ABSTRACT
In this paper we cast DRM in a setting that allows us to model a number of current approaches as games. The DRM game is partitioned into two subgames, one that considers the game associated with content acquisition, and a second that considers how a consumer uses the content, along with a vendor's response to this usage. Examples are provided in order to demonstrate how these subgames correspond to real situations associated with content industries, and the conditions under which Nash equilibria will exist. These subgames form the primary stage of a repeated game that models a number of important long-term interactions between consumers and vendors. We analyze current strategies that attempt to influence the outcome of the repeated game, and we also consider a new type of architectural infrastructure that makes novel use of a trust authority in order to create a suitable environment for constructing DRM games that may prove useful in the future.
- E. Adar and B.A. Huberman. Free riding on Gnutella. First Monday, 5(10), Oct. 2000. http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_10/adar/index.htmlGoogle Scholar
- A. Arnab and A. Hutchison. Fairer usage contracts for {DRM}. In Proceedings of the Fifth ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, pages 1--7, Alexandria, VA, Nov. 2005. Google ScholarDigital Library
- D. Bergemann, T. Eisenbach, J. Feigenbaum, and S. Shenker. Flexibility as an instrument in DRM systems. In Fourth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2-3 2005Google Scholar
- D. Berlind, Executive Editor. Content restriction annulment and protection (CRAP) video. ZDNet, http://news.zdnet.com/2036-2_22-6035707.htmlGoogle Scholar
- N. Christin, A. Weigend, and J. Chuang. Content availability, pollution and poisoning in file sharing peer-to-peer networks. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 68--77, New York, NY, 2005. Google ScholarDigital Library
- D. Dhanekula, G. L. Heileman, and B. Horne. Content spreading in peer-to-peer networks. In Proceedings of IADIS International Conference on e-Commerce 2005, pages 85--92, Porto, Portugal, Dec. 15-17 2005.Google Scholar
- The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, H.R. 2281, United State Code, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860}, Oct. 28 1998.Google Scholar
- P. K. Dutta. Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999.Google Scholar
- E. W. Felton. A skeptical view of DRM and fair use. Communications of the ACM, 46(4):56--59, 2003. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Free software foundation. some confusing or loaded words and phrases that are worth avoiding. www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.htmlGoogle Scholar
- G. L. Heileman and P. A. Jamkhedkar. DRM interoperability analysis from the perspective of a layered framework. In Proceedings of the Fifth ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, pages 17--26, Alexandria, VA, Nov. 2005. Google ScholarDigital Library
- B. Horne, B. Pinkas, and T. Sander. Escrow services and incentives in peer-to-peer networks. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 85--94, Tampa, FL, Oct. 14-17 2001. Google ScholarDigital Library
- P. A. Jamkhedkar and G. L. Heileman. DRM as a layered system. In Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, pages 11--21, Washington, DC, Oct. 2004. Google ScholarDigital Library
- P. A. Jamkhedkar, G. L. Heileman, and I. Martinez-Ortiz. Middleware services for DRM. In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Communication Systems Software and Middleware (COMSWARE), pages 1--8, Bangalore, India, Jan. 7-12 2007.Google ScholarCross Ref
- S. Katzenbeisser, K. Kursawe, and J. Talstra. Graceful infringement reactions in DRM systems. In Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, pages 89--95, Alexandria, VA, Oct. 30 2006. Google ScholarDigital Library
- M. B. Margolin, M. K. Wright, and B. N. Levine. Analysis of incentives--based secrets protection system. In Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, pages 22--30, Washington, DC, Oct. 2004. Google ScholarDigital Library
- P. Moulin and R. Koetter. Data-hiding codes. Proceedings of the IEEE, 93(12):2083--2126, Dec. 2005.Google ScholarCross Ref
- M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.Google Scholar
- B. C. Popescu, F. L. A. J. Kamperman, B. Crispo, and A. S. Tanenbaum. A DRM security architecture for home networks. In Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, pages 1--10, Washington, DC, Oct. 2004. Google ScholarDigital Library
- R. Safavi-Naini, N. P. Sheppard, and T. Uehara. Import/export in digital rights management. In Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, pages 99--110, Washington, DC, Oct. 2004. Google ScholarDigital Library
- A. U. Schmidt, O. Tafreschi, and R. Wolf. Interoperability challenges for DRM systems. In IFIP/GI Workshop on Virtual Goods, Ilmenau, Germany, 2004. http://virtualgoods.tu-ilmenau.de/2004/program.htmlGoogle Scholar
- E. Van Buskirk. A poison pen from the RIAA. WIRED, Feb. 28 2007. www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/02/72834Google Scholar
Index Terms
The drm game
Recommendations
Fairer usage contracts for DRM
DRM '05: Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Digital rights managementDRM has been widely promoted as a means to enforce copyright. In many previous papers, it has been argued that DRM gives too much power to rights holders and actually goes beyond the restrictions provided by copyright laws. In this paper we argue that ...
Differences between the iterated prisoner's dilemma and the chicken game under noisy conditions
SAC '02: Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computingThe prisoner's dilemma has evolved into a standard game for analyzing the success of cooperative strategies in repeated games. With the aim of investigating the behavior of strategies in some alternative games we analyzed the outcome of iterated games ...
Discovering theorems in game theory: Two-person games with unique pure Nash equilibrium payoffs
In this paper we provide a logical framework for two-person finite games in strategic form, and use it to design a computer program for discovering some classes of games that have unique pure Nash equilibrium payoffs. The classes of games that we ...
Comments