

A New Look at Blockchain Leader Election Simple, Efficient, Sustainable and Post-Quantum

Esgin, Muhammed F.; Ersoy, Oguzhan; Kuchta, Veronika; Loss, Julian; Sakzad, Amin; Steinfeld, Ron; Yang, Xiangwen; Zhao, Raymond K.

DOI

[10.1145/3579856.3595792](https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3595792)

Publication date

2023

Document Version

Final published version

Published in

ASIA CCS 2023 - Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Citation (APA)

Esgin, M. F., Ersoy, O., Kuchta, V., Loss, J., Sakzad, A., Steinfeld, R., Yang, X., & Zhao, R. K. (2023). A New Look at Blockchain Leader Election: Simple, Efficient, Sustainable and Post-Quantum. In *ASIA CCS 2023 - Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security* (pp. 623-637). Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). <https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3595792>

Important note

To cite this publication, please use the final published version (if applicable).
Please check the document version above.

Copyright

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.

Takedown policy

Please contact us and provide details if you believe this document breaches copyrights.
We will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository

'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project

<https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care>

Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.



A New Look at Blockchain Leader Election: Simple, Efficient, Sustainable and Post-Quantum

Muhammed F. Esgin
Monash University & CSIRO's Data61
Melbourne, Australia
Muhammed.Esgin@monash.edu

Oğuzhan Ersoy
Radboud University
Delft University of Technology
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
oguzhan.ersoy@ru.nl

Veronika Kuchta
Florida Atlantic University
Boca Raton, USA
vkuchta@fau.edu

Julian Loss
CISPA Helmholtz Center for
Information Security
Saarbrücken, Germany
lossjulian@gmail.com

Amin Sakzad
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
Amin.Sakzad@monash.edu

Ron Steinfeld
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
Ron.Steinfeld@monash.edu

Xiangwen Yang
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
Wayne.Yang@monash.edu

Raymond K. Zhao
CSIRO's Data61
Sydney, Australia
raymond.zhao@data61.csiro.au

ABSTRACT

In this work, we study the blockchain leader election problem. The purpose of such protocols is to elect a leader who decides on the next block to be appended to the blockchain, for each block proposal round. Solutions to this problem are vital for the security of blockchain systems. We introduce an efficient blockchain leader election method with security based solely on standard assumptions for cryptographic hash functions (rather than public-key cryptographic assumptions) and that does not involve a racing condition as in Proof-of-Work based approaches. Thanks to the former feature, our solution provides the highest confidence in security, even in the post-quantum era. A particularly scalable application of our solution is in the Proof-of-Stake setting, and we investigate our solution in the Algorand blockchain system. We believe our leader election approach can be easily adapted to a range of other blockchain settings.

At the core of Algorand's leader election is a verifiable random function (VRF). Our approach is based on introducing a simpler primitive which still suffices for the blockchain leader election problem. In particular, we analyze the concrete requirements in an Algorand-like blockchain setting to accomplish leader election, which leads to the introduction of *indexed VRF* (iVRF). An iVRF satisfies modified uniqueness and pseudorandomness properties (versus a full-fledged VRF) that enable an efficient instantiation based on a hash function without requiring any complicated zero-knowledge proofs of correct PRF evaluation. We further extend iVRF to an *authenticated iVRF with forward-security*, which meets all the requirements to establish an Algorand-like consensus. Our solution is simple, flexible and incurs only a 32-byte additional overhead when combined with the current best solution to constructing a forward-secure signature (in the post-quantum setting).

We implemented our (authenticated) iVRF proposal in C language on a standard computer and show that it significantly outperforms other quantum-safe VRF proposals in almost all metrics.

Particularly, iVRF evaluation and verification can be executed in 0.02 ms, which is even faster than ECVRF used in Algorand.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Security and privacy** → **Hash functions and message authentication codes; Distributed systems security; Digital signatures.**

KEYWORDS

Blockchain, Leader Election, Verifiable Random Function, Post-Quantum, Algorand

ACM Reference Format:

Muhammed F. Esgin, Oğuzhan Ersoy, Veronika Kuchta, Julian Loss, Amin Sakzad, Ron Steinfeld, Xiangwen Yang, and Raymond K. Zhao. 2023. A New Look at Blockchain Leader Election: Simple, Efficient, Sustainable and Post-Quantum. In *ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS '23)*, July 10–14, 2023, Melbourne, VIC, Australia. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3579856.3595792>

1 INTRODUCTION

In a blockchain system, a number of block creators work collectively on producing new blocks and appending them to the blockchain. Such systems rely on consensus protocols to agree on the proper sequencing of blocks. A major goal of a consensus protocol is to elect a leader, who decides on the new block to be appended, and in some cases, to additionally elect a committee, who validates newly produced blocks. In Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols, for example, the leader is elected among the stakeholders with probability proportional to the amount of owned stakes.

Due to their critical roles, it is vital for the security of a blockchain system that leaders are elected from a set of honest users that may not be easily corrupted by an adversary. To accomplish such security requirements, there are various cryptographic techniques employed by different blockchain environments, e.g., [1, 16, 21, 23, 25]. For

example, Algorand, aiming for an environment-friendly solution, employs a cryptographic sortition technique, where a user self-determines if they are elected as a leader using a Verifiable Random Function (VRF) [28]. The goal of the VRF is to introduce a way for each user to produce a *unique* lottery ticket whose validity can be publicly verified via a proof shared by the user. In the case a user has a winning ticket, they publish the ticket as well as a certifying proof, which together constitute the VRF output. The use of VRF in consensus protocols supports scaling and high performance, and allows the Algorand blockchain to support millions of users. VRFs are also used as a core cryptographic primitive in other blockchain systems such as Ouroboros Praos [16] (used in Cardano), Dfinity [25], Rangers Protocol [4] and Filecoin [3].

The VRF and signature solutions employed by Algorand, namely ECVRF [30] and Ed25519 [10], rely on the hardness of discrete logarithm problem (DLP), which is susceptible to quantum attacks. As discussed in [17], the lack of post-quantum security in an Algorand-like blockchain context may be catastrophic, leading to a complete adversarial re-write of the blockchain history. Particularly, the authors in [17] discuss that even if a forward-secure signature is used to secure the blockchain system, a quantum adversary may break DLP to recover users' master secret keys from their master public keys. As such, the adversary can corrupt any user at any time (including previous rounds) by generating the round keys from the master secret key even when the round secret keys are physically deleted by the users. Hence, it is important to migrate to post-quantum solutions, particularly for the consensus part, to make sure at least that the security of prior rounds cannot be compromised¹.

A major bottleneck against making Algorand-like consensus protocols post-quantum is the lack of an *efficient* post-quantum replacement of its VRF. Prior attempts [13, 17, 18] to construct practically efficient post-quantum VRFs have significant disadvantages compared to our solution as we discuss next.

The first practical post-quantum VRF proposal, named LB-VRF, was introduced by Esgin et al. in [17]. This scheme is based on lattices and is relatively efficient for the lattice setting. In particular, an LB-VRF proof is about 5 KB, which is somewhat larger than an ordinary signature based on the same assumptions (at around 2.5–3 KB). A significant limitation of LB-VRF is that it is only *few-time*, meaning that each VRF key pair can only be used to generate a few VRF outputs, particularly just one for the most efficient instantiation. This leads to significant issues because one has to find custom-designed methods to handle key refreshing almost every round (i.e., every 5 seconds). Moreover, since the new key needs to be communicated almost every round, the actual communication cost rises by the public key size to more than 8.3 KB. Another lattice-based VRF proposal, named LaV, was recently introduced by Esgin et al. in [18]. Despite the fact that LaV is a standard VRF (i.e., can directly replace ECVRF used in Algorand in terms of functionality), its main drawback is the proof size at 12 KB.

By employing hash-based cryptography, Buser et al. [13] introduced X-VRF, a post-quantum VRF construction based on the XMSS

signature [11]. This VRF proposal is stateful (like XMSS), but this limitation is not a significant concern in the blockchain applications (at least for its use in Algorand). The main drawback of X-VRF (compared to our solution) is the significant communication overhead at about 3 KB. Another solution in [13] is a standard VRF proposal, named SL-VRF, but its communication cost is significantly larger, at about 40 KB. A summary of the performance of these existing VRF proposals is provided in Table 1.

Given the above state of affairs for post-quantum VRFs, a natural question that we ask in this work is the following.

Do we really need a full VRF to realize an Algorand-like consensus? If not, what is precisely the tool needed for that purpose and how can we construct it from the most basic cryptographic primitives?

We emphasize the importance of simplicity, efficiency, sustainability and (long-term) reliability as we are after a solution that (i) can be readily deployed into Algorand's network, (ii) does not require wasting natural resources, and (iii) offers the strongest security in the post-quantum era. As a result, we build our solution for the VRF functionality based solely on hash functions.

Before going into more details of our solution, we present independent views on Bitcoin's, Algorand's, and our approaches to solving the leader election²/lottery problem on blockchain. These will be helpful in understanding our high-level approach without getting into technical details.

A view of Bitcoin's approach. A common feature of all three approaches that we discuss now is that the blockchain protocol generates a random "magic" number, say Q_n , at each protocol round n . In Bitcoin's approach, this magic number is used to select a random function \mathcal{H}_{Q_n} from a large family of hash functions. Then, the idea of Bitcoin's Proof-of-Work (PoW) approach is to have users race *real-time* to find a "lucky" input, x , that maps under \mathcal{H}_{Q_n} to one of the target values such as $\mathcal{H}_{Q_n}(x) < v$ for some threshold v . The main drawback, well-known in the community, is the tremendous energy consumption and the waste of resources due to the real-time racing as the more computational power one spends, the more chance they have in winning the race.

A view of Algorand's approach. Algorand aims to solve the unsustainability issue of Bitcoin's PoW by moving to a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) based approach. In Algorand, users fix their key pairs in advance of participating in the consensus, say (pk_i, sk_i) for user i . Effectively, fixing the keys seals everyone's fate in that now each user has an internal secret function \mathcal{H}_{sk_i} , which they cannot change since the corresponding public key pk_i acts as its commitment. When the blockchain protocol generates the random magic number Q_n for round n , each user locally computes $\mathcal{H}_{sk_i}(Q_n)$ and checks whether the result is a "winning ticket". The probability of success in the latter check is based on the amount of stake one has. If the check is successful, they can generate a (zero-knowledge) proof to show that they are indeed a winner of the lottery for round n .

¹In recognition of the importance of post-quantum security, Algorand has recently (concurrent to our work) introduced *post-quantum secure state proofs*. See https://developer.algorand.org/docs/get-details/algorand_consensus/#state-proof-keys (accessed on July 26, 2022).

²We note that the high-level approaches we discuss (Bitcoin's, Algorand's and ours) do not guarantee a *single* leader election (and hence, the term 'leader election' is not used to mean 'single leader election'). Thanks to the flexibility of our approach, if multiple potential leaders arise in our protocol, one can employ, for example, the techniques in Algorand (discussed in Sec. 6) to recognise one of them as the true leader.

Views of our approach. Our approach in a way is a new look at a combination of the above two approaches. In particular, we first want to deviate from real-time racing in Bitcoin while still making use of the magic number Q_n to choose a random function \mathcal{H}_{Q_n} at each block generation round. Since we have these functions chosen at each round without a particular user's control,³ what we do is simply ask every user (participating in the consensus) to commit to an input of their choice *in advance* of that round. In particular, at some round $t < n$ (or earlier), each user i commits to their input x_i on blockchain and simply wins the lottery if $\mathcal{H}_{Q_n}(x_i) = v$ for a target value v . To prove that user i indeed won the lottery, they simply publish x_i and everyone can straightforwardly check the claim by calculating $\mathcal{H}_{Q_n}(x_i)$. Overall, for improved efficiency, we ask users to commit to a set of inputs $x_{i,j}$'s early on and use the n -th value $x_{i,n}$ at round n , where the use of the n -th value can be verified so that users do not get to choose between multiple $x_{i,j}$'s.

A “dual” view of our approach is that each user i commits to a one-time function $\mathcal{H}_{x_{i,n}}$ for each round n in advance, and just evaluates $\mathcal{H}_{x_{i,n}}(Q_n)$ to check lottery winning similar to Algorand. However, the major difference of our approach from Algorand's is that we do not require a (zero-knowledge) proof to show the validity of computation and simply ask users to publish $\mathcal{H}_{x_{i,n}}$. The latter approach of ours significantly simplifies the functionality required from the cryptographic tool to accomplish leader election and enables a very efficient instantiation from the most basic primitives. We discuss our approach in more detail in Sec. 1.2.

Forward security. Many blockchain systems such as Algorand and Ouroboros Praos [16] employ *forward-secure* digital signatures to maintain the security of prior rounds in case some stored user key is compromised at some point. Existing generic approaches to achieving forward security can be straightforwardly realized in the post-quantum setting by instantiating the underlying ordinary signatures using post-quantum ones.

One such generic approach is known as the MMM approach [27]. In the MMM ‘sum’ composition, a user creates N key pairs $(pk_1, sk_1), \dots, (pk_N, sk_N)$ of an ordinary signature and constructs a Merkle tree using the public keys as the tree leaves. To sign a message at a particular time i , the user communicates pk_i and an authentication path in addition to a signature on the actual message.

An alternative generic approach, adopted by Algorand, works as follows. A user first generates a key pair (mpk, msk) of an ordinary signature, and similarly round key pairs $(pk_1, sk_1), \dots, (pk_N, sk_N)$. Then, each round public key is signed with msk , denoted as σ'_i , and at a round i , the user communicates (σ'_i, pk_i) in addition to the signature on the actual message. Therefore, the communication difference between the Algorand's approach vs the MMM approach is the cost of a signature (σ'_i) vs an authentication path. The smallest signature length among the schemes selected for standardization by NIST for Post-Quantum Cryptography⁴ is at about 700 bytes, which means even an authentication path for a Merkle tree with 2^{20} leaves is cheaper than such a post-quantum signature. Note

³Here, we are assuming the ideal case where Q_n is generated truly at random by some means. Of course, this is not possible to achieve in practice, but this issue is outside of our simplified discussion here. In our actual protocol, the magic number will be generated similar to Algorand and our approach is flexible enough to support different ways to generate Q_n .

⁴<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/>

that the latter Algorand approach also incurs more computation due to signing of round public keys.

Another alternative approach to constructing forward-secure post-quantum signature could be to use a post-quantum Identity-Based Signature (IBS) scheme. In this case, the IBS master secret key is used to derive signing keys for the round keys, where each round is assigned a different ID. The master secret key is deleted and round keys are stored and used to sign messages, and then each one is deleted as the corresponding round period expires. It is well known that such IBS can be constructed from a two-level Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) scheme. An improved variant of the post-quantum lattice-based LATTE HIBE scheme [2] and its practical implementation are reported in a recent work [32]. However, the user private keys in the latter scheme are already longer than 3 KB (even for a one-level HIBE), and signatures will be even longer. This approach to forward security therefore leads to a longer communication cost compared to an MMM-based solution, which can be instantiated with communication of less than 2.2 KB for each message signed using the Falcon signature scheme [20]. We further note that Algorand's approach described above is an application of a folklore generic IBS construction via certification described, e.g., in [7]. Overall, in the post-quantum setting, the MMM approach already stands out as one of the best options and we adopt it in our work.

1.1 Our Contributions

Our main contribution in this work is the introduction of a simple, efficient, sustainable and post-quantum solution to blockchain leader election problem. Although our solution is based on simple cryptographic tools, our insights to develop this solution are not obvious as they require a new formal treatment of VRFs. Hence, we start by formalizing the concrete VRF requirements for the leader election problem, specifically tailored to the blockchain setting. This leads to notions of (many-time) indexed VRF (iVRF) and authenticated iVRF with forward security (‘authenticated MT-iVRF’ or ‘authenticated iVRF’, in short). The former is targeted at the blockchain leader election problem alone, while the latter combines all requirements to accomplish an Algorand-like consensus, where a forward-secure signature is needed. We believe our definitions capture the requirements in a real-life blockchain setting more closely, particularly matching the sequential (i.e., “indexed”) nature of blockchain protocols.

Then, we introduce our solutions for (many-time) iVRF and authenticated iVRF that build on a cryptographic hash function, ordinary (t -time) signature (for a parameter t) and pseudorandom generator (PRG), which can be built from a hash function. We prove the security of our instantiations assuming the existence of a secure hash function, digital signature and PRG satisfying natural security requirements in the standard model (without random oracles). Since we do not require a random oracle, there is no complicated quantum random oracle model (QROM) analysis needed to argue security against (full) quantum adversaries.

We implemented our constructions in C language on a standard computer with two different post-quantum signature schemes Falcon [20] and XMSS [11] (see Sec. 5 for more details). The performance results of iVRF together with a comparison with other

Table 1: Performance comparison of our iVRF in Sec. 3.1 (with $N = 2^{18}$ evaluations) to other quantum-safe VRF proposals and (non-quantum-safe) ECVRF. The sizes are given in bytes and the times are in milliseconds. For ECVRF, we take the results reported in [13]. For our iVRF, the VRF value can be computed from the proof and hence its size is given as zero.

Scheme	Pub. Key Size	Proof Size	VRF Size	Keygen Time	Eval Time	Verify Time	# of Evaluations	Security Basis
SL-VRF [13]	48	40000	32	0.38	765.00	475.00	Unlimited	LowMC block cipher [5]
LaV [18]	6420	11980	124	-	-	-	Unlimited	Lattices
LB-VRF [17]	3320	4940	84	0.33	3.10	1.30	1	Lattices
X-VRF [13]	64	2720	32	426000.00	0.74	0.90	$N = 2^{18}$	Hash
Our iVRF	32	608	0	< 3087.00	0.01	0.02	$N = 2^{18}$	Hash
ECVRF [30]	32	80	32	0.05	0.10	0.10	Unlimited	Discrete log. (not quantum-safe)

practical post-quantum VRF proposals are provided in Table 1. In the table, we also include ECVRF (used by Algorand) performance results as a reference point even though ECVRF is not quantum-safe. We can see from the table that our iVRF enjoys the smallest sizes across all components compared to other post-quantum schemes. Its evaluation and verification times also outperform all proposals in the table, including ECVRF. The only downside of our approach is its key generation time linear in the total number of allowed evaluations N (arising due to a Merkle hash tree computation).

Our key generation is only a one-time computation per N evaluations that can be straightforwardly parallelized. Note that blockchain applications typically do not require very frequent such evaluations. Particularly, each evaluation (out of N) of iVRF is for one Algorand round, which takes about 4.5 seconds. Therefore, $N = 2^{23}$ evaluations suffice for $4.5 \cdot 2^{23}$ seconds, which is more than a year. As discussed in Sec. 5, for $N = 2^{23}$, even our full authenticated iVRF key generation (including the signature scheme's costs) takes about 10 hours on a *single* core. This computation can be easily completed within a year by progressively running it whenever the device is turned on. Therefore, we believe the key generation time is not a significant limitation for blockchain applications of our approach, especially considering the significant gains of our solution in all other performance metrics. Note also that Algorand already requires a similar $O(N)$ key generation time as discussed further in Sec. 6.3. We now provide an overview of our solution and then discuss its advantages.

1.2 Overview of Solution

This section discusses an overview of how our final authenticated iVRF construction works in the Algorand setting. As mentioned earlier, our solution relies on having users commit to an ordered set of inputs (i.e., random strings), where the index of each input can be verified. We already know an excellent tool for this purpose: Merkle tree! More generally, we can use any (static) vector commitment.

Let us set N (a power of two) as a parameter that defines the number of rounds before a user key is refreshed. This parameter can be adjusted as desired, but users' (local) key generation time is linear in N due to the Merkle tree construction (see Table 1 for a concrete key generation time). We envision that key refreshments of all users are synchronized in the following sense. The time periods are split into *epochs*, composed of N consecutive rounds, and d rounds before an epoch starts, for a delay parameter d , nodes wanting to get involved in consensus in that epoch are expected to commit

to their Merkle tree root on blockchain. If a user performs this commitment at a later time, they still need to wait for d rounds before being able to join the consensus and their Merkle tree still needs to have N leaves⁵.

Let us now see how the key generation is done. A user, Alice, generates N pseudorandom values $x_{0,0}, \dots, x_{N-1,0}$ from a random seed s using a pseudorandom generator (PRG) and computes $x_{i,j} = \mathcal{H}^j(x_{i,0})$ (i.e., j recursive application of \mathcal{H} on $x_{i,0}$) for $j = 1, \dots, t-1$ and $i = 0, \dots, N-1$, where t is a parameter denoting the number of iterations needed to reach agreement within a round (with high probability). She also generates N key pairs $(pk_0, sk_0), \dots, (pk_{N-1}, sk_{N-1})$ of an ordinary (t -time) signature Σ using another random seed s' with the PRG. With these values, Alice now computes $x_{i,t} = \mathcal{H}(x_{i,t-1}, pk_i)$ and constructs a Merkle tree with $(x_{0,t}, \dots, x_{N-1,t})$ as the leaves (depicted in Fig. 1). Alice publishes the Merkle tree root on blockchain as her public key⁶ (or commitment) and keeps the seeds (s, s') and the intermediate Merkle tree nodes as her secret key.

Now suppose we are at the j -th iteration of the i -th round of consensus in an epoch that Alice is able to participate. Let n denote the actual block round number with a "magic number" Q_n (note that $i \equiv n \bmod N$). To generate an authenticated iVRF output on an input message μ to be authenticated/signed, she outputs $v = \mathcal{H}(x_{i,j}, Q_n)$ as the VRF value, $\sigma = \Sigma.\text{Sign}_{sk_i}(\mu)$ as the signature and $\pi = (x_{i,j}, pk_i, AP_i)$ as the proof where AP_i denotes the Merkle tree authentication path w.r.t. the index i .⁷

Upon receiving an authenticated iVRF output $(v, \sigma, (x, pk, AP))$, the verification of iVRF works by first checking if $v = \mathcal{H}(x, Q_n)$ and v is below a threshold. Furthermore, it checks that σ is a valid signature on μ under pk . Finally, for $x' := \mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}^j(x), pk)$, it checks that the Merkle tree root computed via x' and AP is equal to Alice's public key (or commitment) on blockchain for that epoch.

The intuition behind security is quite simple. Alice generated and committed to $x_{i,j}$'s before seeing Q_n . So, she cannot choose them to bias the output of $\mathcal{H}_{Q_n}(x_{i,n}) := \mathcal{H}(x_{i,j}, Q_n)$. Merkle tree

⁵If a user joins late, they can actually leave a bottom left sub-tree 'empty' as that part will not be needed. For example, if a user joins 16 rounds late, then they can just pick the left-most tree node at level 4 (from the bottom) and $N - 16$ leaves to construct the Merkle tree. The sub-tree consisting of the first 16 leaves will not be needed.

⁶To prevent Alice from publishing multiple Merkle roots, we can simply have a flag bit in each account that states whether a user has published their Merkle root for that epoch. If that is the case, the verifiers would reject subsequent Merkle root commitments on blockchain.

⁷In the actual protocol, Alice in fact does not need to communicate v since it can be computed from $x_{i,j}$ and the public Q_n .

commitment also ensures (computationally) that there is only a single valid $x_{i,j}$ that Alice can use at round n . Hence, assuming the randomness of Q_n , no user has a better advantage of winning the lottery. Of course, as in Algorand, we can adjust the winning condition based on the amount of stake to establish a PoS-based setting or the adjustment can be w.r.t. any publicly available information.

The forward security of our approach is inherited from the ‘sum’ composition in the MMM paper [27] (recalled in Appendix A). As in Algorand, we assume that the adversary cannot corrupt a user within a round (i.e., in 4-5 seconds). To allow such corruptions, we can simply ask users to build a Merkle tree with $N \cdot t$ leaves in the first place and consume t leaves at each round (even if the actual number of iterations in a round is less than t).

As mentioned above, our approach in general can work with any (static) vector commitment, which would replace the role of Merkle tree in our description. Therefore, our approach can benefit from further improvements in the context of vector commitments.

1.3 Advantages of Our Approach

Simplicity and flexibility. Our approach supports the use of any ordinary signature and any hash function (satisfying natural properties), which are already supported by almost all blockchain applications. These tools have been studied for a long time, and their post-quantum variants are either already standardized or in standardization. Thanks to its simplicity and flexibility, we believe our approach can be easily adapted to work for a range of blockchain systems, for example, Cardano, Dfinity and Rangers Protocol. Note that our approach does not necessarily require the consensus protocol to be based on Proof-of-Stake, and it may be possible, for example, to adapt it to the Proof-of-Storage setting in Filecoin [3].

Confidence in (post-quantum) security. Hash functions (and symmetric primitives in general) are considered to be the most reliable solution to building quantum-safe cryptosystems. Therefore, our leader election solution is built on the safest alternative. For our full solution with authentication, one can choose the best tradeoff between security and efficiency for a specific system thanks to the flexibility of our approach.

Sustainability. Our approach does not have any racing condition and, therefore, does not lead to a tremendous waste of natural resources like Bitcoin.

Efficiency. Combined with one of the best solutions (i.e., the MMM approach) to achieving forward security in the post-quantum setting, the only additional communication cost of our iVRF-based approach is 32 bytes (i.e. the cost of sending the relevant round’s $x_{i,j}$), which is a minimal cost one could expect to have. In comparison, combining an MMM-style forward-secure post-quantum signature with X-VRF [13], the smallest post-quantum VRF proposal, (under a common hash tree) would give an additional overhead due to the VRF functionality of about 2100 bytes. This overhead is almost two orders of magnitude more than the 32 byte overhead in our iVRF-based construction. We discuss the computational efficiency in Sec. 5 after introducing more details about the concrete digital signature.

Outline of the paper. Due to limited space, standard definitions of hash functions, Merkle tree, pseudorandom generators, and digital signatures are recalled in Appendix A. We formally define our iVRF

notions in Sec. 2, followed by their instantiations in Sec. 3. The security analyses are provided in Sec. 4. We analyze the performance of our schemes and provide implementation results in Sec. 5. Then, we discuss an application of our approach in Algorand in Sec. 6.

2 FORMAL DEFINITIONS OF MANY-TIME INDEXED VRF (MT-iVRF)

In this section, we discuss the formal definitions of a Many-Time Indexed VRF (MT-iVRF) and authenticated MT-iVRF with forward security. Particularly, we discuss the definitions of an authenticated MT-iVRF with forward security, and an MT-iVRF is simply a special case of that. For simplicity, we refer to our constructions as MT-iVRF and authenticated MT-iVRF (omitting ‘with forward security’ or even ‘MT-’ sometimes).

Our definitions are adapted from those of an ordinary VRF [28] and a forward-secure (or key-evolving) signature [6]. We also adapt the unbiasedness definition of [17] into our setting. An important feature of our definitions is that we capture more closely the real-life setting in blockchain, where the protocol is inherently stateful and indexed (by round/iteration numbers). Our modifications over the prior definitions allow us to construct the desired tool efficiently from simple cryptographic primitives.

In an Algorand-like consensus setting (see Sec. 6 for details), we want to enable parties to run a cryptographic sortition where a set of users *secretly* determine their eligibility to participate in consensus. This should be done in a way that no selected party is known to the outside world until they reveal this information. To realise this functionality, VRF is used in Algorand where the VRF uniqueness property ensures that users cannot increase their chance of being selected by producing multiple outputs. Furthermore, the VRF pseudorandomness property prevents an adversary from identifying potential leaders (even if it knows the magic number Q_n) because each user’s VRF output looks random to the outside parties, implying that the adversary cannot predict their output. Our main insights in modifying the formal VRF requirements are as follows. First, in the inherently-stateful blockchain ecosystem, we introduce an index (corresponding, for example, to the round number) to capture time for VRF evaluation and verification to enable index-based properties. Second, we observe that pseudorandomness property is *not* required for past rounds as consensus protocol has already finished for them. As a result, thanks to the formally captured indexing, we can remove the pseudorandomness requirement for previously queried indices. With the above high-level intuition in mind, let us now move to the rigorous definitions.

2.1 Syntax

Let N be the parameter denoting the maximum number of time periods (i.e., ‘rounds’) allowed (i.e., the iVRF is N -time), and t be the parameter denoting the maximum number of ‘iterations’ allowed within any given time period/round. In particular, we are here assuming a more generalized setting where each time period is split into further ‘iterations’, where the forward security will be required w.r.t. to the time periods (not iterations). Note that fixing $t = 1$ leads to the standard forward security setting in [6]. In our definitions of the authenticated MT-iVRF, we let $iAV.Eval$ take two input messages μ_1, μ_2 to allow verifiable VRF evaluation on one

message (μ_1) and authentication of another message (μ_2). The above two generalizations to the formal definitions are done to properly capture an Algorand-like blockchain setting.

In the functions below, we do not index the secret key in order not to clutter the presentation and the key update function $iAV.KeyUpd$ simply periodically updates the secret key. The time period index i is clear from the descriptions of $iAV.Eval$ and $iAV.Verify$ functions as it is part of the input. An authenticated many-time indexed VRF, iAV , is given by the following five algorithms ($iAV.ParamGen$, $iAV.Keygen$, $iAV.KeyUpd$, $iAV.Eval$, $iAV.Verify$):

- $pp \leftarrow iAV.ParamGen(1^\lambda)$: Given the security parameter λ , set up and return public parameters pp containing N . We assume that pp is an implicit input to the other algorithms.
- $(pk_{av}, sk_{av}) \leftarrow iAV.Keygen(pp)$: Given the public parameters pp , return a public-secret key pair (pk_{av}, sk_{av}) .
- $sk_{av} \leftarrow iAV.KeyUpd(sk_{av})$: Given the given secret key sk_{av} for the previous period, update (overwrite) sk_{av} for the current time period.
- $(v, \sigma, \pi) \leftarrow iAV.Eval_{sk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j))$: Given input messages $\mu_1, \mu_2 \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}$ and a pair of indices (i, j) with $0 \leq i < N$ and $0 \leq j < t$, return a VRF value $v \in \{0, 1\}^{m(\lambda)}$ w.r.t. μ_1 , a signature σ w.r.t. μ_2 and an accompanying proof π .
- $0/1 \leftarrow iAV.Verify_{pk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j), v, \sigma, \pi)$: Given input messages μ_1, μ_2 , a pair of indices (i, j) with $0 \leq i < N$ and $0 \leq j < t$, a VRF value v , a signature σ and a purported proof π , check using π if (v, σ) is correctly generated for the given $(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j))$ and pk_{av} .

The (non-authenticated) MT-iVRF construction (in Sec. 3.1) does not have a signature σ and a second message μ_2 . Hence, it only serves the VRF functionality without any authentication. The purpose of the parameters t and j is to formally match our application setting to Algorand. For applications not requiring them, one may simply fix $(t, j) = (1, 0)$.

2.2 Correctness and Security Definitions

Compared to an ordinary VRF, there are two main distinctions of our security definitions. First, uniqueness holds in the case of any (arbitrarily-generated) fixed input-index pair $(\mu_1, (i, j))$, rather than just any (arbitrarily-generated) fixed input μ_1 . Secondly, pseudorandomness is satisfied against any challenge input-index pair (μ_1, i) , where the index i is never queried to the $iAV.Eval$ oracle $O_{iAV.Eval}$. In the case of ordinary VRFs, the adversary is not allowed to query the $O_{iAV.Eval}$ oracle on the challenge input μ_1 .

Provability. For any $(v, \sigma, \pi) \leftarrow iAV.Eval_{sk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j))$ with $(pk_{av}, sk_{av}) \leftarrow iAV.Keygen(pp)$, $sk_{av} \leftarrow iAV.KeyUpd^i(sk_{av})$ and $pp \leftarrow iAV.ParamGen(1^\lambda)$, the algorithm $iAV.Verify_{pk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j), v, \sigma, \pi)$ outputs 1.

Computational Full Uniqueness (CFU). Let adv be a polynomial-time adversary playing the following experiment Exp-CFU:

- (1) $pp \leftarrow iAV.ParamGen(1^\lambda)$.
 - (2) $(\mu_1, i, j, pk_{av}, \mu_2, v, \sigma, \pi, \hat{\mu}_2, \hat{v}, \hat{\sigma}, \hat{\pi}) \leftarrow adv(pp)$.
- The adversary adv wins the game if $iAV.Verify_{pk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j), v, \sigma, \pi) = iAV.Verify_{pk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j), \hat{v}, \hat{\sigma}, \hat{\pi}) = 1$ and $v \neq \hat{v}$, with

$0 \leq i < N$ and $0 \leq j < t$. An $(N$ -time) authenticated MT-iVRF with forward security is said to satisfy *computational full uniqueness*, if the adversary adv wins the above game with at most $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ probability.

Pseudorandomness. Let $adv = (adv_1, adv_2)$ be a polynomial-time adversary playing the following experiment Exp-PRand:

- (1) $pp \leftarrow iAV.ParamGen(1^\lambda)$,
- (2) $(pk_{av}, sk_{av}) \leftarrow iAV.Keygen(pp)$,
- (3) $(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, i^*, j^*, st) \leftarrow adv_1^{O_{iAV.Eval}(\cdot)}(pk_{av})$,
- (4) $sk_{av} \leftarrow iAV.KeyUpd^{i^*}(sk_{av})$,
- (5) $(v_0, \sigma_0, \pi_0) \leftarrow iAV.Eval_{sk_{av}}(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, (i^*, j^*))$,
- (6) $v_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{m(\lambda)}$,
- (7) $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$,
- (8) $b' \leftarrow adv_2^{O_{iAV.Eval}(\cdot)}(v_b, st)$,

where $O_{iAV.Eval}(\cdot)$ is an oracle that on input a message-index tuple $(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j))$ outputs a VRF value v , a signature σ and a corresponding proof of correctness π . The adversary is restricted querying $O_{iAV.Eval}(\cdot)$ on index pairs (i, j) for j sequentially incrementing (i.e., adv must query (i, j) first before being able to query $(i, j + 1)$). Let \mathcal{I} be the set of all index pairs queried by the adversary. The adversary wins the game if $b = b'$ and $(i^*, j^*) \notin \mathcal{I}$.

We say that an authenticated MT-iVRF with forward security is *pseudorandom* if any PPT adversary adv wins Exp-PRand with probability at most $\frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Forward-Secure Unforgeability. Let $adv = (adv_1, adv_2)$ be a polynomial-time adversary playing the following experiment Exp-Forge:

- (1) $pp \leftarrow iAV.ParamGen(1^\lambda)$,
- (2) $(pk_{av}, sk_{av}) \leftarrow iAV.Keygen(pp)$,
- (3) Set $i = 0$,
- (4) Until adv stops or i reaches $N - 1$: increment i by 1; set $sk_{av} \leftarrow iAV.KeyUpd(sk_{av})$ and $st_i \leftarrow adv_1^{O_{iAV.Eval}(i, \cdot)}(pp, pk_{av})$,
- (5) $(\mu_1, \mu_2, k, j, v, \sigma, \pi) \leftarrow adv_2(pp, pk_{av}, sk_{av}, st_1, \dots, st_i)$,
- (6) $b \leftarrow iAV.Verify_{pk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (k, j), v, \sigma, \pi)$,

where $O_{iAV.Eval}(i, \cdot)$ is an oracle that returns an $iAV.Eval$ output w.r.t. the i -th secret key sk_{av} and time period i . adv wins if $b = 1$, $1 \leq k < i$, $0 \leq j < t$ and μ_2 was not queried to $O_{iAV.Eval}$. We say that an indexed VRF is *forward-secure unforgeable* if

$$\Pr[adv \text{ wins Exp-Forge}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Unbiasability. Let $adv = (adv_1, adv_2)$ be a polynomial-time adversary playing the following experiment Exp-Bias:

- (1) $pp \leftarrow iAV.ParamGen(1^\lambda)$,
- (2) $(pk_{av}, \mu_2, v, i, j, st) \leftarrow adv_1(pp)$,
- (3) $\mu_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}$,
- (4) $(\sigma, \pi) \leftarrow adv_2(\mu_1, st)$,
- (5) $b \leftarrow iAV.Verify_{pk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j), v, \sigma, \pi)$.

adv wins if $b = 1$. We say that an authenticated MT-iVRF with forward security is *unbiasable* if

$$\Pr[\text{adv wins Exp-Bias}] \leq 2^{-\ell(\lambda)} + \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

3 OUR CONSTRUCTIONS

We first introduce our many-time indexed VRF (MT-iVRF) which is constructed from a secure Merkle hash tree and which can evaluate up to N time periods (i.e., rounds). This scheme allows multiple iterations within a single round, matching the Algorand setting. After that, we present our final MT-iVRF scheme which also provides authentication and forward security.

3.1 Many-Time indexed VRF (MT-iVRF)

As discussed, the index has two parts as (i, j) , where $i = 0, \dots, N-1$ and $j = 0, \dots, t$ for some public parameters $t, N \geq 1$. This construction is the setting depicted in Fig. 1 with no pk_i 's. We use a cryptographic hash family \mathcal{H} and a PRG $G : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^\lambda)^N$ with functions $(G.\text{Key}, G.\text{Next})$ to generate an initial state and a pair of next state and randomness, respectively (see App. A for more details).

iVRF.ParamGen(1^λ) : Pick a hash function $\mathcal{H} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$. Set parameters t and N for a power-of-2 N . Return $\text{pp} = (\mathcal{H}, G, N, t)$.

iVRF.Keygen(pp) :

- (1) Set up $s \leftarrow G.\text{Key}(1^\lambda)$.
- (2) Derive pseudorandom values $(x_{0,0}, \dots, x_{N-1,0})$ by running $G.\text{Next}$ iteratively on s .
- (3) Compute $x_{i,j+1} = \mathcal{H}(x_{i,j})$ for $i = 0, \dots, N-1$ and $j = 0, \dots, t-1$.
- (4) Construct a Merkle tree using $(x_{0,t}, \dots, x_{N-1,t})$. Let root be the root of the tree.

Return $(\text{pk}_v, \text{sk}_v) = (\text{root}, s)$.

iVRF.Eval $_{\text{sk}_v}(\mu, (i, j))$:

- (1) Derive $x_{i,0}$ from $s = \text{sk}_v$ and update the state of the PRG G .
- (2) Compute $y = \mathcal{H}^{t-1-j}(x_{i,0})$.
- (3) Compute $v = \mathcal{H}(y, \mu)$.
- (4) Compute an authentication path AP_i w.r.t. the leaf index i .

Return v as the VRF value along with a proof $\pi = (y, \text{AP}_i)$.

iVRF.Verify $_{\text{pk}_v}(\mu, (i, j), v, \pi)$:

- (1) Parse $\pi = (y, \text{AP})$.
 - (2) If $v \neq \mathcal{H}(y, \mu)$, return 0.
 - (3) Compute $x_{i,t} = \mathcal{H}^{j+1}(y)$.
 - (4) Compute a Merkle root, root' , using $x_{i,t}$ and AP w.r.t. the leaf index i .
- If $\text{root}' = \text{pk}_v$, return 1. Otherwise, return 0.

3.2 Authenticated MT-iVRF with Forward Security

In the MMM (recursive) sum composition approach [27], described in App. A.3, to construct a forward-secure (FS) signature for N time periods, one makes use of a Merkle tree with N leaves, where each leaf corresponds to a random (one-time) signature key pair with the public keys used to construct the Merkle tree. Therefore, our MT-iVRF instantiation can be naturally combined with the MMM




Figure 1: Overall structure of our Authenticated MT-iVRF with Forward Security. The term $x_{i,0}$'s are pseudorandom strings generated from a seed. The pk_i 's are (independent) public keys of an ordinary (t -time) signature.

approach. The advantage in this case is that we will have a *single* Merkle tree (and a single tool) to realize both the VRF functionality as well as the forward-secure signature. This means that it is sufficient to communicate a *single* authentication path to authenticate both the keys for the FS signature and the evaluator's committed values y used to compute the VRF value $v = \mathcal{H}(y, \mu)$ (where μ is the VRF input/message). As a result, the additional communication overhead of our final authenticated MT-iVRF construction over the MMM approach is minimal at just 32 bytes (recall that $v = \mathcal{H}(y, \mu)$ can be computed in the Algorand application, so need not be communicated).

Concretely, when constructing the Merkle tree, we set $x_{i,t} = \mathcal{H}(x_{i,t-1}, \text{pk}_i)$ (instead of $x_{i,t} = \mathcal{H}(x_{i,t-1})$) in key generation, where $\text{pk}_0, \dots, \text{pk}_{N-1}$ are independent public keys of a (t -time) signature scheme Σ with standard $(\Sigma.\text{Keygen}, \Sigma.\text{Sign}, \Sigma.\text{Verify})$ functions. As with the previous construction, we use a cryptographic hash family \mathcal{H} of functions $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ and a PRG $G : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^\lambda)^N$ with functions $(G.\text{Key}, G.\text{Next})$.

iAV.ParamGen(1^λ) : Pick hash function $\mathcal{H} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$. Set parameters $t = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $N = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ for a power-of-2 N . Return $\text{pp} = (\mathcal{H}, G, N, t)$.

iAV.Keygen(pp) :

- (1) Set up seeds $s, s' \leftarrow G.\text{Key}(1^\lambda)$.
- (2) Derive pseudorandom values $(x_{0,0}, \dots, x_{N-1,0})$ by running $G.\text{Next}$ iteratively on s .
- (3) Compute $x_{i,j+1} = \mathcal{H}(x_{i,j})$ for $i = 0, \dots, N-1$ and $j = 0, \dots, t-2$.
- (4) Derive pseudorandom values (r_0, \dots, r_{N-1}) by running $G.\text{Next}$ iteratively on s' .
- (5) $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Keygen}(\text{pp}; r_i)$ for $i = 0, \dots, N-1$.
- (6) Compute $x_{i,t} = \mathcal{H}(x_{i,t-1}, \text{pk}_i)$ for $i = 0, \dots, N-1$.

(7) Construct a Merkle tree using $(x_{0,t}, \dots, x_{N-1,t})$. Let root be the root of the tree.
 Return $(pk_{av}, sk_{av}) = (\text{root}, (s, 0, s', 0))$.
 iAV.KeyUpd(sk_{av}) :] Parse $sk_{av} = (s, x, s', r)$ and update sk_{av} as $(G.\text{Next}(s), G.\text{Next}(s'))$.
 iAV.Eval $_{sk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j))$:
 (1) Parse $sk_{av} = (s_i, x_{i,0}, s'_i, r_i)$.
 (2) Compute $y = \mathcal{H}^{t-1-j}(x_{i,0})$.
 (3) Compute $v = \mathcal{H}(y, \mu_1)$.
 (4) Compute $pk \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Keygen}(pp; r_i)$.
 (5) Compute $\sigma \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Sign}_{sk}(\mu_2)$.
 (6) Compute an authentication path AP_i w.r.t. the leaf index i .
 Return v as the VRF value, σ as the signature and $\pi = (y, pk, AP_i)$ as the accompanying proof.
 iAV.Verify $_{pk_{av}}(\mu_1, \mu_2, (i, j), v, \sigma, \pi)$:
 (1) Parse $\pi = (y, pk, AP)$.
 (2) If $v \neq \mathcal{H}(y, \mu_1)$, return 0.
 (3) If $\Sigma.\text{Verify}_{pk}(\sigma, \mu_2) = 0$, return 0.
 (4) Compute $y' = \mathcal{H}^j(y)$.
 (5) Compute $x_i = \mathcal{H}(y', pk)$.
 (6) Compute a Merkle root, root' , using x_i and AP w.r.t. the leaf index i .
 If $\text{root}' = pk_{av}$, return 1. Otherwise, return 0.

4 SECURITY ANALYSIS

Provability of our authenticated MT-iVRF (with forward security) construction follows via straightforward investigation.

THEOREM 4.1 (COMPUTATIONAL FULL UNIQUENESS). *The authenticated MT-iVRF construction of Subsection 3.2 satisfies Computational Full Uniqueness, if the hash function family \mathcal{H} is Collision Resistant.*

PROOF. Let **Game** denote the Exp-CFU game running with a PPT adversary adv on input $pp = (\mathcal{H}, G, N, t) \leftarrow \text{iAV.ParamGen}(1^\lambda)$. We denote the adversary run time by T_{adv} . The adversary returns $(\mu_1, i, j, pk_{av}, \mu_2, v, \sigma, \pi = (y, pk, AP), \hat{\mu}_2, \hat{v}, \hat{\sigma}, \hat{\pi} = (\hat{y}, \hat{pk}, \hat{AP}))$. Let W denote the event that adv wins in **Game**, i.e. we have (1) $v \neq \hat{v}$, where $v := \mathcal{H}(y, \mu_1)$, $\hat{v} := \mathcal{H}(\hat{y}, \mu_1)$, and (2) $\text{root} = \hat{\text{root}} = pk_{av}$, where $\text{root} := \text{MT.EvalAP}(i, x_i, AP)$, $x_i := \mathcal{H}(y', pk)$, $y' := \mathcal{H}^j(y)$ and $\hat{\text{root}} := \text{MT.EvalAP}(i, \hat{x}_i, \hat{AP})$, $\hat{x}_i := \mathcal{H}(\hat{y}', \hat{pk})$, $\hat{y}' := \mathcal{H}^j(\hat{y})$. If W happens, then from (1), we have $y \neq \hat{y}$.

We define three subevents that partition the event W . The subevent W_1 occurs if W occurs and $y' = \hat{y}'$. The subevent W_2 occurs if W occurs, W_1 does not occur (so $y' \neq \hat{y}'$) and $x_i = \hat{x}_i$. Finally, the subevent W_3 occurs if W occurs and W_1 and $W_{0,2}$ do not occur (so $x_i \neq \hat{x}_i$).

Subevent W_1 implies $\mathcal{H}^j(y) = \mathcal{H}^j(\hat{y})$ whereas $y \neq \hat{y}$. Let $j' \leq j$ be the smallest positive integer such that $\mathcal{H}^{j'}(y) = \mathcal{H}^{j'}(\hat{y})$. Then $(\mathcal{H}^{j'-1}(y), \mathcal{H}^{j'-1}(\hat{y}))$ is a collision for \mathcal{H} . It follows that there exists an adversary breaking the collision-resistance of \mathcal{H} with run-time at most T_{adv} and success probability $\geq \Pr[W_1]$, so $\Pr[W_1] \leq \varepsilon_{\mathcal{H}, CR} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. The latter equality is from the assumed collision-resistance of \mathcal{H} , where $\varepsilon_{\mathcal{H}, CR}$ is the maximal advantage of an adversary with run time T_{adv} against collision-resistance of \mathcal{H} .

Similarly, subevent W_2 implies that $\mathcal{H}(y', pk) = \mathcal{H}(\hat{y}', \hat{pk})$ whereas $y' \neq \hat{y}'$. Then $((y', pk), (\hat{y}', \hat{pk}))$ is a collision for \mathcal{H} , so $\Pr[W_2] \leq \varepsilon_{\mathcal{H}, CR} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Finally, subevent W_3 implies that $\text{MT.EvalAP}(i, x_i, AP) = \text{MT.EvalAP}(i, \hat{x}_i, \hat{AP})$ whereas $x_i \neq \hat{x}_i$. Then $(i, x_i, AP, \hat{x}_i, \hat{AP})$ is an EvalAP collision for the Merkle Tree hash MT built from \mathcal{H} . It follows from Lemma A.2 and the collision-resistance of \mathcal{H} that $\Pr[W_3] \leq \varepsilon_{\mathcal{H}, CR} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

We conclude that $\Pr[W] = \Pr[W_1] + \Pr[W_2] + \Pr[W_3] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, assuming the collision-resistance of \mathcal{H} . \square

THEOREM 4.2 (PSEUDORANDOMNESS). *The authenticated MT-iVRF construction of Subsection 3.2 satisfies Pseudorandomness, if the pseudorandom number generator G satisfies Pseudorandomness (Def. A.3) and the hash function family \mathcal{H} satisfies the Pseudorandom Function (PRF) properties (Def. A.1).*

PROOF. Let W be the event that the adversary wins, i.e. $b = b'$ and $(i^*, j^*) \notin \mathcal{I}$. We use a game based approach to prove the theorem.

Game₀ : This is identical to Exp-PRand except that the challenger picks at the beginning of the game a uniformly random guess $(\hat{i}, \hat{j}) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \dots, N-1\} \times \{0, \dots, t-1\}$ for the challenge indices (i^*, j^*) output by adv_1 . Let E be the event that the guess is correct, i.e. $(\hat{i}, \hat{j}) = (i^*, j^*)$. We are interested in $\Pr[W]$ and hence we have:

$$\Pr_{\text{Game}_0}[W] = \Pr_{\text{Game}_0}[W \cap E] / \Pr_{\text{Game}_0}[E] = Nt \cdot \Pr_{\text{Game}_0}[W \cap E].$$

The first equality holds since W and E are independent in **Game₀**. The second equality is deduced from $\Pr[E] = 1/(Nt)$ as the attacker's view is independent of what we chose here. In the following games we will trace both $\Pr[W \cap E]$ and $\Pr[E]$ at each game.

Game₁ : This game is identical to previous game except we replace $G.\text{Next}$ output $(x_{0,0}, \dots, x_{N-1,0})$ in line 1 of iAV.Eval $_{sk_{av}}$ and line 2 of iAV.Keygen(pp) algorithms with uniformly random and independent random elements in $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$. We have that $\Pr_{\text{Game}_1}[E] \leq 1/(Nt) + \varepsilon_G$, in which ε_G is the advantage of an adversary in distinguishing the outputs of G from random, as in Def. A.3. **Game₂** : This game is identical to the previous game, except that we replace $x_{i,j}$ in line 3 of iAV.Keygen(pp) by an independent uniformly random element \hat{y} in $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ (instead of $x_{i,j} = H^{t-1-j}(x_{i,0})$ used in **Game₁**), and we also accordingly set $y := \hat{y}$ in line 2 of iAV.Eval $_{sk_{av}}$ when queried at $(i, j) = (\hat{i}, \hat{j})$ and $y := H^{j-j'}(\hat{y})$ when queried at $(i, j) = (\hat{i}, \hat{j})$ for $j < \hat{j}$ by an independent uniformly random element in $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ (note that queries with $i = \hat{i}$ and $j > \hat{j}$ do not occur if the events of interest E or $E \cap W$ occur). By applying the assumed Pseudorandom Function property (PRF) of \mathcal{H} (with an empty string PRF input argument) at most t times, we get $\Pr_{\text{Game}_2}[E] \leq 1/(Nt) + \varepsilon_G + t \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{PRF}}$, where ε_{PRF} is the maximal advantage of an adversary with run-time T_{adv} against the PRF security of \mathcal{H} . Note that in this argument we replace the output of $\mathcal{H}^\alpha(\cdot)$ for $1 \leq \alpha \leq t$ with a random element because the PRF property of \mathcal{H} can be applied sequentially to outputs of each iteration. More specifically, for a uniformly random input x , $\mathcal{H}(x)$ can be replaced by a random string according to the PRF property of \mathcal{H} . Now assuming the indistinguishability of $\mathcal{H}(x)$ from a random, one can replace $\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}(x)) = \mathcal{H}^2(x)$ with a random element. This process

can be inductively iterated for any $\alpha \leq t$ to replace $\mathcal{H}^\alpha(x)$ with a random element assuming the indistinguishability of $\mathcal{H}^{\alpha-1}(x)$ from a uniformly random input to $\mathcal{H}(\cdot)$.

Game₃: This game is identical to the previous game, except that we replace $x_{i,j+1}$ in line 2 of iAV.Keygen(pp) by an independent uniformly random element \hat{y}' in $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ (instead of $x_{i,j+1} = \mathcal{H}(\hat{y})$ used in **Game₂**), and we also accordingly set $v := \hat{v}$ for another independent uniformly random element $\hat{v} \in \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ in line 3 of iAV.Eval_{sk_{av}} when queried at $(i, j) = (\hat{i}, \hat{j})$ (instead of $v = \mathcal{H}(\hat{y}, \mu_1)$ in **Game₂**) and $y := \mathcal{H}^{\hat{j}-j-1}(\hat{y}')$ in line 2 when queried at $(i, j) = (\hat{i}, \hat{j})$ for $j < \hat{j}$ (instead of $y = \mathcal{H}^{\hat{j}-j}(\hat{y})$ in **Game₂**). Notice that we can construct an adversary against the assumed Pseudorandom Function property (PRF) of \mathcal{H} with key \hat{y} as the first input that makes two PRF oracle queries with key \hat{y} (namely at the empty string PRF input to simulate $x_{i,j+1} = \mathcal{H}(\hat{y})$ and at the PRF input μ_1 to simulate $v = \mathcal{H}(\hat{y}, \mu_1)$), such that the $b = 0$ case of the PRF game simulates the view of **Game₂** to adv while the $b = 1$ case simulates the view of **Game₃** to adv. Hence, we get $\Pr_{\text{Game}_3}[E] \leq 1/(Nt) + \epsilon_G + (t+1) \cdot \epsilon_{\text{PRF}}$, where ϵ_{PRF} is the maximal advantage of an adversary with run-time T_{adv} against the PRF security of \mathcal{H} .

Now observe that in **Game₃**, if E occurs then v_0 is perfectly indistinguishable from v_1 since they are both uniformly random and independent of adv's view. It follows that $\Pr_{\text{Game}_3}[W|E] = 1/2$. We further deduce that:

$$\Pr_{\text{Game}_3}[W \cap E] = \Pr_{\text{Game}_3}[E]/2 \leq \frac{1}{2}(1/(Nt) + \epsilon_G + (t+1) \cdot \epsilon_{\text{PRF}}),$$

where in the last equality we have used the above expression for $\Pr_{\text{Game}_3}[E]$. Putting all these together, we have that:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{\text{Game}_0}[W] &= Nt \cdot \Pr_{\text{Game}_0}[W \cap E] \\ &\leq Nt \cdot (\Pr_{\text{Game}_3}[W \cap E] + \epsilon_G + (t+1) \cdot \epsilon_{\text{PRF}}) \\ &\leq Nt \cdot (1/(2Nt) + 3\epsilon_G/2 + 3(t+1) \cdot \epsilon_{\text{PRF}}/2) = 1/2 + \epsilon. \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Since $\epsilon_G = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, $\epsilon_{\text{PRF}} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ and $Nt = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, we conclude that $\epsilon := (Nt/2) \cdot (3\epsilon_G + 3(t+1) \cdot \epsilon_{\text{PRF}}) = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. \square

THEOREM 4.3 (UNBIASABILITY). *The authenticated MT-iVRF construction of Subsection 3.2 satisfies Unbiasability, if the hash function family \mathcal{H} satisfies Everywhere Preimage Resistance (ePre) in the sense of Def. A.1.*

PROOF. Let **Game** denote the Exp-Bias game running with a PPT adversary $\text{adv} = (\text{adv}_1, \text{adv}_2)$. We denote the adversary run time by T_{adv} . On input $\text{pp} = H$, where $H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$, adv_1 returns $(\text{pk}_{\text{av}}, \mu_2, v, i, j, \text{st})$, and on input (μ_1, st) , where $\mu_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}$, adv_2 returns (σ, π) , where $\pi = (y, \text{pk}, \text{AP})$. Let W denote the event that adv wins in **Game**, which implies that $\mathcal{H}(y, \mu_1) = v$. Then we can construct an adversary $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2)$ breaking ePre of \mathcal{H} with run-time at most T_{adv} and advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{ePre}}(\mathcal{B}) \geq \Pr[W]$, which implies that $\Pr[W] \leq 2^{-\ell(\lambda)} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$ by the assumed ePre security of \mathcal{H} . Namely, on input $H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$, \mathcal{B}_1 runs adv_1 on input H to get $(\text{pk}_{\text{av}}, \mu_2, v, i, j, \text{st})$ and \mathcal{B}_1 returns (v, st) , and on input (μ_1, st) for $\mu_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}$, \mathcal{B}_2 runs adv_2 on (μ_1, st) to get (σ, π) , where $\pi = (y, \text{pk}, \text{AP})$, and \mathcal{B}_2 returns y . \square

Due to limited space, we state and prove the forward-secure unforgeability property in App. B.

5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION

Thanks to the simplicity of our scheme, the performance analysis can straightforwardly be done by counting the number of operations. For the hash operations, we look at the amount of bytes to be hashed rather than how many $\mathcal{H}(\cdot)$ operations appear in the description to capture a more accurate result, and consider 32-byte values for $x_{i,j}$'s, μ_i 's and the hash output. We write $|\sigma|_B$ and $|\text{pk}|_B$ to denote the byte-lengths of the ordinary signature and its public key.

iAV.Keygen consists of the following main operations:

- (1) $2N$ PRG iterations,
- (2) less than $(t+2) \cdot N \cdot 32 + N \cdot |\text{pk}|_B$ bytes of hash calculations, and
- (3) N (ordinary) signature key generations.

Therefore, iAV.Keygen runtime is likely to be dominated by N (ordinary) signature key generations (for reasonable values of t), which is consistent with our implementation results discussed further below in this section. Note that key generation of Algorand's approach to forward security (as discussed in the introduction) involves invoking ordinary signature key generation *and* signing algorithms N times each. Hence, our iAV.Keygen runtime is likely to closely match (or may even be faster than) Algorand's approach. Note also that in the context of Algorand, keys for the next epoch can be generated progressively in the current epoch so that the key generation runtime is amortized.

Next, iAV.Eval consists of the following main operations:

- (1) at most $(t+1) \cdot 32$ bytes of hash calculations,
- (2) 1 (ordinary) signature key generation, and
- (3) 1 (ordinary) signing.

Note that the authentication path in iAV.Eval can simply be retrieved when the Merkle tree is stored.

Finally, iAV.Verify consists of the following main operations:

- (1) at most $(2 \log N + t + 2) \cdot 32 + |\text{pk}|_B$ bytes of hash calculations, and
- (2) 1 (ordinary) signature verification.

In terms of communication, iAV.Eval requires transmission of an ordinary signature σ , an ordinary signature public key pk , an authentication path ($\log N$ 32-byte strings) and a 32-byte string (and another 32-byte string if v needs to be communicated). So, in total, $|\sigma|_B + |\text{pk}|_B + (\log N + 1) \cdot 32$ bytes of communication is needed.

The storage requirement by the evaluator is heavily dominated by the storage of the Merkle tree nodes (if they are stored). If the whole tree is stored, then about $32 \cdot 2N = 64N$ bytes of storage is needed. However, standard optimizations such as partial tree storage (together with progressive computation of missing nodes and deletion of used nodes) can be adopted. For example, by computing the two sibling leaf nodes together every two time periods, we can avoid storage of leaf nodes and reduce the storage requirement to $32N$ bytes.

Table 2: Performance of our authenticated MT-iVRF with forward security in Sec. 3.2 for different parameters using Falcon-512.

(N, t)	Proof Size	Keygen	Eval	Verify	Key Lifetime in Algorand
$(2^{18}, 16)$	608 bytes	19.44 mins	4.63 ms	0.046 ms	2 weeks
$(2^{18}, 100)$	608 bytes	19.82 mins	4.72 ms	0.088 ms	2 weeks
$(2^{23}, 16)$	768 bytes	10.40 hours	4.63 ms	0.049 ms	> 1 year
$(2^{23}, 100)$	768 bytes	10.45 hours	4.67 ms	0.092 ms	> 1 year

Table 3: Runtimes of our execution of signature algorithms.

Scheme	Keygen Time	Signing Time	Verify Time
Falcon-512	4.45 ms	0.18 ms	0.023 ms
XMSS-128	290.51 ms	290.98 ms	1.23 ms

We implemented our authenticated MT-iVRF with forward security (from Sec. 3.2) in C language⁸ (on a single Intel i7-7700K core at 4.2GHz). We used Falcon-512 [20] to instantiate the post-quantum signature, SHA-256 for the hash function \mathcal{H} , and AES-256 with the CTR-DRBG mode [29] (implemented by using the AES-NI hardware instructions [24]) for the PRG G . Falcon-512 has a public key of 897 bytes and a signature of 666 bytes. We used the Falcon variant with the ChaCha20 [9] seed expander provided by the latest Falcon reference implementation⁹, with both AVX2 and FMA instructions enabled. Clang 14.0.6 compiler was used to compile the code, with optimisation flags `-O3 -march=native`. We disabled Hyper-threading and Turbo Boost during the benchmarks.

In Tables 2 and 3, we summarize the concrete performance results of our authenticated MT-iVRF with forward security proposal and our execution of Falcon-512 signature, respectively. When computing the proof sizes in Table 2, we remove the costs due to the signature scheme to clearly show the impact of varying parameters since the cost due to the signature is fixed and arises from authentication, not the VRF functionality. We also note that when running iAV.Eval and iAV.Verify, we set $j = 0$ and $j = t - 1$, respectively, to capture the *worst-case* running times.

Let us first analyze the impact of the parameter t . It is easy to see that the proof size is independent of t (as also evident from the theoretical analysis above) and that iAV.Keygen runtime increases very little even when t is increased to a large value like 100. The parameter t has also little impact on the iAV.Eval runtime, and iAV.Verify is still very fast even in the worst case with $t = 100$. Therefore, we believe there is a lot of freedom for the choice of t .

Using the results of Tables 2 and 3, it is easy to derive that the vast majority of iAV.Keygen time is spent on Falcon key generations. Similarly, the vast majority of iAV.Eval time is spent of Falcon key generation and signing. In fact, the slight variations in iAV.Eval for different N values are mainly due to the variations in the Falcon signature runtimes as iAV.Eval runtime is (almost) independent of N (neglecting the minor cost of retrieving log N tree nodes).

⁸Source code available at <https://gitlab.com/raykzhao/ivrf>

⁹<https://falcon-sign.info/Falcon-impl-20211101.zip> (this reference implementation is also adopted in Algorand)

The runtimes of our execution of Falcon-512 (see Table 3) are close to the reported runtimes on the official Falcon website¹⁰. Note that some of our runtimes in Table 3 are faster, due to the ChaCha20 seed expander (up to 8% faster for Keygen on Intel CPUs, as reported by the latest Falcon reference implementation) and higher CPU frequency in our benchmark platform (4.2GHz vs 2.3GHz).

We also measured the performance of the XMSS signature [11] as a choice of signature based on symmetric-key primitives. We added the parameter set XMSS-128 with 128 leaves (greater than our choices of $t \in \{16, 100\}$) using SHA-256 in the XMSS reference implementation¹¹. XMSS-128 has a public key of 64 bytes and a signature of 2404 bytes. The runtimes of our execution of XMSS-128 are summarised in Table 3. Note that we did not use the “fast” variant in the XMSS reference implementation with the BDS algorithm [12], since the BDS algorithm needs to be iterated j times in iAV.Eval. This becomes more than $2\times$ slower than the iAV.Eval without the BDS algorithm when $j = 99$ in our experiment. Compared to Falcon-512, the Keygen and Verify times of XMSS-128 are more than $50\times$ slower, and the signing time is more than $1000\times$ slower. In addition, the signature size of XMSS-128 is also $3.6\times$ bigger than Falcon-512. Therefore, Falcon-512 is a better choice as the signature algorithm due to its advantages in the runtimes and the signature size.

6 APPLICATION TO ALGORAND

The Algorand protocol is a fork-free PoS protocol in which consensus is achieved using a Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocol [14, 15]. To prevent the adversary from adaptively corrupting parties who participate in the protocol, the parties who are actively running the protocol change after every step¹² of the protocol. This is achieved using a VRF that takes into account parties’ stakes. The security of the signature primitives (including the VRF), and, by extension, of the BA protocol, rely on computational assumptions that are known to be broken in the context of a quantum adversary. Hence, to attain post-quantum security for this protocol, it is necessary to shift to alternate constructions for these primitives. The purpose of this section is to provide a high-level explanation of the relevant aspects of Algorand’s BA protocol that should be replaced with post-quantum secure alternatives.

We begin by explaining how parties register their keys to the Algorand blockchain [19]. To create an account, a party registers its public account key *apk* to the blockchain using a registration transaction that includes the spending public key and the amount of coins belonging to the account owner. At each step of the BA protocol, parties individually run the sortition algorithm to check if they are eligible to participate in the consensus protocol. The sortition is implemented using a VRF (see below for how parties register their VRF keys).

At round n , a party computes the output of their VRF on input their VRF secret key *vsk* and a special quantity Q_n , which is

¹⁰<https://falcon-sign.info/>

¹¹<https://github.com/XMSS/xmss-reference>

¹²Note that a *round* of the Algorand protocol may include several *periods*, each consisting of a constant number of *steps*, namely 5 steps [15]. In our iVRF formal model, we use two indices (for rounds and iterations), and each step of a period in Algorand increments one iteration in our iVRF model (i.e., there is no need to introduce a third index in the formal model, which would unnecessarily complicate its presentation).

derived from the blockchain. The main idea is that Q_n will be unpredictable to any party at the time of registering its public key to the blockchain. Therefore, it also should not be able to predict if it will be eligible to participate in the consensus protocol at round n . We elide a detailed description of how the protocol computes Q_n , as it is not relevant for explaining the sortition mechanism.

The initial quantity Q_0 is assumed to be randomly generated (as part of the genesis block). At round n , the previous round's magic number Q_{n-1} is used. Particularly, the *leader* of period j of round n is elected as the party P_i with the lowest VRF value (proportional to its stakes) satisfying^{13 14}

$$\mathcal{H}(\Sigma.\text{Sign}_i(n, j, 1, Q_{n-1})) \leq p \cdot \text{stake}(P_i), \quad (2)$$

where p is a predefined threshold value and $\text{stake}(P_i)$ denotes the amount of stakes owned by P_i . More generally, parties determine their eligibility to participate in the protocol for a given step $s > 1$ (of period j) of the BA protocol by checking whether

$$\mathcal{H}(\Sigma.\text{Sign}_i(n, j, s, Q_{n-1})) \leq p' \cdot \text{stake}(P_i), \quad (3)$$

where $p' \gg p$ is a predefined value.

Every period of the protocol is associated with a leader who is also elected via VRF. The BA protocol may have several periods (each consisting of a constant number of steps with rotating participants). Each potential round leader in round n proposes a block including new valid transactions together with its VRF proof for round n and broadcasts them to the network. After the blocks are proposed by the potential leaders, all participants of the protocol verify the correctness of the VRF outputs and choose the candidate block with the lowest VRF value. Once a block is accepted by collecting a strong majority of votes ($2/3$ of the votes) from the active protocol participants, parties move on to the next round.

6.1 Key Management in Algorand

In Algorand, there are four types of keys: *spending keys*, *VRF (selection) keys*, *voting keys* and (recently introduced) *state proof keys* [19]. Spending keys, also known as root keys, are used for sending and receiving coins by an account. An account is identified with the root public key apk of the spending key. Also, later on, the VRF, voting and state proof keys of the account are validated via the spending keys.

VRF keys are used to check if an account is selected for participation in the voting phase as the leader or, more generally, as an active participant in the BA protocol. Hence, all protocol messages are validated with a VRF proof.

Voting keys are used to authenticate participation during the voting phase of the BA agreement protocol. To achieve *forward security*, voting keys are periodically updated. This simple update works as follows: parties delete the latest used private key, and move to the next one. To avoid registering a new voting key each time, per epoch, a batch of ephemeral voting keys $(epk_1, esk_1), (epk_2, esk_2), \dots$ (10,000 as the default value) are generated. These keys are authenticated using a signature relative to the root voting key apk , which is validated by the signature of the

spending key. Thus, a batch of keys are committed and (partially) validated as follows whenever a new epoch begins. First, the user registers a new root key epk , which it validates by signing with the spending key of the root public key apk of the previous epoch. Each ephemeral voting key epk_i is later validated using epk .

In theory (to ensure full forward security), voting keys should be updated immediately after their use in a step of the BA protocol. However, in practice, they are updated every round [19]. This results in a slightly weaker form of security where a fully adaptive adversary may indefinitely stall progress of the protocol. However, such a strong adversary appears somewhat unrealistic in practice.

Recently, Algorand introduced state proof keys used to generate post-quantum secure state proofs. Similar to voting keys, state proof keys consist of ephemeral keys that are renewed in epochs.

6.2 Our Modifications to the Algorand Protocol

We aim to achieve a post-quantum version of Algorand protocol by replacing cryptographic algorithms that are vulnerable to quantum attacks. In March 2022, concurrently and independently from our work, Algorand added *state proofs* to the protocol to improve its resilience against quantum attacks. In state proofs, a subset-sum-based hash function [22] and the Falcon signature algorithm [20] are used. However, the rest of the protocol mainly utilizes pre-quantum algorithms. Algorand uses SHA-512/256 and EdDSA [8, 26] as primary hash function and signature scheme, respectively.

The security of the Algorand protocol relies on a strong honest majority among each of the BA committees that actively run the protocol. With the above choices, the Algorand protocol achieves its desired security properties with overwhelming probability $(1 - 10^{-18})$ given appropriate network conditions [21]. The committee and leader elections for the BA protocol are done via the VRF function. However, since the VRF function is instantiated with the pre-quantum algorithms, these election protocols are not post-quantum secure¹⁵. In our protocol, we can replace the signature scheme EdDSA with any post-quantum signature, and particularly propose to use Falcon signature since it has the minimal total size for a public key and a signature among those selected by the NIST for post-quantum signature standardization. Also, we replace the VRF function with MT-iVRF, which is defined in Section 3. In fact, as discussed before, we can realize both VRF and signature functionalities by a single tool, our authenticated MT-iVRF from Sec. 3.2.

As mentioned previously, the election in the BA protocol is done via a VRF with the input of Q_n value, which should satisfy *uniqueness*, *pseudorandomness* and *unbiasability* (See Sec. 5.6 and proof of Lemma 5.11 in [15]). Our iVRF construction satisfies somewhat different notions of uniqueness, pseudorandomness, and unbiasedness than the ones stated in [15]. First of all, our formal model in Sec. 2 is designed to collectively capture the VRF and forward secure signature requirements in an Algorand-like blockchain setting, where the protocol is inherently indexed (or timed). Particularly, we assume the protocol operates in rounds (indexed by i), periods within rounds (indexed by j), and each period consists of a constant number of steps. We require in an Algorand-like blockchain

¹³The signature used in Algorand's VRF (given in Eqn. 2) has the uniqueness property.

¹⁴Note that in the Algorand protocol given in [15], the period parameter j is omitted since each round is described over one period, whereas the current implementation of the protocol explained in [19] may include several periods per round.

¹⁵We note here that the uniqueness property of ECVRF used in Algorand does not rely on any computational assumption [30] and, therefore, is plausibly post-quantum (in ROM). However, the pseudorandomness property requires DDH assumption [30] and, therefore, ECVRF as a whole is not post-quantum.

setting that at any particular step of a period of any round, each (computationally bounded) user can only produce a single valid VRF value, as captured by our formal uniqueness model. Similarly, we need pseudorandomness to hold against indices that have not been queried before. That is, it is fine for the outputs from previous steps/rounds to not satisfy pseudorandomness, as the past unique VRF values have already served their purpose and are no longer relevant. Moreover, by combining the forward-secure signature with iVRF, our construction given in Sec. 3.2 reduces the validation costs. More specifically, we require only one Merkle Tree authentication path, rather than two in the separate construction case.

Thanks to the blockchain-oriented design of our formal definitions, the security properties achieved by our iVRF are sufficient to ensure the required properties on the BA committee elections leveraged in Algorand's proofs. As shown in Sec. 4, our iVRF satisfies the aforementioned properties, and thereby can be substituted in the original Algorand protocol without impacting its security.

Finally, recall that our MT-iVRF construction includes t pseudo-random strings $(x_{i,j})$ per round. Here, the iteration parameter t can be chosen based on the network and security assumptions. The BA protocol of Algorand is expected to terminate within at most 2.5 periods (which corresponds to 16 steps in total) [14]. As discussed in Sec. 5, the parameter t has little impact on the computation (and no impact on the communication) performance and, hence, can be safely adjusted without a significant compromise in performance.

6.3 Interpreting Our iVRF Performance for Algorand

It is easy to see that the iAV.Keygen runtime is heavily dominated by Falcon key generations, which are needed anyway for forward security. As discussed earlier, this key generation process can be amortized over time or parallelized. For example for $N = 2^{23}$, splitting the computation into 4 cores (and using 4 random seeds instead of one to generate signature keys) reduces the required *once-a-year* computation time to just 2.6 hours. Alternatively, whenever the user's device is turned on, the signature keys can be progressively computed (and hashed to avoid storing the whole key). Therefore, in terms of keygen procedure, there is effectively no computational overhead over what already needs to be done to achieve forward security. Note that the ephemeral key generation process that already exists in Algorand together with a little more of effort for the generation of $x_{i,j}$'s and the Merkle tree can serve as iAV.Keygen.

From Table 2, we can see that an evaluation (including signing) can be done under 5 ms, which is well below the Algorand's round time at 4.5 seconds. Therefore, a committee member's local authenticated iVRF evaluations are not expected to lead to any slowdown. We can also conclude that 50,000 or more iAV.Verify executions can be performed within the time period of a round. In fact, as seen in Tables 1 and 2, our verification (including signature validation) runs even faster than ECVRF verification used by Algorand. Therefore, we also do not expect any slowdown due to verification.

As discussed in Sec. 5, for the storage of the Merkle tree nodes, we need about $32N$ bytes, meaning only 256 MB is needed even for $N = 2^{23}$. Note that the existing Algorand protocol already has a similar storage requirement where N pairs of an ephemeral key and a signature (each pair of size about 96 bytes) are stored.

Perhaps the only significant cost introduced with the use of our authenticated MT-iVRF in the Algorand setting is the increased communication. As discussed before, the vast majority of the increased communication cost stems from the use of a post-quantum forward-secure signature and there is only a 32-byte additional cost due to the VRF functionality. Such an additional cost of increased communication appears unavoidable in the current state of affairs when post-quantum security is desired as evidenced by the increased sizes of all schemes standardized by NIST¹⁶.

REFERENCES

- [1] 2018. Chia Documentation. Available at https://docs.chia.net/docs/03consensus/consensus_intro.
- [2] 2019. *Quantum-Safe Identity-based Encryption*. Technical Report. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute, Sophia-Antipolis, France.
- [3] 2020. What sets it apart: Filecoin's proof system. Available at https://spec.filecoin.io/algorithms/expected_consensus/.
- [4] 2022. RangersProtocol Whitepaper. Available at <https://www.rangersprotocol.com/pdf/RangersProtocolWhitepaper.pdf>.
- [5] Martin R. Albrecht, Christian Rechberger, Thomas Schneider, Tyge Tiessen, and Michael Zohner. 2015. Ciphers for MPC and FHE. In *EUROCRYPT (1) (LNCS, Vol. 9056)*. Springer, 430–454.
- [6] Mihir Bellare and Sara K. Miner. 1999. A Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme. In *CRYPTO (LNCS, Vol. 1666)*. Springer, 431–448.
- [7] Mihir Bellare, Chanathip Namprempre, and Gregory Neven. 2004. Security Proofs for Identity-Based Identification and Signature Schemes. In *EUROCRYPT (LNCS, Vol. 3027)*. Springer, 268–286.
- [8] Daniel J. Bernstein. 2006. Curve25519: New Diffie-Hellman Speed Records. In *Public Key Cryptography (LNCS, Vol. 3958)*. Springer, 207–228.
- [9] Daniel J. Bernstein. 2008. ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20. <https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf>.
- [10] Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, Peter Schwabe, and Bo-Yin Yang. 2011. High-Speed High-Security Signatures. In *CHES (LNCS, Vol. 6917)*. Springer, 124–142.
- [11] Johannes Buchmann, Erik Dahmen, and Andreas Hülsing. 2011. XMSS - A Practical Forward Secure Signature Scheme Based on Minimal Security Assumptions. In *PQCrypto (LNCS, Vol. 7071)*. Springer, 117–129.
- [12] Johannes Buchmann, Erik Dahmen, and Michael Schneider. 2008. Merkle Tree Traversal Revisited. In *PQCrypto (LNCS, Vol. 5299)*. Springer, 63–78.
- [13] Maxime Buser, Rafael Dowsley, Muhammed F. Esgin, Shabnam Kasra Kerman-shahi, Veronika Kuchta, Joseph K. Liu, Raphael Phan, and Zhenfei Zhang. 2022. Post-Quantum Verifiable Random Function from Symmetric Primitives in PoS Blockchain. In *ESORICS (LNCS, Vol. 13554)*. Springer, 25–45.
- [14] Jing Chen, Sergey Gorbunov, Silvio Micali, and Georgios Vlachos. 2018. ALGORAND AGREEMENT: Super Fast and Partition Resilient Byzantine Agreement. *IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.* (2018), 377.
- [15] Jing Chen and Silvio Micali. 2019. Algorand: A secure and efficient distributed ledger. *Theor. Comput. Sci.* 777 (2019), 155–183.
- [16] Bernardo David, Peter Gazi, Aggelos Kiayias, and Alexander Russell. 2018. Ouroboros Praos: An Adaptively-Secure, Semi-synchronous Proof-of-Stake Blockchain. In *EUROCRYPT (2) (LNCS, Vol. 10821)*. Springer, 66–98.
- [17] Muhammed F. Esgin, Veronika Kuchta, Amin Sakzad, Ron Steinfeld, Zhenfei Zhang, Shifeng Sun, and Shumo Chu. 2021. Practical Post-quantum Few-Time Verifiable Random Function with Applications to Algorand. In *Financial Cryptography (2) (LNCS, Vol. 12675)*. Springer, 560–578.
- [18] Muhammed F. Esgin, Ron Steinfeld, Dongxi Liu, and Sushmita Ruj. 2022. Efficient Hybrid Exact/Relaxed Lattice Proofs and Applications to Rounding and VRFs. *Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2022/141*. <https://ia.cr/2022/141>.
- [19] Algorand Foundation. 2022. Algorand Key Specification. Available at: <https://github.com/algorandfoundation/specs/blob/master/dev/partkey.md>.
- [20] Pierre-Alain Fouque, Jeffrey Hoffstein, Paul Kirchner, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Thomas Pornin, Thomas Prest, Thomas Ricosset, Gregor Seiler, William Whyte, and Zhenfei Zhang. 2018. Falcon: Fast-Fourier lattice-based compact signatures over NTRU. *Submission to the NIST's PQC standardization process* 36, 5 (2018).
- [21] Yossi Gilad, Rotem Hemo, Silvio Micali, Georgios Vlachos, and Nikolai Zeldovich. 2017. Algorand: Scaling Byzantine Agreements for Cryptocurrencies. In *Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP)*. ACM, 51–68.
- [22] Yossi Gilad, David Lazar, and Chris Peikert. 2021. Subset-Sum Hash Specification. Available at: <https://github.com/algorandfoundation/specs/blob/master/dev/cryptographic-specs/sumhash-spec.pdf>.

¹⁶ csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/selected-algorithms-2022

- [23] Sergey Gorbunov. 2018. Algorand Releases First Open-Source Code: Verifiable Random Function. Available at <https://medium.com/algorand/algorand-releases-first-open-source-code-of-verifiable-random-function-93c2960abd61>.
- [24] Shay Gueron. 2009. Intel's New AES Instructions for Enhanced Performance and Security. In *FSE (LNCS, Vol. 5665)*. Springer, 51–66.
- [25] Timo Hanke, Mahnush Movahedi, and Dominic Williams. 2018. DFINITY Technology Overview Series, Consensus System. *CoRR* abs/1805.04548 (2018). arXiv:1805.04548 <http://arxiv.org/abs/1805.04548>
- [26] Simon Josefsson and Ilari Liusvaara. 2017. Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). *RFC* 8032 (2017), 1–60.
- [27] Tal Malkin, Daniele Micciancio, and Sara K. Miner. 2002. Efficient Generic Forward-Secure Signatures with an Unbounded Number Of Time Periods. In *EUROCRYPT (LNCS, Vol. 2332)*. Springer, 400–417.
- [28] Silvio Micali, Michael O. Rabin, and Salil P. Vadhan. 1999. Verifiable Random Functions. In *FOCS*. IEEE Computer Society, 120–130.
- [29] NIST. 2015. Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1>.
- [30] Dimitrios Papadopoulos, Duane Vessels, Shumon Huque, Moni Naor, Jan Věelák, Leonid Reyzin, and Sharon Goldberg. 2017. Making NSEC5 Practical for DNSSEC. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/099. <https://ia.cr/2017/099>.
- [31] Phillip Rogaway and Thomas Shrimpton. 2004. Cryptographic Hash-Function Basics: Definitions, Implications, and Separations for Preimage Resistance, Second-Preimage Resistance, and Collision Resistance. In *FSE (LNCS, Vol. 3017)*. Springer, 371–388.
- [32] Raymond K. Zhao, Sarah McCarthy, Ron Steinfeld, Amin Sakzad, and Máire O'Neill. 2021. Quantum-safe HIBE: does it cost a Latte? Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/222. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/222>.

A PRELIMINARIES

For a finite set S , we denote by $x \xleftarrow{\$} S$ the sampling of a uniformly random element x of S . For a security parameter λ , we denote by $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ a negligible function in λ , where $\text{negl}(\lambda) := O(\text{poly}(\lambda)/2^\lambda)$.

A.1 Hash Functions and Merkle Tree

Definition A.1 (Hash-Function Family). A (cryptographic) hash function family with security parameter λ is a set \mathcal{H} of polynomial-time computable functions $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ that map an arbitrary-length message to an 2λ -bit hash value (digest). We define the following desirable security properties for a cryptographic hash family \mathcal{H} :

Everywhere Preimage Resistance (ePre): For this notion, we treat the domain of \mathcal{H} as $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda} \times \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}$. Let $v \in \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$. We define the following experiment Exp-ePre with any PPT adversary $\text{adv} = (\text{adv}_1, \text{adv}_2)$: Let $(v, \text{st}) \leftarrow \text{adv}_1(\mathcal{H})$ for $\mathcal{H} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$, and $y \leftarrow \text{adv}_2(\mu, \text{st})$ for $\mu \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}$. adv wins game Exp-ePre if $\mathcal{H}(y, \mu) = v$. We say that \mathcal{H} satisfies Everywhere Preimage Resistance (ePre) if for any PPT adversary adv ,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{ePre}}(\text{adv}) := \Pr[\text{adv wins Exp-ePre}] \leq 2^{-\ell(\lambda)} + \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Collision Resistance (CR): We say that \mathcal{H} satisfies Collision Resistance if, on input $\mathcal{H} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$, a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary adv outputs (m, \hat{m}) such that $\mathcal{H}(m) = \mathcal{H}(\hat{m})$ but $m \neq \hat{m}$, with at most $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ probability.

Pseudorandom Function (PRF): For this notion, we treat the domain of \mathcal{H} as $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda} \times \{0, 1\}^*$ (note that the second input can be the empty string). Let adv be a PPT adversary playing the following experiment Exp-PRF :

- (1) Let $\mathcal{H} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}$.
- (2) Let $y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$.

- (3) Let F be a function chosen uniformly at random from the set of all functions from $\{0, 1\}^*$ to $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$.

- (4) Let $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$.

- (5) $b' \leftarrow \text{adv}^{O_b(\cdot)}(\mathcal{H})$.

where $O_b(\cdot)$ is an oracle that on input $\mu \in \{0, 1\}^*$ returns $\mathcal{H}(y, \mu) \in \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ if $b = 0$ and $F(\mu) \in \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ if $b = 1$. The adversary wins the game if $b = b'$.

We say that \mathcal{H} satisfies the Pseudorandom Function (PRF) property if any PPT adversary adv wins Exp-PRF with probability at most $\frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

We remark that all the above security properties are natural and standard assumptions on cryptographic hash functions used in practice. The flavour of Everywhere Preimage Resistance above (ePre) is a variant of the ePre one-wayness notion defined in [31], where the input μ above corresponds to the hash key in the ePre definition in [31]. In our variant, the adversary commits to the output value v before getting the hash key μ , whereas in [31] the value v is fixed at the beginning of the game.

We recall the construction of a Merkle Tree hash from a collision resistant hash family \mathcal{H} . Given a hash function family \mathcal{H} of hash functions $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda} \times \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$, a Merkle Tree hash MT consists of the following probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms (MT.Setup, MT.Eval, MT.AP, MT.EvalAP):

$(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{MT.Setup}(1^\lambda, N = 2^\ell)$: Given the security parameter 1^λ and the power-of-2 number of Merkle tree leaves $N = 2^\ell$, sample a hash function $\mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$ and output the public parameters $\text{pp} = (\mathcal{H}, N)$.

$(\text{root}, T) \leftarrow \text{MT.Eval}(x_0, \dots, x_{N-1})$: Given as input N Merkle tree leaf values (x_0, \dots, x_{N-1}) , compute the Merkle tree root (root) and other tree node values (T) as follows:

- $(x_0^{(\ell)}, \dots, x_{N-1}^{(\ell)}) \leftarrow (x_0, \dots, x_{N-1})$
- for $j = \ell - 1$ down to 0 (level index)
- for $i = 0, \dots, N/2^{\ell-j} - 1$ (node index)
- Let $x_i^{(j)} \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(x_{2i}^{(j+1)}, x_{2i+1}^{(j+1)})$
- end for

- end for
- $\text{root} \leftarrow x_0^{(0)}$

- $T \leftarrow (x_i^{(j)})_{i,j}$

Return (root, T) .

For every $j \in \{0, \dots, \ell - 1\}$ and $i \in \{0, N/2^{\ell-j} - 1\}$, the pair $(x_{2i}^{(j+1)}, x_{2i+1}^{(j+1)})$ are called *sibling* node values in the Merkle tree, and the node value $x_i^{(j)} = \mathcal{H}(x_{2i}^{(j+1)}, x_{2i+1}^{(j+1)})$ is called the parent node value of those sibling node values.

$\text{AP}_i \leftarrow \text{MT.AP}(i, T)$: Given as input a leaf node index $i \in \{0, \dots, N - 1\}$ and a node value tree $T = (x_i^{(j)})_{i,j}$, compute the list of ℓ node values on the path P_i from the leaf node value $x_i^{(\ell)}$ to the root node value $x_0^{(0)}$ (not including the root), and return the *authentication path* AP_i consisting of ℓ sibling node values of the nodes in P_i .

$\text{root} \leftarrow \text{MT.EvalAP}(i, x_i, \text{AP}_i)$: Given as input a leaf node index $i \in \{0, \dots, N - 1\}$, an i 'th leaf node value x_i and an authentication path AP_i of ℓ sibling node values along the path P_i

from the i 'th leaf node to the root node, compute the node values of the nodes in P_i and return the root value root.

LEMMA A.2 (MERKLE TREE COLLISION RESISTANCE). *If \mathcal{H} is a collision-resistant hash family, then the Merkle Tree hash MT built from \mathcal{H} satisfies the following collision-resistance property:*

EvalAP Collision Resistance. *Let $pp \leftarrow \text{MT.Setup}(1^\lambda, N)$. On input pp , a polynomial-time adversary adv outputs $(i, x_i, \text{AP}_i, x'_i, \text{AP}'_i)$ such that $i \in \{0, \dots, N-1\}$, $x'_i \neq x_i$ but $\text{root}' = \text{root}$ with at most $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ probability, where $\text{root}' \leftarrow \text{MT.EvalAP}(i, x'_i, \text{AP}'_i)$ and $\text{root} \leftarrow \text{MT.EvalAP}(i, x_i, \text{AP}_i)$.*

A.2 Pseudorandom Generator

We start with the following definition.

Definition A.3. A (stateful) pseudorandom number generator G with security parameter λ is a pair of algorithms $(G.\text{Key}, G.\text{Next})$ and an integer Q , where $G.\text{Key}$ is a probabilistic algorithm which takes no input and outputs an initial state $s \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, $G.\text{Next}$ is a deterministic algorithm which, given the current state s , outputs a pair $(s', r) \leftarrow G.\text{Next}(s)$, where s' is the new state and $r \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ is the output and Q is the maximal number of outputs the pseudorandom number generator is allowed to produce.

The following security properties are desirable for a stateful pseudorandom generator G :

Pseudorandomness of G : A challenger first lets $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. All successive queries to $O^{G.\text{Next}}(s)$ should be indistinguishable from random, where $O^{G.\text{Next}}(\cdot)$ uses either $(s', r_0) \leftarrow G.\text{Next}(s)$ or a random string $r_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to respond r_b to adv . The adversary adv returns b' and wins the game if $b' = b$.

Forward security of G : The challenger generates a random initial secret input s and challenges the adversary adv on its capacity to distinguish the real output of the pseudorandom number generator from random. In addition to the usual procedures detailed in the above pseudorandomness game, the adversary adv has access to an oracle O^{GetState} in which adv has access to the current value of the state s . A G is called (T, Q, ϵ) -forward-secure, if for any adversary adv running in time at most T , making at most Q calls to $O^{G.\text{Next}}(\cdot)$, followed by one call to an oracle, which is the last call adv is allowed to make and gets the last state s , the advantage of adv in this game is at most ϵ .

A.3 Digital Signatures and Forward Security

Definition A.4 (Digital Signature). A signature scheme Σ consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms $(\Sigma.\text{Keygen}, \Sigma.\text{Sign}, \Sigma.\text{Verify})$ satisfying the following:

- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Keygen}(1^\lambda)$: Given the security parameter 1^λ , output a public-secret key pair (pk, sk) .
- $(\sigma, \mu) \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Sign}_{sk}(\mu)$: Given as input a secret key sk and a message μ , output a signature-message pair (σ, μ) .
- $0/1 \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Verify}_{pk}(\sigma, \mu)$: Given as input a public key pk , a signature σ and a message μ it outputs a bit $b = 1$ if the signature is valid and $b = 0$ otherwise.

It is required that for every λ , every key pair (pk, sk) output by the key generation algorithm, and every message $\mu \in \{0, 1\}^*$ it holds that $\Sigma.\text{Verify}_{pk}(\Sigma.\text{Sign}_{sk}(\mu), \mu) = 1$.

Unforgeability against Chosen-Message Attacks (UF-CMA). A signature scheme $\Sigma = (\Sigma.\text{Keygen}, \Sigma.\text{Sign}, \Sigma.\text{Verify})$ is unforgeable against chosen-message attacks if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries, the probability to win the following experiment Exp-UF-CMA is $\text{negl}(\lambda)$:

- (1) $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Keygen}(1^\lambda)$
- (2) $(\sigma, \mu) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{O^{\Sigma.\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)}}(pk)$, where $O^{\Sigma.\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)}$ is a signing oracle that returns a signature on input a message μ
- (3) If $1 \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Verify}(\sigma, \mu, pk)$ and μ has not been queried to $O^{\Sigma.\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)}$ return 1, else return 0.

We write $\Sigma.\text{Keygen}(1^\lambda; r)$ to denote that the key generation function is run using a randomness r .

In [27], the authors showed a way of constructing a forward-secure signature from any (ordinary) signature using a ‘sum’ composition. Let N be the total time period for the forward-secure signature and assume for simplicity that N is a power of two. We recall below how this ‘MMM approach’ works for a given (one-time) signature scheme Σ .

MMM forward-secure signature approach (sum composition).

- $(\widetilde{pk}, \widetilde{sk}_0) \leftarrow \text{FSS.Keygen}(1^\lambda, N)$:
 - (1) Set up $s \leftarrow G.\text{Key}(1^\lambda)$
 - (2) Compute $(s_i, r_i) \leftarrow G.\text{Next}(s_{i-1})$ for $i = 0, \dots, N-1$ where $s_{-1} := s$
 - (3) Compute $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Keygen}(1^\lambda; r_i)$ for $i = 0, \dots, N-1$.
 - (4) Create a Merkle tree using (pk_0, \dots, pk_{N-1}) as the leaves and denote its root by root .
 - (5) Return $(\widetilde{pk}, \widetilde{sk}_0) = (\text{root}, (s, 0))$.
- $\widetilde{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{FSS.Update}(\widetilde{sk}_{i-1})$: Parse $\widetilde{sk}_{i-1} = (s_{i-1}, r_{i-1})$ and return $G.\text{Next}(s_{i-1})$.
- $\hat{\sigma} \leftarrow \text{FSS.Sign}_{\widetilde{sk}_i}(\mu, i)$: Parse $\widetilde{sk}_i = (s_i, r_i)$ and derive $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Keygen}(1^\lambda; r_i)$. Compute $\sigma \leftarrow \Sigma.\text{Sign}_{sk}(\mu)$. Return $\hat{\sigma} = (\sigma, pk, \text{AP})$ where AP is the authentication path for index i .
- $0/1 \leftarrow \text{FSS.Verify}_{\widetilde{pk}}(\hat{\sigma}, \mu, i)$:
 - (1) Parse $\hat{\sigma} = (\sigma, pk, \text{AP})$.
 - (2) If $\Sigma.\text{Verify}_{pk}(\sigma, \mu) = 0$, return 0.
 - (3) Using pk and AP , compute a Merkle root root' w.r.t. the index i .
 - (4) If $\text{root}' = \widetilde{pk}$, return 1. Otherwise, return 0.

In [27], the authors prove that the above construction is a proper forward-secure signature scheme. For a digital signature scheme to be forward-secure, it should be computationally infeasible to forge a signature for a new message in a time period earlier than a time period, when a secret key was given/leaked to the adversary.

B REMAINING PROOF

THEOREM B.1 (FORWARD-SECURE UNFORGEABILITY). *The authenticated MT-iVRF construction of Sec. 3.2 is forward-secure, if the underlying signature Σ is t -time unforgeable against CMA and the stateful pseudorandom number generator G satisfies Forward-Security (Def. A.3).*

PROOF OF THM B.1. We conduct the proof by the following games from game **Game**₀ to game **Game**₃. For each game **Game** _{i} , we use Win_i to denote the event that adversary \mathcal{A} wins Exp-Forge in **Game** _{i} . Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary issues at most q queries to $O_{\text{iAV.Eval}}$.

Game₀ : This is identical to Exp-Forge.

Game₁ : This is identical to **Game**₀ except we replace the output of $G.\text{Next}$ in $\text{iAV.KeyUpd}(\text{sk}_{\text{av}})$ with random elements. It is obvious from the forward-security property of G that $|\Pr[\text{Win}_1] - \Pr[\text{Win}_0]| \leq \epsilon$, where ϵ here is the advantage of an adversary in breaking the forward-security of G .

Game₂ : This is identical to **Game**₁ except that the adversary can simulate (v, π) without knowing the private key sk_{av} of the signature. This is the case since we replaced the output of $G.\text{Next}$ with random elements in previous game. Since there is no difference in the view of the attacker from the previous game, we have $\Pr[\text{Win}_2] = \Pr[\text{Win}_1]$. Since we have used N consecutive sum composition of Σ (that is $\Sigma_{\log N}^\oplus$ according to [27]) in our scheme, this game is now identical to an experiment with adversary \mathcal{B} against the forward-security of $\Sigma_{\log N}^\oplus$. In particular, Theorem 1 of [27] implies that: $\Pr[\text{Win}_2] \leq N \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ wins Exp-UF-CMA}]$. Overall, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Win}_0] &\leq \Pr[\text{adv wins Exp-Forge}] \\ &\leq N \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ wins Exp-UF-CMA}] + \epsilon \leq \text{negl}(\lambda), \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality holds since $N = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, and $\epsilon = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, $\Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ wins Exp-UF-CMA}] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ by the assumed forward-security of G and t -time unforgeability of Σ , respectively. \square