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JACIII Vol.19 No.4 pp. 514-522
doi: 10.20965/jaciii.2015.p0514
(2015)

Paper:

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Complex Multi-Issue Negotiation Using Utility Hyper-Graphs

Rafik Hadfi and Takayuki Ito

Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Nagoya Institute of Technology
Gokiso, Showa-ku, Nagoya 466-8555, Japan

Received:
September 27, 2014
Accepted:
April 10, 2015
Published:
July 20, 2015
Creative Commons License
Keywords:
multi-agent systems, multi-issue negotiation, nonlinear utility spaces, hyper-graph, max-sum
Abstract
We propose to handle the complexity of utility spaces used in multi-issue negotiation by adopting a new representation that allows a modular decomposition of the issues and the constraints. This is based on the idea that a constraint-based utility space is nonlinear with respect to issues, but linear with respect to the constraints. This allows us to rigorously map the utility space into an issue-constraint hyper-graph. Exploring the utility space reduces then to a message passing mechanism along the hyper-edges of the hyper-graph by means of utility propagation. Optimal contracts are found efficiently using a variation of the Max-Sum algorithm. We evaluate the model experimentally using parameterized nonlinear utility spaces, showing that it can handle a large family of complex utility spaces by finding optimal contracts, outperforming previous sampling-based approaches. We also evaluate the model in a negotiation setting. We show that under high complexity, social welfare could be greater than the sum of the individual agents’ best utilities.
Cite this article as:
R. Hadfi and T. Ito, “Complex Multi-Issue Negotiation Using Utility Hyper-Graphs,” J. Adv. Comput. Intell. Intell. Inform., Vol.19 No.4, pp. 514-522, 2015.
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