In this paper, we explore the security against integral attacks on well-known stream ciphers SNOW 3G and KCipher-2. SNOW 3G is the core of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms UEA2 and UIA2, and KCipher-2 is a standard algorithm of ISO/IEC 18033-4 and CRYPTREC. Specifically, we investigate the propagation of the division property inside SNOW 3G and KCipher-2 by the Mixed-Integer Linear Programming to efficiently find an integral distinguisher. As a result, we present a 7-round integral distinguisher with 2³ chosen IVs for KCipher-2. As far as we know, this is the first attack on a reduced variant of KCipher-2 by the third party. In addition, we present a 13-round integral distinguisher with 2⁷ chosen IVs for SNOW 3G, whose time/data complexity is half of the previous best attack by Biryukov et al.