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Realistically Fingerprinting Social Media Webpages in HTTPS Traffic

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Published:26 August 2019Publication History

ABSTRACT

In webpage fingerprinting (WPF), an adversary attempts to identify webpages in encrypted network traffic. Identifying social media webpages however is a challenging task, due to the similarity and dynamic nature of such pages. Existing webpage fingerprinting attacks often have unrealistic assumptions regarding the capability of government agencies or knowledge of the criminal's environment, which renders these attacks ineffective when applied to social media platforms. In this paper, we unravel the current concerns in state of the art WPF attacks in a social network context for forensic analysis. To resolve the issues presented, we propose an enhanced version of the WPF attack 'IUPTIS' and introduce an intelligent observer that significantly improves upon previous works. Furthermore, our improvements are compared to related WPF attacks by conducting extensive experiments on two social platforms: Twitter and Instagram. Our examination shows that the improved IUPTIS attack defeats previous works in terms of realistic obstacles such as HTTP/2, caching and performance costs, thus making it feasible to identify social media webpages with minimal resources.

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Other conferences
        ARES '19: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
        August 2019
        979 pages
        ISBN:9781450371643
        DOI:10.1145/3339252

        Copyright © 2019 ACM

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        • Published: 26 August 2019

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