

A Heuristic Proof Procedure for First-Order Logic

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SUMMARY Inspired by the efficient proof procedures discussed in *Computability logic* [3], [5], [6], we describe a heuristic proof procedure for first-order logic. This is a variant of Gentzen sequent system [2] and has the following features: (a) it views sequents as games between the machine and the environment, and (b) it views proofs as a winning strategy of the machine. From this game-based viewpoint, a powerful heuristic can be extracted and a fair degree of determinism in proof search can be obtained. This article proposes a new deductive system LK_g with respect to first-order logic and proves its soundness and completeness.

key words: proof procedures, heuristics, game semantics, classical logic

1. Introduction

The Gentzen sequent system LK plays a key role in modern theorem proving. Unfortunately, the LK system and its variants based on focused proof [1] (as well as resolution and tableaux (see [7] for discussions)) are typically based on blind search and, therefore, does not provide the best strategy if we want a short proof.

In this paper, inspired by the seminal work of [3], we present a variant of LK, called LK_g (g for game), which yields a proof in normal form with the following features:

- All the quantifier inferences are processed first. This is achieved via deep inference.
- If there are several quantifiers to resolve in the sequent, we apply to sequents a technique called *stability analysis*, a powerful heuristic technique which greatly cuts down the search space for finding a proof.
- A quantifier is processed only when it needs to be processed. In other words, our terminating condition (our axiom) is much better than the traditional proof procedures including [1].

In essence, LK_g is a *game-viewed* proof which captures *game-playing* nature in proof search. It views

1. sequents as games between the machine and the environment,
2. proofs as a winning strategy of the machine, and
3. $\forall xF$ as the env's move and $\exists xF$ as the machine's move.

At each stage, we construct a proof by the following rules:

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1. If the sequent is stable, then it means that the machine is the current winner. In this case, it requests the user to make a move.
2. If the sequent is unstable, then it means that the environment is the current winner. In this case, the machine makes a move.

In this way, a fair (probably maximum) degree of determinism can be obtained from the LK_g proof system.

In this paper we present the proof procedure for first-order classical logic. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We describe LK_g in the next section. In Sect. 3, we present some examples of derivations. In Sect. 4, we prove the soundness and completeness of LK_g. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. The Logic LK_g

The formulas are the standard first-order classical formulas, with the features that (a) \top , \perp are added, and (b) \neg is only allowed to be applied to atomic formulas. Thus we assume that formulas are in negation normal form.

The deductive system LK_g below axiomatizes the set of valid formulas. LK_g is a one-sided sequent calculus system, where a sequent is a multiset of formulas. Our presentation closely follows the one in [3].

First, we need to define some terminology.

1. A **surface occurrence** of a subformula is an occurrence that is not in the scope of any quantifiers (\forall and/or \exists).
2. A sequent is **propositional** iff all of its formulas are so.
3. The **propositionalization** $\|F\|$ of a formula F is the result of replacing in F all \exists -subformulas by \perp , and all \forall -subformulas by \top . The **propositionalization** $\|F_1, \dots, F_n\|$ of a sequent F_1, \dots, F_n is the propositional formula $\|F_1\| \vee \dots \vee \|F_n\|$.
4. A sequent is said to be **stable** iff its propositionalization is classically valid; otherwise it is **unstable**.
5. The notation $F[E]$ represents a formula F together with some surface occurrence of a subformula E .

The rules of LK_g

LK_g has the five rules listed below, with the following additional conditions:

1. X :stable means that X must meet the condition that it is stable. Similarly for X :unstable.

2. Γ is a multiset of formulas and F is a formula.
3. In \exists -Choose, t is a closed term, and $H(t)$ is the result of replacing by t all free occurrences of x in $H(x)$.
4. The ‘Succ’ rule reads as follows: A stable sequent X containing no surface occurrence of $\forall xH(x)$ is derivable.
5. The ‘Fail’ rule reads: An unstable sequent X containing no surface occurrence of $\exists xH(x)$ is not derivable.

Fail	
\perp	
<hr/>	(no surf $\exists xH(x)$ in X)
X :unstable	
\exists-Choose	
$\Gamma, F[H(t)]$	
<hr/>	
$\Gamma, F[\exists xH(x)]$:unstable	
Replicate	
$\Gamma, F[\exists xH(x)], F[\exists xH(x)]$	
<hr/>	
$\Gamma, F[\exists xH(x)]$:unstable	
Succ	
\top	
<hr/>	(no surface $\forall xH(x)$ in X)
X :stable	
\forall-Choose	
$\Gamma, F[H(\alpha)]$	
<hr/>	(α is a new constant)
$\Gamma, F[\forall xH(x)]$: stable	

In the above, the “Replicate” rule is an optimized version of what is known as Contraction, where contraction occurs only when there is a surface occurrence of $\exists xH(x)$.

A **LK_g-proof** of a sequent X is a sequence X_1, \dots, X_n of sequents, with $X_n = X$, $X_1 = \top$ such that, each X_i follows by one of the rules of LK_g from X_{i-1} .

3. Examples

Below we describe some examples.

Example 3.1: The formula $\forall x\exists y(p(x) \rightarrow p(y))$ is provable in LK_g as follows:

1. $p(\alpha) \rightarrow p(\alpha)$ Succ
2. $\exists y(p(\alpha) \rightarrow p(y))$ \exists -Choose
3. $\forall x\exists y(p(x) \rightarrow p(y))$ \forall -Choose

Example 3.2: The formula $\exists y\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow p(y))$ is provable in LK_g as follows:

1. $(p(\alpha_1) \rightarrow p(a)), (p(\alpha_2) \rightarrow p(\alpha_1))$ Succ
2. $(p(\alpha_1) \rightarrow p(a)), \forall x(p(x) \rightarrow p(\alpha_1))$ \forall -Choose
3. $(p(\alpha_1) \rightarrow p(a)), \exists y\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow p(y))$ \exists -Choose
4. $\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow p(a)), \exists y\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow p(y))$ \forall -Choose
5. $\exists y\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow p(y)), \exists y\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow p(y))$ \exists -Choose
6. $\exists y\forall x(p(x) \rightarrow p(y))$ Replicate

On the other hand, the formula $(\exists xp(x) \rightarrow \forall yp(y))$ which is invalid can be seen to be unprovable. This can be derived only by two \forall -Choose rules and then the premise should be of the form $\neg p(\alpha_1), p(\alpha_2)$ for some new constants α_1, α_2 . The latter is not classically valid.

We conclude this section by discussing performance aspects of LK and LK_g. LK (and its variants) processes \exists, \forall -quantifiers in an eagerly fashion, even when it is unnecessary. On the other hand, LK_g processes these quantifiers in a lazy fashion, only when it is absolutely necessary. It can be expected then that LK_g typically has shorter proofs for validity (and invalidity if any) than LK.

As an example, consider the following:

$$p(a) \wedge \forall x_1, \dots, \forall x_n q(x_1, \dots, x_n).$$

LK_g immediately declares that this formula is invalid, as it is unstable and there is no surface occurrence of $\exists xH(x)$. In contrast, LK typically processes $\forall x_1, \dots, \forall x_n$, which is redundant.

As a second example, consider the following:

$$((p \rightarrow q) \wedge (q \rightarrow r)) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow (r \vee \exists x_1, \dots, \exists x_n s(x_1))).$$

Again, LK_g immediately declares that this formula is valid, as it is stable and there is no surface occurrence of $\forall xH(x)$. In contrast, LK is likely to process $\exists x_1, \dots, \exists x_n$, which is redundant.

4. The Soundness and Completeness of LK_g

We now present the soundness and completeness of LK_g.

Theorem 4.1: 1. If LK_g terminates with success for X , then X is valid.
 2. If LK_g terminates with failure for X , then X is invalid.
 3. If LK_g does not terminate for X , then X is invalid.

Proof. Consider an arbitrary sequent X .

Soundness: Induction on the length of derivations.

Case 1: X is derived from Y by \exists -Choose. By the induction hypothesis, Y is valid, which implies that X is valid.

Case 2: X is derived from Y by Replicate. By the induction hypothesis, Y is valid. Then, it is easy to see that X is valid.

Case 3: X is derived from Y by Succ.

In this case, we know that there is no surface occurrences of $\forall xH(x)$ in X and $\|X\|$ is classically valid. It is then easy to see that, reversing the propositionalization of $\|X\|$ (replacing \perp by any formula of the form $F[\exists xH(x)]$) preserves validity. For example, if X is $p(a) \rightarrow p(a), \exists xq(x)$,

then $\|X\|$ is valid and X is valid as well.

Case 4: X is derived from Y by \forall -Choose.

Thus, there is an occurrence of $\forall xH(x)$ in X . The machine makes a move by picking up some fresh constant c not occurring in X . Then, by the induction hypothesis, the premise is valid. Now consider any interpretation I that makes the premise true. Then it is easy to see that the conclusion is true in I . It is commonly known as “generalization on constants”.

Completeness: Assume LK_g terminates with failure.

We proceed by induction on the length of derivations.

If X is stable, then there should be a LK_g-unprovable sequent Y with the following condition.

Case 1: \forall -Choose: X has the form $\Gamma, F[\forall xG(x)]$, and Y is $\Gamma, F[G(\alpha)]$, where α is a new constant not occurring in X . In this case, Y is a LK_g-unprovable sequent, for otherwise X is LK_g-provable. By the induction hypothesis, Y is not true in some interpretation I . Then it is easy to see that X is not true in I . Therefore X is not valid.

Next, we consider the cases when X is not stable. Then there are three cases to consider.

Case 2.1: Fail: In this case, there is no surface occurrence of $\exists xG(x)$ and the algorithm terminates with failure. As X is not stable, $\|X\|$ is not classically valid. If we reverse the propositionalization of $\|X\|$ by replacing \top by any formula with some surface occurrence of $\forall G(x)$, we observe that invalidity is preserved. Therefore, X is not valid.

Case 2.2: \exists -Choose: In this case, X has the form $\Gamma, F[\exists xG(x)]$, and $Y(t)$ is $\Gamma, F[G(t)]$, where t is a closed term. In this case, $Y(t)$ is a LK_g-unprovable sequent for any t , for otherwise X is LK_g-provable. By the induction hypothesis, none of $Y(t)$ is valid and thus none of $Y(t)$ is not true in some interpretation I . Then it is easy to see that X is not true in I . Therefore X is not valid.

Case 2.3: Replicate: In this case, X has the form $\Gamma, F[\exists xG(x)]$, and Y is $\Gamma, F[\exists xG(x)], F[\exists xG(x)]$. In this case, Y is a LK_g-unprovable sequent, for otherwise X is LK_g-provable. By the induction hypothesis, Y is not valid and is not true in some interpretation I . Then it is easy to see that X is not true in I . Therefore X is not valid.

Now assume LK_g is not terminating, because Replicate occurs infinitely many times. We prove this by contradiction.

Assume that X is valid but unprovable. Let Z be an infinite multiset of propositional formulas obtained by applying infinite numbers of Replicate, together with \exists -Choose and \forall -Choose rules. Then it is easy to see that Z remains still valid but unprovable. By the compactness theorem on propositional logic, there is a finite subset Z' of Z , which is a valid sequent. Then there must be a step t in the procedure such that, after t , Z' is derived. Then it is easy to see that Z' remains LK_g-unprovable. However, as Z' is valid, it must be provable by Succ. This is a contradiction and, therefore, X is not valid. ■

5. Some Optimizations

Although LK_g performs well for valid sequents, it performs poorly for invalid sequents. For example, it does not even terminate for the invalid sequent $p(a), p(b) \wedge \exists xq(x)$.

For this reason, what we need is a good heuristic for determining, in a simple yet effective way, whether a sequent is invalid. In this section, we employ a simple heuristic called *maximum propositionalization* which replaces in a sequent X all \exists -subformulas by \top . If X' is obtained from X by maximum propositionalization, then it is easy to observe that if X' is invalid, then X is invalid as well.

The deductive system LK_g' uses this heuristic. First, we need to define some terminology.

1. The **max-propositionalization** $\|F\|_{\max}$ of a formula F is the result of replacing in F all \exists -subformulas by \top , and all \forall -subformulas by \top . This process naturally extends to sequents.
2. The **min-propositionalization** $\|F\|_{\min}$ of a formula F is the result of replacing in F all \exists -subformulas by \perp , and all \forall -subformulas by \perp . This process naturally extends to sequents.
3. A sequent is said to be **max-p-invalid** iff its max-propositionalization is classically invalid. A sequent is said to be **min-p-valid** iff its min-propositionalization is classically valid.

The rules of LK_g'

Below, X :stable means that X is stable but not min-p-valid. Similarly X :unstable means that X is unstable but not min-p-valid.

Fail

\perp

X : max-p-invalid

\exists -Choose

$\Gamma, F[H(t)]$

$\Gamma, F[\exists xH(x)]$:unstable

Replicate

$\Gamma, F[\exists xH(x)], F[\exists xH(x)]$

$\Gamma, F[\exists xH(x)]$:unstable

Succ

\top

X : min-p-valid

\forall -Choose

$$\frac{\Gamma, F[H(\alpha)]}{\Gamma, F[\forall x H(x)]: \text{stable}} \quad (\alpha \text{ is a new constant})$$

The heuristic employed in LKg' is quite simple and needs to be improved. For example, it does not apply well to the invalid sequent $p(a), \exists x p(x)$. It would be nice to improve our heuristic so that it can apply to a wider class of invalid sequents.

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