Dirk Bergemann
Abstract
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the impact that the structure of private information has on bidding behavior, and the sharing of surplus between the seller and the bidder. Our results provide lower bounds and upper bounds for bids and revenues across all information structures. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms.
- Bergemann, D., B. Brooks, and S. Morris (2015): "The Limits of Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, 105, 921--957.Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- Bergemann, D. (2016): "Informationally Robust Auction Design," Tech. rep., Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 2065.Google Scholar
- Bergemann, D. (2017a): "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Econometrica, 85, 107--143.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Bergemann, D. (2017b): "Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Tech. rep., Yale University, University of Chicago and Princeton University.Google Scholar
- Bergemann, D. (2018): "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence," Tech. rep., Yale University, University of Chicago and Princeton University.Google Scholar
- Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2013): "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, 81, 1251--1308.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Bergemann, D. (2016): "Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games," Theoretical Economics, 11, 487--522.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Brooks, B. and S. Du (2018): "Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Tech. rep., University of Chicago and Simon Fraser University.Google Scholar
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Index Terms
- First-price auctions with general information structures: a short introduction
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