Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Abstract
Keyword auctions account for an enormous proportion of revenue for the major search engines. Consequently, substantial literature analyzing alternative auction designs has sprouted in recent years. We contribute to this growing literature by engaging in a simulation-based analysis of strategic interactions in keyword auctions which are difficult to analyze in closed form. In this letter we provide an overview of two specific efforts in this direction. The first effort presents analysis of the dynamic bidding strategies, while the second effort is performed in a static context, but involves a close analysis of several classes of Bayesian bidding strategies. Both these efforts attempt to bridge the gap between the mostly theoretical literature to date and real auctions.
- CARY, M., DAS, A., EDELMAN, B., GIOTIS, I., HEIMERL, K., KARLIN, A. R., MATHIEU, C., AND SCHWARZ, M. 2007. Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions. In Eighth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 262-271. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- LAHAIE, S. AND PENNOCK, D. M. 2007. Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions. In Eighth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 50-56. Google ScholarDigital Library
- VARIAN, H. 2007. Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, 6, 1163-1178.Google ScholarCross Ref
- VOROBEYCHIK, Y. 2009. Simulation-based game theoretic analysis of keyword auctions with low-dimensional bidding strategies. In Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. Google ScholarDigital Library
- VOROBEYCHIK, Y. AND REEVES, D. 2008. Equilibrium analysis of dynamic bidding in sponsored search auctions. International Journal of Electronic Business.Google Scholar
Index Terms
- Simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions
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