Davide Bilò
ABSTRACT
Let G=(V,E) be a graph modeling a network where each edge is owned by a selfish agent, which establishes the cost for using her edge by pursuing only her personal utility. In such a setting, several classic network optimization problems, like for instance many graph traversal problems, asks for solutions in which an edge of G can be used several times. In game-theoretic terms, these problems are known as one-parameter problems, but with a peculiarity: the workload of each agent is a natural number. In this paper we refine the classic notion of monotonicity of an algorithm so as to exactly capture this property, and we then provide a general technique to efficiently develop truthful mechanisms for this family of problems.
- A. Archer and E. Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In Proc. of the 42nd Annual IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 482--491, 2001. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- M.-Y. Kao, X.-Y. Li, and W. Wang. Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: A general framework. In Proc. of the 6th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2005. Google ScholarDigital Library
- N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behaviour, 35:166--196, 2001.Google ScholarCross Ref
Index Terms
- An algorithm composition scheme preserving monotonicity
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