Sending News Back Home:
Misinformation Lost in Transnational Social Networks

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Prior research into misinformation has overwhelmingly concentrated on English-speaking communities. As a result, misinformation has proliferated, almost unchecked, in non-English contexts resulting in a dearth of understanding the structures and impact of misinformation among marginalized and immigrant communities. Through qualitative coding of social media data and a thematic inductive analysis inspired approach, we investigate how misinformation has proliferated through social media sites, such as Facebook, and the types of informational content, and specific misinformation narratives, that spread across the Vietnamese diasporic community during the 2020 U.S. Informed by the work of organizations such as Viet Fact Check, The Interpreter, and other community-led initiatives working to provide fact-checking and online media analysis in Vietnamese and English, we present and discuss salient misinformation narratives that spread throughout Vietnamese diasporic Facebook posts, fact-checking and misleading information patterns, and inter-platform networking activities. This work contributes contextual knowledge to researchers seeking to understand how to represent and include immigrant diasporic communities and their sociocultural contexts, within research on transnational misinformation around sociotechnical systems.

1 INTRODUCTION

Social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and communications platforms like WhatsApp and WeChat, have become central pillars of the global media ecosystem [113]. Individuals turn to these spaces to find breaking news, share news with their professional and personal networks and comment on current affairs. Research indicates that social media sites and communications platforms are popular within immigrant and non-English language speaking communities within the U.S. [39] especially in light of decreases in availability of local ethnic media [88].

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Foreign language local news media has declined substantially in recent decades due to the economic crisis within journalism caused by digitization and a consolidation of local news outlets by larger media conglomerates. For example, research from the Latino Media Report found only 244 Spanish language newspapers operating within the U.S. mostly operating with small newsrooms, or no newsrooms at all, and with many not producing any original content [86]. Without access to traditional media in their native language, members of non-English speaking communities must look online for news and information. Accordingly, social media sites and messaging applications have become vital alternative news sources [67], retaining the added benefit of global interconnection [89]. These spaces are the "lingua franca" [79] of diasporic communities as they offer low or no-cost ways to communicate across geographic boundaries.

However, digital communication technologies often lack the informational gatekeeping of traditional journalistic outlets, leaving them vulnerable to the spread of misleading and fabricated content. Past research has looked to identify the causes [146], spread [58], and impact [22] of misleading content online. Such studies mostly fall under the umbrella of "misinformation" and "disinformation" research or have been broadly characterized as "information disorder" [129]. Information disorder has become a central concern of Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) [83, 111]. CSCW research has looked to understand how online platforms are implicated in the spread of misinformation around election interference [23] and public health crises [70], in addition to attempts to counter misinformation through fact-checking [59].

A networking of digital communications technologies amplifies the danger of misinformation as misleading content can spread easily across different platforms and offline contexts. Attempts to mitigate the spread and impact of misinformation have taken the form of technical interventions, e.g. algorithmic content moderation [112] and automated flagging of problematic content [84], educational interventions around informational and media literacy [81], data integrity and provenance tools [12, 13], and content-based corrections through fact-checking [116]. However, research into information disorder and attempts to counter it have predominantly focused on misinformation spread in English language and native language contexts [92]. This results in invisibilizing misinformation that is spread in languages other than English. A growing body of research seeks to address the global spread of misinformation, particularly since recent research highlights the differential impact of misinformation, and the targeting of strategic disinformation, on historically marginalized and immigrant communities [51, 99]. For example, in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, Latinx communities were targeted with misinformation via Facebook and WhatsApp that focused on false claims that Democratic candidate Joe Biden was a "Fidel Castro-style" socialist [46]. Thus, researchers call for more empirical research into the spread, saliency and impact of misinformation shared in non-English native speaking and historically marginalized communities, and greater attention to the role of race, identity, and power within mis- and disinformation [106].

Our research focuses on the Vietnamese American community in order to address a lack of consideration on how misinformation spreads within refugee and immigrant communities living within the U.S. Activists within the Vietnamese American community have organized to address the rising prevalence of online misinformation in Vietnamese [122]. In response, community-led efforts such as Viet Fact Check and The Interpreter (Người Thông) have emerged to provide translations and fact-checking content in Vietnamese that addresses common misinformation narratives and conspiracy theories [14, 15]. Little academic research has been undertaken to support community-led efforts in their understanding of the spread and saliency of Vietnamese language misinformation. Further, activists and Internet experts at Viet Fact Check and Free Press highlight

how technical interventions developed by platforms like Facebook and YouTube ignore non-English language misinformation. Content posted in English that would be removed or flagged as misleading if it were posted in English, but posts in a different global language would not be treated the same by platforms [91]. This tendency to over-privilege English language content above other languages is similarly suggested by leaked information from Facebook whistle-blower Frances Haugen. Documents confirmed that 87% of Facebook's earmarked budget for tackling misinformation is spent on the United States, despite North American users representing only 10% of the platform's active users [42]. There exists a role for CSCW research to empirically document and systematically analyze the existence of misinformation within non-English speaking communities to support community-led intervention efforts and to ensure that technical interventions to misinformation account for a diversity of linguistic, sociocultural and technological differences within digital communication.

In this paper we explore the spread of misinformation in Vietnamese about the 2020 U.S. Presidential election. We focus on the social media site Facebook as it is highly-used by Vietnamese Americans and because the site specifically announced in September 2020 that it would be taking active steps to remove election-related misinformation [1]. Accordingly, we focus on three research questions:

(1) What types (e.g. video, links to traditional news media and/or other sources images, memes, text, live streams) of misleading content were prevalent in Vietnamese?

(2) What misinformation narratives spread in Vietnamese around the 2020 U.S. Presidential election?

(3) How did Facebook intervene in the spread of misinformation in Vietnamese?

After synthesizing related work on misinformation, its impact on historically marginalized communities and extant attempts to mitigate this impact, we present an analysis of Facebook data gathered across a six-month period spanning the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign, election and confirmation. Through thematic analysis and coding of publicly available Facebook posts in Vietnamese, our subsequent findings highlight the most salient misinformation narratives around the U.S. presidential election in Vietnamese, emergent themes related to a lack of access to, or trust in Vietnamese language fact-checking, and minimal visible intervention into the spread of misinformation by Facebook including a lack of flagging misleading posts. We then discuss implications for CSCW research into misinformation focusing on a need to expand beyond Anglocentric studies of misinformation the necessity of technical interventions to account for a diversity of sociocultural and linguistic contexts.

2 BACKGROUND

In this literature review we synthesize research from across academic disciplines on the spread of misleading information via social media. We then note how misinformation has been found to have a differential impact on historically marginalized and immigrant communities, focusing in particular on misinformation in non-English language contexts. In light of this, we explore how misinformation can be understood through the roles of race, power and identity. Finally, we discuss both top-down grassroots, community-led efforts to understand and mitigate the spread of misinformation in a diversity of contexts, including the Vietnamese American community, and the role for CSCW research in supporting such efforts.

2.1 Digital Mis- and Disinformation on Social Media

"Misinformation" has become a broadly used umbrella term to frame academic conversations about misleading content. Definitions of misleading content, often colloquially referred to as "fake news", tend to delineate content across two domains, facticity and intent [117]. Information that is false but not intended to cause harm (low facticity, low intent to deceive) is labeled misinformation. Whereas false information that is deliberately spread (low facticity, high intent to deceive) has been termed disinformation [130]. Difficulty lies, however, in determining an individual or organization's true intent in the context of digital communication. In some instances ill-intent is made obvious. For example in foreign-state attempts to spread discord such as strategic campaigns by Russia's Internet Research Agency (IRA) in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election [131]. In the main, intent is hard to uncover through systematic academic research, thus the terms misinformation or "information disorder" have become the most common phrases for capturing the broad phenomenon of rapidly proliferating misleading content.

Global networking through information technologies and social media sites has facilitated the increasing spread of misinformation. Individuals have low-cost access to globalized networks of communication enabling anyone to spread messages quickly, cost-efficiently and across geographic borders. Accordingly, misinformation is a global challenge. Research in the U.K. highlights the use of political bots on Twitter to disrupt online conversations around the divisive Brexit campaign [56]; the spread of misinformation on Facebook in Bangladesh has resulted in hate attacks and mob lynching [53], and further research has highlighted the prevalence and significant impact of misinformation in Australia, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, among others [63]. In addition to undermining confidence in democratic systems and disrupting political civil order, information disorder has also retained major public health consequences. The spread of misinformation on social media around the global COVID-19 pandemic has been labelled a public health crisis or "infodemic" that has exacerbated the spread of the virus and led to public rejection of the safe and efficacious COVID-19 vaccines [32, 77]. The scale, diversity and severity of the consequences of social media misinformation have made it a core concern for CSCW researchers and academia more broadly [59, 102].

Research has been undertaken to understand the entire lifecycle of misleading information. This includes its origins [78], the different forms mis- and disinformation takes [129], how it spreads across networked technologies like social media [69] and within offline contexts [115], audience-centered approaches to understand the saliency or vulnerability of individuals [134] and groups [105] to misleading information, and its behavioral and attitudinal impacts [24]. The complexity of misinformation with means that studying information disorder is a moving target, especially as it reifies existing inequalities and differences [49]. Adding to this complexity is how misinformation reifies existing inequalities and differences. Research into the spread of mis- and disinformation around the 2016 U.S. Presidential election has brought to light how misleading information can be weaponized to exploit existing racial tensions and societal divisions [55, 76]. This is not only shown in the explicit targeting of racial minorities by disinformation but also is illuminated by the differential impact and saliency misinformation narratives retain for historically marginalized groups [66]. Acknowledging that historically marginalized and immigrant groups within the U.S. and globally face different challenges with regards to misinformation and often have amplified consequences for believing in misinformation [66] is thus vital for researchers unpacking the "wicked problem" of information disorder [120].

2.2 The Differential Impact of Misinformation within Immigrant Communities

Current research into the mis- and disinformation field privileges an Anglocentric, English language-first approach to research that wrongfully universalizes the narratives, causes and effects of problematic information. This has led to an invisibilizing of the experiences of immigrant and historically marginalized communities have with misinformation [119].

There is increasing concern about the spread of misinformation in immigrant communities because of a loss of trust in traditionally authoritative and expert entities (notably government agencies, academia, medical professionals, etc.). In parallel, minority communities are a growing political power within the U.S., both as an attractive voting bloc for traditional powers and as self-empowered communities [29, 61]. This expansion of power, combined with growing mistrust in traditional information sources, has led to vulnerabilities for historically marginalized communities. This is exacerbated by misinformation. Notably, research has documented the growing prevalence of Spanish-language misinformation on a number of topics including COVID-19 and the 2020 Presidential election targeting Latinx communities, another growing political power in the U.S. [27, 45, 57]. Similar concerns arise within Asian American Pacific Islander (AAPI) communities given the exponential growth of population, economic, and political activity from AAPI community members [31]. In both Latinx and AAPI communities, the spread of misinformation has been seen as a specific strategy to undermine political efficacy [20] and diminish political power of racial and ethnic minority groups [147].

Digital misinformation and communication barriers on social media usages are impacted by these political and social power dynamics, which requires an understanding of systemic racism [96] and how it manifests in the socio-cultural contexts of immigrant communities. Historically marginalized communities have experienced a lack of access to information and educational resources and digital technologies [87]. The minimization to this issue, paired with historic failures of media and digital technologies to properly represent and serve historically marginalized communities [94, 121] has resulted in a lack of trust towards traditional information sources.

"Language isolation" is one area where the resources and information gap has been further exacerbated in online spaces. A decline in local ethnic media sources necessitates non-English speaking individuals turn to digital spaces for information-seeking. However, those who are not fluent in English have an even more edited and curated version of translated news, often through YouTube videos, memes and social media posts, that easily runs into mis- and disinformation territory [11]. In the absence of access via traditional information sources, information-seeking becomes a complex order of operations as it is most commonly sought out on social media platforms where published content is created by community members and moderated by the proprietary platform [62] instead of entities such as the FCC (Federal Communications Commission). A lack of informational vetting within these spaces, and the platforms' orientation towards engagement and profit lead to the vulnerable spread of misleading rather than authoritative civic information.

To gain insight into the breadth of (mis)information Vietnamese-speakers within the U.S. consumed on social media around the 2020 Presidential election RQ1 asks: What types (e.g. video, links to traditional news media and/or other sources, images, memes, text, live streams) of misleading content were prevalent in Vietnamese?

2.3 Understanding Sociocultural and Linguistic Contexts for Misinformation Spread

"Saliency, or "stickiness", describes the quality of a piece of information being prominent, memorable, noticeable, or important [36]. The saliency of misinformation is a strong indicator of what types of information are deemed important by an individual or community and/or the ability

of the information to trigger emotional impact. Existing research understanding the saliency of misinformation has addressed the ways which repeat offenders have influenced information reach and spread [118], gestural misinformation as an influential force similar to spoken and written word [50], and saliency detection through topic-modeling [128]. While useful, extant research into saliency has failed to consider how "stickiness" may differ across social and cultural contexts, particularly what may underpin the saliency of misinformation to historically marginalized communities. This disregards the need to address sociocultural and historical contexts, most commonly from memory and trauma, that informs an individual's willingness to believe and trust information. For example, in the recent 2020 U.S. Presidential election many Latinx communities, especially Cuban American, circulated or invested in misinformation about Joe Biden being a socialist or communist. This narrative plays upon historical fears of communism of the homeland, which is said to have had a significant impact on presidential candidate Trump's popularity within the Cuban American community [46, 82, 97]. misinformation narrative becomes "sticky" for those who fled a U.S.-war torn, communist regime. Understanding community-specific saliency allows for considerations of how misinformation narratives may hold relevance to other communities with parallel histories, for instance these anti-communist sentiments retain relevancy for Vietnamese American immigrants too [126].

Two popular misinformation narratives that spread throughout the Vietnamese diaspora targeted Joe Biden and Kamala Harris during their presidential campaign. Mainstream media articles that were shared across online messaging platforms, further spread false information that Biden voted to deport Vietnamese refugees in 1985 [124] and that Harris is a communist [123]. Both narratives were disproved through multiple fact checking platforms, but these continued to stick with community members during the election because of the weight of political ideologies of those who fled a communist state.

In the Vietnamese American socio-historical context, there are different waves of refuge and emigration to the U.S. Thus, each misinformation narrative has varied saliency effects within the broader Vietnamese American community. Understanding how these differences hold consequences for trust in (mis)information is vital to work towards effective strategies to counter digital misinformation. Diverse immigrant experiences represent historical traumas, or refugee reflexes [135], that continue to present-day linguistic understandings of terms that describe our political and sociocultural environment. Vietnamese Americans, particularly refugees, act upon assimilation, patriotism, and loyalty to be able to make anew in their land of refuge [21], n tension with historical and conflicting interpretations of political terms like "communism" and "social democratic". Prior research provides evidence that legacy of the "good immigrant" is two-fold: (1) marking pressures to fulfill the American dream, impacting economic motivations and beliefs, further guiding immigrants to be susceptible to misinformation around taxes and other economic policy [88]; and (2) reframing war, resettlement, and humanitarianism in U.S. foreign policy as successful in light of U.S. failure [38].

As the CSCW community looks to understand the existence and spread of digital misinformation, and build and evaluate tools towards mitigating its impact, it is central that research attends to how power, race and identity make information salient to a diversity of communities. This is made urgent by the documented targeting of historically marginalized communities with disinformation. It is already widely discussed that Black peoples are at higher risk of positive cases and death from COVID-19 [30], which has been intensified by misinformation and rumors around the virus and COVID-19 vaccines shared among online and offline conversations. For some within the community, this has resulted in vaccine hesitancy, cemented by the histories of negative

manipulation experienced by Black communities from state-funded and media organizations [18, 35]. To unpack the saliency of misinformation within the Vietnamese American community, RQ2 explores the narratives re-circulated on social media asking: What misinformation narratives spread in Vietnamese around the 2020 U.S. Presidential election?

2.4   Top-down and Bottom-up Efforts to Combat Misinformation

There exists a broad range of interventions designed to prevent and mitigate the increasing spread of misinformation online ranging from educational efforts focused on media literacy [52], to fact checking by traditional media outlets and academic institutions [132], and technical tools to detect and analyze misinformation in real-time [109]. Informational and media literacy research focuses on efforts to equip audiences with skills to individually detect misleading information by cueing individual skepticism related to the content, source and professionalism of information one may encounter online [81]. These efforts are often necessarily combined with fact checking as literacy programs urge audiences to seek out fact checking content that can confirm or deny information they are consuming online.

Another line of research examines the potential role of fact-checking in disrupting the spread and saliency of online misinformation. Jiang and Wilson analyzed linguistic signals present in the audience comments of fact-checking posts by Snopes and PolitiFact, finding the existence of both positive effects of fact-checking in disrupting misinformation and the potential for "backfire" effects [59]. This echoes concerns from academics and media commentators that the sharing of corrective information online may actually serve to further cement belief in misinformation. However, a meta-analysis of fact-checking by Nyhan downplays the potential for a backfire effect, but instead expressing caution that the lasting impact of fact-checks may be diminished, particularly in the face of continued propagation of misleading information by elites [95]. Further, Graves writes that regardless of perceptions of its limitations, fact checking by professionals is vital in order to promote fact-based discourse more broadly [48].

As national level fact-checking projects primarily produce fact checks only in English, community-led fact-checking and translation efforts have gained popularity in order to stop the spread of misinformation in a diversity of languages and communities. For example, within the Vietnamese American community, a grassroots group has emerged—Viet Fact Check—to provide fact checking and authoritative media content in Vietnamese. The non-profit organization is volunteer-run and seeks to empower the Vietnamese diaspora by providing fact checked rebuttals to misinformation that is accessible to Vietnamese and English readers [4]. Similar community-led projects have emerged across community contexts, including Desifacts.org—an Indian American-led organization that provides fact checking content in English and is curated specifically to the misinformation community-members see circulating in their own social networks [5]. Such community-led efforts hope to overcome issues of trust often associated with fact-checking [40] by cultivating a community-specific framework for understanding and combating misinformation narratives that are visibly impactful within their specific communities.

Fact-checking as a route to disrupting the spread and impact of misinformation has also been taken up within top-down platform interventions [136]. Popular social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter use in-house and/or third-party fact checkers to provide further context on top-trending stories (Twitter) and on content flags. Content flagging was particularly prominent around the 2020 U.S. presidential election and within the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic. If information is shared around these topics that has been debunked by fact-checkers, platforms display short "flags" under the content that highlight that the above information may be inaccurate

and redirect users to what they deem to be authoritative sources [137]. However, research into the efficacy of these interventions is mixed—in an experimental setting Mena found that flagging may reduce false news sharing [138], while research by Gaozhao highlighted that although audiences may rely heavily on flags for assessments of content credibility, they do not elicit active critical thinking in consumers [139]. Nonetheless, content flagging has become a central tool in platforms' fight against misinformation, alongside attempts to reduce the amount of "bots" or inauthentic users, banning users who violate community guidelines, and "shadow banning", i.e. limiting the features available to certain users or deprioritizing their content within others feeds. However, compounding questions over the potential effectiveness of such technical interventions are issues around implementation. As previously mentioned, leaked information from a Facebook whistleblower confirmed an over-privileging of English-language content and users in terms of financial resources and attention. It is therefore pertinent to question the extent to which non-English language misinformation is visibly acted on by social media platforms, either through removal or flagging. As such, our third research question asks: RQ3 - How did Facebook intervene in the spread of misinformation in Vietnamese?

In sum, academic research on misinformation interventions has tended to focus on English-language or native-language efforts, leaving a gap in understanding the resources, challenges, and utility of fact checking within immigrant communities in the U.S. Our work specifically examines Vietnamese language misinformation spread within the U.S., offering a necessary perspective to aid community-led and technical intervention efforts and address gaps in current online misinformation research.

3 METHODS

Inspired by Braun & Clarke's thematic inductive analysis approach [28], we qualitatively coded a sample of 400 publicly accessible Facebook posts in Vietnamese to identify different narrative themes.

3.1 Data Collection

Through the CrowdTangle tool [103], we collected Facebook posts written in Vietnamese and published between August 12th, 2020 through January 20th, 2020. Posts were collected using search terms related to misinformation narratives that spread around the U.S. Presidential election. See Appendix A for a full list of these terms, built from existing research by the Election Integrity Partnership [140]. CrowdTangle has in-built translation capabilities which allowed us to search posts in Vietnamese.

This time period begins August 12th with the announcement of Kamala Harris as the Vice Presidential nominee, serving as the beginning to Democratic ticket's campaign for Presidency; and ends January 20th on Inauguration Day, the exchange of administrative power to the new President. While CrowdTangle provides access to only public posts— underrepresenting posts that are made private on users' personal accounts or posted on private groups—public posts are useful to gain insights into the nature of conversations on the platform. It should be noted that the resulting dataset contains a mix of information—opinion and conversation around the election, misinformation about election integrity and electoral candidates, fact-checking and news-sharing. The search query terms, built from a database of keywords related specifically to known misinformation narratives, surfaced both content that disputes misinformation and posts that spread and amplify misinformation narratives related to election candidates and election integrity.

We collected a total of 4,238 posts, which can be challenging for qualitative analysis. Accordingly, we narrowed the sample for hand-coding by filtering the data to a representative sample of 400 posts. To do this, we took the top 200 "most engaged with" posts, in addition to a random sampling of 200 other posts from the dataset. We define "engagement" as the sum of interactions (i.e., the love, wow, haha, angry, sad, and care reactions Facebook allows for) in addition to traditional measurements of engagement (e.g., shares, comments, and total views) of a Facebook post. Initially, our dataset considered only the number of interactions for a post; however, some posts had notable gaps between the total number of interactions and the total views. We believe this juxtaposition emerges from the passive consumption of social media. Passive use involves "consumption of content (e.g., viewing posts) without direct interactions of or exchanges among users" [133]. Kruikemeier, et al., found that both active and passive forms of political Internet use resulted in the increased involvement of politics [72]. Hence, we chose to include the total views into our Sum of all Engagements metrics.

We hired professional translators to translate the Facebook group names and posts from Vietnamese to English and hired both Vietnamese and English-speaking researchers to thematically code the posts. These professionals were vetted to have a background in qualitative research methods and knowledge of misinformation literature, as well as their multilingual expertise. Of note, due to posts being poorly written (i.e., incorrect grammar, slang terms), even fluent Vietnamese to English translators faced difficulty in understanding the meaning of some posts. Translators were asked to translate posts as is, and additional coders with background knowledge in election-related narratives were hired to better make sense of the contextual grounding of the translated posts.

3.2 Analytic Method

We performed qualitative coding on the set of 400 posts by employing thematic inductive analysis [28] to identify different narrative themes. Our codebook (see OSF URL) captured narrative themes, categorized the sources of posts, analyzed any platform interventions or additions made to the posts and other emergent themes. We began with open axial coding of the posts, with each research taking on 10 posts to build a content and affordance codebook. Written text, videos, screenshots, image graphics, and hyperlinks to external URLs related to the Facebook posts were thoroughly read, watched, and reviewed to determine the types of narrative topics that the Vietnamese Facebook posts were about. From this analysis, an initial codebook was developed with 22 distinct narrative topic codes.

These early topic codes highlighted explicitly election related narratives (i.e. pro/anti-Trump, Big Lie, Biden, StopTheSteal, etc.), given the nature of the query terms used to create the dataset. Over the course of two months, we undertook several rounds of coding to refine the codebook. Once the codebook was finalized seven researchers—three fluent in both Vietnamese and English and four fluent in English only—iteratively coded four to six different sets of 20 posts. We held weekly meetings to discuss our decision-making processes and to reach an agreement on code attributes and definitions to ensure consensus and quality of the codes. During the coding phase, we added more narrative topics as they arose in the text, videos, images, and external URLs, resulting in a collection of 34 topics total. Then, we iteratively matched the collection of topics into overarching themes by the likeness in keywords and similarities in narratives. This served as a tool to help us find emerging themes and identify trends among the posts. Alongside the narrative topic codes, other codes that required less deliberation include: language of the post (i.e., Vietnamese, English, or mixed), shared media content type (i.e. video, infographic, photo, etc.), status of content moderation (i.e. flagged or still accessible on Facebook), and the source of the shared media (i.e.

mainstream, government organization, political official, etc.). Detailed definitions of each code are available in the data dictionary at [see OSF URL].

4 Findings

An analysis of Vietnamese language posts about the 2020 U.S. Presidential election highlighted several themes related to the spread of misinformation. In answering our research questions, we focus on four main insights that emerge from an analysis of the prominent narrative and content themes. First, (1) in reference to RQ1 we explore the types of content shared in Vietnamese including misinformation and fact checking content, in addition to (2) analyzing how Facebook content led audiences to other social media sites and websites. Second, to answer RQ1 we explore the narratives topic that were most prevalent within the dataset including those related to the "Big Lie" that the election was stolen away from candidate Trump and to the "StopTheSteal'' campaign that suggested the results of the election would be lawfully overturned. In this analysis we focus on three underlying themes related to these overarching misinformation narratives including the prevalence of anti-China and anti-Communist sentiment, conspiratorial thinking around fraudulent voting machines, and distrust in social and traditional media. Finally, (3) we discuss the lack of flagging of content in Vietnamese and the inconsistent approach taken to intervene in the spread of Vietnamese language misinformation.

4.1 Facebook conversations contained a mix of fact-checking and misinformation

In order to explore RQ1—what types of misleading content were prevalent in Vietnamese—we looked to understand the balance of content shared around the election, including both misleading content and fact checking attempts. Further, coding analyzed the different media content shared by Vietnamese Facebook users including video, images and memes and links to external websites.

The majority of the posts in Vietnamese that had high engagement were those which were re-posting already popular moving image content—videos with audio, visual, translated closed captioning, and/or in-video annotations. While these video-based posts did not get a significant amount of further engagement when posted with Vietnamese comments, they were still re-shared in Facebook groups consisting of Vietnamese expats and Vietnamese across the global diaspora, evidence of exposure to satellite Facebook groups that connect tens of thousands of group members.

It is noteworthy that not all content within the dataset should be characterized as "misinformation". The sample included a diversity of post types such as current news announcements, reactionary posts, explicit information spreading requests, and publishing and promoting original content—all of which include many examples of factually inaccurate misinformation and misleading framing of information. Among the problematic content, there were also many posts containing fact checks or attempted debunks of proliferating misinformation. Vietnamese community members took to individual efforts to address and refute posts which planted information disorder that erupted in the Facebook group and threads.

4.1.1 Fact-checking via source sharing. Many of these on-the-ground fact checking and/or debunking posters shared English-language news sources as evidence to their fact check. Most often these news sources come from mainstream media livestreams of election results or broadcasts of victory speeches, with the commentary in Vietnamese pointing out its veracity or simply translating news headlines into Vietnamese. For example, Fig, 1. is a re-post with a comment from the poster.

The original post promoted a livestream video from NowThis News media company, in English, but the Vietnamese poster re-shared and translated the copy from NowThis News.

The content of the Fig, 1. is not a direct debunk from a claim within an existing post, but instead this re-post of NowThis was translated to Vietnamese to promote a platform publishing "final polls & forecasts" statistics, as well as resources on where to vote and contact information to access food support and intimidation protection. The user experience in this type of information-sharing flows from an individual user commenting in Vietnamese to a media institution promoting English-language content.

4.1.2 Translating debunking content from English to Vietnamese. The dataset also includes posts with a mixture of user experiences due to information and resource sharing in Vietnamese and English languages. Consistent user experiences came from posts that provided both Vietnamese language commentary and resources. This allows viewers who are fluent in Vietnamese the ability to understand the context of the post from the poster's commentary and the resource link provided. Fig, 2. demonstrates mainstream media institution, BBC News Tiếng Việt (Vietnamese), commenting in Vietnamese and posting a video that has been translated from English to Vietnamese. Providing both pieces of content in the same language leaves less opportunity for misinterpretations of information. Posts similar to Fig, 2. featured resource links to authoritative news sites with some variations of partial or full translations from English to Vietnamese of commentary, external media, and personal messages in Vietnamese.

It was also common for the highly engaged posts in the dataset, which were translated from Vietnamese to English, to share external links to partisan news outlets, most popularly Breitbart, Epoch Times, and Project Veritas—known amplifiers of election related misinformation [141][142][143]. Externally linked articles from these partisan news outlets in the dataset covered misleading narratives such as fraudulent voting practices [3][101] and sowed distrust in social and traditional media [71]. These narratives have been fact checked in both English [144] and Vietnamese [145], but despite the efforts of existing Vietnamese language media translation (i.e., The Interpreter) and fact checking (i.e. Viet Fact Check), external links and general reference to those specific resources was not prevalent in the dataset. In the case in which these partisan media were used as sources, it was more common for "debunking" to occur from individuals sharing livestreams or merely stating their opinions as commentary in a new post or within the conversation threads.

Fig, 3. highlights a common posting behavior in which posters shared external links or re-posted from partisan news channels. In this case, an individual re-posted to a public Facebook group for a U.S. state-specific Vietnamese community, a video from James O'Keefe, founder and journalist of Project Veritas, only available in English. O'Keefe claims misleading information about a ballot manipulation, while the only context provided in Vietnamese is a comment stating: "The truth is revealed". Allegations tying the Biden campaign to this voter fraud were debunked [85], but these fact checking articles are not readily available in Vietnamese language. Accordingly, these English language incidents proliferate and compete with just one Vietnamese language fact-checking article [145]. In contrast, there were livestreams such as Fig, 4. which demonstrated the inter-community disapproval for the pre-communist Vietnam flag being represented as pro-Trump rallies.

4.2.   Misinformation is Networked Across Different Platforms and Websites

As seen in the fact checking and debunking behaviors, through sharing external links and posting videos published on external platforms, our dataset shows evidence of misinformation networked across a variety of platforms and websites outside of our immediate Facebook dataset.

We saw a heavy prevalence of image and video sharing in our dataset, which is further supported by anecdotal journalistic coverage of the significant influence of video content in Vietnamese American households [62]. Videos were mostly shared in English with little to no Vietnamese translation, not even added as closed captioning or dubbed over audio description. In the rare instances in which translations were provided, these were posted by Vietnamese news organizations (i.e., ethnic media) as a subsegment within their larger newsreel. The majority of the videos promoted and redirected viewers to the organization's external channels, whether it be a company or individual website, YouTube channel, or even Telegram channels. The variety of external sites from proprietary web pages to messaging platforms creates a network of misinformation sources across an array of communication platforms, amplifying misleading content and complicating intervention efforts.

In other cases, still images were also widely spread throughout group and individual account posts. These images ranged from screenshots of text from webpages, edited and/or annotated photographs, to infographics, and more. For example, Fig, 5. is a still image that commonly appeared throughout our dataset after the election results were announced and before inauguration day. The image is a photograph of Rudy Giuliani pointing to a poster of a map of the U.S. highlighting the states with ballot count discrepancies: Georgia, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Arizona. While this image does not navigate viewers to a site external to Facebook, the infographic-like text added below the photo describes the image as "Trump campaign press conference: We prove that President Trump won by a landslide" accrediting this statement to "Trump's attorneys". A definitive source is not provided.

Nearly a quarter of the dataset contained posts that linked out to other URLs, namely news websites of differing credibility. These included media outlets such as the BBC and CNN, alongside partisan news organizations such as Breitbart, Epoch Times, Project Veritas, NewsMax TV, and Shock Ya!. All of these are all English-first institutions, which relied upon individual and ethnic media community members to translate into or validate in Vietnamese.

4.3   Narratives around the "Big Lie" of voter fraud spread widely in Vietnamese

Querying search terms about to the U.S. Presidential election unsurprisingly surfaced a significant amount of content in Vietnamese related to the misinformation narratives that proliferated around the 2020 election. RQ2 thus looked to examine the data surfaced to understand which narratives maintained a particular prominence within Vietnamese-literate communities on Facebook and how these narratives were presented, i.e., whether or not the common tropes seen in English—e.g., stolen mail-in ballots, premeditated election rigging by the Democratic party and conspiracy theories related to QAnon—were similarly spread within Vietnamese communities. Most prevalent, and most popular, were translated videos, images, and comments from conservative leaders within candidate Trump's inner circle, notably Donald Trump Jr. and lawyers Rudy Giuliani and Sidney Powell. This content was undoubtedly misinformation—claiming that the election was stolen by Democrats. This campaign, made under the hashtag #StopTheSteal, undermined (without widespread evidence) the integrity of election procedures such as mail-in voting and electronic voting machines.

Echoing the prevailing misinformation circulating in English, the Vietnamese language dataset was dominated by two overarching misinformation narratives. First, what has become known as "the Big Lie" [26]—the false assertion that the election was "stolen" from Donald Trump through pre-planned and widespread voter fraud—and second, the StopTheSteal campaign that circulated ongoing misinformation in the months following the election suggesting the election result would be legally overturned by some means. As these narratives spread across social media in English, so too were they translated into Vietnamese and spread among Vietnamese language Facebook users. Those most highly engaged with posts within the dataset presented these overarching narratives around an overwhelmingly pro-Trump framework, indeed posts often came from groups explicitly named for their support of Trump for example (as translated) "We Love President Trump" and "Vietnamese People Support Trump." In the broader set of randomly sampled posts the same overarching narratives were posted about, but with less of an ideological framing. Some posts, for instance, shared information about claims of voter fraud in an attempt to either fact check or debunk the idea.

What emerges from an analysis of the election narratives engaged with by Vietnamese posters is a battleground of misinformation. Some posters look to share misleading "evidence" of voter fraud to their fellow community members in order to question the election result, and others share posts hoping to debunk the misinformed narratives they have seen spreading online. In order to better understand this informational conflict, our coding analyzed emergent narrative frames that underpinned election-related misinformation. The following analysis presents three dominant frames; (1) attachments to anti-Chinese or anti-Communist narratives; (2) conspiratorial thinking around QAnon and Dominion Voting Machines; and (3) suggestions of censorship and distrust related to traditional and social media.

4.3.1 Anti-Communist Sentiment as a Driver of Misinformation Sharing Popular posts within the dataset included anti-communist or anti-socialist narratives with some specifically framing election fraud as tied to China. Posts argued that the results of the Presidential election were fraudulent and tied to foreign interference from China and other socialist countries, such as Cuba and Russia. Further, broad anti-China sentiment was a common narrative, either arguing that Democratic candidates were too aligned with China or that candidate Trump would stand up for America against Chinese influence. Several of the most heavily engaged with posts shared a viral video produced by Donald Trump Jr. (Fig, 6.) that claimed that Biden "spent his career sucking up to China."

Vietnamese posters shared such content alongside personal comments about the election being stolen or fears of Chinese influence should the election results be maintained. For example, Fig, 7., shows a post shared in both Vietnamese and English that suggests collusion with China to change the election results.

Fig, 7. also highlights an often used trope within the dataset, references to religion and God. Many posters framed uncertainty about the election result and the security of the election around religious rhetoric of "God's will" and, particularly, that it was God's will that America remain a strong, Democratic country, untouched by Chinese or socialist influence.

4.3.2 Conspiratorial thinking around QAnon and Fraudulent Voting Machines. While misinformation around specific instances of voter fraud, for example, dumped mail ballots and ballot harvesting [64], were particularly pervasive within English-speaking online spaces, these particularized instances were not as prevalent within the Vietnamese dataset. Instead, overarching narratives of

fraud and foreign intervention were more prominent, including conspiratorial ideas tied to QAnon and Dominion Voting Machines. References to QAnon—the alt-right conspiracy theory around the existence of "Deep State" that controls global governments and operates human trafficking rings [34]—appeared several times in the dataset, with a small number of Vietnamese posters spreading the same QAnon content in multiple Vietnamese language Facebook groups. This included the sharing of an 8-minute-long video, dubbed over with Vietnamese translation, of known conspiracy theorist Jerome Corsi [33] "confirming" the existence of QAnon (Fig, 8.)

Border proponents of the QAnon conspiracy theory alleged that election interference would occur in order to secure the continued existence of the "Deep State" that Donald Trump was elected to dismantle. This conspiratorial thinking was made more mainstream with allegations that Dominion Voting Machines, a company that supplies voting software to voting districts across the U.S. and globally, had intentionally designed fraudulent voting machines that would rig an election victory for the Democrats. Though widely and quickly debunked by fact checkers and election officials across the country [17], this misinformation proliferated broadly because key conservative players such as Rudy Giuliani and Sidney Powell pursued legal action to overturn the election results on the grounds of these claims. Such claims were also existent within the Vietnamese dataset, particularly through the sharing of news articles from partisan news sites like Breitbart, and NewsMax who heavily reported the claims and through the sharing of news around the Trump team's lawsuits. Further, Vietnamese posters linked the conspiracy theory to intervention from socialist countries. For example, the post in Fig, 9. questions whether voting machines provided by Dominion and Smartmatic had been rigged in collaboration with Cuba, Venezuela, and Democrat donor George Soros.

4.3.3. Claims of censorship and pervasive distrust of social and traditional media. A third narrative emerged around distrust of media coverage and of social media companies with regards to information about the election result and election integrity. Multiple posters claimed that technology companies including Facebook and Twitter had interfered in the election either through censoring conservative candidates and public conversation or directly colluding with foreign powers to manipulate political outcomes. See below instructive examples, translated into English;

> "Donald Trump single-handedly fought the world Communist bloc, led by China. At the same time, an entire American tycoon that has pro-Chinese interests, and the American Democracy Party have colluded with Beijing. With pressure from the US Democrats, the mainstream media channels of Democrats—Twitter, Facebook, Google—have been plotting to overthrow the American Liberal regime." - Translated Facebook Post.

> "Even Facebook itself can spread a lot of bad articles about Trump but a bad article or video (that is true) about Joe [Biden] is deleted by Facebook. What's going on with the media? I finally realized that there are many forces trying to control the media in the way they want, the same way the Chinese media are doing with their people."
> - Translated Facebook Post.

Distrust was similarly extended to more traditional media, with posters arguing that traditional media outlets were similarly aligned with the Democrats to either intervene in the election or censor "true" information shared by conservatives. Again, this narrative intertwined with other frames around anti-China and anti-communist sentiment, cementing widespread media distrust as a natural orientation for "patriotic" Americans.

4.4 Efforts by Facebook to flag or intervene in the spread of Vietnamese language misinformation

In order to explore our final research question—how did Facebook intervene in the spread of misinformation in Vietnamese?—coders captured whether posts had been "flagged" by Facebook or if the post had been removed and was no longer publicly accessible on the site. In recent years, Facebook has looked to add more context to posts that contain information that has been widely fact checked, this has particularly occurred around elections and COVID-19 [9]. Flags highlight that the information in the post may be false according to fact checkers, or simply state a true claim and link to more resources. For example, election related flags included messages like "Joe Biden has been confirmed as the winner of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. Get More Info" alongside a link to Facebook's Voting Information Center [16]. Only a small subset of the Vietnamese dataset contained flagged posts, with the majority of posts (despite containing election-related narratives that were often flagged when shared in English) appearing with no additional contextual information from Facebook. It is noteworthy that the small subset of posts that were flagged primarily shared content from other English-language sources such as videos from "Team Trump" and Fox News (see Fig, 10).

The removal of posts was far more pervasive with around a quarter of the 400-post dataset no longer publicly accessible. While data about the post including its content, source and engagement metrics could be analyzed via the CrowdTangle tool the post itself was no longer publicly viewable. Difficulty lies in assessing why this content is no longer available as there exists a range of reasons why the post can no longer be seen. For instance, the post may have been deleted by the user, the user may have deleted their account, the group may no longer exist, or Facebook may have removed the content if it violates community guidelines around election information. In the absence of concrete data about why a post is no longer accessible it is impossible to discern through research whether or not the absence of a post is evidence of Facebook intervening to stop the spread of misinformation.

However, what emerges from an analysis of flagging and post removal is an inconsistency in what Facebook chooses (either through automated or human-led intervention) to moderate. For example, multiple posts within the dataset contained misleading information about Dominion Voting Machines with a small minority flagged (see Fig, 11.), some now unavailable for public viewing and most still present and viewable on Facebook at the time of analysis. Facebook's Help Center claims that their machine-learning technology finds copies of false information and narratives that have been disputed by fact checkers [9]. However, the existence, and mixed approach to flagging, of similar (and sometimes identical) content in Vietnamese about the widely debunked Dominion Voting Systems conspiracy theories suggests that this technology is not performing well on Vietnamese language content.

5 Discussion

In this paper we have explored the kinds of information that spread in Vietnamese on Facebook around the 2020 U.S. Presidential election and the ways in which the information was communicated on Facebook. Most prevalent within this dataset is the existence of misleading information, or misinformation, related to the integrity of election procedures and conspiracy theories claiming Democrats planned to rig the election in their favor. These findings highlight how prominent English language misinformation narratives are translated into non-English languages to cause the spreading of misleading political information across diverse communities. Further, through an analysis of narratives that emerged around these claims we learned that anti-communist and anti-

China rhetoric served an amplifying effect, making misinformation narratives acutely salient to Vietnamese audiences. We also saw a prevalence of English language news media, in particular partisan news media, shared to give credibility to misinformation or to frame information in a misleading way. This was aided by a lack of formal fact-checking in Vietnamese, with most efforts at debunking being made by individual users translating or partially translating English content. The continued availability of these posts, in addition to the fact that very few were flagged by Facebook with additional context, highlights a lack of intervention by Facebook in the spread of misinformation in Vietnamese. In this section, we explore the consequences of this inaction and further explore how an analysis of emergent themes attached to misinformation narratives are useful for CSCW research into the impact and spread of misinformation, as well as in the design of technical and education interventions to information disorder.

5.1 Technical interventions in non-English language contexts

Facebook has faced increasing criticism around the spread of misinformation [100], including criticism from Congress about its decision to restrict academic researchers' access to its data [68]. Access to Facebook data, as this paper highlights, is central for CSCW researchers and the broader academic community to understand and mitigate the spread of problematic digital information. The findings from this paper's analysis of publicly available Facebook posts via the CrowdTangle tool is thus an example of how data access (even limited) can highlight how Facebook is used within specific informational contexts and the extent to which the social media site influences the information ecosystem and needs of historically marginalized communities. However, our specific findings highlight a problematic role for Facebook within Vietnamese-literate communities. The social media site affords global interconnection across the Vietnamese diaspora. However, this global interconnectivity when paired with a lack of authoritative news content and fact-checking in Vietnamese and, importantly, in the absence of effective content moderation from Facebook, leads to an amplification of misinformation. Prior to the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, Facebook (alongside other major social media companies) vowed to proactively address misinformation about election integrity and elevate authoritative content about voting procedures and the election result [107]. The continued availability of misinformation in Vietnamese and the lack of flagging of Vietnamese language posts about the election suggest that this promise was not upheld effectively for Vietnamese content.

This reflects the lived experiences of leaders and activists within the Vietnamese American community. Nick Nguyen, co-founder of Viet Fact Check, and Carmen Scurato of Free Press express frustrations at dealing with Facebook with regards to misinformation in Vietnamese and Spanish [90]. In their direct interactions with Facebook, they found little clarity from the social media site and their representatives as to whether or how Facebook builds systems to protect people from misinformation spread in languages other than English. During our own data collection, coding and analysis, it was stark to find such little visible intervention from Facebook on posts containing widely debunked misinformation and conspiracy theories.

Facebook features include in-built translation capabilities, providing Vietnamese literate communities legible experience with the social media site in Vietnamese. Fact-checking and context flags appear in Vietnamese and there is a Vietnamese language version of the Voting Information Center. However, flags and prompts to visit the election information resource do not consistently appear on content that has been written and shared in Vietnamese. Accordingly, while the informational resource may exist in Vietnamese it is not dependably offered to Vietnamese users, despite posts containing misinformation narratives that were commonly flagged when posted in

English. See Figures 10 and 11. Issues, therefore, appear to exist at the machine learning and content moderation levels which are failing to pick up misinformation narratives in non-English contexts. Our findings thus provide more evidence for community-led calls to action, suggesting a need to better address language and cultural contexts in the design of technical interventions to detecting, removing, and fact-checking misinformation. Moreover, this works provides a foundation for future CSCW work to design and evaluate non-English language tools for the detection of online misinformation, in addition to highlighting the needs for CSCW research to contend with language diversity within technical and educational misinformation interventions.

5.2 Sociocultural saliency as method in misinformation research

The dearth of research on the spread of misinformation on online platforms in non-English languages, reflects a failure within the discipline to understand the importance of social and cultural saliencies in information disorder. CSCW research risks perpetuating the systemic racism that technology platforms have embedded into their own operational practices by assuming a universality in digital information experiences. Research must seek to counter the invisibilizing of sociocultural contexts that are crucial to understanding digital information-seeking and informational outcomes. CSCW research is well positioned to adapt and evolve existing methodologies, such as participatory design, value sensitive design, persona modeling, and network analysis, to be inclusive, representative, and tangibly community-centered. In considering the nuance in sociocultural lived experiences, we suggest that social media research consider the reach and impact of transnational information spread as evidential.

Through community-led fact-checking efforts, misinformation in non-English languages has made some waves in mitigating the spread of misinformation on social media sites. For example, the banning of a popularized Vietnamese YouTube channel host who was notorious for promoting misinformation was spearheaded by the joint efforts of multiple Vietnamese diasporic community groups and amplified by mainstream media [127]. However, given the scale of available information on social media sites alone, volunteer-run community groups cannot keep up with the research, practice, outreach, and advocacy needs necessary to combat the spread of misinformation. This is further compounded by the changing landscapes of proprietary technology platforms, the companies that operate them, and the dynamic behavioral trends that netizens develop. This is seen through the fact that despite the Vietnamese community group efforts, the notorious YouTube channel was banned only after mainstream media aired coverage.

However, community-led organizations have been central in understanding the sociocultural saliency of particularized misinformation narratives, evidencing the need for research to attend to how the historical experiences of immigrant communities hold consequence for information-seeking behaviors for generations. Behaviors and interactions within information communication technologies must be analyzed in conjunction with a recognition that these communities of humans have experienced intergenerational traumas across borders, historical encounters of real targeted disinformation, and continued oppression from systemic practices. These qualitative frameworks can expand the band-aid solutions to problematic information and behaviors online, providing empathy and vital connections between researcher, user, and developer.

5.3   Building sustainable informational infrastructures in non-English speaking communities

Finally, the prevalence of misinformation within the U.S. in non-English languages highlights significant gaps in information and communication resources for immigrant communities. Past research and commentary expressed concerns over a decline in ethnic media within the U.S. [65, 73] and the economic difficulties journalism has faced because of digitization hold acute impact for smaller news outlets like local ethnic and foreign-language news [54]. Our findings substantiate the consequences of a lack of traditional media sources for non-English speaking communities including the continued spread of misinformation narratives that are widely debunked by English-language outlets. Despite the existence of community projects like Viet Fact Check and even foreign-language media like BBC News Tiếng Việt providing Vietnamese language fact-checks and authoritative news coverage, few Facebook users shared or posted content from such sources. Instead, when fact-checking did occur, it was primarily an individualized pursuit with Facebook users translating small sections of English language videos or articles themselves to share within their networks.

Contextualizing this finding requires also grappling with the limitations of our research, in particular our data sample. The CrowdTangle tool provided access to public posts on the social media site, i.e., posts by public pages and within public Facebook Groups. Within the context of Vietnamese diasporic communication, this access is useful since a significant number of Facebook groups are used by Vietnamese diasporic communities across the globe for information sharing and community building. However, much news and information sharing happen within the private spaces of closed groups and individual newsfeeds. Though gaining access to this more private information is ethically fraught, without access it is impossible for us to measure the true extent of Vietnamese misinformation on the platform. However, access to the public conversation does provide insight—a canary in the coalmine—as to what misinformation narratives were prevalent and impactful enough for Vietnamese Facebook users to want to share and discuss them in more public forums. Further, this study design is limited by its focus on only 400 posts within the overall dataset (a necessary limitation for viable, in-depth qualitative research). However, by combining a random set of posts with the most highly engaged-with posts, we believe that the 400 post dataset is well representative of the breadth and depth of conversation in Vietnamese around the 2020 election.

Accordingly, the lack of sharing within these public spaces of authoritative and community-led Vietnamese news and fact-checking within the dataset is concerning and requires attention from future research. Questions arise as to why authoritative information in Vietnamese about the U.S. Presidential election was not as salient to Facebook users as compared to misinformed and misleading information. Further research must also be undertaken to understand the role of algorithms in enhancing or diminishing the visibility of authoritative Vietnamese content, especially in parallel with Facebook's ongoing partnership with global third-party fact-checkers [2].

Building sustainable informational infrastructures for language-isolated communities like Vietnamese speakers within the U.S., therefore requires balance of access to traditional ethnic media sources (where they exist), multilingual technical interventions to deprioritize or remove misleading information and greater understanding of the sociocultural dimensions of what makes misinformation desirable. The CSCW community is well-positioned to understand these intersections and do research that can aid communities to build or adapt informational infrastructures to weather periods of potential informational crisis such as political elections and public health events.

6 CONCLUSION

In this paper we have framed the spread of misinformation in non-English as a CSCW concern, especially considering the increasing spread of global misinformation in online environments. This approach provides insight into the significance of understanding the differential impact of mis- and disinformation on historically marginalized and immigrant communities. Centering the sociocultural, historical, and racial analyses of salient misinformation narratives, we recognize the stickiness of misinformation among Vietnamese Americans when tied to anti-communist and anti-China sentiments. Such saliency attends to historical traumas of refugee and immigrant experiences in the U.S. while also acknowledging the dynamics of becoming, and being within, marginalized and immigrant identities. We offer this contextual approach not only as a theoretical understanding, but argue that it can be similarly useful for those seeking to build tools to detect and counter misinformation. As technology platforms and media learn to scale mis- and disinformation mitigation, we need to better identify how communities are being targeted by culturally and historically salient disinformation in an attempt to undermine their political efficacy, and address how current technological structures may exacerbate such vulnerabilities.

The political implications of misinformation are real and tangible, as evidenced by the Republic of Vietnam flag being flown at the January 6th Capitol riot. As CSCW research looks to understand and mitigate the spread and impact of misinformation, it is crucial that we center race and identity as central factors in the saliency of misinformation. We conclude by emphasizing the need to understand the ways systemic racism has undermined the informational resources of non-English speaking communities in ways that makes them more vulnerable to misleading and toxic online information.

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7   APPENDIX A: CrowdTangle Search Query Terms

Search Term	CrowdTangle Search Query
Electoral fraud	(election fraud) OR (electoral fraud)
Ballot dumping	(ballot dumping) OR (mail dumping) OR (ballot cheating) OR (ballot harvesting)
Blue CoupQAnon	(Blue CoupQAnon) OR (QAnon)
Dominion	(hammer and scorecard) OR (dominion voting systems) OR (dominion) AND (voting)
ballot harvesting	(ballot dumping) OR (mail dumping) OR (ballot cheating) OR (ballot harvesting)
QAnon	(Blue CoupQAnon) OR (QAnon)
stolen election	(stolen election) OR (rigged election)
Rigged election	(stolen election) OR (rigged election)
Ballots from dead people	(dead people voted) OR (dead voter) OR (ballots from dead people)
Red Mirage	(Red Mirage) OR (Blue Wave) AND election
dead people voted	(dead people voted) OR (dead voter) OR (ballots from dead people)
vote buying	(vote buying) OR (voter fraud)
election fraud	(election fraud) OR (electoral fraud)
Voter fraud	(vote buying) OR (voter fraud)
Hammer and scorecard	(hammer and scorecard) OR (dominion voting systems) OR (dominion) AND (voting)
voter intimidation	(voter, intimidation) AND (election, US)
mail dumping	(ballot dumping) OR (mail dumping) OR (ballot cheating) OR (ballot harvesting)
Dominion voting system	(hammer and scorecard) OR (dominion voting systems) OR (dominion) AND (voting)
China rigged	(china, rigged) AND (election)
Biden socialist	biden AND socialist OR biden AND communist
Trump immigration vietnam	Trump Immigration Vietnam
Harley Rouda Ho Chi Minh	Harley Rouda Ho Chi Minh
Biden refugees Vietnam	(biden refugees vietnam) OR "H.R. 9286"

Fig. 1. A post sharing an English language livestream video that followed the up-to-date election poll counts and provided predictions on a color-coded map of the U.S.

Fig. 2. A post from an authoritative news organization sharing commentary and a video, both in Vietnamese, in regard to Kamala Harris' reaction to the Presidential election outcome.

Fig. 3. A post providing a simple comment, "The truth is revealed", to a shared video featuring James O'Keefe, founder and journalist for Project Veritas.

Fig. 4. This re-post by an individual added commentary expressing their embarrassment in seeing the pre-communism Vietnam flag being represented at a protest claiming election fraud.

Fig. 5. This still image, included in a Facebook post, depicts Rudy Giuliani arguing voting ballot results, favoring Donald Trump, during a press conference. The image text does not accredit an authoritative or definitive source yet suggests legal claims.

Fig. 6. A heavily shared video from Donald Trump Jr. tying President Biden to China.

Fig. 7. A Facebook post shared in both English and Vietnamese questioning China's potential involvement in the President election outcome.

Fig. 8. A video shared in Vietnamese of author Jerome Corsi allegedly confirming the existence of QAnon.

Fig. 9. A post sharing a video that questions whether electronic voting machines were used to change the election result across multiple countries'.

Fig. 10. A post sharing a video from Team Trump that was flagged by Facebook with additional context.


Fig. 11. A fact-check message from Facebook that appeared on a post about Dominion Voting Machines.