Noam Nisan
Michael Schapira
Gregory Valiant
Abstract
Often, in both computerized settings and economics settings, the prescribed behavior for participants is to repeatedly "best respond" to each others' actions. We aim to understand when such myopic "local rationality" is also "globally rational", i.e., when is it best for a player, given that the others are repeatedly best-responding, to also repeatedly best-respond?
- Nisan, N., Schapira, M., Valiant, G., and Zohar, A. 2011a. Best-response auctions. In EC '11: Proceedings of the 12th symposium on Electronic Commerce. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Nisan, N., Schapira, M., Valiant, G., and Zohar, A. 2011b. Best-response mechanisms. In ICS '11: Proceedings of the 2nd symposium on Innovations in Computer Science.Google Scholar
Index Terms
- When is it best to best-respond?
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