

# PANEL ON INFORMATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

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Information and Public Policy

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Computing professionals have been immersed predominantly in problems of how to acquire, formulate, and retrieve information with some vague notion that someone, somewhere, sometime is going to use that information to better frame suitable policy. This assumes of course a rational universe in which strategies are based on outcomes of observations and guided by criteria which optimize something reasonable --such as health, income, production, power, or what have you. We may be waking up now to the realization that the technical problem has a much broader scope than first envisioned. The technical problem may have to also include a demonstration that information can be used to formulate rational policy in the first place and how to do it.

It is true that information is used, sometimes. But there are so many examples of information not entering the formation of public policy that serious questions need to be asked on how public policy is formed. The answer is, of course, that public policy is formed through the workings of a variety of political and social factors in which information plays a relatively small part. Perhaps one of the most awesome examples is furnished by the Russian economy. For years, probably ever since the Revolution, Russians have busily accumulated data about the performance of their economy starting at the production level. This vast amount of information practically remains unused when economic goals are specified. These economic goals are predominantly set through processes of negotiation, mixed with coercion, in which management is not above lustily lying about capabilities and performance so as to obtain the most favorable quotas. As a result, specification for performance is set up almost in complete isolation of "reality". Of course, if the Russians sell enough oil or mine enough gold they can then buy steel or automobile plants or food or computers and computer know-how. That we do better in the West is perhaps not so much due to our better use of information on how our economy performs but to relatively favourable conditions created by a relatively free market place. We may make better use of information in setting out our policy goals than do the Russians, but nothing to brag about. Surely after having seen the mighty McNamara stumble like a blind man into Vietnam because he refused to accept information not congruent with administration prejudices, or the Public Health Service (in Canada and the U.S.) ignore information on health hazards, or regulating agencies refuse to explore the problems of the regulated consumers, or the haphazard ways by which monies are made tight or loose depending upon the prejudices of successions of economic theorists, or and so on, how can reasonable people still take seriously the proposition that actual information about

the political quality, the economic activity, or the social need forms the basis on which public policy is formed?

Yet, we are in a dilemma here. Public policy (whether it is with respect to the environment, to health, to the economy, or to our political survival) needs to be formulated in a rational way if we are going to count many future generations. The fact that information has played less of a role in the past in setting public policy may have been due to the happy circumstance, noticed first by de Tocqueville, that we are so big and so mighty that we can afford large and splendid mistakes. But the days may be past when we can make mistakes without end or perhaps the mistakes have become so big that no country can tolerate them, not even in North America. Whatever the case may be, we may have to turn toward rational policies based on the best information available in order to survive.

The Panel will act as a group of intellectuals, computer professionals, and political soothsayers. They will explore the interrelationship between three crucial topics:

1. What is the actual role of information in public policy decisions? (with emphasis on the reality and not the appearance)
2. What are the conditions under which information may possibly become useful to decision-makers and provide input for optimal decisions?
3. What are the technical limitations to achieving the ideal?

While the panel members will address themselves to some of these questions in detail, a number of them will make additional amplifications.

T.D.C. Kuch will point out that in industrial nations today the interplay of data, computers, and public policy is highly complex and any reductionist approach is apt to overlook those very aspects which are most central, even if least recognized. Any conceptual model of reality must be tested against an analysis of a real situation.

Hypotheses are offered as a contribution to a theory of the place of data and its manipulation in the formation and execution of public policy; then these will be tested by the analysis of a real situation in which public and private agencies came into conflict, and in which the collection, analysis, and use of data was the apparent central focus of contention. In light of this analysis, the hypothesis will be reformulated, conclusions will be drawn, and an estimate will be given as to the applicability of the particular example to other instances of the use of data in policy making.

K.C. Laudon will focus primarily on topic two. His overall point of view is that one cannot understand the failure of urban information systems to influence public policy without understanding the social and political values, and interests which shape their origins, design, and utilization. Within this framework the following observations need to be made:

1. With respect to origins, current information systems are designed to maximize the rationality and efficiency of administration of existing social programs as opposed to maximizing other social values such as justice and equality.
2. That current information systems which are proliferating at local administrative levels of government in the United States were never intended by their builders (except in public relations campaigns) to have much impact on the overall design of social policy or the formulation of new policies. As it turns out, local government administers policies established at the national level.
3. That even where in local jurisdictions information systems could have a limited impact on social service delivery policies the manner in which information systems have been organized (usually as Czars of local information policy) prevents the participation of local professionals actually engaged in service delivery and thereby limits the utility of the information system for changing local policies.
4. And finally that the whole emphasis in current information theory is that information is a cost which can be reduced by more efficient storage and collection. Little new information is being collected. Moreover very little effort is spent in most installations in analysing information; instead there exists the simplistic belief that information is knowledge, and that the better organization of existing information pools can answer critical policy questions. Any social scientist who looks into the kinds of data stored in the local welfare, police, court, or health information systems in his area will quickly find a wealth of administrative information useless for policy analysis or formulation.

D.D. McCracken also will address himself primarily to topic two. However he will stress his essential optimism on the value of informed opinion in decision-making processes. Obviously there are a lot of exceptions and counter examples to that optimism, but there is room for someone with technical knowledge and a concern about the public good to have an impact with a good letter to his congressman or with testimony at a state legislative hearing, etc.