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Title: Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach

Abstract

GPS spoofing attack (GSA) has been shown to be one of the most imminent threats to almost all cyber-physical systems incorporated with the civilian GPS signal. Specifically, for our current agenda of the modernization of the power grid, this may greatly jeopardize the benefits provided by the pervasively installed phasor measurement units (PMU). In this study, we consider the case where synchrophasor data from PMUs are compromised due to the presence of a single GSA, and show that it can be corrected by signal processing techniques. In particular, we introduce a statistical model for synchrophasorbased power system state estimation (SE), and then derive the spoofing-matched algorithms for synchrophasor data correction against GPS spoofing attack. Different testing scenarios in IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, 118-bus systems are simulated to show the proposed algorithms’ performance on GSA detection and state estimation. Numerical results demonstrate that our proposed algorithms can consistently locate and correct the spoofed synchrophasor data with good accuracy as long as the system observability is satisfied. Finally, the accuracy of state estimation is significantly improved compared with the traditional weighted least square method and approaches the performance under the Genie-aided method.

Authors:
 [1];  [2]; ORCiD logo [3]
  1. Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States). Electricity Infrastructure
  2. Schlumberger, Sugar Land, TX (United States). Pressure Pumping and Chemistry Product Group
  3. Univ. of Wyoming, Laramie, WY (United States). Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Univ. of Wyoming, Laramie, WY (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Science (SC), Basic Energy Sciences (BES); USDOE Office of Electricity (OE)
OSTI Identifier:
1438224
Report Number(s):
PNNL-SA-129371
Journal ID: ISSN 1949-3053
Grant/Contract Number:  
AC05-76RL01830; SC0012671; OE0000657
Resource Type:
Journal Article: Accepted Manuscript
Journal Name:
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 9; Journal Issue: 5; Journal ID: ISSN 1949-3053
Publisher:
IEEE
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION; phasor measurement units; global positioning system; synchronization; state estimation; current measurement; power grids; voltage measurement

Citation Formats

Fan, Xiaoyuan, Du, Liang, and Duan, Dongliang. Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.1109/TSG.2017.2662688.
Fan, Xiaoyuan, Du, Liang, & Duan, Dongliang. Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach. United States. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2017.2662688
Fan, Xiaoyuan, Du, Liang, and Duan, Dongliang. 2017. "Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach". United States. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2017.2662688. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1438224.
@article{osti_1438224,
title = {Synchrophasor Data Correction under GPS Spoofing Attack: A State Estimation Based Approach},
author = {Fan, Xiaoyuan and Du, Liang and Duan, Dongliang},
abstractNote = {GPS spoofing attack (GSA) has been shown to be one of the most imminent threats to almost all cyber-physical systems incorporated with the civilian GPS signal. Specifically, for our current agenda of the modernization of the power grid, this may greatly jeopardize the benefits provided by the pervasively installed phasor measurement units (PMU). In this study, we consider the case where synchrophasor data from PMUs are compromised due to the presence of a single GSA, and show that it can be corrected by signal processing techniques. In particular, we introduce a statistical model for synchrophasorbased power system state estimation (SE), and then derive the spoofing-matched algorithms for synchrophasor data correction against GPS spoofing attack. Different testing scenarios in IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, 118-bus systems are simulated to show the proposed algorithms’ performance on GSA detection and state estimation. Numerical results demonstrate that our proposed algorithms can consistently locate and correct the spoofed synchrophasor data with good accuracy as long as the system observability is satisfied. Finally, the accuracy of state estimation is significantly improved compared with the traditional weighted least square method and approaches the performance under the Genie-aided method.},
doi = {10.1109/TSG.2017.2662688},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1438224}, journal = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
issn = {1949-3053},
number = 5,
volume = 9,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2017},
month = {Wed Feb 01 00:00:00 EST 2017}
}

Journal Article:
Free Publicly Available Full Text
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Citation Metrics:
Cited by: 65 works
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Figures / Tables:

Figure 1 Figure 1: A 4-bus power system to demonstrate the impact of GSA on SE.

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Works referencing / citing this record:

Survey on synchrophasor data quality and cybersecurity challenges, and evaluation of their interdependencies
journal, December 2018


Impact of Cyber Attacks on High Voltage DC Transmission Damping Control
journal, April 2018