Abstract
In this paper, we use The Monks Story, a famous traditional Chinese proverb, as an example to illustrate the practicality of our model on the matters in reality. The Monks Story is typically used in literature that is related to marketing, human resource, and management aspects. However, in our paper, we look at the Monks Story from a different perspective: we assume that the number of players does not change over time and examine how players’ behaviors evolve over time. Our analysis of this story is focused on how individual player as a dual-self individual makes decisions when interacting with other players. We analyze the story and compare the results under three scenarios: history-independent strategy case, history-dependent strategy case and dual-self approach.
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Original Russian Text © W. Wang, J. Zheng, 2014, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Priloszheniya, 2014, No. 4, pp. 97–115.
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Wang, W., Zheng, J. Infinitely repeated games with self-control: A dual-self interpretation of the Monks Story. Autom Remote Control 76, 521–534 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915030169
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915030169