Peter Key
Alexandre Proutiere
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce and investigate a novel class of multipath routing games with elastic traffic. Users open one or more connections along diffierent feasible paths from source to destination and act selfishly--seeking to transfer data as fast as possible.Users only control their routing choices , and once these choices have been made, the connection rates are elastic and determined via congestion control algorithms (e.g.TCP) which ultimately maximize a certain notion of the network utility. We analyze the existence and the performance of the Nash Equilibria (NEs) of the resulting routing games.
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Cross Ref
- P. Key, A. Proutiere. Routing Games with Elastic Traffic. MSR Technical Report, 2009.Google Scholar
- P. Key, L. Massoulie, and D. Towsley. Path selection and multipath congestion control. In proc. of IEEE Infocom, 2007.Google ScholarDigital Library
- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V.V. Vazirani (Eds). Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, 2007. Google ScholarDigital Library
- M. Voorneveld and H. Norde A characterization of Ordinal Potential Games Economics Letters, 19:235--242, 1997.Google ScholarCross Ref
Index Terms
- Routing games with elastic traffic
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