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On greedy network formation

Published:08 October 2012Publication History
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Abstract

Greedy navigability is a central issue in the theory of networks. However, the exogenous nature of network models do not allow for describing how greedy routable-networks emerge in reality. In turn, network formation games focus on the very emergence proess, but the applied shortest-path based cost functions exclude navigational aspects. This paper takes a frst step towards incorporating both emergence (missing in algorithmic network models) and greedy navigability (missing in network formation games) into a single framework, and proposes the Greedy Network Formation Game. Our first contribution is the game definition, where we assume a hidden metric space underneath the network, and, instead of usual shortest path metric, we use the length of greedy paths as the measure of communiation cost between players. Our main finding is that greedy-routable small worlds do not emerge on constant dimensional Eulidean grids. This simply means that the emergence of topologies on which w eunderstood the priniples of greedy forwarding cannot be explained endogenously. We also present a very brief outlook on how the situation hanges in the hyperbolic space.

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              cover image ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
              ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review  Volume 40, Issue 2
              September 2012
              129 pages
              ISSN:0163-5999
              DOI:10.1145/2381056
              Issue’s Table of Contents

              Copyright © 2012 Authors

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              Association for Computing Machinery

              New York, NY, United States

              Publication History

              • Published: 8 October 2012

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