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Optimisation of strategy placements for public good in complex networks

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Published:04 August 2014Publication History

ABSTRACT

Game theory has long been used to model cognitive decision making in societies. While traditional game theoretic modelling has focused on well-mixed populations, recent research has suggested that the topological structure of social networks play an important part in the dynamic behaviour of social systems. Any agent or person playing a game employs a strategy (pure or mixed) to optimise pay-off. Previous studies have analysed how selfish agents can optimise their payoffs by choosing particular strategies within a social network model. In this paper we ask the question that, if agents were to work towards the common goal of increasing the public good (that is, the total network utility), what strategies they should adapt within the context of a heterogeneous network.

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Other conferences
    SocialCom '14: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Social Computing
    August 2014
    115 pages
    ISBN:9781450328883
    DOI:10.1145/2639968

    Copyright © 2014 Owner/Author

    Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    • Published: 4 August 2014

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