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CAPTCHA smuggling: hijacking web browsing sessions to create CAPTCHA farms

Published:22 March 2010Publication History

ABSTRACT

CAPTCHAs protect online resources and services from automated access. From an attacker's point of view, they are typically perceived as an annoyance that prevents the mass creation of accounts or the automated posting of messages. Hence, miscreants strive to effectively bypass these protection mechanisms, using techniques such as optical character recognition or machine learning. However, as CAPTCHA systems evolve, they become more resilient against automated analysis approaches.

In this paper, we introduce and evaluate an attack that we denote as CAPTCHA smuggling. To perform CAPTCHA smuggling, the attacker slips CAPTCHA challenges into the web browsing sessions of unsuspecting victims, misusing their ability to solve these challenges. A key point of our attack is that the CAPTCHAs are surreptitiously injected into interactions with benign web applications (such as web mail or social networking sites). As a result, they are perceived as a normal part of the application and raise no suspicion. Our evaluation, based on realistic user experiments, shows that CAPTCHA smuggling attacks are feasible in practice.

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        SAC '10: Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
        March 2010
        2712 pages
        ISBN:9781605586397
        DOI:10.1145/1774088

        Copyright © 2010 ACM

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        Association for Computing Machinery

        New York, NY, United States

        Publication History

        • Published: 22 March 2010

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        SAC '10 Paper Acceptance Rate364of1,353submissions,27%Overall Acceptance Rate1,650of6,669submissions,25%

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