-129371
Journal ID: ISSN 1949-3053
- Grant/Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830; SC0012671; OE0000657
- Resource Type:
- Journal Article: Accepted Manuscript
- Journal Name:
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Additional Journal Information:
- Journal Volume: 9; Journal Issue: 5; Journal ID: ISSN 1949-3053
- Publisher:
- IEEE
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION; phasor measurement units; global positioning system; synchronization; state estimation; current measurement; power grids; voltage measurement
Citation Formats
Fan, Xiaoyuan, Du, Liang, and Duan, Dongliang. Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach. United States: N. p., 2017.
Web. doi:10.1109/TSG.2017.2662688.
Fan, Xiaoyuan, Du, Liang, & Duan, Dongliang. Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach. United States. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2017.2662688
Fan, Xiaoyuan, Du, Liang, and Duan, Dongliang. 2017.
"Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach". United States. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2017.2662688. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1438224.
@article{osti_1438224,
title = {Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach},
author = {Fan, Xiaoyuan and Du, Liang and Duan, Dongliang},
abstractNote = {GPS spoofing attack (GSA) has been shown to be one of the most imminent threats to almost all cyber-physical systems incorporated with the civilian GPS signal. Specifically, for our current agenda of the modernization of the power grid, this may greatly jeopardize the benefits provided by the pervasively installed phasor measurement units (PMU). In this study, we consider the case where synchrophasor data from PMUs are compromised due to the presence of a single GSA, and show that it can be corrected by signal processing techniques. In particular, we introduce a statistical model for synchrophasorbased power system state estimation (SE), and then derive the spoofing-matched algorithms for synchrophasor data correction against GPS spoofing attack. Different testing scenarios in IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, 118-bus systems are simulated to show the proposed algorithms’ performance on GSA detection and state estimation. Numerical results demonstrate that our proposed algorithms can consistently locate and correct the spoofed synchrophasor data with good accuracy as long as the system observability is satisfied. Finally, the accuracy of state estimation is significantly improved compared with the traditional weighted least square method and approaches the performance under the Genie-aided method.},
doi = {10.1109/TSG.2017.2662688},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1438224},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
issn = {1949-3053},
number = 5,
volume = 9,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2017},
month = {Wed Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2017}
}
Web of Science
Figures / Tables:
Works referencing / citing this record:
Survey on synchrophasor data quality and cybersecurity challenges, and evaluation of their interdependencies
journal, December 2018
- Sundararajan, Aditya; Khan, Tanwir; Moghadasi, Amir
- Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, Vol. 7, Issue 3
Impact of Cyber Attacks on High Voltage DC Transmission Damping Control
journal, April 2018
- Fan, Rui; Lian, Jianming; Kalsi, Karanjit
- Energies, Vol. 11, Issue 5
A Survey on Synchrophasor Data Quality and Cybersecurity Challenges, and Evaluation of their Interdependencies
text, January 2018
- Sundararajan, Aditya; Khan, Tanwir; Moghadasi, Amir
- arXiv
Figures / Tables found in this record: