# Efficient Construction of a Substitution Box Based on a Mordell Elliptic Curve Over a Finite Field 

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#### Abstract

Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is used in many security systems due to its small key size and high security as compared to the other cryptosystems. In many well-known security systems substitution box (S-box) is the only non-linear component. Recently, it is shown that the security of a cryptosystem can be improved by using dynamic S-boxes instead of a static S-box. This fact necessitates the construction of new secure S -boxes. In this paper, we propose an efficient method for the generation of S-boxes based on a class of Mordell elliptic curves (MECs) over prime fields by defining different total orders. The proposed scheme is developed in such a way that for each input it outputs an S-box in linear time and constant space. Due to this property, our method takes less time and space as compared to all existing S-box construction methods over elliptic curve. Furthermore, it is shown by the computational results that the proposed method is capable of generating cryptographically strong S-boxes with comparable security to some of the existing S-boxes constructed over different mathematical structures.


Key words: Mordell elliptic curve; Finite field; Substitution box; Total order; Computational complexity

## 1 Introduction

Cryptography deals with the techniques to secure the private data. In these techniques, the data is transformed into an unreadable form by using some keys so that the adversaries cannot extract any useful information. S-box is the only non-linear component of many well-known cryptosystems including Advanced Encryption System (AES). It is therefore the security of such cryptosystems solely depends on the cryptographic properties of their S-boxes. Shannon 33] proved that a cryptosystem is secure, if it can create confusion and diffusion in the data up to a certain level. An S-box is cryptographically strong enough to create desire confusion and diffusion, if it satisfies certain tests including the test of non-linearity, approximation, strict avalanche, bit independence and algebraic complexity. Nowadays, AES is considered to be the most secured and widely used cryptosystem, and hence many cryptographers studied its S-box. The study in [35, 5, 26, 30] reveals that the AES S-box is vulnerable against algebraic attacks because of its sparse polynomial representation. It is also noticed that a cryptosystem based on a single S-box is unable to generate desirable security, if the data is highly correlated [2, 15]. Furthermore, it is shown that the
security of a cryptosystem can be improved by using dynamic S-boxes instead of a static S-box, see for example [31, 20, 27, 1, 25, 19. The two main reasons behind this are: (a) static S-box is vulnerable to data analysis attack and subkey attacks in which subkeys are obtained by using inverse subbyte, if inverse of the S-box is known [31]; and (b) it is shown in [20, 27, 1, 25, 19] that the algorithms using dynamic S-box are more complex and provide more overhead to the cryptanalysts when compared with static S-box. Different image encryption algorithms by using dynamic S-box are presented in [40, 37, 8, 24]. In these studies it turned out that the image cryptosystems based on a dynamic S-box provide better security when compared with the cryptosystems using a static S-box. Due to these reasons many researchers have proposed new S-box generation techniques based on different mathematical structures including algebraic, and differential equations.

For an S-box design technique, it is necessary that the resultant S-box: (a) inherits the properties of the underlying mathematical structure. This is an important requirement which leads to the efficient generation and better understanding of the cryptographic properties of the S-box; (b) is generated in low time and space complexity; and (c) satisfies the security tests. Of course, an S-box generation technique with high time complexity is not suitable for the cryptosystems using multiple, and dynamic S-boxes. Lui et al., 23] presented an improved AES S-box based on an algebraic method. Cui et al., 6] used an affine function to generate an S-box with 253 non-zero terms in its polynomial representation. Tran et al., 36 used composition of a Gray code instead of an affine mapping with the AES S-box to generate an S-box with high algebraic complexity. Khan and Azam [21] proposed different methods for the generation of cryptographically strong S-boxes based on a generalization of Gray S-box, and affine functions, see [22]. Azam [2] used the later S-boxes for the encryption of confidential images. Chaotic maps including Baker, logistic, and Chebyshev maps are used to generate new S-boxes in [11, 10, 29]. Similarly, elliptic curves (ECs) are also used in the field of cryptography for the development of highly secure cryptosystems. Miller [28] presented an EC based security system which has smaller key size and higher security as compared to RSA. Jung et al., [17] developed a link between the points on hyper-elliptic curves and non-linearity of an S-box. Hayat et al., 12, 13, for the first time used EC over a prime field for the generation of dynamic S-boxes. In these schemes, an S-box is generated by using the $x$-coordinates of the points on an ordered EC over a prime $p$, where the ordering $\prec$ on the points is performed with respect to their values i.e., for any two points $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right)$ and $\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right)$ on the EC, $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \preceq\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right)$, if $\left(y_{1}^{2} \leq y_{2}^{2}\right)$ $(\bmod p)$. Actually, the scheme in [13] is a generalization of the scheme in [12]. Although these methods are capable of generating cryptographically strong Sboxes, but they have the next two weak points. Firstly, they need to compute and store the EC for their generation process. Due to this, the time and space complexity of these schemes are $\mathcal{O}\left(p^{2}\right)$ and $\mathcal{O}(p)$, respectively, where $p \geq 257$ is the prime of the underlying EC. Secondly, the output of these schemes is uncertain i.e., for each set of input parameters the algorithms do not necessarily output an S-box.

The purpose of this article is to develop such a novel and efficient S-box generation technique based on a finite Mordell elliptic curve (MEC) which generates secure S-box inheriting the properties of the underlying MEC for each set of input parameters. To achieve this, we defined some typical type of total orders on the points of the MEC, and then used $y$-coordinates instead of $x$-coordinates to obtain an S-box. The remaining paper is organized as follows: Some basic definitions and results related to EC are discussed in Section 2. The proposed algorithm is described in Section 3. Section 4 contains the security analysis, while a detailed comparison of the newly developed scheme with some of the existing methods is performed in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 6.

## 2 Preliminaries

For a prime $p$, and two non-negative integers $a, b \leq p-1$, the EC $E_{p, a, b}$ over the prime field $\mathbf{F}_{p}$ is defined to be the collection of infinity point $O$, and all ordered pairs $(x, y) \in \mathbf{F}_{p} \times \mathbf{F}_{p}$ satisfying the equation

$$
y^{2} \equiv x^{3}+a x+b(\bmod p)
$$

We call $p, a$, and $b$ the parameters of the EC $E_{p, a, b}$. An approximation for the number of points $\# E_{p, a, b}$ on $E_{p, a, b}$ can be obtained by using Hasse's formula (39, 3]

$$
\left|\# E_{p, a, b}-p-1\right| \leq 2 \sqrt{p}
$$

Mordell elliptic curve (MEC) is a special kind of elliptic curve with $a=0$. The significance of some MECs $E_{p, 0, b}$ is that they have exactly $p+1$ points. The following Theorem [39] gives the information of such MECs.

Theorem 1 Let $p>3$ be a prime such that $p \equiv 2(\bmod 3)$. Then for each $b \in \mathbf{F}_{p}$, the MEC $E_{p, 0, b}$ has exactly $p+1$ distinct points, and has each integer in $[0, p-1]$ exactly once as a $y$-coordinate.

Henceforth, a MEC $E_{p, 0, b}$, where $p \equiv 2(\bmod 3)$, is simply denoted by $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$.

## 3 Description of the Proposed S-box Designing Technique

In this section, we give an informal intuition of our proposed method. Our aim is to develop such an S-box generation technique based on a MEC which outputs an S-box: (a) in linear time and constant space for each set of input parameters; (b) that inherits the properties of the underlying MEC; and (c) having high security against cryptanalysis. Note that the S-box design techniques proposed by [12, 13] do not satisfy conditions (a) and (b). One of the possible ways of designing such a technique is to input such an EC which contains all integer values from $[0,255]$ without repetition. It is, therefore, the proposed algorithm
takes a MEC $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$ as an input, and uses $y$-coordinates to generate an S-box instead of $x$-coordinates. The next task is to use these $y$-coordinates in such a way that the resultant S-box inherits the properties of the underlying MEC. Of course, the usage of some arithmetic operations such as modulo operation for this purpose S-box will destroy the structure of the underlying MEC. Thus, we used the concept of total order on the MEC to get an S-box. Order theory is intensively used in formal methods, programming languages, logic, and statistic analysis. Now the natural question is how to define different orderings on the MEC. Note that for each $x$ value of MEC, there are two $y$ values. Thus, we can divide the orderings on MEC into two categories: (1) one is that in which the two $y$ values of each $x$ appear consecutively; and (2) the other one contains those orderings in which the two $y$ values of each $x$ do not appear consecutively. Based on this fact, we defined three different type of orderings on a given MEC $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$ to generate three different S-boxes.

### 3.1 The proposed orderings on a MEC $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$

The orderings used in the proposed method are discussed below.
(1) A natural ordering on a MEC: We define a natural ordering $\prec_{N}$ on $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$ based on $x$-coordinates as follows

$$
\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \prec_{N}\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \Leftrightarrow\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { either if } x_{1}<x_{2} ; \text { or }  \tag{1}\\
\text { if } x_{1}=x_{2}, \text { and } y_{1}<y_{2}
\end{array}\right.
$$

where $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right),\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \in E_{p \equiv 2, b}$.
The aim of this ordering is to sort the points on the MEC in such a way that the $x$-coordinates are in non-decreasing order, and the two $y$ values corresponding to each $x$ appear consecutively.

The next two orderings are introduced based on the following observation deduced from Theorem 1 to diffuse the $y$-coordinates on a MEC.

Observation: For any two distinct points $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right)$ and $\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right)$ on the MEC $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$, and either $x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{2}+y_{2}$ or $x_{1}+y_{1} \equiv x_{2}+y_{2}(\bmod p)$, it holds that $x_{1} \neq x_{2}$.
(2) A diffusion ordering on a MEC: An ordering is defined on $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$ to diffuse the two $y$ values of each $x$. Let $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right)$ and $\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right)$ be any two points on $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$, the diffusion ordering $\prec_{D}$ is defined to be

$$
\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \prec_{D}\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \Leftrightarrow\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { either if } x_{1}+y_{1}<x_{2}+y_{2} ; \text { or }  \tag{2}\\
\text { if } x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{2}+y_{2}, \text { and } x_{1}<x_{2} .
\end{array}\right.
$$

Lemma 2 The relation $\prec_{D}$ is a total order on the $M E C E_{p \equiv 2, b}$.
Proof. For each $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \in E_{p \equiv 2, b}$, we have $x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{1}+y_{1}$, and therefore $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \prec_{D}\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right)$. This implies that $\prec_{D}$ is reflexive. Next, we need to show that $\prec_{D}$ satisfies the antisymmetric property. Thus, for $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right),\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \in$
$E_{p \equiv 2, b}$, suppose that $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \prec_{D}\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right)$, and $\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \prec_{D}\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right)$ hold. This implies that $x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{2}+y_{2}$. This is because of the fact that $x_{1}+y_{1}<$ $x_{2}+y_{2}$, and $x_{2}+y_{2}<x_{1}+y_{1}$ are the only cases for which the supposition and $x_{1}+y_{1} \neq x_{2}+y_{2}$ are true, which eventually imply that $x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{2}+y_{2}$. Now if $x_{1} \neq x_{2}$, then by the supposition and the fact $x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{2}+y_{2}$, we have $x_{1}<x_{2}$ and $x_{2}<x_{1}$, which lead to the contradiction $x_{1}=x_{2}$. Thus $x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{2}+y_{2}$ and $x_{1}=x_{2}$ hold, which ultimately imply that $y_{1}=y_{2}$, and therefore $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right)=\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right)$. Now, to prove the transitivity property, suppose that $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \prec_{D}\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right)$, and $\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \prec_{D}\left(x_{3}, y_{3}\right)$ hold, where $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right),\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right),\left(x_{3}, y_{3}\right) \in E_{p \equiv 2, b}$. Now if $x_{1}+y_{1}<x_{2}+y_{2}$ and $x_{2}+y_{2} \leq x_{3}+y_{3}$, or $x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{2}+y_{2}$ and $x_{2}+y_{2}<x_{3}+y_{3}$, then $x_{1}+y_{1}<x_{3}+y_{3}$, and therefore $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \prec_{D}\left(x_{3}, y_{3}\right)$. Similarly, if $x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{2}+y_{2}=x_{3}+y_{3}$, then $x_{1}<x_{2}$ and $x_{2}<x_{3}$, and hence $x_{1}+y_{1}=x_{3}+y_{3}$ and $x_{1}<x_{3}$. This completes the proof.
(3) A modulo diffusion ordering on a MEC: The order $\prec_{M}$ defined below produces diffusion in both $x$-coordinates and $y$-coordinates of the points on $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$. Let $\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right),\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \in E_{p \equiv 2, b}$, then

$$
\left(x_{1}, y_{1}\right) \prec_{M}\left(x_{2}, y_{2}\right) \Leftrightarrow\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\text { either if }\left(x_{1}+y_{1}<x_{2}+y_{2}\right)(\bmod p) ; \text { or }  \tag{3}\\
\text { if } x_{1}+y_{1} \equiv x_{2}+y_{2}(\bmod p) \text {, and } x_{1}<x_{2}
\end{array}\right.
$$

Lemma 3 The relation $\prec_{M}$ is a total order on the MEC $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$.
Lemma 3 can be proved by using the similar arguments as used in the proof of Lemma 2

The effect of these orderings $\prec_{N}, \prec_{D}$ and $\prec_{M}$ on $y$-coordinates of the MEC $E_{101 \equiv 2,1}$ is shown in Figure 1 by plotting them in a non-decreasing order of their points on the MEC w.r.t $\prec_{N}, \prec_{D}$ and $\prec_{M}$, respectively.


Figure 1: The arrangements of $y$-coordinates of $E_{101 \equiv 2,1}$ w.r.t. the proposed orderings

Similarly, a relation among the sets of all $y$-coordinates of the MEC $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$ obtained by different proposed orderings $\prec_{H}$ and $\prec_{K}$, where $H, K \in\{N, D, M\}$, is quantified by computing their correlation coefficient $\rho_{H K}$. The correlation results for different MECs are shown in Table $\mathbb{1}$ It is evident from the results that each ordering has different effect on the $y$-coordinates of the underlying MEC.

Table 1: Results of the correlation test

| $p$ | $b$ | $\rho_{N D}$ | $\rho_{N D}$ | $\rho_{D M}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 101 | 1 | -0.0588 | 0.0550 | -0.0497 |
| 827 | 87 | -0.0044 | 0.0008 | 0.0027 |
| 1013 | 118 | 0.0028 | -0.0059 | 0.0003 |
| 2027 | 8 | 0.0007 | -0.0068 | -0.0002 |

### 3.2 The proposed S-box construction method

Let $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$ be a Mordell elliptic curve (MEC), where $p \geq 257$. The lower bound on the prime $p$ is 257 for the proposed method so that MEC has at least 256 points. An S-box $S_{p, b}^{H}$, where $H \in\{N, D, M\}$, is generated by selecting the $y$ coordinates on $E_{p \equiv 2, b}$ which are in the interval $[0,255]$ as $S_{p, b}^{H}:\{0,1, \ldots, 255\} \rightarrow$ $\{0,1, \ldots, 255\}$ defined as $S_{p, b}^{H}(i)=y_{i}$, such that $\left(x_{i}, y_{i}\right) \in E_{p \equiv 2, b}$, and $\left(x_{i-1}, y_{i-1}\right) \prec_{H}\left(x_{i}, y_{i}\right)$.

It is clear from Theorem that $S_{p, b}^{H}$ is a bijection, which further implies that the proposed method generates an S-box for each set of input parameters.

Lemma 4 For any prime $p \geq 257$ such that $p \equiv 2$ (mod 3), integer $b \in[0, p-1]$, and $H \in\{N, D, M\}$, the $S$-box $S_{p, b}^{H}$ can be generated in time complexity $\mathcal{O}(p)$ and constant space.

Proof. The generation of $S_{p, b}^{H}$ requires calculation of 256 points on the MEC with $y$-coordinates in $[0,255]$, and then their sorting. The calculation of 256 points on the MEC can be done in $\mathcal{O}(p)$, since for each $y \in[0,255]$, a for loop of size $p$ is required to find integer $x$ such that $(x, y)$ is a point on the MEC. However, the sorting of these 256 points can be done in a constant time with respect to the ordering $H$. Thus, $S_{p, b}^{H}$ can be generated in $\mathcal{O}(p)$ time. Furthermore, the generation process store only 256 points on the MEC for sorting purpose, and therefore it takes constant space.

It is evident from Lemma 4 that the time and space complexity of the proposed S-box generation method is independent of the parameter $b$ and the ordering on the underlying MEC. An algorithmic description of the proposed generation method is given in Algorithm 1.

```
Algorithm 1 The proposed S-box generation method
Input: A Mordell elliptic curve \(E_{p, b}\), where \(p \equiv 2(\bmod 3)\), with a total order
    \(H \in\{N, D, M\}\).
Output: The proposed S-box \(S_{p, b}^{H}\).
    \(A:=\emptyset ; /^{*}\) The set of 256 points of the MEC with \(y\)-coordinates in [0, 255]*/
    for each \(y=0,1, \ldots, 255\) do
        while \(x \in[0, p-1]\) do
            if \(x^{3}+b \equiv y^{2}(\bmod p)\) then
                \(A:=A \cup\{(x, y)\}\)
            end if
        end while
    end for
    Sort \(A\) with respect to the ordering \(H\);
    Output all \(y\)-coordinates of the points in \(A\) preserving their order as the
    S-box \(S_{p, b}^{H}\).
```

The S-boxes $S_{1667,351}^{N}, S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ and $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$ generated by the proposed technique are presented in Tables (11)-(13), respectively.

## 4 Security Analysis

Several standard tests are applied on the S-boxes obtained by the proposed method to test their cryptographic strength. A brief introduction to these security tests, and their results for some of the newly generated S-boxes $S_{1667,351}^{N}$, $S_{1949,544}^{N}, S_{3023,626}^{N}, S_{3299,1451}^{D}, S_{3041,1298}^{D}, S_{3347,2937}^{D}, S_{4229,2422}^{M}, S_{4217,1156}^{M}$ and $S_{3299,1400}^{M}$ are discussed in this section.

### 4.1 Non-Linearity (NL)

It is important for an S-box to create confusion in the data up to a certain level to keep the data secure from the adversaries. The confusion creation capability of an S-box $S$ over the Galois Field $G F\left(2^{8}\right)$ is measured by its non-linearity $\mathcal{N}(S)$, which is defined below

$$
\mathcal{N}(S)=\min _{\alpha, \beta, \gamma}\left\{x \in G F\left(2^{8}\right): \alpha \cdot S(x) \neq \beta \cdot x \oplus \gamma\right\},
$$

where $\alpha \in G F\left(2^{8}\right), \gamma \in G F(2), \beta \in G F\left(2^{8}\right) \backslash\{0\}$ and "." represents dot product over $G F(2)$.

An S-box with high NL is capable of generating high confusion in the data. However, it is also shown in 38 that an S-box with high NL may not satisfy other cryptographic properties. The NL of some of the newly constructed Sboxes is listed in Table 2. Note that each listed S-box has NL 106, which is large enough to create high confusion.

Table 2: Non-linearity of the newly generated S-boxes

| S-boxes | $S_{1667,351}^{N}$ | $S_{1949,544}^{N}$ | $S_{3023,626}^{N}$ | $S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ | $S_{3041,1298}^{D}$ | $S_{3347,2937}^{D}$ | $S_{4299,2422}^{M}$ | $S_{4217,1156}^{M}$ | $S_{3999,1400}^{M}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| NL | 106 | 106 | 106 | 106 | 106 | 106 | 106 | 106 | 106 |

### 4.2 Approximation Attacks

A cryptographically strong S-box must have high resistance against approximation attacks. The approximation attacks can be divided into two categories namely linear approximation attacks, and differential approximation attacks which are explained below.

The resistance of an S-box $S$ against linear approximation attacks is measured by calculating its maximum number $\mathcal{L}(S)$ of coincident input bits with the output bits. The mathematical expression of $\mathcal{L}(S)$ is as follows

$$
\mathcal{L}(S)=\frac{1}{2^{8}}\left\{\max _{\alpha, \beta}\left\{\left|\#\left\{x \in G F\left(2^{8}\right): \alpha \cdot x=\beta \cdot S(x)\right\}-2^{7}\right|\right\}\right\},
$$

where $\alpha \in G F\left(2^{8}\right)$ and $\beta \in G F\left(2^{8}\right) \backslash\{0\}$.
An S-box $S$ is said to be highly resistive against linear approximation attacks if it has low value of $\mathcal{L}(S)$. The LAP of the newly generated S-boxes is listed in Table 3. The average LAP of all of the listed S-boxes is 0.1371 which is very

Table 3: LAP of the newly generated S-boxes

| S-boxes | $S_{1667,351}^{N}$ | $S_{1949,544}^{N}$ | $S_{3023,626}^{N}$ | $S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ | $S_{3041,1298}^{D}$ | $S_{3347,2937}^{D}$ | $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$ | $S_{4217,1156}^{M}$ | $S_{3299,1400}^{M}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| LAP | 0.1328 | 0.1328 | 0.1406 | 0.1484 | 0.1328 | 0.1406 | 0.1328 | 0.1328 | 0.1406 |

low, and hence the proposed scheme is capable of generating S-boxes with high resistance against linear approximation attacks.

### 4.2.1 Differential Approximation Probability (DAP)

The strength of an S-box against differential approximation attacks is measured by calculating its DAP. For an S-box $S$, the $\operatorname{DAP} \mathcal{D}(S)$ is the maximum probability of a specific change $\Delta y$ in the output bits $S(x)$ when the input bits $x$ are changed to $x \oplus \triangle x$ i.e.,

$$
\mathcal{D}(S)=\frac{1}{2^{8}}\left\{\max _{\triangle x, \Delta y}\left\{\#\left\{x \in G F\left(2^{8}\right): S(x \oplus \Delta x)=S(x) \oplus \triangle y\right\}\right\}\right\}
$$

where $\triangle x, \triangle y \in G F\left(2^{8}\right)$, and " $\oplus$ " is bit-wise addition over $G F(2)$.
The smaller is the value of DAP, the higher is the security of the S-box against differential approximation attacks. The experimental results of DAP on the newly generated S-boxes are presented in Table 4 It is evident from Table 4 that the newly generated S-boxes have high resistance against differential attacks.

Table 4: DAP of the newly generated S-boxes

| S-boxes | $S_{1667,351}^{N}$ | $S_{1949,544}^{N}$ | $S_{3023,626}^{N}$ | $S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ | $S_{3041,1298}^{D}$ | $S_{3347,2937}^{D}$ | $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$ | $S_{4217,1156}^{M}$ | $S_{3299,1400}^{M}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| DAP | 0.0391 | 0.0391 | 0.0391 | 0.0391 | 0.0391 | 0.0391 | 0.0391 | 0.0391 | 0.0391 |

### 4.3 Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC)

The diffusion creation capability of an S-box is calculated by SAC. The SAC of an S-box $S$ is the measure of change in output bits when a single input bit is changed. The SAC of an S-box $S$ with boolean functions $S_{i}$, where $1 \leq i \leq 8$, is computed by calculating an eight dimensional square matrix $M(S)=\left[m_{i j}\right]$ by using each of the eight elements $\alpha_{j} \in G F\left(2^{8}\right)$ with only one non-zero bit as

$$
m_{i j}=\frac{1}{2^{8}}\left(\sum_{x \in G F\left(2^{8}\right)} w\left(S_{i}\left(x \oplus \alpha_{j}\right) \oplus S_{i}(x)\right)\right)
$$

where $w(v)$ denotes the number of non-zero bits in the vector $v$.
SAC test is fulfilled, if all entries of $M(S)$ are close to 0.5 . The entries of SAC matrix corresponding to each newly generated S-boxes $S_{1667,351}^{N}, S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ and $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$ are plotted in a linear order in Figure 2. The average of minimum, and maximum values of $M(S)$ corresponding to each of the newly generated Sboxes are 0.4115 and 0.6094 , respectively. Table 5 clearly shows that the $S$-boxes
generated by the proposed method based on a MEC is capable of generating high diffusion in the data.

Table 5: SAC of the newly generated S-boxes

| S-boxes | $S_{1667,351}^{N}$ | $S_{1949,544}^{N}$ | $S_{3023,626}^{N}$ | $S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ | $S_{3041,1298}^{D}$ | $S_{3347,2937}^{D}$ | $S_{4299,2422}^{M}$ | $S_{4217,1156}^{M}$ | $S_{3999,1400}^{M}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| SAC(max) | 0.5938 | 0.625 | 0.6563 | 0.6406 | 0.6094 | 0.6094 | 0.5938 | 0.6094 | 0.625 |
| SAC(min) | 0.4531 | 0.4219 | 0.4219 | 0.4063 | 0.4219 | 0.4063 | 0.375 | 0.3906 | 0.3594 |



Figure 2: SAC matrix plot for $S_{1667,351}^{N}, S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ and $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$

### 4.4 Bit Independence Criterion (BIC)

BIC is also an important test to measure the diffusion creation strength of an S-box. The main idea of this test is to investigate the dependence of a pair of output bits when an input bit is reversed. The BIC of an S-box $S$ over $G F\left(2^{8}\right)$ with $S_{i}$ boolean functions is also calculated by computing a square matrix $N(S)=\left[n_{i j}\right]$ of dimension eight as follows

$$
n_{i j}=\frac{1}{2^{8}}\left(\sum_{\substack{x \in G F\left(2^{8}\right) \\ 1 \leq k \leq 8}} w\left(S_{i}\left(x \oplus \alpha_{j}\right) \oplus S_{i}(x) \oplus S_{k}\left(x+\alpha_{j}\right) \oplus S_{k}(x)\right)\right)
$$

Of course $n_{i i}=0$. An S-box is said to be good if all off-diagonal values of its BIC matrix are near to 0.5 . The experimental results of this test on the newly generated S-boxes $S_{1667,351}^{N}, S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ and $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$, excluding the value 0, are shown in a linear order in Figure 3. The minimum, and maximum values of BIC matrix $N(S)$ of each of the newly generated S-boxes are listed in Table 6. It is evident from Figure 3 and Table 6 that the S-boxes generated by the proposed methods are strong enough to generate high diffusion in the data.

Table 6: BIC of the newly generated S-boxes

| S-boxes | $S_{1667,351}^{N}$ | $S_{1949,544}^{N}$ | $S_{3023,626}^{N}$ | $S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ | $S_{3041,1298}^{D}$ | $S_{3347,2937}^{D}$ | $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$ | $S_{4217,1156}^{M}$ | $S_{3299,1400}^{M}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| BIC(max) | 0.5273 | 0.5293 | 0.5313 | 0.5371 | 0.5273 | 0.5254 | 0.5254 | 0.5313 | 0.5449 |
| BIC(min) | 0.4648 | 0.4629 | 0.4707 | 0.4707 | 0.4844 | 0.4746 | 0.4688 | 0.4766 | 0.4727 |



Figure 3: BIC matrix plot for $S_{1667,351}^{N}, S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ and $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$

### 4.5 Algebraic Complexity(AC)

The resistance of an S-box against algebraic attacks is measured by computing its linear polynomial. The AC of an S-box is the number of non-zero terms in its linear polynomial. The greater is the AC, the greater is the security of the S-box against algebraic attacks. The AC of the newly generated S-boxes is computed, and is presented in Table 7 The minimum, and maximum values of AC of the newly generated S-boxes are 253 , and 255 , respectively, which are very close to
the optimal value 255 . Thus, the proposed method is able to generate S -boxes with good AC based on a MEC.

Table 7: The AC of the newly generated S-boxes

| S-boxes | $S_{1667,351}^{N}$ | $S_{1949,544}^{N}$ | $S_{3023,626}^{N}$ | $S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ | $S_{3041,1298}^{D}$ | $S_{3347,2937}^{D}$ | $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$ | $S_{2517,1156}^{M}$ | $S_{3299,1400}^{M}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| AC | 254 | 254 | 255 | 255 | 254 | 255 | 253 | 253 | 255 |

## 5 Comparison and Discussion

A detailed comparison of the proposed S-box construction method is performed in this section.

### 5.1 Time and Space Complexity

It is always desirable to have algorithms with low time and space complexity from implementation point of view. The time and space complexity of the proposed method and other S-box generation methods 12 , 13 based on ECs are compared in Table 8 . Note that each method in [12, 13] has quadratic time complexity, while the proposed method takes linear time in the underlying prime $p$ for the generation of an S-box. However, the space complexity of the methods in [12, 13] is $\mathcal{O}(p)$, where $p$ is the underlying prime, while it is constant for the proposed method. Hence, the newly developed method is more suitable for the implementation when compared to all existing S-box generation methods over EC.

Table 8: Comparison of time and space complexity of the proposed method with other methods over ECs

| S-box | Ref. [12] | Ref. [13] | Proposed method |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Time complexity | $\mathcal{O}\left(p^{2}\right)$ | $\mathcal{O}\left(p^{2}\right)$ | $\mathcal{O}(p)$ |
| Space complexity | $\mathcal{O}(p)$ | $\mathcal{O}(p)$ | $\mathcal{O}(1)$ |

### 5.2 Generation Efficiency

For a good dynamic S-box construction scheme, it is necessary to ensure the generation of S-box for each valid input parameters, and construct enough number of distinct S-boxes. It is evident from Theorem 1 that the proposed method always generate an S-box for each input, while the output of the methods in 12, 13 are uncertain i.e., they do not guarantee the construction of S-boxes for each input. This implies that the proposed method is better than the other existing schemes over ECs.

The proposed method can generate at most $p-1$ number of distinct Sboxes for a given prime $p$ and ordering, since for each $b \in[1, p-1]$ it can generate exactly one S-box. We generated all S-boxes by the proposed method
for different primes $p=257,263,269,281,293,1013,1019,1031,1049,1061$ and 1997 and each ordering developed in this paper. The number of distinct S-boxes for each ordering is same for all the primes and is listed in listed in Table 9 It is evident from Table 9 that the number of distinct $S$-boxes generated by proposed S-box design scheme attains the optimal value and increases with the increase in the size of the prime. Hence, one can generate the desired number of distinct S-boxes by using the proposed method on a appropriate prime.

Table 9: The number of distinct S-boxes constructed by the proposed scheme for some primes

| $p$ | 257 | 263 | 269 | 281 | 293 | 1013 | 1019 | 1031 | 1049, | 1061 | 1997 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Distinct S-boxes | 256 | 262 | 268 | 280 | 292 | 1012 | 1018 | 1030 | 1048 | 1060 | 1996 |

### 5.3 Cryptographic Properties

The cryptographic properties of some of the S-boxes constructed by the proposed method are compared with some of the well-known existing S-boxes due to [11, 10, 29, 32, 16, 18, 14, 7, 9, 4, 34, generated by different mathematical structures. The properties of the S-boxes used in this comparison are listed in Table 10 Note that the non-linearity (NL) of the S-boxes $S_{1667,351}^{N}, S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ and $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$ is greater than that of the S-boxes in [11, 10, 12, 18, 9, 4, 4, 34, and hence the newly generated $S$-boxes create better confusion in the data when compared to the later S-boxes. This implies that the proposed technique is capable of generating S-boxes with good NL when compared to some of the other existing techniques. Moreover, the linear approximation probability (LAP) of the newly generated S-boxes is better than the LAP of the S-boxes in [11, 10, 29, 9, 4, 34, while their differential approximation probability (DAP) is at most the DAP of the S-boxes in 11, 10, 29, 12, 18, 9, 4, 34. Thus, the Sboxes generated by the proposed technique have same or better security against approximation attacks as compared to the other S-boxes. Similarly, the SAC, BIC and AC test results of the newly generated S-boxes are comparable with the S-boxes listed in Table 10. Hence, the proposed S-box generation technique based on a MEC is capable of generating S-boxes with cryptographic properties comparable with some of the existing S-box construction techniques based on different mathematical structures.

Table 10: Comparison of the newly generated S-boxes with some of the existing S-boxes

| S-boxes | NL | LAP | DAP | SAC(Max) | SAC(Min) | BIC(Max) | BIC(Min) | AC |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Ref. 11 | 103 | 0.1328 | 0.0391 | 0.5703 | 0.4414 | 0.5039 | 0.4961 | 255 |
| Ref. 10 | 102 | 0.1484 | 0.0391 | 0.6094 | 0.375 | 0.5215 | 0.4707 | 254 |
| Ref. 29 | 106 | 0.1406 | 0.0391 | 0.5938 | 0.4375 | 0.5313 | 0.4648 | 251 |
| Ref. 12 | 104 | 0.0391 | 0.0391 | 0.625 | 0.3906 | 0.53125 | 0.4707 | 255 |
| Ref. 18 | 104 | 0.109 | 0.0469 | 0.593 | 0.39 | 0.499 | 0.454 | 255 |
| Ref. 7 | 112 | 0.062 | 0.0156 | 0.562 | 0.453 | 0.504 | 0.480 | 9 |
| Ref. 9 | 74 | 0.2109 | 0.0547 | 0.6875 | 0.1094 | 0.5508 | 0.4023 | 253 |
| Ref. 4] | 100 | 0.1328 | 0.0547 | 0.6094 | 0.4219 | 0.5313 | 0.4746 | 255 |
| Ref. 34 | 103 | 0.1328 | 0.0391 | 0.5703 | 0.3984 | 0.5352 | 0.4727 | 255 |
| $S_{1667,351}^{N}$ | 106 | 0.1328 | 0.0391 | 0.5938 | 0.4531 | 0.5273 | 0.4648 | 254 |
| $S_{3229,1451}^{D}$ | 106 | 0.1484 | 0.0391 | 0.6406 | 0.4063 | 0.5371 | 0.4707 | 255 |
| $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$ | 106 | 0.1328 | 0.0391 | 0.5938 | 0.375 | 0.5254 | 0.4688 | 253 |

## 6 Conclusion

In this article, we presented an S-box design scheme based on $y$-coordinates of a finite Mordell elliptic curve (MEC), where prime is congruent to 2 modulo 3. The technique uses some special type of total orders on the points of the MEC, and generates an S-box. The main advantages of the proposed method are that it has linear time complexity, constant space complexity and generate an S-box for each input parameter which are not possible in all existing S-box generation schemes over elliptic curves. Several standard security tests are performed on the S-boxes generated by the proposed method to analyze its cryptographic efficiency. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme can generate cryptographically strong S-boxes. Furthermore, it is shown by computational results that the cryptographic properties of the newly generated S-boxes are comparable with some of the well-known existing S-boxes generated by different mathematical structures.

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## 7 Appendix: S-boxes generated by proposed method

Table 11: The S-box $S_{1667,351}^{N}$ generated by the proposed method based on the natural ordering

| 154 | 217 | 227 | 110 | 85 | 29 | 199 | 37 | 68 | 21 | 91 | 78 | 208 | 3 | 148 | 40 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 198 | 52 | 54 | 2 | 73 | 7 | 168 | 201 | 229 | 184 | 146 | 6 | 172 | 28 | 44 | 67 |
| 195 | 53 | 106 | 10 | 204 | 131 | 157 | 185 | 187 | 156 | 206 | 161 | 81 | 103 | 211 | 33 |
| 96 | 159 | 72 | 134 | 164 | 143 | 140 | 193 | 145 | 231 | 237 | 12 | 221 | 188 | 197 | 116 |
| 47 | 19 | 129 | 104 | 51 | 236 | 56 | 133 | 55 | 220 | 87 | 1 | 203 | 117 | 210 | 24 |
| 4 | 174 | 175 | 113 | 34 | 213 | 171 | 255 | 30 | 43 | 130 | 191 | 57 | 137 | 76 | 234 |
| 247 | 244 | 173 | 223 | 63 | 60 | 230 | 166 | 8 | 190 | 139 | 99 | 49 | 200 | 23 | 245 |
| 58 | 102 | 226 | 83 | 122 | 70 | 241 | 94 | 127 | 41 | 194 | 233 | 97 | 251 | 107 | 26 |
| 109 | 61 | 248 | 90 | 192 | 167 | 147 | 82 | 158 | 225 | 36 | 50 | 84 | 92 | 88 | 38 |
| 74 | 136 | 138 | 232 | 62 | 176 | 128 | 189 | 124 | 118 | 169 | 14 | 228 | 0 | 243 | 181 |
| 123 | 254 | 20 | 202 | 75 | 149 | 219 | 120 | 160 | 9 | 253 | 39 | 180 | 207 | 114 | 142 |
| 183 | 93 | 101 | 15 | 238 | 177 | 132 | 212 | 35 | 250 | 239 | 249 | 179 | 17 | 65 | 186 |
| 11 | 125 | 178 | 45 | 170 | 141 | 121 | 126 | 119 | 64 | 144 | 182 | 112 | 22 | 165 | 222 |
| 100 | 69 | 252 | 216 | 13 | 27 | 152 | 235 | 80 | 5 | 196 | 59 | 25 | 151 | 79 | 155 |
| 240 | 77 | 115 | 71 | 31 | 105 | 95 | 86 | 209 | 150 | 98 | 89 | 163 | 246 | 66 | 18 |
| 162 | 214 | 218 | 42 | 242 | 46 | 111 | 48 | 215 | 224 | 135 | 108 | 153 | 32 | 16 | 205 |

Table 12: The S-box $S_{3299,1451}^{D}$ generated by the proposed method based on the diffusion ordering

| 33 | 151 | 65 | 207 | 12 | 103 | 96 | 123 | 190 | 126 | 82 | 155 | 21 | 1 | 229 | 186 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 61 | 224 | 42 | 179 | 63 | 178 | 73 | 153 | 138 | 168 | 146 | 41 | 46 | 9 | 109 | 184 |
| 124 | 243 | 236 | 57 | 19 | 6 | 100 | 94 | 69 | 48 | 116 | 216 | 54 | 228 | 90 | 81 |
| 47 | 13 | 88 | 197 | 247 | 129 | 206 | 198 | 221 | 5 | 78 | 80 | 150 | 200 | 145 | 55 |
| 60 | 105 | 212 | 18 | 210 | 43 | 137 | 250 | 135 | 166 | 52 | 115 | 91 | 208 | 25 | 199 |
| 77 | 170 | 121 | 122 | 11 | 254 | 27 | 157 | 175 | 34 | 104 | 201 | 95 | 222 | 133 | 176 |
| 36 | 3 | 141 | 218 | 30 | 162 | 220 | 193 | 28 | 110 | 223 | 161 | 74 | 182 | 226 | 113 |
| 0 | 112 | 234 | 144 | 241 | 20 | 156 | 62 | 49 | 23 | 26 | 35 | 148 | 101 | 233 | 56 |
| 181 | 130 | 118 | 149 | 70 | 173 | 71 | 45 | 50 | 204 | 10 | 87 | 232 | 93 | 177 | 67 |
| 4 | 120 | 8 | 40 | 72 | 125 | 92 | 114 | 68 | 83 | 225 | 246 | 158 | 143 | 53 | 196 |
| 249 | 242 | 136 | 195 | 160 | 213 | 131 | 107 | 66 | 29 | 230 | 188 | 38 | 111 | 205 | 253 |
| 171 | 251 | 102 | 235 | 31 | 127 | 217 | 17 | 183 | 117 | 37 | 211 | 164 | 97 | 119 | 219 |
| 167 | 134 | 24 | 16 | 255 | 2 | 32 | 215 | 227 | 154 | 187 | 75 | 231 | 240 | 172 | 142 |
| 244 | 89 | 14 | 98 | 76 | 85 | 147 | 79 | 64 | 180 | 214 | 139 | 152 | 238 | 51 | 185 |
| 22 | 44 | 194 | 99 | 39 | 169 | 203 | 189 | 108 | 86 | 132 | 237 | 163 | 239 | 209 | 245 |
| 59 | 202 | 15 | 58 | 248 | 128 | 174 | 140 | 192 | 191 | 106 | 165 | 159 | 84 | 7 | 252 |

Table 13: The S-box $S_{4229,2422}^{M}$ generated by using the proposed method based on the modulo diffusion ordering

| 15 | 13 | 247 | 249 | 167 | 183 | 179 | 173 | 101 | 204 | 105 | 210 | 214 | 205 | 199 | 19 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 164 | 38 | 85 | 72 | 98 | 90 | 113 | 12 | 239 | 217 | 165 | 228 | 123 | 195 | 26 | 216 |
| 207 | 30 | 182 | 219 | 14 | 215 | 232 | 135 | 241 | 145 | 17 | 244 | 223 | 114 | 29 | 70 |
| 104 | 81 | 71 | 99 | 191 | 128 | 227 | 86 | 172 | 185 | 5 | 75 | 197 | 184 | 109 | 248 |
| 162 | 250 | 25 | 110 | 125 | 230 | 129 | 35 | 102 | 234 | 54 | 171 | 194 | 16 | 33 | 73 |
| 155 | 246 | 154 | 84 | 149 | 134 | 238 | 18 | 240 | 67 | 200 | 253 | 61 | 31 | 170 | 180 |
| 55 | 20 | 224 | 187 | 10 | 147 | 92 | 133 | 196 | 242 | 146 | 27 | 34 | 140 | 28 | 192 |
| 63 | 127 | 143 | 203 | 137 | 2 | 74 | 193 | 65 | 4 | 124 | 51 | 107 | 24 | 42 | 122 |
| 103 | 22 | 41 | 226 | 235 | 252 | 116 | 212 | 77 | 49 | 48 | 201 | 148 | 221 | 251 | 80 |
| 229 | 115 | 93 | 139 | 181 | 52 | 97 | 119 | 189 | 166 | 21 | 45 | 53 | 100 | 32 | 131 |
| 112 | 94 | 59 | 142 | 117 | 36 | 153 | 254 | 66 | 158 | 79 | 121 | 8 | 130 | 132 | 60 |
| 245 | 231 | 126 | 152 | 151 | 89 | 0 | 39 | 160 | 136 | 37 | 78 | 236 | 56 | 206 | 157 |
| 222 | 174 | 82 | 69 | 6 | 83 | 220 | 3 | 57 | 111 | 208 | 47 | 141 | 87 | 168 | 176 |
| 11 | 118 | 169 | 58 | 243 | 120 | 150 | 91 | 190 | 23 | 178 | 44 | 7 | 43 | 177 | 76 |
| 161 | 144 | 163 | 68 | 88 | 138 | 218 | 108 | 159 | 186 | 40 | 237 | 175 | 46 | 198 | 96 |
| 202 | 9 | 62 | 50 | 64 | 233 | 255 | 209 | 188 | 1 | 106 | 225 | 95 | 213 | 156 | 211 |

