GENERIC COMPUTABILITY, TURING DEGREES, AND ASYMPTOTIC DENSITY

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ABSTRACT. Generic decidability has been extensively studied in group theory, and we now study it in the context of classical computability theory. A set A of natural numbers is called generically computable if there is a partial computable function which agrees with the characteristic function of A on its domain D, and furthermore D has density 1, i.e. $\lim_{n\to\infty} |\{k < n : k \in D\}|/n = 1$. A set A is called *coarsely computable* if there is a computable set R such that the symmetric difference of A and R has density 0. We prove that there is a c.e. set which is generically computable but not coarsely computable and vice versa. We show that every nonzero Turing degree contains a set which is not generically computable and also a set which is not coarsely computable. We prove that there is a c.e. set of density 1 which has no computable subset of density 1. Finally, we define and study generic reducibility.

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a general realization that worst-case complexity measures such as P, NP, exponential time, and just being computable often do not give a good overall picture of the difficulty of a problem. The most famous example of this is the Simplex Algorithm for linear programming, which runs hundreds of times every day, always very quickly. Klee and Minty [5] constructed examples for which the simplex algorithm takes exponential time, but these examples do not occur in practice.

Gurevich [4] and Levin[9] independently introduced the idea of *average*case complexity. Here one has a probability measure on the instances of a problem and one averages the time complexity over all instances. An important result is the result of Blass and Gurevich [1] that the *Bounded Product Problem* for the modular group, $PSL(2, \mathbb{Z})$, is *NP*-complete but has polynomial time average-case complexity. Average-case complexity is, however, difficult to work with because it is highly sensitive to the probability distribution used and one must still consider all cases.

Generic-case complexity was introduced by Kapovich, Miasnikov, Schupp and Shpilrain [6] as a complexity measure which is much easier to work with. The basic idea is that one considers partial algorithms which give no

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incorrect answers and fail to converge only on a "negligible" set of inputs as defined below.

Definition 1.1 (Asymptotic density). Let Σ be a nonempty finite alphabet and let Σ^* denote the set of all finite words on Σ . The *length*, |w|, of a word w is the number of letters in w. Let S be a subset of Σ^* . For every $n \ge 0$ let $S \lceil n$ denote the set of all words in S of length at most n. Let

$$\rho_n(S) = \frac{|S\lceil n|}{|\Sigma^*\lceil n|}$$

We define the upper density $\overline{\rho}(S)$ of S in Σ^* as

$$\overline{\rho}(S) := \limsup_{n \to \infty} \rho_n(S)$$

Similarly, we define the *lower density* $\rho(S)$ of S in Σ^* as

$$\underline{\rho}(S) := \liminf_{n \to \infty} \rho_n(S)$$

If the actual limit

 $\rho(S) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \rho_n(S)$ exists, then $\rho(S)$ is the *(asymptotic) density* of S in Σ^* . **Definition 1.2.** A subset S of Σ^* is generic if $\rho(S) = 1$ and S is negligible if $\rho(S) = 0$.

It is clear that S is generic if and only if its complement \overline{S} is negligible. Also, the union and intersection of a finite number of generic (negligible) sets is generic (negligible).

Definition 1.3. In the case where the limit

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} \rho_n(S) = \rho(S) = 1$$

we are sometimes interested in estimating the speed of convergence of the sequence $\{\rho_n(S)\}$. To this end, we say that the convergence is *exponentially* fast if there are $0 < \sigma < 1$ and C > 0 such that for every $n \ge 1$ we have $1 - \rho_n(S) \le C\sigma^n$. In this case we say that S is strongly generic.

Definition 1.4. Let S be a subset of Σ^* with characteristic function χ_S . A partial function Φ from Σ^* to $\{0, 1\}$ is called a *generic description* of S if $\Phi(x) = \chi_S(x)$ whenever $\Phi(x)$ is defined (written $\Phi(x) \downarrow$) and the domain of Φ is generic in Σ^* . A set S is called *generically computable* if there exists a *partial computable* function Φ which is a generic description of S. We stress that *all* answers given by Φ must be correct even though Φ need not be everywhere defined, and, indeed, we do not require the domain of Φ to be computable.

It turns out that one can prove sharp results about generic-case complexity without even knowing the worst-case complexity of a problem. Magnus [10, 11] proved that one-relator groups have solvable word problem in the 1930's. We do not know any precise bound on complexity over the entire class of one-relator groups. But for any one-relator group with at least three generators, the word problem is strongly generically linear time [6]. Also, we do not know whether or not the isomorphism problem restricted to one-relator presentations is solvable but the problem is strongly generically linear time [7, 8]. A very clear discussion of Boone's group with unsolvable word problem is given in Rotman [16]. The proof shows that one can model a universal Turing machine inside the group and words coding the Turing machine are called "special" words. Such words are indeed very special and the word problem for Boone's group is strongly generically linear time [6]. Indeed, it is not known whether there is a finitely generated group whose word problem is not generically computable.

In many ways, generic computability is orthogonal to the idea of Turing degrees since generic computability depends on how information is distributed in a given set.

Observation 1.5. Every Turing degree contains a set which is strongly generically computable in linear time. Let A be an arbitrary subset of ω and let $S \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ be the set $\{0^n : n \in A\}$. Now S is Turing equivalent to A and is strongly generically computable in linear time by the algorithm Φ which, on input w, answers "No" if w contains a 1 and does not answer otherwise. Here all computational difficulty is concentrated in a negligible set, namely the set of words containing only 0's. Note that since the algorithm given is independent of the set A, the observation shows that one algorithm can generically decide uncountably many sets.

The next observation is a general abstract version of Miasnikov's and Rybalov's proof ([12], Theorem 6.5) that there is a finitely presented semigroup whose word problem is not generically computable.

Observation 1.6. Every nonzero Turing degree contains a set which is not generically computable. Let A be any noncomputable subset of ω and let $T \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$ be the set $\{0^n 1w : n \in A, w \in \{0,1\}^*\}$. Clearly A and T are Turing equivalent. For a fixed n_0 , $\rho(\{0^{n_0}1w : w \in \{0,1\}^*\}) = 2^{-(n_0+1)} > 0$. A generic algorithm for a set must give an answer on some members of any set of positive density. Thus T cannot be generically computable since if Φ were a generic algorithm for T we could just run bounded simulation of Φ on the set $\{0^n 1w : w \in \{0,1\}^*\}$ until Φ gave an answer, thus deciding whether or not $n \in A$. Here the idea is that the single bit of information $\chi_A(n)$ is "spread out" to a set of positive density in the definition of T. Also note that if A is c.e. then T is also c.e. and thus every nonzero c.e. Turing degree contains a c.e. set which is not generically computable.

In the current paper we study generic computability for sets of natural numbers using the concepts and techniques of computability theory and the classic notion of asymptotic density for sets of natural numbers. An easy result, analogous to Observation 1.6 above, is that every nonzero Turing degree contains a set of natural numbers which is not generically computable. We define the notion of being *densely approximable* by a class C of sets and observe that a set A is generically computable if and only if it is densely approximable by c.e. (computably enumerable) sets. We prove that there is a c.e. set of density 1 which has no computable subset of density 1. It follows as a corollary that there is a generically computable set A such that no generic algorithm for A has a computable domain.

We call a set A of natural numbers *coarsely computable* if there is a computable set B such that the symmetric difference of A and B has density 0. We show that there are c.e. sets which are coarsely computable but not generically computable and c.e. sets which are generically computable but not coarsely computable. We also prove that every nonzero Turing degree contains a set which is not coarsely computable.

We consider a relativized notion of generic computability and also introduce a notion of generic reducibility which which gives a degree structure and which is related to enumeration reducibility. Almost all of our proofs use the collection of sets $\{R_n\}$ defined below which form a partition of $\mathbb{N} - \{0\}$ into subsets of positive density. We use this collection to define a natural embedding of the Turing degrees into the generic degrees and show that this embedding is proper. We close by describing some related ongoing work with Rod Downey and stating some open questions.

2. Generic computability of subsets of ω

We identify the set $\mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, ...\}$ of natural numbers with the set ω of finite ordinals and from now on we will focus on generic computability properties of subsets of ω and how these interact with some classic concepts of computability theory. Thus, we are using the 1-element alphabet $\Sigma = \{1\}$ and identifying $n \in \omega$ with its unary representation $1^n \in \{1\}^*$, so that we also identify ω with $\{1\}^*$. In this context, of course, our definition of (upper and lower) density for subsets of $\{1\}^*$ agrees with the corresponding classical definitions for subsets of ω . In particular, the density of A, denoted $\rho(A)$ is given by $\lim_n \frac{|A[n]|}{n+1}$, provided this limit exists, where $A[n = A \cap [0, n]$. Further, for $A \subseteq B$, the density of A in B is $\lim_n \frac{|A[n]|}{|B|n|}$, provided B is nonempty and this limit exists. Corresponding definitions hold for upper and lower density. It is clear that if A has positive upper density in B, and B has positive density, then A has positive upper density.

Our notation for computability is mostly standard, except that we use Φ_e for the unary partial function computed by the *e*-th Turing machine, and we let $\Phi_{e,s}$ be the part of Φ_e computed in at most *s* steps. Let W_e be the domain of Φ_e . We identify a set $A \subseteq \omega$ with its characteristic function χ_A .

Definition 2.1. Let C be a family of subsets of ω . A set $A \subseteq \omega$ is densely C-approximable if there exist sets

 $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $C_0 \subseteq \overline{A}, C_1 \subseteq A$ and $C_0 \cup C_1$ has density 1.

The following proposition corresponds to the basic fact that a set A is computable if and only if both A and its complement \overline{A} are computably enumerable.

Proposition 2.2. A set A is generically computable if and only if A is densely approximable by c.e. sets.

Proof. If A is densely approximable by c.e. sets then there exist c.e. sets $C_0 \subseteq \overline{A}$ and $C_1 \subseteq A$ such that $C_0 \cup C_1$ has density 1. For a given x, start enumerating both C_0 and C_1 and if x appears, answer accordingly.

If A is generically computable by a partial computable function Φ , then the sets C_0 and C_1 on which Φ respectively answers "No" and "Yes" are the desired c.e. sets.

Corollary 2.3. Every c.e. set of density 1 is generically computable.

Recall that a set A is *immune* if A is infinite and A does not contain any infinite c.e. set and A is *bi-immune* if both A and its complement \overline{A} are immune. If the union $C_0 \cup C_1$ of two c.e. sets has density 1, certainly at least one of them is infinite. Thus we have the following corollary.

Corollary 2.4. No bi-immune set is generically computable

Now the class of bi-immune sets is both comeager and of measure 1. (This is clear by countable additivity since the family of sets containing a given infinite set is of measure 0 and nowhere dense.) Thus the family of generically computable sets is both meager and of measure 0. See Cooper [2] for the definition of 1-generic in computability theory and see Nies [14] for the definition of 1-random. (This use of the word "generic" in the term "1-generic" has no relation to our general use of "generic" throughout this paper.) We cite here only the facts that 1-generic sets and and 1-random sets are bi-immune, and it thus follows that no generically computable set is 1-generic or 1-random.

The following sets R_k play a crucial role in almost all of our proofs.

Definition 2.5.

$$R_k = \{m: 2^k | m, 2^{(k+1)} \nmid m\}$$

For example, R_0 is the set of odd nonnegative integers. Note that $\rho(R_k) = 2^{-(k+1)}$. The collection of sets $\{R_k\}$ forms a partition of unity for $\omega - \{0\}$ since these sets are pairwise disjoint and $\bigcup_{k=0}^{\infty} R_k = \omega - \{0\}$.

From the definition of asymptotic density it is clear that we have *finite* additivity for densities: If S_1, \ldots, S_t are pairwise disjoint sets whose densities exist, then

$$\rho(\bigcup_{i=1}^{t} S_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{t} \rho(S_i).$$

Of course, we do not have general countable additivity for densities, since ω is a countable union of singletons. However, we do have countable additivity in certain restricted situations, where the "tails" of a sequence contribute vanishingly small density to the union of a sequence of sets.

Lemma 2.6 (Restricted countable additivity). If $\{S_i\}, i = 0, 1, ...$ is a countable collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of ω such that each $\rho(S_i)$ exists and $\overline{\rho}(\bigcup_{i=N}^{\infty} S_i) \to 0$ as $N \to \infty$, then

$$\rho(\bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} S_i) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \rho(S_i).$$

Proof. The sequence of partial sums $\sum_{i=0}^{t} \rho(S_i)$ is a monotone nondecreasing sequence bounded above by 1, and so converges. Let its limit be r. Now

$$\frac{|(\bigcup_{i=0}^{\infty} S_i) \lceil n|}{n+1} = \frac{|(\bigcup_{i=0}^{N} S_i) \lceil n|}{n+1} + \frac{|(\bigcup_{i=N+1}^{\infty} S_i) \lceil n|}{n+1}$$

We need to show that the term on the left approaches r as $n \to \infty$. For any N, as $n \to \infty$ the first term on the right approaches $\sum_{i=0}^{N} \rho(S_i)$ by finite additivity and thus approaches r as $N \to \infty$. We are done because, by hypothesis, the second term on the right can be made arbitrarily close to 0 by choosing N sufficiently large and then n sufficiently large. In more detail, let $\epsilon > 0$ be given. Choose N_0 so that for all $N \ge N_0$, $\overline{\rho}(\bigcup_{i=N}^{\infty} S_i) < \epsilon/3$. Choose N_1 so that for all $N \ge N_1$, $|r - \sum_{i=0}^{N} \rho(S_i)| < \epsilon/3$. Fix $N = \max\{N_0, N_1\}$. Rewrite the displayed equation above as $a_n = b_{n,N} + c_{n,N}$, so that we are trying to prove that $a_n \to r$ as $n \to \infty$. Choose n_0 so large so that for all $n \ge n_0$, $c_{n,N} < \epsilon/3$. Choose n_1 so large that for all $n \ge n_1$, $|\sum_{i=0}^{N} \rho(S_i) - b_{n,N}| < \epsilon/3$. Standard calculations show that if $n \ge \max\{n_0, n_1\}$, then $|a_n - r| < \epsilon$.

Definition 2.7. If $A \subseteq \omega$ then $\mathcal{R}(A) = \bigcup_{n \in A} R_n$

Our sequence $\{R_n\}$ clearly satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 2.6, so we have the following corollary.

Corollary 2.8. $\rho(\mathcal{R}(A)) = \sum_{n \in A} 2^{-(n+1)}$

This gives an explicit construction of sets with a pre-assigned densities.

Corollary 2.9. Every real number $r \in [0, 1]$ is a density.

If $r = .b_0 b_1 b_2 \cdots_i \ldots$ is the binary expansion of r, let $A = \{i : b_i = 1\}$ and then $\rho(\mathcal{R}(A)) = r$. Recall that a real number r is *computable* if and only if there is a computable function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{Q}$ such that $|r - f(n)| \leq 2^{-n}$ for all $n \geq 0$.

Observation 2.10. The density r_A of $\mathcal{R}(A)$, i.e. $\sum_{n \in A} \rho(R_n)$, is a computable real if and only if A is computable.

Proof. If A is computable, to compute the first t bits of r_A , check if $0, \ldots, t$ are in A, and take the resulting fraction $.b_0 \ldots b_t$. If r_A is computable then there exists an algorithm Φ which, when given t, computes the first t digits of the binary expansion of r_A . To see if $n \in A$, compute the first (n + 1) bits of r_A .

We shall later characterize those reals which are densities of computable sets.

It is obvious that every Turing degree contains a generically computable subset of ω . Namely, given a set A, let $B = \{2^n : n \in A\}$. Then B is generically computable via the algorithm which answers "no" on all arguments which are not powers of 2 and gives no answer otherwise. Now A and B are Turing equivalent, and in fact they are many-one equivalent if $A \neq \omega$.

Observation 2.11. The set $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is Turing equivalent to A and is generically computable if and only if A is computable. Hence, every nonzero Turing degree contains a subset of ω which is not generically computable.

This is the same argument as in Observation 1.7, namely any generic algorithm for $\mathcal{R}(A)$ must converge on an element of each R_n . Note also that A and $\mathcal{R}(A)$ are many-one equivalent for $A \neq \omega$, so that every many-one degree which contains a noncomputable set also contains a set which is not generically computable.

Definition 2.12. Two sets A and B are generically similar, which we denote by $A \sim_g B$, if their symmetric difference $A \triangle B = (A \setminus B) \cup (B \setminus A)$ has density 0.

It is easy to check that \sim_g is an equivalence relation. Any set of density 1 is generically similar to ω , and any set of density 0 is generically similar to \emptyset .

Definition 2.13. A set A is *coarsely computable* if A is generically similar to a computable set.

From the remarks above, all sets of density 1 or of density 0 are coarsely computable. One can think of coarse computability in the following way: The set A is coarsely computable if there exists a *total* algorithm Φ which may make mistakes on membership in A but the mistakes occur only on a negligible set. While being coarsely computable is not of practical value in providing algorithms we shall see that it is an interesting measure of how computable a set is.

Observation 2.14. The word problem of any finitely generated group $G = \langle X : R \rangle$ is coarsely computable.

Proof. If G is finite then the word problem is computable. Indeed, since computability is independent of the particular presentation as long as it is finitely generated, we can use the finite multiplication table presentation, which shows that the word problem is even a regular language. Now if G

is an infinite group, the set of words on $(X \cup X^{-1})^*$ which are not equal to the identity in G has density 1 and hence is coarsely computable. (See, for example, [19].)

Proposition 2.15. There is a c.e. set which is coarsely computable but not generically computable.

Proof. Recall that a c.e. set A is simple if \overline{A} is immune. It suffices to construct a simple set A of density 0, since any such set is coarsely computable but not generically computable by Proposition 2.2. This is done by a slight modification of Post's simple set construction. Namely, for each e, enumerate W_e until, if ever, a number $> e^2$ appears, and put the first such number into A. Then A is simple, and A has density 0 because for each e, it has at most e elements less than e^2 .

It is easily seen that the family of coarsely computable sets is meager and of measure 0. In fact, if A is coarsely computable, then A is neither 1-generic nor 1-random. To see this, note first that if A is 1-random and C is computable, then the symmetric difference $A \triangle C$ is also 1-random, and the analogous fact also holds for 1-genericity. The result follows because 1-random sets have density 1/2 ([14], Proposition 3.2.13) and 1-generic sets have upper density 1.

Theorem 2.16. There exists a c.e. set which is not generically similar to any co-c.e. set and hence is neither coarsely computable nor generically computable.

Proof. Let $\{W_e\}$ be a standard enumeration of all c.e. sets. Let

$$A = \bigcup_{e \in \omega} (W_e \cap R_e)$$

Clearly, A is c.e. We first claim that A is not generically similar to any co-c.e. set and hence is not coarsely computable. Note that

$$R_e \subseteq A \triangle \overline{W_e}$$

since if $n \in R_e$ and $n \in A$, then $n \in (A \setminus \overline{W_e})$, while if $n \in R_e$ and $n \notin A$, then $n \in (\overline{W_e} \setminus A)$. So, for all e, $(A \triangle \overline{W_e})$ has positive lower density, and hence A is not generically similar to $\overline{W_e}$. It follows that A is not coarsely computable. Of course, this construction is simply a diagonal argument, but instead of using a single witness for each requirement, we use a set of witnesses of positive density.

Suppose now for a contradiction that A were generically computable. By Proposition 2.2, let W_a , W_b be c.e. sets such that $W_a \subseteq A$, $W_b \subseteq \overline{A}$, and $W_a \cup W_b$ has density 1. Then A would be generically similar to $\overline{W_b}$ since

$$A \triangle \overline{W_b} \subseteq \overline{W_a \cup W_b}$$

and $\overline{W_a \cup W_b}$ has density 0. This shows that A is not generically computable.

Definition 2.17. If $A \subseteq \omega$ and $\{A_s\}$ is a sequence of finite sets we write $\lim_s A_s = A$, if for every n we have, for all sufficiently large $s, n \in A$ if and only if $n \in A_s$.

The Limit Lemma, due to J. Shoenfield, characterizes the sets A computable from the halting problem 0' as the limits of uniformly computable sequences of finite sets.

Lemma 2.18 (The Limit Lemma). Let $A \subseteq \omega$ Then $A \leq_T 0'$ if and only if there is a uniformly computable sequence of finite sets $\{A_s\}$ such that $\lim_s A_s = A$.

We note that by Post's Theorem, the sets Turing reducible to 0' are precisely the sets which are Δ_2^0 in the arithmetical hierarchy.

Theorem 2.19. The set $\mathcal{R}(A) = \bigcup_{n \in A} R_n$ is coarsely computable if and only if $A \leq_T 0'$.

Proof. First suppose that $A \leq_T 0'$. Then by the Limit Lemma there is a uniformly computable sequence $\{A_s\}$ of finite sets such that $\lim_s A_s = A$. To construct a computable set C generically similar to $\mathcal{R}(A)$ we do the following. Any n is in a unique set R_k . Compute this k, so $n \in \mathcal{R}(A)$ if and only if $k \in A$. We put n into C if and only if k is in the approximating set A_n . This condition is computable. Now note that if n is sufficiently large then $k \in A$ if and only if $k \in A_n$. Hence

$$(C \triangle \mathcal{R}(A)) \cap R_k$$

is finite for all k. Let $D = (C \triangle \mathcal{R}(A))$. Then $D \cap R_k$ has density 0 for all k and thus D has density 0 by Lemma 2.6 on restricted countable additivity. It follows that $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is coarsely computable.

Now suppose that $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is coarsely computable, that is, it is generically similar to a computable set C. We need to show that $A \leq_T 0'$ by finding a uniformly computable sequence of finite sets $\{A_s\}$ with $\lim_s A_s = A$.

Note that $\rho(C) = \rho(\mathcal{R}(A))$ which exists, and $\rho(C \cap R_n) = \rho(\mathcal{R}(A) \cap R_n)$. So if $n \in A$, then $\rho(\mathcal{R}(A) \cap R_n) = \rho(R_n) = 2^{-(n+1)}$ while if $n \notin A$, then $\rho(R_n \cap \mathcal{R}(A)) = 0$. Thus, we can use our ability to approximate $\rho(C \cap R_n)$ to approximate A.

At stage s, for every $n \leq s$, calculate

$$\rho_s(C \cap R_n) = \frac{|(C \cap R_n)\lceil s|}{s+1}$$

Put *n* into A_s if and only if this fraction is $\geq \frac{1}{2}(2^{-(n+1)})$. The sequence $\{A_s\}$ is uniformly computable. It converges to A since $\rho_s(C \cap R_n)$ converges to $\rho(C \cap R_n)$ as $s \to \infty$.

In particular, if A is any set Turing reducible to 0' but not computable then $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is coarsely computable but not generically computable. We can now prove the following theorem. **Theorem 2.20.** Every nonzero Turing degree contains a set which is not coarsely computable.

Proof. If A is not Turing reducible to 0', then $\mathcal{R}(A)$, which is Turing equivalent to A, is not coarsely computable by the previous theorem. Now assume that A is noncomputable and $A \leq_T 0'$. We now apply Theorem 1.2 of [13] which implies that every nonzero Turing degree $\mathbf{a} \leq \mathbf{0}'$ computes a function f which is not majorized by any computable function. The argument is now essentially a diagonalization argument using such an $f \leq_T A$ as a time bound.

We now construct a set $B \leq_T f$ which is not coarsely computable. This suffices since then

$$A \oplus B = \{2n : n \in A\} \cup \{2n + 1 : n \in B\}$$

is a set Turing equivalent to A which is not coarsely computable.

For every pair $\langle e, k \rangle$ the requirement $P_{e,k}$ is that if Φ_e is a total $\{0, 1\}$ -valued function, then there exists a $j \geq k$ such that Φ_e and the characteristic function of B disagree on all points in the interval $[2^j, 2^{(j+1)})$. If all the $P_{e,k}$ are met, then the upper density of $B \triangle \Phi^{-1}(1)$ is at least $\frac{1}{2}$ for each e with Φ_e total and $\{0, 1\}$ -valued. Hence B is not generically similar to the set whose characteristic function is Φ_e .

For definiteness, set $0 \notin B$. We now determine B on each interval $[2^j, 2^{j+1})$ in the natural order. Initially, no requirements are met. Suppose that B has been defined on each interval $[2^i, 2^{i+1})$ for i < j. Say that a requirement $P_{e,k}$ requires attention if it is not yet met, $j \geq k$, and

$$\Phi_{e,f(j)}(x) \downarrow \text{ for all } x \in [2^j, 2^{(j+1)})$$

If there is no requirement $P_{e,k}$ with $\langle e,k\rangle \leq j$ which requires attention, let *B* be empty on the interval $[2^k, 2^{k+1})$. Otherwise, let $\langle e,k\rangle$ be minimal such that $P_{e,k}$ requires attention. Make B(x) and $\Phi_e(x)$ disagree on all $x \in [2^j, 2^{(j+1)})$, and declare $P_{e,k}$ met (forever). In this case we say that $P_{e,k}$ receives attention.

We claim that all the requirements $P_{e,k}$ are satisfied. Note that each such requirement receives attention at most once. Suppose for a contradiction that $P_{e,k}$ is not met, so that Φ_e is total and $\{0,1\}$ -valued and $P_{e,k}$ never receives attention. Since there are only finitely many stages at which requirements P_a for $a < \langle e, k \rangle$ receive attention, there are only finitely many j such that $\Phi_{e,f(j)}$ is defined on all points in the interval $[2^j, 2^{j+1})$. Let g(j)be the first stage such that $\Phi_{e,g(j)}$ is defined for all points in $[2^j, 2^{(j+1)})$. Now g is a computable function, but $g(j) \ge f(j)$ for all sufficiently large j, contradicting that f is not majorized by any computable function. \Box

The above proof is less uniform than the proof of the corresponding result (Observation 2.11) for generic computability. More precisely, the proof of Observation 2.11 shows that there is a fixed oracle Turing machine M such that M^A is a generically noncomputable set of the same Turing degree as A

for every noncomputable set A, namely $M^A = \mathcal{R}(A)$. However, we do not know whether there is a fixed such M with the corresponding property for coarse computability.

A real number r which is computable relative to 0' is called a Δ_2^0 real, and it is well known that these are the reals whose binary expansion is computable from 0'. It then follows from the Limit Lemma that a real number $r \in [0,1]$ is Δ_2^0 if and only if $r = \lim_n q_n$ for some computable sequence of rational numbers in the interval (0, 1).

Theorem 2.21. A real number $r \in [0, 1]$ is the density of some computable set if and only if r is a Δ_2^0 real.

Proof. If A is computable then we can compute

$$q_n = \rho_n(A) = \frac{|\{k : k \le n, \ k \in A\}|}{n+1}$$

for all n. Thus, if $\rho(A) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \rho_n(A)$ exists, its value r is a Δ_2^0 real.

We must now show that if $r = lim_n q_n$ is the limit of a computable sequence of rationals in the interval (0,1), there is a computable set A with $\rho(A) = r$. We define a computable increasing sequence $\{s_n\}$ of positive integers such that

$$\left|\frac{|A\lceil s_n|}{s_n+1} - q_n\right| \le \frac{1}{n} \text{ and } \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{|A\lceil s_n|}{s_n+1} = r.$$

Take $s_1 = 1$ and put 0 in A. If $A \lceil s_n$ is already defined there are two cases. If $\frac{|\bar{A}[s_n]}{s_n+1} < q_{n+1}$ find the least k such that

$$\frac{|A\lceil s_n| + k}{s_n + k + 1} \ge q_{n+1}$$

(Such a k exists because $q_{n+1} < 1$.) Let $s_{n+1} = s_n + k$ and let $A \lceil s_{n+1} =$ $A\lceil s_n \cup \{s_n+1,\ldots,s_n+k\}.$ If $\frac{|A[s_n]}{s_n+1} \ge q_{n+1}$ find the least k such that

$$\frac{|A\lceil s_n|}{s_n+k+1} < q_{n+1}.$$

Let $s_{n+1} = s_n + k$ and let $A \lceil s_{n+1} = A \lceil s_n$. (We add no new elements to A.)

Since $s_n \ge n$ we have $|\rho_{s_n(A)} - q_n| \le \frac{1}{n}$ for all n. It follows that $\rho_{s_n}(A)$ approaches $\lim_n q_n = r$ as $n \to \infty$. Furthermore, by construction, $\rho_k(A)$ is monotone increasing or decreasing on each interval $(s_n, s_{n+1}]$, so that $\rho_k(A)$ is between $\rho_{s_n}(A)$ and $\rho_{s_{n+1}}(A)$ whenever $s_n < k < s_{n+1}$. Hence $\rho_k(A) \to r$ as $k \to \infty$, so $\rho(A) = r$.

It is easily seen that every c.e. set of upper density 1 has a computable subset of upper density 1, and this makes it tempting to conjecture that every c.e. set of density 1 has a computable subset of density 1. Our next result is a refutation of this conjecture. This result has several important

corollaries, and the technique of its proof will be used to show in Theorem 2.26 that there is a set which is generically computable but not coarsely computable.

Theorem 2.22. There exists a c.e. set A of density 1 which has no computable subset of density 1.

Proof. We will construct A so that it does not contain any co-c.e. subset of density 1. We will heavily use our partition of unity $\{R_n\}$. To ensure that A has density 1, we impose the following infinitary positive requirements:

$$P_n: R_n \subseteq^* A$$

where $B \subseteq^* A$ means that $B \setminus A$ is finite. These requirements ensure that A has density 1 because (if $0 \in A$)

$$\overline{A} = \overline{A} \cap \bigcup_{n \in \omega} R_n = \bigcup_{n \in \omega} (\overline{A} \cap R_n)$$

and the last union has density 0 by restricted countable additivity (Theorem 2.6).

Let $\{W_e\}$ be a standard enumeration of all c.e. sets. We must ensure that if $\overline{W_e} \subseteq A$ (i.e. $W_e \cup A = \omega$), then $\overline{W_e}$ does not have density 1, (i.e. W_e does not have density 0). Since R_e has positive density, it suffices to meet the following negative requirement N_e : If $W_e \cup A = \omega$ then W_e does not have upper density 0 on R_e .

The usefulness of the sets R_e here is that the positive requirement P_e puts only elements of R_e into A and the negative requirement N_e keeps only elements of R_e out of A. Since the R_e 's are pairwise disjoint, this eliminates the need for the usual combinatorics of infinite injury constructions and indeed allows the construction of A to proceed independently on each R_e . The idea of the proof is that we can make the density of A low on an interval within R_e by restraining A on that interval, and at the same time starting to put the rest of R_e into A. If eventually the interval is contained in $W_e \cup A$, we have found an interval where W_e has high density and can start over with a new interval, Otherwise, $W_e \cup A \neq \omega$, and we meet the requirement vacuously with a finite restraint.

We construct each subset $A_e = A \cap R_e$, the *e*-th part of A, in stages. Initially, each $A_{e,0}$ is empty and the constraint r(e,0) is the least element of R_e .

At stage s, check whether or not $W_{e,s+1} \cup A_{e,s}$ fills up R_e below r(e, s), that is, whether or not $A_{e,s} \cup W_{e,s+1} \supseteq R_e \lceil r(e, s)$. If not, then $A_{e,s+1}$ is $A_{e,s}$ together with the first element of R_e which is greater than r(e, s) and which is not already in $A_{e,s}$. Set r(e, s+1) = r(e, s) in this case.

If $A_{e,s} \cup W_{e,s+1} \supseteq R_e \lceil r(e,s)$, then $A_{e,s+1}$ is $A_{e,s} \cup (R_e \lceil r(e,s))$. Now choose r(e,s+1) large enough so that r(e,s+1) > r(e,s) and $A_{e,s+1}$ has density less than or equal to 1/2 on $R_e \lceil r(e,s+1)$.

For each e there are two possibilities. The first is that $\lim_{s} r(e.s) = \alpha_e \in \omega$. In this case note that all elements of R_e which are greater than α_e are put

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into $A_e = A \cap R_e$. Thus we indeed have $R_e \subseteq^* A$. The negative requirement N_e is met vacuously because $W_e \cup A \neq \omega$.

The second possibility is that $\lim_{s} r(e, s) = \infty$. In this case $W_e \cup A_e$ fills up arbitrary large initial intervals of R_e . So $R_e \subseteq A$ by construction and W_e has positive upper density on R_e since it must supply at least 1/2 of the elements of arbitrarily large initial intervals of R_e . Namely, when r(e, s)takes on a new value, at most half of the elements of R_e less than or equal to r(e, s) are in A, and no elements of R_e less than or equal to r(e, s) enter Auntil every number in R_e less than or equal to r(e, s) has been enumerated in $W_e \cup A$, so at least half of these numbers have been enumerated in W_e . This process occurs for infinitely many values of r(e, s).

This theorem has two immediate corollaries. The first follows from the fact that any c.e. set of density 1 is generically computable.

Corollary 2.23. Generically computable sets need not be densely approximable by computable sets.

Corollary 2.24. There exists a generically computable set A of density 1 such that no generic algorithm for A has computable domain.

Proof. Let A be the c.e. set of the Theorem above. If Φ were a generic algorithm for A with computable domain then $\{x|\Phi(X) \downarrow = 1\}$ would be a computable subset of A with density 1, a contradiction.

Observation 2.25. A set A is generically computable by a partial algorithm with computable domain if and only if A is densely approximable by computable sets.

Theorem 2.26. There is a generically computable c.e. set A which is not coarsely computable.

Proof. The proof is similar to that of the previous theorem. We will construct disjoint c.e. sets A_0, A_1 such that

 $A_0 \cup A_1$ has density 1 and A_1 is not coarsely computable.

Note that both A_0 and A_1 are generically computable since they are disjoint c.e. sets and their union has density 1. So it will follow that A_1 is generically computable but not coarsely computable. We now have positive requirements

$$P_e: R_e \subseteq^* (A_0 \cup A_1)$$

and negative requirements

 N_e : If Φ_e is total then $\Phi_e^{-1}(1) \triangle A_1$ is not of density 0.

Satisfaction of the positive requirement suffices to ensure that $A_0 \cup A_1$ has density 1 as in the proof of Theorem 2.26. It is clear that satisfaction of all of the negative requirements implies that A_1 is not coarsely computable.

We again have a restraint function r(e, s). Initially, each $A_{e,0}$ is empty and the restraint r(e, 0) is the least element of R_e . At stage s, for each $e \leq s$, check whether

Domain
$$(\Phi_{e,s+1}) \supseteq R_e[r(e,s)]$$

If so, let F be the set of elements of $R_e[r(e,s)]$ which are not already in $A_0 \cup A_1$. Put all elements of $F \cap \Phi_e^{-1}(1)$ into A_0 and all other elements of F into A_1 . Since by construction at least half of the elements of $R_e[r(e,s)]$ are in F, and $F \subseteq \Phi_e^{-1}(1) \triangle A_1$, this action ensures that at least half of the elements of $R_e[r(e,s)]$ are in $\Phi_e^{-1}(1) \triangle A$. Set r(e,s+1) to be the least element of R_e such that at most half of the elements of $R_e[r(e,s+1)]$ are in $A_{0,s+1} \cup A_{1,s+1}$.

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Domain $(\Phi_{e,s+1}) \not\supseteq R_e \lceil r(e,s)$

then put into A_1 the least element of R_e which is greater than r(e, s) and which is not already in A_1 . Set r(e, s + 1) = r(e, s).

The proof that the positive requirements P_e are met is exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2.26. Hence $A_0 \cup A_1$ has density 1.

It remains to show that each negative requirement N_e is met. Suppose that Φ_e is total. Then by construction, there are infinitely many s with r(e, s + 1) > r(e, s), and so $\lim_s r(e, s) = \infty$. For each such s, the construction guarantees that at least half of the elements of $R_e \lceil r(e, s) \rceil$ are in $\Phi_e^{-1}(1) \triangle A_1$. Thus the latter set has lower density at least $\frac{1}{2}$ on R_e and hence has positive lower density on ω .

3. Relative Generic Computability

As almost always in computability theory, the previous results relativize to generic computability using an arbitrary oracle.

Definition 3.1. A set *B* is generically *A*-computable if there exists a generic description Φ of *B* which is a partial computable function relative to *A*. Also, *B* is coarsely *A*-computable if it is generically similar to a set computable from *A*.

Using Post's Theorem, we see that a set A is generically $0^{(n)}$ -computable if and only if it is densely approximable by Σ_{n+1}^0 sets and A is coarsely $0^{(n)}$ computable if and only if it is generically similar to a Δ_{n+1}^0 set. Thus the previous results show that for every $n \ge 0$ there is a Σ_{n+1}^0 set of density 1 which is not densely approximable by Δ_{n+1}^0 sets. Also, there are generically $0^{(n)}$ -computable sets which are not coarsely $0^{(n)}$ -computable and coarsely $0^{(n)}$ -computable sets which are not generically $0^{(n)}$ -computable.

Definition 3.2. Given a set A the generic class $\widehat{G}(A)$ of A is the family of all subsets of ω which are generically A-computable, that is, generically computable by oracle Turing machines with an oracle for A.

Observation 3.3. $A \leq_T B$ if and only if $\widehat{G}(A) \subseteq \widehat{G}(B)$.

Proof. It is clear that if $A \leq_T B$ then $\widehat{G}(A) \subseteq \widehat{G}(B)$. On the other hand, if $\widehat{G}(A) \subseteq \widehat{G}(B)$ then $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is generically computable from B but a generic computation of $\mathcal{R}(A)$ allows one to compute A. Hence $A \leq_T B$. \Box

So $A \equiv_T B$ if and only if $\widehat{G}(A) = \widehat{G}(B)$ and if \boldsymbol{a} is a Turing degree then $\widehat{G}(\boldsymbol{a})$ is a well-defined generic class. If $A <_T B$ then Observation 1.7 shows that $\widehat{G}(A)$ is strictly contained in $\widehat{G}(B)$.

Observation 3.4. Let (\mathbf{D}, \leq_T) be the set of all Turing degrees partially ordered by Turing reducibility and let (\mathbf{G}, \subseteq) be the family of all generic classes partially ordered by set inclusion. Then the function \mathfrak{A} from \mathbf{D} to \mathbf{G} defined by $\mathbf{a} \mapsto \hat{G}(\mathbf{a})$ is an order isomorphism.

Proof. The remarks above show that \mathfrak{A} is well-defined, 1-1, and orderpreserving and it is onto by definition.

Recall that a Turing degree \boldsymbol{a} is minimal if $\boldsymbol{a} > 0$ and there is no Turing degree \boldsymbol{b} with $0 < \boldsymbol{b} < \boldsymbol{a}$. A theorem of Spector [2] shows that there exist uncountably many minimal Turing degrees. We can analogously define a generic class $\widehat{G}(A)$ to be minimal if $\widehat{G}(A) \not\supseteq \widehat{G}(\emptyset)$ and there is no generic class $\widehat{G}(B)$ with $\widehat{G}(\emptyset) \subsetneq \widehat{G}(B) \subsetneq \widehat{G}(A)$. It would seem to be difficult to directly construct minimal generic classes but the order isomorphism \mathfrak{A} gives the following corollary of Spector's theorem.

Corollary 3.5. There are uncountably many minimal generic classes.

It is important to note that relative generic computability does *not* give a notion of reducibility because it is not transitive. It is generally false that if $A \in \widehat{G}(B)$ and $B \in \widehat{G}(C)$ then $A \in \widehat{G}(C)$. For example, let A and Bbe Turing equivalent sets such that B is generically computable and A is not generically computable. (We have observed that every nonzero Turing degree contains such sets A and B.) Then $A \in \widehat{G}(B)$ and $B \in \widehat{G}(\emptyset)$, but $A \notin \widehat{G}(\emptyset)$. We introduce a related notion which is transitive in the next section.

4. Generic Reducibility

The failure of transitivity just noted for relativized generic computability is not surprising because the definition of $A \in \widehat{G}(B)$ involves using a *total* oracle for B to produce only a *generic* computation of A. This is analogous to the failure of transitivity for the relation "c.e. in", where an oracle for Bis used to produce only an enumeration of A. The natural way to achieve transitivity is to have the oracle and the output be of a similar nature. The notion of enumeration reducibility (\leq_e) has been well studied. The intuitive concept of enumeration reducibility is that $A \leq_e B$ if there is a fixed oracle Turing machine M which, given a listing of B in any order on its oracle tape, produces a listing of A. From this point of view, when the machine lists a number n in A, it has used the membership of k in B only for a finite set D of values of k, and we can effectively list the set of pairs (n, D) for which this occurs. This leads to a more convenient formal definition of enumeration reducibility where we replace oracle Turing machines by c.e. sets of codes of such pairs.

Definition 4.1. An enumeration operator is a c.e. set. If W is an enumeration operator, the elements of W are viewed as coding pairs $\langle n, D \rangle$, where $n \in \omega$ and D is a finite subset of ω identified with its canonical index $\sum_{k \in D} 2^k$. We view W as the mapping from sets to sets

$$X \to W(X) := \{n : (\exists D) [\langle n, D \rangle \in W \& D \subseteq X]\}$$

We can now use enumeration operators to formally define enumeration reducibility.

Definition 4.2. Y is enumeration reducible to X (written $Y \leq_e X$) if Y = W(X) for some enumeration operator W.

It is well known that the enumeration operators are closed under composition and hence that enumeration reducibility is transitive. Also, each enumeration operator W is obviously \subseteq -monotone in the sense that if $U \subseteq V$ then $W(U) \subseteq W(V)$.

We are now ready to define generic reducibility. Recall that a generic description of a set A is a partial function Ψ which agrees with the characteristic function of A on its domain and which has a domain of density 1. If Ψ is a partial function, let $\gamma(\Psi) = \{\langle a, b \rangle : \Psi(a) = b\}$, so that $\gamma(\Psi)$ is a set of natural numbers coding the graph of Ψ . A listing of the graph of a generic description of a set A is called a *generic listing for* A. Intuitively, the idea is that A is generically reducible to B if there is a fixed oracle Turing machine M which, given any generic listing for B on its oracle tape, generically computes A. It is again convenient to use enumeration operators in the formal definition.

Definition 4.3. A is generically reducible to B (written $A \leq_g B$) if there is an enumeration operator W such that, for every generic description Ψ of $B, W(\gamma(\Psi)) = \gamma(\Theta)$ for some generic description Θ of A.

Note that \leq_g is transitive because enumeration operators are closed under composition. (It is also easy to check transitivity from the intuitive definition.) Thus generic reducibility leads to a degree structure as usual.

Definition 4.4. The sets A and B are generically interreducible, written $A \equiv_g B$, if $A \leq_g B$ and $B \leq_g A$. The generic degree of A, written $\deg_g(A)$, is $\{C : C \equiv_g A\}$. Of course, the generic degrees are partially ordered by the ordering induced by \leq_g .

The generic degrees have a least element $\mathbf{0}_g$, and the elements of $\mathbf{0}_g$ are exactly the generically computable sets. The generic degrees form an upper

semi-lattice, with join operation induced by \oplus where $A \oplus B = \{2n : n \in A\} \cup \{2n+1 : n \in B\}$. The following easy result gives another way in which the generic degrees resemble the Turing degrees.

Proposition 4.5. Every countable set of generic degrees has an upper bound.

Proof. Let sets A_0, A_1, \ldots be given. We must produce a set B with $A_n \leq_q B$ for all n. Let the function $f_n: \omega \to R_n$ enumerate R_n in increasing order and define $B = \bigcup_n f_n(A_n)$. Note that since f_n is 1-1 and the R_n are disjoint, we have $B(f_n(x)) = A_n(x)$. To see that $A_n \leq_g B$, let W be an enumeration operator such that $W(\gamma(\Psi)) = \gamma(\Psi \circ f_n)$ for every partial function Ψ . We must show that if Ψ is a generic description of B then $\Psi \circ f_n$ is a generic description of A_n , First, note that if $\Psi(f_n(x)) \downarrow$, then $\Psi(f_n(x)) = B(f_n(x)) = A(x)$, and hence $\Psi \circ f_n$ agrees with the characteristic function of A_n on its domain D. It remains to show that D has density 1. Since Ψ is a generic description, its domain D has density 1. The increasing bijection f_n from ω to R_n is also an increasing bijection from D to $\widehat{D} \cap R_n$. To show that D has density 1, it thus suffices to show that $D \cap R_n$ has density 1 in R_n . This follows from the general fact that if C is any generic set and E is any set of positive density, then $C \cap E$ is generic in E. (Just check that $E \setminus C$ is negligible in E.) \square

We do not know however, whether every generic degree bounds only countably many generic degrees.

The Turing degrees can be embedded into the enumeration degrees by the mapping which takes the Turing degree of a set A to the enumeration degree of $\gamma(\chi_A)$. We now give an analogous embedding of the Turing degrees into the generic degrees.

Lemma 4.6. $A \leq_T B$ if and only if $\mathcal{R}(A) \leq_q \mathcal{R}(B)$.

Proof. If $\mathcal{R}(A) \leq_g \mathcal{R}(B)$ then $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is generically computable from a generic listing of $\mathcal{R}(B)$ and thus computable from B. But a generic computation of $\mathcal{R}(A)$ allows one to compute A. Hence $A \leq_T B$. A generic listing of $\mathcal{R}(B)$ allows one to compute B uniformly. Hence if $A \leq_T B$ then $\mathcal{R}(A)$ is uniformly computable from any generic listing of $\mathcal{R}(B)$ and we have $\mathcal{R}(A) \leq_g \mathcal{R}(B)$.

So $A \equiv_T B$ if and only if $\mathcal{R}(A) \equiv_g \mathcal{R}(B)$, and if \boldsymbol{a} is a Turing degree then $\deg_q(\mathcal{R}(\boldsymbol{a}))$, defined as $\deg_q(\mathcal{R}(A))$ for $A \in \boldsymbol{a}$, is well-defined.

Theorem 4.7. Let (\mathbf{D}, \leq_T) be the set of all Turing degrees partially ordered by Turing reducibility and let (\mathbf{I}, \leq_g) be the set of all generic degrees partially ordered by generic reducibility. Then the function \mathfrak{B} from \mathbf{D} to \mathbf{I} defined by $\mathbf{a} \mapsto \deg_a(\mathcal{R}(\mathbf{a}))$ is an order embedding.

Proof. The remarks above show that \mathfrak{B} is well-defined, 1-1, and order-preserving.

It follows at once from the above observation and the existence of an antichain of Turing degrees of the size of the continuum ([17], Chapter 2) that there is an antichain of generic degrees of the size of the continuum.

Theorem 4.8. The order embedding \mathfrak{B} from the Turing degrees to the generic degrees defined above is not surjective.

We must show that there is a set A such that there is no set B with $A \equiv_g \mathcal{R}(B)$. Our first task is to give conditions on A (without mentioning any other sets) which imply that there is no set B with $A \equiv_g \mathcal{R}(B)$. These conditions involve enumeration reducibility, for which we follow Cooper ([2], Sections 11.1 and 11.3). An enumeration degree **a** is called *total* if there is a total function f such that its graph $\gamma(f)$ has degree **a**. An enumeration degree **b** $\leq_{\mathbf{e}} \mathbf{a}$ is not total. Thus, a set A has quasi-minimal enumeration degree if and only if A is not c.e. and every total function f with $\gamma(f) \leq_e A$ is computable. The next lemma gives the desired conditions on A.

Lemma 4.9. Suppose that A is a set of density 1 such that A is not generically computable and the enumeration degree of A is quasi-minimal. Then there is no set B such that $A \equiv_q \mathcal{R}(B)$.

Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that A satisfies the above hypotheses and $A \equiv_g \mathcal{R}(B)$. Let S_A be the semicharacteristic function of A, that is, $S_A(n) = 1$ if $n \in G$ and $S_A(n)$ is undefined otherwise. Note that $A \equiv_e \gamma(S_A)$, and S_A is a generic description of A since A has density 1. Since $\mathcal{R}(B) \leq_g A$, by the definition of generic reducibility, there is a generic description Θ of $\mathcal{R}(B)$ such that $\gamma(\Theta) \leq_e S_A$. However, as we have noted, B is computable by a fixed oracle machine from any generic description of $\mathcal{R}(B)$. Hence, if χ_B is the characteristic function of B, we have

$$\gamma(\chi_B) \leq_e \gamma(\Theta) \leq_e S_A \leq_e A.$$

Therefore, $\gamma(\chi_B) \leq_e A$. Since the enumeration degree of A is quasi-minimal and χ_B is total, it follows that χ_B and hence B and $\mathcal{R}(B)$ are computable. As $A \leq_g \mathcal{R}(B)$, we conclude that A is generically computable, which is the desired contradiction.

Proof. To prove the theorem must now construct a set A satisfying the hypotheses of the above lemma. We use a modified version of Cooper's elegant exposition of Medvedev's proof of the existence of quasi-minimal edgrees. ([2], Theorem 11.4.2). In order to ensure that A has density 1 we meet the following positive requirements ensuring that A has density 1:

$$P_n: R_n \subseteq^* A$$

In order to ensure that A is not generically computable, we satisfy the following requirements:

$$S_n: \Phi_n$$
 does not generically compute A

Note that meeting all the requirements P_n and S_n ensures that A is not c.e. since any c.e. set of density 1 is generically computable.

Hence, in order to ensure that the e-degree of A is quasi-minimal, it suffices to ensure that every total function f with $\gamma(f) \leq_e A$ is computable. Our standard listing $\{W_e\}$ gives us a listing of enumeration operators. We will meet the following requirements:

U_n : If $W_n(A) = \gamma(f)$ where f is a total function, then f is computable

We identify partial functions with their graphs. For example, if θ and μ are partial functions, then $\theta \supseteq \mu$ means that the graph of θ contains the graph of μ . We say that θ and μ are *compatible* if they agree on the intersection of their domains, or, equivalently, $\theta \cup \mu$ is a partial function. A *string* is a $\{0,1\}$ -valued partial function σ whose domain is equal to $\{0,1,\ldots,k-1\}$ for some k called the *length* of σ .

At each stage s in the construction of A, we will have a partial computable function θ_s (taking values in $\{0, 1\}$) which represents the part of the characteristic function of A constructed by the beginning of stage s. We will have $\theta_{s+1} \supseteq \theta_s$ for all s, and the characteristic function of A will be $\bigcup_s \theta_s$. The domain of θ_s will be a computable set having at most finitely elements not in $\bigcup_{i < s} R_i$. Further, there will be only finitely many x with $\theta_s(x) = 0$. Let θ_0 be the empty partial function.

If s = 3n, then define $\theta_{s+1} \supseteq \theta_s$ by setting $\theta_{s+1}(x) = 1$ for all $x \in \bigcup_{i < s} R_i$ such that $\theta_s(x) \neq 0$. These steps will ensure that $\bigcup_s \theta_s$ is total and each $R_i \subseteq^* A$.

If s = 3n+1 we diagonalize against Φ_n . If there exists an $x \in R_s \setminus dom(\sigma_s)$ with $\Phi_n(x)$ defined then let $\sigma_{s+1}(x)$ have a value of 0 or 1 which is different from $\Phi_n(x)$. If no such x exists let $\sigma_{s+1} = \sigma_s$. This ensures that the requirement S_n is met because $R_s \cap dom(\theta_s)$ is finite and R_s has positive density.

If θ is a partial function, let $\theta^{-1}(1) = \{x : \theta(x) = 1\}.$

If s = 3n + 2, there are two cases.

Case 1. There exists a string σ_s compatible with θ_s and numbers x, y_1 , and y_2 such that $y_1 \neq y_2$ and $\langle x, y_1 \rangle, \langle x, y_2 \rangle \in W_n(\sigma_s^{-1}(1))$.

In this case, let $\theta_{s+1} = \theta_s \cup \sigma_s$, ensuring that $W_n(A)$ is not a single valued function.

Case 2. Otherwise. Let $\theta_{s+1} = \theta_s$. We must show that the requirement U_n is met in this case. Suppose that $W_n(A) = \gamma(f)$ where f is a total function. We must show that f is computable. Note that the set of strings compatible with θ_s is computable for fixed s. Given x, to compute f(x) effectively, search effectively for a number y and a string σ which is compatible with θ_s such that $\langle x, y \rangle \in W_n(\sigma^{-1}(1))$. We claim that such σ, y exist, and the only possible value for y is f(x), which suffices to show that f is computable. First, observe that there is a string σ compatible with θ_s with $\langle x, f(x) \rangle \in W_n(\sigma^{-1}(1))$ since $\langle x, f(x) \rangle \in W_n(A)$ and $A \supseteq \theta_s$. Thus,

the desired σ and y exist, in fact with y = f(x). It remains to show that if $\langle x, y \rangle \in W_n(\tau^{-1}(1) \text{ where } \tau \text{ is a string compatible with } \theta_s$, then y = f(x). Let μ be a string compatible with θ_s such that $\mu^{-1}(1) \supseteq \sigma^{-1}(1) \cup \tau^{-1}(1)$. (To obtain μ , let b be the greater of the length of σ and the length of τ , and, for x < b, set $\mu(x) = \theta_s(x)$ if x is in the domain of $\theta_s(x)$, and otherwise let $\mu(x) = 1$.) Then, by the monotonicity of enumeration operators, $\langle x, f(x) \rangle$ and $\langle x, y \rangle$ both belong to $W_n(\tau^{-1}(1))$. Since Case 1 does not apply, we conclude that y = f(x), which completes the proof. \Box

5. Further results and open questions

The authors, in ongoing joint work with Rod Downey, have obtained further results in the area and are working on open questions. The section is a brief update on this project. Full results and proofs will appear in a later paper [3].

One aspect of the project is the study of the connection between computability theory and asymptotic density. Recall that it was shown in Theorem 2.22 that there is a c.e. set A of density 1 which has no computable subset of density 1. In that proof, the positive requirements $R_n \subseteq^* A$ had an infinitary nature, and this makes one suspect that no such A is low. (A set A is called *low* if $A' \leq_T 0'$ or, in other words, every A-c.e. set is computable from the halting problem.) Indeed this is the case, and we also show that every nonlow c.e. set computes such an A.

Theorem 5.1. [3] The following are equivalent for any c.e. degree **a**:

- (1) The degree \mathbf{a} is not low.
- (2) There is a c.e. set A of degree **a** such that A has density 1 but no computable subset of A has density 1.

Another line of results related to Theorem 2.22 involves weakening the requirement that the subsets have density 1. The following result is easy.

Theorem 5.2. [3] If A is a c.e. set of upper density at least r, where r is a computable real, then A has a computable subset of upper density at least r. In particular, every c.e. set of upper density 1 has a computable subset of upper density 1.

We know by Theorem 2.22 that this result fails for lower density even in the case r = 1, but we show that a slightly weaker version holds for lower density.

Theorem 5.3. [3] If A is a c.e. set and r is a real number, and the lower density of A is at least r, then for each $\epsilon > 0$ A has a computable subset whose lower density at least $r - \epsilon$. In particular, every c.e. set of density 1 has computable subsets of lower density arbitrarily close to 1.

In Theorem 2.21 we showed that the densities of computable sets are precisely the Δ_2^0 reals in [0,1]. In [3] we consider analogous results for upper and lower densities, and for c.e. sets. Call a real number $r \ left-\Pi_n^0$ if $\{q \in \mathbb{Q} : q < r\}$ is Π_n^0 , i.e. the lower cut of r in the rationals is Π_n^0 . An analogous definition holds for other levels of the arithmetic hierarchy.

Theorem 5.4. [3]. Let r be a real number in the interval [0, 1].

- (1) r is the lower density of a computable set if and only if r is left Σ_2^0
- (2) r is the upper density of a computable set if and only if r is left $\Pi_2^{\overline{0}}$
- (3) r is the density of a c.e. set if and only if r is left Π_2^0
- (4) r is the lower density of a c.e. set if and only if r is left Σ_3^0 (5) r is the upper density of a c.e. set if and only if r is left Π_2^0

The other main topic of our ongoing project with Downey is the structure of the generic degrees and the generic classes. However, here we are have not yet been able to answer some questions which would seem to be basic.

Question 1. Do there exist noncomputable sets A, B whose generic classes form a minimal pair in the sense that every set generically computable from both A and B is generically computable? (That is, $\widehat{G}(A) \cap \widehat{G}(B) = \widehat{G}(\emptyset)$.)

So far, our results on the above question have a negative character. A set A is hyperimmune if A is infinite and for every computable sequence $\{F_i\}_{i \in \omega}$ of pairwise disjoint finite sets, $A \cap F_i = \emptyset$ for some index *i*.

Theorem 5.5. [3] Let A and B be sets such that $A \cup B$ is hyperimmune. Then A and B do not form a minimal pair in the sense of the above question.

This result shows that minimal pairs for relative generic computability (if they exist at all) are far rarer than for Turing reducibility.

Corollary 5.6. [3] The set of pairs (A, B) such that $\widehat{G}(A) \cap \widehat{G}(B) = \widehat{G}(\emptyset)$ is meager and of measure 0 in $2^{\omega} \times 2^{\omega}$.

Corollary 5.7. [3] If A and B are Δ_2^0 sets, then A, B do not form a minimal pair for relative generic computability in the above sense.

Further, we do not know whether there exist minimal degrees or minimal pairs for generic reducibility. Since there exist hyperimmune sets of minimal Turing degree, the following result shows that our embedding \mathfrak{B} of the Turing degrees into the generic degrees need not map minimal Turing degrees to minimal generic degrees.

Theorem 5.8. [3] If **a** is a Turing degree and **a** contains a hyperimmune set, then $\mathcal{R}(\mathbf{a})$ is not a minimal generic degree.

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