



FORMAL SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF A CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOL

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Abstract: This paper presents an exercise in the verification of a connection establishment protocol. A specification language named SPEX, tailored for the needs of communications protocols, is proposed, and its relation to a semi-automated verification system, AFFIRM, is discussed. This language is then used to specify a connection protocol currently being used. Certain errors are uncovered by analysis using the verification system. However, the major portion of the protocol's operation are shown to be correct.

1. INTRODUCTION

Computer networks are becoming increasingly widespread; their use already permeates our everyday life. As a consequence, their correct functioning becomes paramount. Given that computer networks are extremely complex systems, the task of certifying that they behave properly is non-trivial.

This paper presents an exercise in verifying that a particular algorithm to realize an important function in computer networks, namely *connection establishment*, does indeed behave properly. The methods discussed are applicable for analyzing a wide range of other network functions as well.

The remainder of this section gives background material. Section 1.1 discusses the nature and need for connection establishment in computer networks; Section 1.2 then presents a new language suitable for the specification of protocols, and Section 1.3 describes a system in which properties of such specifications can be proved.

Section 2 presents a specification of a connection protocol currently being used in practice, given in the language introduced earlier. Section 3 then discusses particular properties of this protocol and shows their verification.

1.1 Connection Establishment Protocol - This section presents the motivation for connection establishment protocols in general and for the

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three-way handshake used in the ARPANET in particular*.

Consider a distributed system with several interconnected nodes. The nodes are connected by an unreliable transmission medium in which messages may be lost or duplicated and each node has several processes. Imagine now that two processes wish to communicate; a common method to overcome this possible loss of data is to attach a sequence number to each data packet that flows, in either direction, between them. If the two nodes can agree on a starting number to be used, again in each direction, then this will allow the detection of packets arriving out of order or being duplicated.

Suppose now that the system, when it is created, initializes the nodes to have agreed upon sequence numbers, thus allowing the data transfer to take place immediately. Unfortunately, such systems are impractical, for a number of reasons.

First, since the system is intended to be distributed, a failure at one node would require the whole system to be re-initialized. Second, although there is a potential for communication between any two processes in the system, only a few pairs will actually be engaged in data exchange at any one time. Since the resources needed to maintain communication between processes is quite significant, it is desirable for the nodes to be able to keep these resources allocated only while the exchange is taking place, thus increasing their utilization.

These considerations lead to the notion of *connections*: When two processes wish to communicate, the corresponding nodes will cooperate among themselves to establish a common frame of reference, e.g., sequence numbers for data flowing in each direction, for the exchange of data; when the exchange is complete, the connection is closed, freeing the resources for use by other processes. The period of time that a particular connection is open between two processes, i.e., a particular frame of references is in effect, is called an *incarnation* of that connection.

It is clear that for the exchange of data to be successful, the two nodes must agree on the state of the connection. A further problem is introduced by the fact that the transmission medium may delay and/or duplicate packets that flow between the two nodes. Since connections can open and close, it is

*The reader familiar with the three-way handshake may skip this section.

possible for packets from old incarnations to be in the medium, and obviously they should not be mistaken for packets belonging to a newly opened connection.

Since packets may be lost, a positive acknowledgement-retransmission on timeout scheme is used. In other words, a copy of each packet sent is kept by the sender until an acknowledgement of its reception by the receiver is received. If, after some predefined amount of time, no acknowledgement themselves are not acknowledged.

An important fact to notice is that if there is a positive probability (no matter how small) that a packet is lost, then it is actually impossible to completely separate the connection establishment from the data transfer itself. To see why, consider the last (synchronization) packet exchanged during the connection establishment; each node will consider the connection to be open upon sending and receiving this packet. It is clear that the node receiving this packet can be sure that the other node has a compatible view of the connection. The sender, however, cannot be so sure, given the possibility that this last packet may be lost; only when the first data packet arrives (in the reverse direction) will it be sure that the other node actually received it. Therefore, the sender node must maintain both the data exchange and the connection establishment information for that period of time. A problem equivalent to this is discussed in [2].

In many systems, connections are opened and closed quite frequently. In view of the fact that the medium may duplicate packets, it is possible for a connection request packet from a previous incarnation to appear at one node at such a time as to be mistaken as a current one, thereby initiating a connection with the wrong frame of reference [4].

A problem still remains as to how to identify packets from previous incarnations as being old. The sequence numbers chosen to establish the frame of reference of a new connection must prevent that Reference [18] discusses this issue in more detail.

A protocol has been proposed to handle the connection establishment problems as discussed in the previous paragraphs. It is called the three-way handshake [14,19]. The particular version used here is taken from TCP [TCP80], the second generation transport level protocol being used in the ARPA internet system.

This protocol derives its name from the sequence of steps a node goes through in order to establish a connection. Suppose node A wishes to communicate with node B, and that node A takes the initiative. Then, they through the following steps:

1. Node A sends node B a connection request, called SYN (for SYNchronize).
2. Node B receives the SYN packet, and responds with a SYN of its own together with an acknowledgment, together called SYNACK (for SYNchronize and ACKnowledge).
3. Node A receives the SYNACK packet, verifies that the ACK portion does indeed acknowledge its own previous SYN, and sends an ACK packet acknowledging node B's SYN. At this point, node

A considers the connection to be opened.

4. Node B receives the ACK packet, verifies that it does acknowledge its own previous SYN, and then considers the connection to be opened.

There are two basic modes in which to open a connection: an active mode, in which the issuing node takes the initiative, and a passive mode, in which the issuing node merely listens for incoming connection requests, and accepts the first to come in. The basic protocol described above can be modified to handle the case when both nodes do an active open simultaneously.

If at any point an incorrect packet arrives, then an RST (reset) packet is sent back to abort the connection opening procedure.

Figure 1-1 contains a state transition diagram taken from [16]. It does not show transitions caused by RST or incorrect packets.

1.2 Overview of SPEX - We present here an overview of a language, called SPEX, to be used for the specification of a layer of a distributed system in general and computer networks in particular. This language will be used later to describe the three-way handshake protocol. As will be evident from the details given below, the underlying model in SPEX is that of a non-deterministic state transition system, with some specialized features to facilitate protocol specification. SPEX is discussed at greater length in [12].

A layer is regarded as consisting of interconnected Nodes. In the case of the example presented here, a Node can be a *Station* or a *Medium*. The pattern of interactions of the nodes constitutes the layer's definition. A particular pattern of behavior characterizes a node's *type*; A layer may in general be composed of several distinct types of nodes, each with its own behavior, and may have several *instances* of each type of node as well.

Thus, in order to completely characterize a layer, it is necessary to describe the behavior of each of node (given in the *Node Behavior* part of the specification), the set of instances of each node type and the way the instances are interconnected (given in the *Topology* part), and the desired properties of the interactions between the instances (given in the *Properties* part). In addition, the specification of any data types used in specifying a node's behavior must also be included.

A node is some entity that has some internal *State Variables* and some externally visible *Interface Variables*; these variables may be of arbitrarily complex data types (which may be defined using algebraic data type specification methods [4,6,8,9]). A node reacts to a set of specified *Events*. When one such event occurs, some state variables and some interface variables may have their values changed as a result of this occurrence.

State variables can be accessed only locally at each node. Interface variables, on the other hand, can be accessed from the outside - this is how a node communicates with the outside world, i.e., other nodes in the same layer or other layers using the layer in which the node is defined.




Figure 1-1: Three-Way Handshake State Transition Diagram

Accordingly, the interface variables at each node are divided into two kinds: Those that are *exported* to other layers and those that are connected to other nodes in the same layer. In addition, each interface variable may have a *direction of data flow* associated with it, meaning that data in that variable flows *into or out of* a node; if no direction is specified, this means data in that variable flows in both directions.

The actual behavior of a node is given by describing how a node reacts to the occurrence of certain specified events. Each event known at a node has a *pre-condition* associated with it; this pre-condition is a predicate involving state and interface variables at that node. As long as a pre-condition is *true*, its associated event is said to be enabled; enabled events may fire at any time.

The node's behavior is given in terms of the new values of all its variables when each of the possible events occurs. All changes for an event are considered to happen simultaneously, i.e. the events are considered atomic. This means that if any variable *X* is used to compute the new value of some variable, the value used in the computation is the value *X* had *before* the event happened. For brevity's sake, whenever a variable is *not* mentioned on the left hand side of any event effects statement it means that its value is *not* changed by the occurrence of that event.

Since state variables are not visible externally, they can be regarded as *history* variables[11] which accumulate information about the computation.

Since interface variables are externally visible, it is possible for an event *e1* at some node N1 to change the value of some interface variable at another node, say N2. In fact, *e1* may actually enable some event at N2; this is effectively how nodes exchange data and synchronize their activity.

The last item necessary to completely describe a node's behavior is its *Initial State*, specifying the value of any variables at system creation time. The most general way to specify this is by giving predicates which must be *true* in the initial state; it may not be necessary or even possible to give actual values to the variables.

All of the above must be specified for each node type that exists in the layer.

The overall system behavior specified is defined as the set of *all valid* sequences of events. A valid sequence is formed by starting from an initial state (i.e. a state satisfying the initial state predicates) and successively firing enabled events; it may be of infinite length. If it is of finite length, then the final state arrived at by executing the sequence has no enabled events.

Once all node types have been specified, it is necessary to describe how the several nodes are connected. This is achieved by allowing interface variables at each node to be connected to interface variables at other nodes; the intended semantics is that these are, in fact, shared variables between the corresponding nodes.

The *Topology* part then specifies how the interface variables of each node in the system (i.e., each instance of each type of node) are connected to interface variables of the other nodes.

The *Properties* section states two kinds of properties of the protocol, *Assumed* and *Asserted* properties. Asserted properties are those that must be proved true by the specifier, and serve as an additional check of the accuracy of the specification. In other words, proving these properties increases the confidence of the specifier that the specification corresponds to her/his intuitive understanding of the system.

Assumed properties are used to *define* certain operations in a non-computational fashion by giving input/output relationships between

arguments and returned values.

SPEXifications** can be conveniently translated into algebraic style data type specifications of the kind that are supported by the AFFIRM system (see Section 1.3). This capability can be exploited to prove properties of the protocol using analysis methods from the abstract data type specification domain, or to perform a limited form of symbolic execution of the specification, which helps in determining the accuracy of the specification**. Reference[12] discusses this translation in detail.

An overview of algebraic specification of data types and of AFFIRM is given in the next section.

1.3 - Overview of Algebraic Specification of Data Types and of AFFIRM

The material presented in this section has been abridged from[4,17].

AFFIRM[10] is an experimental system for the algebraic specification of and the verification of properties of user-defined abstract data types. The heart of the system is a natural deduction theorem prover for the interactive proof of these properties, which are stated in the predicate calculus extended with data types. Programs, written in a variant of *Pascal* extended with user-defined abstract data types, may be verified using the inductive assertion method[3]. Additional features include tools for the analysis of algebraic specifications, a library of useful data types, and user interface facilities. Experience with AFFIRM includes extensive experimentation with data type specifications, verification of small programs, the specification and partial proof of a large file updating module, and the proof of high level properties of security kernels.

The specification and theorem-proving portions of AFFIRM are relevant to the current discussion.

Like other specification and verification systems, AFFIRM follows its own particular theoretical and programming paradigm-abstract data types specified algebraically and properties verified by rewriting rule techniques. A brief description of the algebraic style of data type specifications and of the theorem proving portions of AFFIRM follows.

Following the algebraic style of specifications [5,6,7,8,9], a data type specified by first defining three sets of functions:

1. *Constructors*. These functions create values of the type. Their range is the data type being specified. All values of the type can be described in terms of a some functional composition of these functions.

2. *Extenders (or Modifiers)*. These functions also have the data type being specified as their range, but in contrast to the constructors, they are not needed to express values of the data type-they are derived operators. These functions can be defined in terms of the constructors.

3. *Selectors*. These functions yield values of types other than the one being specified. The general term for these functions is *selector*, but functions yielding values of type *Boolean* are often termed

* "SPEXification" will be used to mean SPEXspecification.

** I.e., whether the specification captures the designer's intuitive understanding of the system

predicates. These functions are defined in terms of the parameters of the constructors.

For example, the constructors of a queue are *NewQueue* (the empty queue) and *Add* (Appends an element to a queue). Example extender functions are *Remove* (deletes the first element from a queue) and *Append* (concatenates two queues). Observe that these extender functions can be defined in terms of the constructors *NewQueue* and *Add*. Example selector functions are *Front*, *#Elements* and *In* (a predicate). These are definable in terms of the parameters to *Add*.

The effect such a specification is to view values of the type in terms of the constructors which can build them. Hence, all selectors and extenders are defined in terms of these constructors. For example, the queue of integers <1,2,3> is represented (in infix form) as ((NewQueueOfInteger Add 1) Add 2) Add 3

This first part of a specification gives the *signature* of all operations, i.e., their domains and their ranges. Figure 1-2 shows an example for the type *QueueOfInteger*. The second part of a data type specification

```

declare q,q':QueueOfInteger;
declare i:Integer;

interface NewQueueOfInteger, q Add i : QueueOfInteger;
interface Remove(q), Append(q,q') : QueueOfInteger;
interface #Elements(q), Front(q) : Integer;
interface i in q: Boolean;

```

Figure 1-2: Signature of type *QueueOfInteger*

provides semantics for the operations whose domain and information was given in the first part. Extenders and selectors are defined by equational axioms of the form *lhs == rhs* relating how each function behaves when applied to each of the constructors. Constructor functions are treated as primitive, unspecified operations. Example of axioms taken from a specification of the type *QueueOfInteger* are given in Figure 1-3.

```

axioms
  Remove(NewQueueOfInteger) == NewQueueOfInteger,
  Remove(q Add i) == if q = NewQueueOfInteger
    then q
    else Remove(q) Add i,

  #Elements(NewQueueOfInteger) == 0,
  #Elements(q Add i) == #Elements(q) + 1;

  Append(q, NewQueueOfInteger) == q,
  Append(q1, q2 Add i) == Append(q1, q2) Add i,

```

Figure 1-3: Some axioms for type *QueueOfInteger*

Data types in general have properties that the specifier may wish to prove. For example, "The number of elements in each queue". Formally, this property is stated as

$\#Elements(Append(q,q')) = \#Elements(q) + \#Elements(q')$

Properties of a data type are proved using a method called *structural induction* [7,13] which is based on the notion that all values of the data type can be produced by repeated applications of the *constructor* functions. To prove a property P of all elements of a data type, it suffices to show that

1. It is true for the "base" cases - the constructors that produce values of the type without taking values of the type as arguments (e.g., $P(\text{NewQueue})$).
2. Assuming P is true for some value q , then it is also true for all values obtained by a applying constructors to q (e.g., for all q , $P(q)$ implies $P(q \text{ Add } i)$).

There much more to specifying a data types specification than just giving a set of axioms. A good data type specification should provide the desired set of operations. These operations should have the expected (intuitive) properties. Also, the axioms should facilitate simple proofs. In other words, the type has an associated *theory* that expresses properties derived from the axioms. (Building these theories is a mathematical art.) The main method of proof of such properties is induction, for which the schema part of a type provides the proof structure.

AFFIRM is not exactly a proof checker, nor is it a proof finder. The responsibility for finding and executing a proof strategy rests solely with the user. At each proof step, modifications are made to a system maintained proof structure. Then the rewriting rules of the data types of the program, together with the rules of propositional logic, are applied to simplify the proposition currently being worked upon. In general, the user is attempting to reduce a formula to a set of subgoals so simple that their proofs are immediate, i.e., can be obtained by the system without further direction. Some example commands for carrying out proofs and their effects are:

try proposition Set up *proposition* as the current goal.

employ Induction(v) Induction is a user-defined schema for the the type of induction desired and v is the variable to be induced upon. The proof structure is modified to show the induction.

apply proposition Use *proposition* as a lemma in the proof (*proposition* must separately be proved or assumed). A separate *put* command instantiates the variables in the lemma to the proper values in the current goal.

suppose proposition - Break the current goal into two subgoals, one with the additive hypothesis *proposition* and the other with \sim *proposition*.

split Break up the proposition at a designated spot into subgoals, e. g., the proposition $H \text{ imp } (C_1 \text{ and } C_2)$ can be split into the two propositions $H \text{ imp } C_1$ and $(H \text{ and } C_1) \text{ imp } C_2$.

replace Replace subexpressions with other

subexpressions according to designated equalities in the current proposition.

invoke defn Invoke a definition *defn* that the user has made at some time.

The user can explore various avenues of proof until the proof is complete or until the conjecture is found to be unprovable, at which point the proof of the corrected conjecture must be restarted or the bad proof steps corrected.

Each theorem or intermediate proposition in AFFIRM is represented by a named node in a directed acyclic graph called the *proof forest*. The proof of a theorem comprises a tree, whose named arcs represent AFFIRM commands and thus deductive steps. AFFIRM checks for circularity within the current tree.

An example of an AFFIRM proof is discussed in Section 3.

1.4 Relation to Other Work - There is a large body of work regarding techniques for specifying protocols. These include Petri nets (and related graph models), formal languages, sequencing expression, and (parallel) programming languages. Much of this work is limited in expressive power, in the sense that specifications grow unproportionally large as the complexity of the protocol being specified increases. Also, many suffer from lack of a solid theory and/or of automated tools for verification. Reference [15] provides a survey of this work.

Although the underlying model of SPEX is not new, it is believed to be the first language allowing the formal specification of non-deterministic state transition systems in a modular, hierarchical fashion, and for which semi-automated verification tools exist. An important advantage of the modularization and the symbolic nature of the specification is that there is no combinational explosion when analyzing more complex protocols. Reference [12] contains an example in which a complex protocol, involving an arbitrary number of nodes, is specified, but where the complexity of the proof is independent on the number of nodes.

2. SPECIFICATION OF THE THREE-WAY HANDSHAKE IN SPEX

This section examines a SPEXification of the three-way handshake protocol described informally in Section 1.1. Appendix I contains the actual text of the SPEXification.

After giving the state variables, interfaces, initial state, and events for one station, the main portion of the specification shows the behavior of the station for each event. A small specification for the medium is also given, stating that the medium is essentially a queue with an added *LoseMessage* event. In the sequel, a brief explanation of the SPEXification is given.

The three way handshake protocol involves two nodes with identical behavior. The corresponding node type is *Station*.

Each station needs the following State Variables: *ISS* - is some constant to be used as Initial Send Sequence number.

Incarnation#In - is an incarnation identification for the packets coming in from the other node.

Incarnation#Out - is an incarnation identification

for the packets leaving this node.

OldUnack - is the sequence number of the oldest sent packet which has not yet been acknowledged.
Seq#ToSend - is the sequence number that should be attached to the next data packet to be sent.
Seq#ToReceive - is the expected sequence number of next packet coming in.
TimeoutBuffer - is a queue of packets containing copies of packets which have been sent but not yet acknowledged*.

The exported interface to using layers contains two variables.

Command - is a command buffer through which the user indicates what type of open request is desired.
StateOf - is a variable that remembers the state of the station, i.e., somehow remembers the recent history of messages that have been exchanged. Its value can be one of {Closed, Listen, SynSent, SynReceived, Established}.
Each station has two interface variables which are internal to the layer, namely:
InPort - is a queue incoming packets, with possible loss.
OutPort - is a queue of outgoing packets, with possible loss.

The initial state of each station requires that the *State* of the station be *Closed*, the *TimeoutBuffer* be empty and the sequence numbers and incarnation number of incoming packets be zero**.

The events to which a station can react are:

ActiveOpen - which is caused when the user issues an active open command. This means that a connection request will be sent to the other party.

PassiveOpen - which is caused when the user issues a passive open command. This means that the station will listen for incoming connection requests, and accept the first one that comes.

Timeout - which is caused when a timeout occurs, i.e. when a certain amount of time has elapsed without a packet being acknowledged.

ReceiveRst - which is caused when a packet arrives whose control field is *rst* (reset). This is control packet used to indicate the discovery of an anomalous situation.

ReceiveAck - which is caused when an acknowledgement packet arrives.

ReceiveSyn - which is caused when a packet arrives whose control field is *syn* (synchronize). This is a connection request.

ReceiveSynAck - which is caused when a packet which is both an acknowledgement and a connection request arrives.

The node type representing the medium has only an interface variable, *Buffer*, which is a queue of packets. There is only one event that can happen, *LoseMessage*, which models the medium being faulty. Note that the *transmit* operation of the medium is modeled as an *Add* to the queue, and the queue, and the *receive* operation is modeled a *Remove* from the queue, with the packet delivered obtained by *from* of the queue (before the *Remove*).

The definition of the data type *Packet* can be

* Strictly speaking, *Timeoutbuffer* does not have to be a queue, but just a collection, of packets. Modeling it as a queue results in simpler axioms in this situation.

**Zero is used an arbitrary initial value.

found in Appendix II. A brief description is given here.

The fields of a packet are the following:

SeqNumber - is the sequence number of the packet.
Seq#Inc - is the incarnation number associated with the sequence number.
AckNumber - is the sequence number that the packet is acknowledging.
Ack#Inc - is the incarnation number of the acknowledgement field.
Ctl - is the control field of the packet.

As an illustration of the effects of an event, consider the *ActiveOpen* event. Its pre-condition states that it can fire only if the *StateOf* of the node is *Closed*, and the user issued an active open command by placing the value *Active* in the *command* buffer. When this event fires, the effects specified state, for instance, that a SYN packet is sent to the other side by appending it to the *OutPort* interface variable. It is also specified that the *StateOf* state variable becomes *SynSent*.

Finally, the *Topology* section states that there are two stations, *Left* and *Right*, connected by a medium in each direction (i.e., *OutPort@Left, Buffer@LeftToRight*, and *InPort@Right* are all a single shared queue).

The *Properties* section states properties concerning the correct operation of the system that will be discussed in section 3.

The SPEXification given in Appendix I is a simplification of the one given in TCP. The main differences are:

- TCP allows connections between arbitrary pairs of addresses within a large address space. As in TCP, the SPEXification assumes this addressing function is performed by a higher(sub) level, so that only fixed pairs of nodes need be considered.
- TCP uses a sequence number and an initial send sequence number selection algorithm to handle the problems of distinguishing incarnations. TCP sequence numbers correspond roughly to a concatenation of incarnation and sequence number in our specification. TCP sequence numbers are of finite size, whereas they are of infinite size in the SPEXification.
- The SPEXification concerns itself only with the connection opening phase of the protocol; it does not allow closing of the connection in the middle of an opening. Likewise, it does not allow data to be sent while a connection is being opened.
- When a RST packet arrives at a node that is in SYNSENT state, the TCP remembers whether the connection started via an active or via a passive open. If the open was a passive one, the station returns to the LISTEN state rather than closing the connection. The SPEXification always closes the connection after a reset. This modification does not affect the functional correctness of the protocol, but makes the corresponding SPEXification simple.

For the purpose of verifying properties of the three-way handshake, the SPEXification has been manually translated into an algebraic data type

specification that can be understood by the AFFIRM system. Appendix II contains the generated axioms and auxiliary data type definitions (e.g., Packet, QueueOfPacket, etc.) in AFFIRM system

3. VERIFICATION

3.1 - Introduction - This section discusses the verification of properties concerning functional correctness and liveness. The discussion is presented in terms of the algebraic style data type specification as understood by AFFIRM.

As was discussed in section 1.1, the functional correctness of a connection protocol cannot be completely separated from the succeeding data transfer phase. This introduces a problem as to the point in time at which the claim of functional correctness should be made. Ideally, functional correctness should state that

"At the end of the connection phase, both stations are in the Established state and are synchronized, which means that 'old' data will not be accepted, but 'new' data will be"

Therefore, it would be necessary to describe at least part of the data transfer protocol as well.

Because the data transfer has been omitted from the specification, a modified version of this property must be used. The following sections describe this in more detail.

3.2 - Functional Correctness - Consider now the functional correctness of the protocol, as stated above, but considering only one node's point of view.*

```
(StateOf = Established)@Right
imp Seq#ToReceive@Left=Seq#ToSend@Right and
Incarnation#In@Left=Incarnation#Out@Right;
```

Stated in words, this says that if the station on the *Right* side in the *Established* state, then the connection is synchronized for data flowing out of this node.

This property is proved to be invariant using inductive proof methods which are used for abstract data types. After working with this specification, it became apparent that this theorem was not strong enough to be used in an inductive proof, for the following reason. Careful study of the protocol shows that it is possible for the above properties to hold in the *SynSent* state also, when simultaneous active open commands are issued at both nodes, as follows: one side may be in the *SynSent* state and may have already received an acknowledgement for its SYN packet; this side would not enter the *Established* state until it receives the SYN packet from the other side. This situation is characterized by the fact that *OldUnack* (the oldest unacknowledged sequence number) is not *ISS* anymore. Since this side has received an acknowledgement for its SYN, it can be sure that the other side knows its *Seq#ToSend* and its *Incarnation#Out*. Hence the statement of functional correctness must be strengthened (for one side only) as follows:

Theorem FC:

```
((StateOf=Established)or((StateOf=SynSent)and
OldUnack<=ISS))@Right
```

```
imp
```

* The notation $P@n$ means P is to be evaluated in node n .

```
Seq#ToReceive@Left = Seq#ToSend@Right
and Incarnation#In@Left= Incarnation#Out@Right;
```

This need to strengthen or generalize a theorem in order to prove its invariance is typical of inductive proof methods used for abstract data types.

Notice that this strengthened statement implies the weaker one, so that proving the stronger one proves the weaker one as well.

Figure 3.1 contains a proof tree for this theorem produced by the AFFIRM system; the lemmas and definitions used are given in Figure 3-2 (these figures contain axioms and theorems stated using AFFIRM syntax; the correspondence to SPEX syntax should be obvious)*. The proof follows an inductive argument, over all possible events in the system. Broadly speaking, this amounts to, given a *goal* state (e.g., *Established*), examining how each event can move the system *into* that state (e.g., *Receive Ack* event in *SynReceived* state). In general, there are many states from which the system may move into the goal state. Considering now each of those states, one uses the inductive hypothesis to try to prove the theorem.

After some examination of the proof tree, it is possible to see that most cases follow directly from the inductive hypotheses; this can be seen in the proof tree by looking at the branches and noticing where only an *invoke* IH command (possibly preceded and/or followed by some *replace*, *case* and *invoke* commands) was given. Now the cases are examined which do *not* follow directly from the inductive hypotheses, i.e., involve the application of some lemmas.

Consider what happens when a *Received@Right* occurs ($\leftrightarrow < 1$)*. The relevant case to consider has the node at right in *SynSent* or in *SynReceived*, and the incoming acknowledgement has the current incarnation number (since otherwise the packet would be discarded as old). In other words, the incarnation number in the packet is equal to *Incarnation#Out@Right* (See hypotheses of theorem *AcksAndSyns* in Fig. 3-2, applied at $\leftrightarrow < 2$). But if the incarnation number is current, then there must have been a SYN packet in the past which this current packet acknowledges (see definition of *HasSyn*, invoked at $\leftrightarrow < 3$). Thus, the current ACK carries the *same* incarnation number that the SYN carried, which means that the station at left has its *Incarnation#In* set to the incarnation number of that SYN packet. Therefore, we can conclude that *Incarnation#Out@Right=Incarnation#In@Left*.

To see that the sequence numbers correspond, it suffices to see that, if the state of a node is not *Listen* or *Close*, then its *Seq#ToSend* is always equal to *ISS+1(Seq#ToSend)* will not change until data is sent—see theorem *Seq#ToSendVals*, applied at $\leftrightarrow < 4$), and that all SYN packets carry *ISS* as their sequence numbers. Since the *Seq#ToReceive* is taken from the SYN packet, it must

** Numbers on the left should be ignored; they result from bookkeeping in AFFIRM.

** Indicators of the form $\leftrightarrow < n$ are used to point to the corresponding places in the proof tree

performer be $ISS+1$ (see theorem Seq#ToReceiveVals, applied at $\leftarrow < 5$). Therefore Seq#ToReceive@Left = Seq#ToSend@Right.

The next relevant case is when a ReceiveSyn@Left occurs ($\leftarrow < 6$). This can be correct only if the node at left is in either Listen or SynSent; all other cases either cause an error or ignore the packet. But a careful examination of the state machine shows that it is not possible to have the station at one side in either Listen or SynSent, and the other in either Established or in SynReceived with OldUnack = ISS (theorem SynchNoLorCorSS, applied at $\leftarrow < 7$). Therefore this situation really cannot occur.

The other relevant cases are when a ReceiveSynAck occurs at either node. If it happens at the node at right, then the proof follows the same argument as the case for the ReceiveAck@Right. If it happens at the node at left, then the proof follows the reasoning for the case ReceiveSyn@Left.

3.3 Liveness - Another useful property that we may want to show that this protocol possesses is *Liveness*, which states that either some event in the system is enabled or the system is in its final state. Since open events are *user* generated, these events are ignored, and we assume that the system starts in a state where neither side in the Closed state and both sides are not passively listening. In this case, it is expected that the correct protocol will complete the connection establishment and reach a final global state in which both sides have reached the Established state.

In order to prove such a property, however, it is necessary to prevent certain sequences from actually being valid for the system. These are sequences composed entirely of *LoseMessage* and/or *Timeout* events. Such sequences reflect *fairness* assumptions on the medium, as well as finite capacity. Thus, restrictions must be made in the specification to insure the fairness of the medium. These restrictions are incorporated by including a limit in the number of occurrences of the *LoseMessage* event, as well as on the size of the medium.

Accordingly, the number of occurrences of the *LoseMessage* event is limited by having an extra auxiliary counter such that *LoseMessage* can be enabled only when the counter is positive, and each time *LoseMessage* fires it decreases the counter by one. It is set to some constant value each time a message or an acknowledgement is received. This constant value must be finite, but can be arbitrarily large.

The capacity of the medium can be taken into consideration by augmenting the pre-condition of all events that put something into the medium with a test to see if the length of the corresponding queue is less than a certain constant, which again must be finite but arbitrarily large. This rules out behaviors in which a node times out over and over, without anything else happening in the system.

With these modifications introduced, an attempt was made to prove that this protocol is alive, i.e., it satisfies.

Theorem Liveness:

forall S,i

```
[~ PreCond(S,ReceiveXX) and
 ~ PreCond(S,Timeout)
and ~PreCond(S,LoseMessage) and
 StateOf~=Closed]@i
and ~(StateOf@i= Listen and
 StateOf@OppositeSide(i)=Listen)
imp
 (StateOf=Established)@Left and
 (StateOf=Established)@Right;
```

where $XX=\{Ack, Syn, SynAck, Rst\}$

An inductive proof goes through for all cases except for ReceiveRst. After some investigation, it was found that there is a scenario in which it is possible for the two nodes to end in the Closed state, which is a contradiction of the theorem! Figure 3-3 shows this scenario (with SEQ treated as a single item representing both the sequence number and the incarnation number).

This situation is considered an error because old duplicate packets in the medium prevent a connection from being established. Note that this is a liveness error, not a safety error, since nothing bad happens, i.e., no incorrect synchronization or data transfer takes place, but the intended progress does not occur.

Another situation in which there is no progress may occur because of the protocol simplification introduced that a node always returns to Close state when a RST packet arrives. Note that this is not the scenario describe above.

An interesting observation is that, if data packets are allowed to be sent, this scenario can be continued in such a way that it actually accepts data incorrectly. It is sufficient for the appropriate old data packets to arrive at Node A at the point in which it went into the Established state, and before any RST packets were sent by Node B; this is indicated in Figure 3-3. However, it should be noted that this situation depends on an extremely unlikely timing of message exchanges, which is not expected to be of practical significance.

This incorrect data can be avoided with a small change in the protocol. Work is under way to verify that a corrected version of the three-way handshake avoids it.

Reference[1] discusses the verification of other types of liveness properties in algebraically described state transition systems.

4. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has presented an exercise in the verification of properties of a connection establishment protocol. A specification language tailored for the need of communications protocols has been proposed, and is relation to a semi-automated verification system discussed. This language was then used to specify a connection protocol currently being used, and certain errors were uncovered using the verification system, although the major portion of the protocol's operation was shown to be correct.

This work is part of an ongoing project to develop better protocol specification and analysis



Figure 3-3: Example of a liveness error in the three-way handshake

techniques; further work is described in [12,18]. Our preliminary experience indicates that the combination of state transition and abstract data type specification methods being pursued provides a reasonably convenient and powerful approach to these problems.

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```

theorem Synchronized, StateOf(S, Right) = Established
or StateOf(S, Right) = SynSent and OldUnack(S, Right) ~ = ISS(Right)
imp synchronized(S);
Synchronized uses EorSSimpEorSR, SynchNoLorCorSS, AcksAndSyns, FrontInQ,
Seq#ToSndVals, and Seq#ToReceiveVal.

```

proof tree:

```

Synchronized
  apply EorSSimpEorSR {proved by Schwabe using AFFIRM 120 on 4-Feb-81 in
    transcript <SCHWABE>AFFIRMTRANSCRIPT.3-FEB-81.2}
54 put S'=S
55 employ Induction(S)
Empty:
  Immediate
apr:
  56 employ NormalForm(i')
    ActiveOpen:
      57 cases
      65 invoke IH
      66 replace
      67 invoke synchronized | all |
      (proven!)
    PassiveOpen:{Synchronized, apr:}
      58 cases
      125 invoke IH
      126 invoke synchronized | all |
      (proven!)
    LoseMessage:{Synchronized, apr:}
      59 invoke IH
      128 invoke synchronized | all |
      (proven!)
    Timeout:{Synchronized, apr:}
      60 invoke IH
      130 invoke synchronized | all |
      (proven!)
    ReceiveRst:{Synchronized, apr:}
      61 cases
      131 employ NormalForm(i')
        Left:
          132 invoke IH
          134 invoke synchronized | all |
          (proven!)
        Right:
          133 invoke IH
          136 invoke synchronized | all |
          (proven!)
    ReceiveAck:{Synchronized, apr:}
      62 cases
      69 employ NormalForm(i')
        Left:
          70 invoke IH
          72 invoke synchronized | all |
          (proven!)
        Right:
          71 invoke IH
          74 replace
          75 invoke synchronized | all |
          76 apply AcksAndSyns
          77 put pk = Front(Medium(ss', Left))
          78 and S=ss'
          79 apply FrontInQ
          80 put Q = Medium(ss', Left)
          81 replace
          82 invoke PreCond | -4 : -3 |
          83 apply Seq#ToSndVals
          84 put S=ss'
          85 invoke IncomingAck#Valid | all |
          86 invoke HasSyn
          87 replace
          88 apply Seq#ToReceiveVal
          89 put S=ss'
          (proven!)
    ReceiveSyn:{Synchronized, apr:}
      63 cases
      90 invoke IH
      91 replace
      92 invoke synchronized | all |
      93 cases
      94 replace
      95 apply SynchNoLorCorSS
      96 put S=ss'
      97 replace
      98 (proven!)
    ReceiveSynAck:{Synchronized, apr:}
      64 cases
      99 employ NormalForm(i')
        Left:
          100 invoke IH
          102 invoke synchronized | all |
          103 cases
          104 replace
          105 apply SynchNoLorCorSS
          106 put S=ss'
          (proven!)

```

Figure 3-1: Proof tree for the functional correctness of the three way handshake

```

Right:{Synchronized, apr:, ReceiveSynAck:}
101 invoke IH
108 invoke synchronized | all |
109 apply AcksAndSyns
110 put S=ss'
    and pk = Front(Medium(ss', Left))
111 apply FrontInQ
112 put Q = Medium(ss', Left)
113 replace
114 invoke IncomingAck#Valid | last | , PreCond | 1 |
115 replace
116 invoke HasSyn
117 invoke PreCond
118 replace
119 apply Seq#ToSndVals
120 put S=ss'
121 replace
122 apply Seq#ToReceiveVal
123 put S=ss'
124 replace
    (proven!)

```

Figure 3-1: Proof tree continued

```

theorem Synchronized, StateOf(S, Right) = Established
or StateOf(S, Right) = SynSent
and OldUnack(S, Right) ~ = ISS(Right)
imp synchronized(S);

theorem AcksAndSyns, pk in Medium(S, Left)
and StateOf(S, Left) ~ = Listen
and StateOf(S, Left) ~ = Closed
and Inc # Ack(pk) = Incarnation # Out(S, Right)
and (Control(pk) = ack) or (Control(pk) = synack)
imp HasSyn(S, pk);

theorem FrontInQ, Q ~ = NewQueueOfPacket imp Front(Q) in Q;

theorem Seq # ToSndVals, StateOf(S, Right) ~ = Closed
and StateOf(S, Right) ~ = Listen
imp Seq # ToSnd(S, Right) = 1 + ISS(Right);

theorem Seq # ToReceiveVal, StateOf(S, Right) ~ = Closed
and StateOf(S, Right) ~ = Listen
and StateOf(S, Left) = SynReceived
or StateOf(S, Left) = Established
and Incarnation # Out(S, Right) = Incarnation # In(S, Left)
imp Seq # ToReceive(S, Left) = 1 + ISS(Right);

theorem EorSSimpEorSR, StateOf(S, Right) = Established
or StateOf(S, Right) = SynSent
and OldUnack(S, Right) ~ = ISS(Right)
imp StateOf(S, Left) = Established
or StateOf(S, Left) = SynReceived;

theorem SynchNoLorCorSS, StateOf(S, Right) = Established
or StateOf(S, Right) = SynSent
and OldUnack(S, Right) ~ = ISS(Right)
imp StateOf(S, Left) ~ = Listen
and StateOf(S, Left) ~ = Closed
and StateOf(S, Left) ~ = SynSent;

define synchronized(S)
= ( Seq # ToReceive(S, Left) = Seq # ToSnd(S, Right)
and Incarnation # In(S, Left) = Incarnation # Out(S, Right));

HasSyn(S, pk)
= some SS, SS', pk'
( SS join SS' = S
and pk in Medium(SS, Right)
and Inc # Seq(pk') = Inc # Ack(pk)
and Inc # Seq(pk') = Incarnation # In(S, Left)
and # Control(pk) = synack
then Control(pk') = syn
else (Control(pk') = syn or Control(pk') = synack));

```

Figure 3-2: Theorems and definitions used in the proof of the three way handshake

I. SPEXification of the Three Way Handshake

```

Node(Station)[
  State Variables
  [
    ISS,                                | Initial Send Sequence #
    Incarnation # In,                    | Incarnation # of incoming packets
    Incarnation # Out,                    | Incarnation # of outgoing packets
    OldUnack,                            | Oldest unacknowledged seq. #
    Seq # ToSend,                        | Seq # to put in the next outgoing packet
    Seq # ToReceive,                     | Next expected seq #
    :Nat,                                | Nat stands for Natural

    TimeoutBuffer : QueueOfPackets,      | buffer with packets sent and not acknowledged
  ]

  Interfaces
  [
    Exported::
      Command : Command,                 | One of {Active,Passive,Null}
      StateOf : SysState,                 | State of this side of the connection
    Internal::
      InPort ,                           | msgs coming in
      OutPort                             | msgs going out
      :QueueOfPackets ;
  ]

  Initial State
  [
    Incarnation # Out = Maxval(InPort Append OutPort) and | Maxval produces a unique value
                                                                | see Properties section
    Incarnation # In = 0 and
    Seq # ToSend = 0 and
    Seq # ToReceive = 0 and
    StateOf = Closed and
    OldUnack = 0,
    TimeoutBuffer = NewQueueOfPackets ;
  ]

  Events
  [
                                                                | Events and their pre-conditions
    ActiveOpen : PreCond is StateOf = Closed and Command = Active,
    PassiveOpen : PreCond is StateOf = Closed and Command = Passive,
    Timeout : PreCond is TimeoutBuffer ~ = NewQueueOfPackets,
    ReceiveRst : PreCond is InPort ~ = NewQueueOfPackets and Control(Front(InPort)) = rst,
    ReceiveAck : PreCond is InPort ~ = NewQueueOfPackets and Control(Front(InPort)) = ack,
    ReceiveSyn : PreCond is InPort ~ = NewQueueOfPackets and Control(Front(InPort)) = syn,
    ReceiveSynAck : PreCond is
      InPort ~ = NewQueueOfPackets and Control(Front(InPort)) = synack
  ]

  Behavior
  [
                                                                | first we define some auxiliary predicate and
                                                                | functions to improve readability of the specifica

    define IncomingAck # Valid ==

      ( AckNumber(Front(InPort)) = +OldUnack) and
      Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)) = Incarnation # Out;
                                                                | Acknowledgement for X has Ack = X + 1

    define IncomingSeq # Valid ==

      ( SeqNumber(Front(InPort)) = Seq # ToReceive) and
      Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)) = Incarnation # In;
  ]

```

```

ActiveOpen::
  Command ← Null,

  Incarnation# Out ← Maxval(InPort Append OutPort),

  OldUnack ← ISS,

  Seq# ToSend ← +ISS

  StateOf ← SynSent

  TimeoutBuffer ←

    NewQueueOfPackets Add pkt(ISS,Maxval(InPort Append OutPort),
                               AnyNat,AnyNat,syn)

  OutPort ←
    Outport Add pkt(ISS,Maxval(InPort Append OutPort),
                    AnyNat,AnyNat,syn) ;

PassiveOpen::
  Command ← Null,

  StateOf ← Listen,

  TimeoutBuffer ← NewQueueOfPackets;

ReceiveRst::
  StateOf ←
  if StateOf = SynSent and IncomingAck # Valid
  then Closed
  else if StateOf = Listen
  then Listen
  else if IncomingSeq # Valid
  then Closed
  else StateOf,

  TimeoutBuffer ←
  if StateOf = SynSent and IncomingAck # Valid
  then NewQueueOfPackets
  else if IncomingSeq # Valid
  then NewQueueOfPackets
  else TimeoutBuffer,

  InPort ← Remove(InPort);

ReceiveAck::
  OldUnack ←
  if StateOf = SynSent
  then if IncomingAck # Valid
  then + OldUnack
  else OldUnack
  else if StateOf = SynReceived
  then if IncomingAck # Valid and IncomingSeq # Valid
  then + OldUnack
  else OldUnack
  else OldUnack,

  StateOf ←
  if StateOf = SynReceived
  then if IncomingAck # Valid and IncomingSeq # Valid
  then Established
  else SynReceived
  else StateOf,

  TimeoutBuffer ←
  if StateOf = Closed or StateOf = Listen
  then NewQueueOfPackets
  else if StateOf = SynReceived
  then if IncomingAck # Valid and IncomingSeq # Valid
  then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer,Seq# ToSend)
  else TimeoutBuffer
  else if StateOf = SynSent
  then if IncomingAck # Valid
  then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer,Seq# ToSend)
  else TimeoutBuffer,

  OutPort ←
  if StateOf = Closed or StateOf = Listen
  or ((StateOf = SynSent) and ~IncomingAck # Valid)
  then OutPort
  Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
          Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
          AnyNat,AnyNat,
          rst)
  else if StateOf = SynReceived
  then if ~IncomingSeq # Valid
  then OutPort
  Add pkt(Seq# ToSend,Incarnation# Out,
          Seq# ToReceive,Incarnation# In,
          ack)
  else if ~IncomingAck # Valid
  then OutPort
  Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
          Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
          AnyNat,AnyNat,
          rst)
  else OutPort
  else OutPort,

  InPort ← Remove(InPort) ;

ReceiveSyn::
  Incarnation# Out ←
  if StateOf = Listen
  then Maxval(InPort Append OutPort)
  else Incarnation# Out,

  Incarnation# In ←
  if ((StateOf = Listen) or StateOf = SynSent)
  then Seq# Inc(Front(InPort))
  else Incarnation# In,

  OldUnack ←
  if StateOf = Listen
  then ISS
  else OldUnack,

  Seq# ToSend ←
  if StateOf = Listen
  then +ISS
  else Seq# ToSend,

  Seq# ToReceive ←
  if StateOf = Listen or StateOf = SynSent
  then +SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
  else Seq# ToReceive,

```

```

StateOf ←
  if StateOf = Listen
  then SynReceived
  else if StateOf = SynSent
  then if OldUnack = ISS
  then SynReceived
  else Established
  else StateOf,
.
TimeoutBuffer ←
  if StateOf = Listen
  then NewQueueOfPackets
  Add pkt(ISS,Maxval(InPort Append OutPort),
    + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
    ,Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
    synack)
  else if StateOf = Closed
  then NewQueueOfPackets
  else TimeoutBuffer,
OutPort ←
  if StateOf = SynSent
  then OutPort
  Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,Incarnation # Out,
    + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
    ,Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
    ack)
  else if StateOf = SynReceived or StateOf = Established
  then if IncomingSeq # Valid
  then OutPort
  else OutPort
  Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,
    Incarnation # Out,
    Seq # ToReceive,
    Incarnation # In,
    ack)
  else if StateOf = Listen
  then OutPort
  Add pkt(ISS,Maxval(InPort Append OutPort),
    + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
    ,Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
    synack)
  else OutPort
  Add pkt(0,Incarnation # Out,
    + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
    ,Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
    rst),
InPort ← Remove(InPort) ;

ReceiveSynAck::
Incarnation # In ←
  if (StateOf = SynSent) and IncomingAck # Valid
  then Seq # Inc(Front(InPort))
  else Incarnation # In,
OldUnack ←
  if StateOf = SynSent
  then if IncomingAck # Valid
  then + OldUnack
  else OldUnack
  else if StateOf = SynReceived or StateOf = Established
  then if IncomingAck # Valid and IncomingSeq # Valid
  then + OldUnack
  else OldUnack
  else OldUnack,

```

```

Seq # ToReceive ←
  if StateOf = SynSent
  then if IncomingAck # Valid
  then + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
  else Seq # ToReceive
  else Seq # ToReceive,
StateOf ←
  if StateOf = SynSent and IncomingAck # Valid
  then Established
  else StateOf,
TimeoutBuffer ←
  if StateOf = Closed or StateOf = Listen
  then NewQueueOfPackets
  else if StateOf = SynSent
  then if IncomingAck # Valid
  then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer,OldUnack)
  else NewQueueOfPackets
  else TimeoutBuffer,
OutPort ←
  if StateOf = Closed or StateOf = Listen
  then OutPort
  Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
    Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
    AnyNat,AnyNat,
    rst)
  else if StateOf = SynSent
  then if IncomingAck # Valid
  then OutPort
  Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,Incarnation # Out,
    + SeqNumber(Front(InPort))
    ,Seq # Inc(Front(InPort)),
    ack)
  else OutPort
  Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
    Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
    AnyNat,AnyNat,
    rst)
  else if StateOf = Established
  then if IncomingSeq # Valid
  then OutPort
  else OutPort
  Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,
    Incarnation # Out,
    Seq # ToReceive,
    Incarnation # In,
    ack)
  else if StateOf = SynReceived
  then if ~IncomingSeq # Valid
  then OutPort
  Add pkt(Seq # ToSend,Incarnation # Out,
    Seq # ToReceive,Incarnation # In,
    ack)
  else if ~IncomingAck # Valid
  then OutPort
  Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(InPort)),
    Ack # Inc(Front(InPort)),
    AnyNat,AnyNat,
    rst)
  else OutPort,
InPort ← Remove(InPort);

Timeout::
  OutPort ← OutPort Append TimeoutBuffer ;
  ]
[ Node Station ]

```

```

Node(Medium)[
  State Variables[] No state variables []
  Interfaces
  [
    Exported::
      Buffer : QueueOfPacket ;
  ]
  Initial State
  [ Buffer = NewQueueOfPacket ; ]
  Events[ LoseMessage :
      PreCond is Buffer ~ = NewQueueOfPacket ;]
  Behavior
  [
    LoseMessage::
      Buffer ← Remove(Buffer) ;
  ]
] Node Medium]

Topology
[
  | There is a medium RightToLeft and a medium LeftToRight
  | There are two instances of node type Station: Left and Right

  Instances::
    RightToLeft, LeftToRight : Medium,
    Left, Right : Station ;

  Connections::
    InPort@Left, OutPort@Right <—> Buffer@RightToLeft,
    OutPort@Left, InPort@Right <—> Buffer@LeftToRight;
]

Properties
[
  assume Maxval(Q),
  forall pk(
    pk in Q imp (Maxval(Q) > Seq # Inc(pk)
      and Maxval(Q) > Ack # Inc(pk))),
  assert CorrectSynch,
    ((StateOf = Established) or StateOf = SynSent and
      OldUnack ~ = ISS)@Right imp
      Seq # ToSend@Right = Seq # ToReceive@Left and
      Incarnation # Out@Right = Incarnation # In@Left,
  assert Liveness,
    For all i i can be one of {Left, Right}
      ( ~PreCond(ReceiveAck) and ~PreCond(ReceiveSyn) and
        ~PreCond(ReceiveSynAck) and ~PreCond(ReceiveRst) and
        ~PreCond(Timeout) and ~PreCond(LoseMessage)
        and StateOf ~ = Closed)@i and
        ~(StateOf@i = Listen and StateOf@OppositeSide(i) = Listen)
        imp (StateOf = Established)@Left
        and (StateOf = Established)@Right ;
]

```

NOTE: Due to space limitations, only a representative set of the axioms generated from the SPEXification of the three-way handshake are included. The full set can be found in [12].

II. Axioms generated from the SPEXification of the Three Way Handshake

```

type ThreeWay;
needs types Event, SequenceOfEvent, Packet, QueueOfPackets, SysState, Side;
declare Q, q, q' : QueueOfPackets;
declare seq #, .seq #, .ack #, .snd # : Integer;
declare cf : ControlField;
declare S, SS, SS' : SequenceOfEvent;
declare pe : Event;
declare pk, pk' : Packet;
declare i, i', j : Side;

interface ISS(i) : Integer;

interface
  TimeoutBuffer(S, i),
  Medium(S, i)
  : QueueOfPackets;

interface
  StateOf(S, i)
  : SysState;

interface
  Maxval(q),
  Incarnation # In(S, i),
  Incarnation # Out(S, i),
  OldUnack(S, i),
  Seq # ToSend(S, i),
  Seq # ToReceive(S, i)
  : Integer;

interface Induction(S) : Boolean;

{auxiliary functions to help in the readability of the axioms}

interface PreCond(S, pe),
  IncomingAck # Valid(S, i),
  IncomingSeq # Valid(S, i)
  : Boolean;

define {auxiliary function definitions}

  PreCond(S, ActiveOpen(i)) == StateOf(S, i) = Closed,
  PreCond(S, PassiveOpen(i)) == StateOf(S, i) = Closed,
  PreCond(S, Timeout(i)) == TimeoutBuffer(S, i) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets,
  PreCond(S, LoseMessage(i)) == Medium(S, i) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets,

  PreCond(S, ReceiveRst(i)) ==
    ( Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets) and
    Control(Front(Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)))) = rst,
  PreCond(S, ReceiveAck(i)) ==
    ( Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets) and
    Control(Front(Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)))) = ack,
  PreCond(S, ReceiveSyn(i)) ==
    ( Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets) and
    Control(Front(Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)))) = syn,
  PreCond(S, ReceiveSynAck(i)) ==
    ( Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)) ~ = NewQueueOfPackets) and
    Control(Front(Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)))) = synack,

  IncomingAck # Valid(S, i) ==
    ( AckNumber(Front(Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)))) = 1 + OldUnack(S, i)) and
    Inc # Ack(Front(Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)))) = Incarnation # Out(S, i),

  IncomingSeq # Valid(S, i) ==
    ( SeqNumber(Front(Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)))) = Seq # ToReceive(S, i))
    and Inc # Seq(Front(Medium(S, OppositeSide(i)))) = Incarnation # In(S, i);

axioms {ReceiveAck}

  Incarnation # Out(S apr ReceiveAck(i, i)) == Incarnation # Out(S, i),
  Incarnation # In(S apr ReceiveAck(i, i)) == Incarnation # In(S, i),

```

```

OldUnack(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j) ==
if i = j and PreCond(S.ReceiveAck(i))
then if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i)
then 1 + OldUnack(S,i)
else OldUnack(S,i)
else if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived
then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) and IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
then 1 + OldUnack(S,i)
else OldUnack(S,i)
else OldUnack(S,i)
else OldUnack(S,i),

Seq # ToSend(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j) == Seq # ToSend(S,j),

Seq # ToReceive(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j) == Seq # ToReceive(S,j),

StateOf(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j) ==
if i = j and PreCond(S.ReceiveAck(i))
then if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived
then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) and IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
then Established
else SynReceived
else StateOf(S,i)
else StateOf(S,i),

TimeoutBuffer(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j) ==
if i = j and PreCond(S.ReceiveAck(i))
then if StateOf(S,i) = Closed or StateOf(S,i) = Listen
then NewQueueOfPackets
else if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived
then if IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) and IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer(S,i),Seq # ToSend(S,i))
else TimeoutBuffer(S,i)
else if StateOf(S,i) = SynSent
then if AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))) =
1 + OldUnack(S,i)
then DeletePacket(TimeoutBuffer(S,i),Seq # ToSend(S,i))
else TimeoutBuffer(S,i)
else TimeoutBuffer(S,i)
else TimeoutBuffer(S,j),

Medium(S apr ReceiveAck(i),j) ==
if PreCond(S.ReceiveAck(i)) then
if i = j
then if StateOf(S,i) = Closed or StateOf(S,i) = Listen
or ((StateOf(S,i) = SynSent) and ~IncomingAck # Valid(S,i))
then Medium(S,i)
Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
Inc # Ack(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
AnyNat,AnyNat,
rst)
else if StateOf(S,i) = SynReceived
then if ~IncomingSeq # Valid(S,i)
then Medium(S,i)
Add pkt(Seq # ToSend(S,i),
Incarnation # Out(S,i),
Seq # ToReceive(S,i),
Incarnation # In(S,i),
ack)
else if ~IncomingAck # Valid(S,i) then
then Medium(S,i)
Add pkt(AckNumber(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
Inc # Ack(Front(Medium(S,OppositeSide(i)))),
AnyNat,AnyNat,
rst)
else Medium(S,i)
else Medium(S,i)
else if j = OppositeSide(i)
then Remove(Medium(S,i))
else Medium(S,i)
else Medium(S,j);

axioms {LoseMessage}

Incarnation # Out(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) == Incarnation # Out(S,j),
Incarnation # In(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) == Incarnation # In(S,j),
OldUnack(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) == OldUnack(S,j),
Seq # ToSend(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) == Seq # ToSend(S,j),
Seq # ToReceive(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) == Seq # ToReceive(S,j),
StateOf(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) == StateOf(S,j),
Medium(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) ==
if i = j and PreCond(S.LoseMessage(i))
then Remove(Medium(S,i))
else Medium(S,j),
TimeoutBuffer(S apr LoseMessage(i),j) == TimeoutBuffer(S,j);

```

Auxiliary Data Type Definitions

```

type Packet;

needs types Integer, ControlField;

declare dummy, pk: Packet;
declare seq #, ack #, inc # s, inc # a: Integer;
declare cf: ControlField;

interface pkt(seq #, inc # s, ack #, inc # a, cf): Packet;

interfaces SeqNumber(pk), AckNumber(pk), Inc # Seq(pk), Inc # Ack(pk): Integer;

interface Control(pk): ControlField;

axiom dummy = pk
= ( (SeqNumber(dummy) = SeqNumber(pk)) and AckNumber(dummy)
= AckNumber(pk)
and Control(dummy) = Control(pk)
and Inc # Ack(dummy) = Inc # Ack(pk)
and Inc # Seq(dummy) = Inc # Seq(pk));

axiom SeqNumber(pkt(seq #, inc # s, ack #, inc # a, cf)) == seq #;
axiom AckNumber(pkt(seq #, inc # s, ack #, inc # a, cf)) == ack #;
axiom Inc # Seq(pkt(seq #, inc # s, ack #, inc # a, cf)) == inc # s;
axiom Inc # Ack(pkt(seq #, inc # s, ack #, inc # a, cf)) == inc # a;
axiom Control(pkt(seq #, inc # s, ack #, inc # a, cf)) == cf;

end {Packet};
type QueueOfPacket;

needs type Packet;

declare dummy, q, q1, q2, qq: QueueOfPacket;
declare i, i1, i2, ii: Packet;

interfaces
NewQueueOfPacket, q Add i, Remove(q),
Append(q1, q2), que(i): QueueOfPacket;

infix Add;

interfaces
Front(q), Back(q): Packet;

interfaces
NormalForm(q), Induction(q), i in q: Boolean;

infix in;

axioms dummy = dummy == TRUE,
q Add i = NewQueueOfPacket == FALSE,
NewQueueOfPacket = q Add i == FALSE,
q1 Add i1 = q2 Add i2 == ((q1 = q2) and (i1 = i2)),

Remove(NewQueueOfPacket) == NewQueueOfPacket,
Remove(q Add i) == if q = NewQueueOfPacket
then q
else Remove(q) Add i,

Append(q, NewQueueOfPacket) == q,
Append(q, q1 Add i1) == Append(q, q1) Add i1,

que(i) == NewQueueOfPacket Add i,

Front(q Add i) == if q = NewQueueOfPacket
then i
else Front(q),

Back(q Add i) == i,

i in NewQueueOfPacket == FALSE,
i in (q Add i1) == (i in q or (i = i1));

rulelemma
Append(NewQueueOfPacket, q) == q;

schemas NormalForm(q) == cases(Prop(NewQueueOfPacket),
all qq, ii (Prop(qq Add ii))),

Induction(q) == cases(Prop(NewQueueOfPacket),
all qq, ii (IH(qq) imp Prop(qq Add ii)));

end {QueueOfPacket};

```