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Approximating the nash social welfare with indivisible items

Published:12 November 2015Publication History
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Abstract

In this letter we briefly discuss our main result from [Cole and Gkatzelis 2015]. Given a set of indivisible items and a set of agents having additive valuations, our goal is to allocate the items to the agents in order to maximize the geometric mean of the agents' valuations, i.e., the Nash social welfare. This problem is known to be NP-hard, and our main result is the first efficient constant-factor approximation algorithm for this objective.

References

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  1. Approximating the nash social welfare with indivisible items

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