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OASIS: Operational Access Sandboxes for Information Security

Published:07 November 2014Publication History

ABSTRACT

Android's permission system follows an "all or nothing" approach when installing an application. The end user has no way to know how the permissions are actually used by the application, and how the sensitive data flows during its execution. With this work we present OASIS (Operational Access Sandboxes for Information Security), a trusted component that allows developers to execute operations on sensitive data while keeping that data confidential. OASIS allows the end user to have full control over the data available to applications, and also grants policy based regulation of sensitive data flows. Moreover, our system can be deployed via a simple application installation, and does not require any modification to the stock Android OS.

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  1. OASIS: Operational Access Sandboxes for Information Security

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        SPSM '14: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones & Mobile Devices
        November 2014
        118 pages
        ISBN:9781450331555
        DOI:10.1145/2666620

        Copyright © 2014 ACM

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        Association for Computing Machinery

        New York, NY, United States

        Publication History

        • Published: 7 November 2014

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        SPSM '14 Paper Acceptance Rate11of29submissions,38%Overall Acceptance Rate46of139submissions,33%

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