Thomas Ågotnes
Michael Wooldridge
ABSTRACT
Qualitative Coalitional Games (QCGs) are a version of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals which are either satisfied or unsatisfied, and each choice available to a coalition is a set of goals, which would be jointly satisfied if the coalition made that choice. A coalition in a QCG will typically form in order to bring about a set of goals that will satisfy all members of the coalition. In this paper, we introduce and study Temporal QCGs (TQCGs), i.e., games in which a sequence of QCGs is played. In order to represent and reason about such games, we introduce a linear time temporal logic of QCGs, known as £ (TQCG). We give a complete axiomatization of £ (TQCG), use it to investigate the properties of TQCGs in a small example, identify its expressive power, establish its complexity, characterise classes of TQGCs with formulas from our logical language, and formulate several (temporal) solution concepts for TQCGs.
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Index Terms
- Temporal qualitative coalitional games
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