

A Cryptographic Moving-Knife Cake-Cutting Protocol with High Social Surplus

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Abstract: This paper proposes a cake-cutting protocol using cryptography when the cake is a heterogeneous good that is represented by an interval on a real line. Although the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol with one knife achieves simple fairness and truthfulness, all players must execute the protocol synchronously. Thus, the protocol cannot be executed on asynchronous networks such as the Internet. We show that the moving-knife protocol can be executed approximately but asynchronously by a discrete protocol using a secure auction protocol. The number of cuts is $n - 1$ where n is the number of players, which is the minimum. Sgall and Woeginger proposed another asynchronous protocol that satisfies simple fairness, truthfulness, and the minimum number of cuts. These two protocols are compared from the viewpoint of social surplus. The simulation result shows that the cryptographic moving-knife protocol is better than the Sgall-Woeginger protocol.

Keywords: game-theory, cake-cutting, moving-knife, secure auction, social surplus

1. Introduction

Cake-cutting is an old problem in game theory [2], [16], [18]. It can be employed for such purposes as dividing territory of a conquered island or assigning jobs to members of a group.

This paper discusses achieving a moving-knife protocol using cryptography in cake-cutting when the cake is a heterogeneous good that is represented by an interval, $[0, 1]$, on a real line.

The moving-knife protocol is a common technique for achieving fair cake-cutting. The trusted third party (TTP) or one of the players moves a knife on the cake. Every player watches the movement and calls ‘stop’ when the knife comes to some specific point that is desirable for the player. Cake is cut at the points the calls are made. Many protocols that use one or more knives were shown to achieve some desirable property such as exact division [2].

The simplest moving-knife protocol using one knife was proposed by Dubins and Spanier [6]. The protocol achieves simple fairness and it is truthful.

Moving-knife protocols have several disadvantages. First, all players must watch the knife movement simultaneously, thus moving-knife protocols cannot be executed on networks such as the Internet, in which transmission delays cannot be avoided. In addition, moving knives means cutting the cake at an infinite number of places, thus it is considered to be inefficient.

Many discrete protocols have been proposed that achieve simple fairness [9], [12], [19], [21], [22]. Several different models were proposed that concern the allowed types of primitives. The

simplest model is just minimizing the number of cuts. Then, the Robertson-Webb model was proposed [18]. In the model, ‘cut’ and ‘eval’ operations are allowed. The complexity of the protocol is given by the total number of these two operations.

However, the cake-cutting problem when applied to the simplest model has not yet been completely solved. Discrete versions of the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol considered in Refs. [8], [21] are not truthful.

Sgall and Woeginger [20] proposed an asynchronous protocol that satisfies simple fairness, truthfulness, and the minimum number of cuts. Its assignment result differs from the one of Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol. Sgall-Woeginger protocol is static, that is, every player must decide all of its evaluations in advance. On the other hand, Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol is dynamic, that is, every player evaluates the currently remaining piece of cake in each round of the protocol. How the assignment results of these static and dynamic protocols differ is important when these protocols are applied to real world problems.

Cryptography is not commonly used in cake-cutting protocols. A commitment protocol [3] is used in meta-envy-free cake-cutting protocols [14] for multiple parties to declare simultaneously their respective private values. Complicated cryptographic protocols have not been used for cake-cutting protocols so far.

1.1 Our Result

We show a cryptographic cake-cutting protocol that achieves approximate simple fairness with the minimum number of cuts. We use a secure auction protocol that calculates the maximum bid and the winning player while hiding the bid of each player. The protocol output is approximately the same as that of Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol. The protocol achieves approxi-

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mate simple fairness and it is truthful. Sgall-Woeginger protocol achieves simple fairness, truthfulness, and the minimum number of cuts. We compare these two protocols in the viewpoint of social surplus. Through a simulation, we show that the social surplus of cryptographic moving-knife protocol is better than that of Sgall-Woeginger protocol. Since the cryptographic moving-knife protocol is dynamic, each player can obtain more utility than static Sgall-Woeginger protocol. Thus, the former protocol is superior than the latter one.

2. Preliminaries

Throughout the paper, the cake is a heterogeneous good that is represented by interval $[0, 1]$ on a real line. Each player P_i has a utility function, μ_i , that has the following three properties.

- (1) For any interval $X \subseteq [0, 1]$ whose size is not empty, $\mu_i(X) > 0$.
- (2) For any X_1 and X_2 such that $X_1 \cap X_2 = \emptyset$, $\mu_i(X_1 \cup X_2) = \mu_i(X_1) + \mu_i(X_2)$.
- (3) $\mu_i([0, 1]) = 1$.

The tuple of the utility function of $P_i (i = 1, \dots, n)$ is denoted as (μ_1, \dots, μ_n) . Utility functions might differ among players. No player has knowledge of the utility of the other players.

An n -player cake-cutting protocol, f , assigns several portions of $[0, 1]$ to the players such that every portion of $[0, 1]$ is assigned to one player. We denote $f_i(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n)$ as the set of portions assigned to player P_i by f , when the tuple of the utility function is (μ_1, \dots, μ_n) .

All players are risk-averse, namely they avoid gambling. They try to maximize the worst case utility they can obtain.

A desirable property for cake-cutting protocols is truthfulness. A protocol is truthful if there is no incentive for any player to lie about his utility function. If a player obtains more utility by declaring a false value, the protocol is not robust. For example, consider the simplest cake-cutting protocol ‘divide-and-choose.’ In this protocol, Divider first cuts the cake into two pieces $[0, x]$ and $[x, 1]$, such that $\mu([0, x]) = \mu([x, 1]) = 1/2$ for Divider. Chooser selects the piece she prefers. Divider obtains the remaining piece. Since the utility function of Divider is unknown to Chooser, Divider can lie about his utility function and cut the cake as $[0, x']$ and $[x', 1]$, for any $x' (\neq x)$. In this case, Chooser might select the piece such that the utility for Divider is more than half and Divider might obtain less than half. Thus, the risk-averse Divider obeys the rule of the protocol and cuts the cake in half. ‘Divide-and-choose’ is thus truthful for risk-averse players.

Several desirable properties of cake-cutting protocols have been defined [18]. Simple fairness, which is the most fundamental one, is defined as follows.

For any i , $\mu_i(f_i(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n)) \geq 1/n$.

This paper discusses simple fair cake-cutting protocols. One of the other types of the desirable property is the social surplus, that is, the total utilities the players obtain. For two protocol f and f' which has the same properties (for example, both truthful and simple fair), f is better than f' in the sense of social surplus if $\sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i(f_i(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n)) > \sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i(f'_i(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n))$.

Several kinds of complexity models of discrete cake-cutting problems are defined. The simplest model is that the complexity

is the total number of cuts. This model is further divided into two categories.

- Cut-and-calculate model: Any operation that uses the utility function of each player is possible other than cutting.
- Cut-only model: No operation other than cutting is allowed. Thus, the utility of player P_i can be known only by P_i performing a cut.

Another model called the Robertson-Webb model [18] is introduced. The operations are restricted to the following two types in the model.

- $Cut_i(I, \alpha)$: Player P_i cuts interval $I = [x_1, x_2]$ such that $\mu_i([x_1, y]) = \alpha \mu_i(I)$, where $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$.
- $Eval_i(I)$: Player P_i evaluates interval $I = [x_1, x_2]$, which is one of the cuts previously performed using the protocol. P_i returns $\mu_i(I)$.

The complexity of the Robertson-Webb model is defined as follows.

- Robertson-Webb cut-complexity model: The complexity is measured by the number of cuts. That is, evaluation queries can be issued for free.
- Robertson-Webb cut-and-query-complexity model: The complexity is measured by the total number of cuts and queries.

For the cut-and-calculate model, the minimum number of cuts for simple fair division is $n - 1$, where n is the number of players. For the cut-only model, when the number of players is $n = 3$, the minimum number of cuts for simple fair division is three [18]. When $n = 4$, the minimum number of cuts is four [9]. For a general number of players, the Divide and Conquer protocol [9] achieves $1 + nk - 2^k$ cuts, where $k = \lfloor \log_2 n \rfloor$ [17]. The lower bound of the cut-only model is $\Omega(n \log n)$ [4].

For the Robertson-Webb cut-and-query-complexity model, the lower bound is $\Omega(n \log n)$ [20]. Edmonds and Pruhs extended the $\Omega(n \log n)$ lower bound to the cases when a player obtains a union of intervals and approximate fairness is achieved [7].

This paper considers the simplest cut-and-calculate model.

3. Dubins-Spanier Moving-knife Protocol

This section outlines the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol [6] shown in Fig. 1.

When the number of remaining players is k and the remaining

- 1: **begin**
- 2: Let $k \leftarrow n$ and $x \leftarrow 1$.
- 3: **repeat**
- 4: The TTP moves the knife from x toward 0. Let y be the current position of the knife.
- 5: Player P_i calls ‘stop’ if $\mu_i([y, x]) = \mu_i([0, x])/k$.
- 6: The TTP immediately stops moving the knife when ‘stop’ is called. Let x' be the point of the knife when ‘stop’ is called.
- 7: The TTP cuts the cake at x' . The player who said ‘stop’ obtains the piece $[x', x]$ and exits the protocol.
- 8: Let $k \leftarrow k - 1$ and $x \leftarrow x'$.
- 9: **until** $k = 1$
- 10: The remaining player obtains the rest of the cake $([0, x])$.
- 11: **end**.

Fig. 1 Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol.

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1: begin
2: Let  $k \leftarrow n$  and  $x \leftarrow 1$ .
3: repeat
4:   Each player  $P_i$  declares point  $x_i$  such that  $\mu_i([x_i, x]) = \mu_i([0, x])/k$ .
5:   Let  $x'$  be the maximum of  $x_i$ s. Let  $P_i$  be the player who called  $x'$ .
6:    $P_i$  obtains piece  $[x', x]$  and exits the protocol.
7:   Let  $k \leftarrow k - 1$  and  $x \leftarrow x'$ .
8: until  $k = 1$ 
9: The remaining player obtains the rest of the cake  $([0, x])$ .
10: end.

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Fig. 2 Endriss protocol.

cake is $[0, x]$, each remaining player P_i calls ‘stop’ if the knife comes to point y which satisfies $\mu_i([y, x]) = \mu_i([0, x])/k$, that is, the value of piece $[y, x]$ is $1/k$ of the remaining cake. The first player who calls ‘stop’ obtains piece $[y, x]$ and exits the protocol. The remaining players continue the same procedure for the remaining cake $[0, y]$.

Each player obtains at least $1/n$ based on the utility function of the player, thus simple fairness is achieved.

In addition, the protocol is truthful for risk-averse players. Consider the case when player P_i tells a lie. Assume that the number of current remaining players is k . Let the remaining players be $P_i, P_{i+1}, \dots, P_{i+k-1}$ and the remaining cake be $[0, x]$. The actual place that P_i to call ‘stop’ is x_i , that is, $\mu_i([x_i, x]) = \mu_i([0, x])/k$.

If P_i calls ‘stop’ earlier than x_i , P_i obtains less than $\mu_i([0, x])/k$ and the result is worse than telling the truth.

If P_i does not call ‘stop’ even if the knife comes to x_i , player P_{i+1} might call ‘stop’ at $x_i - \epsilon$. The remaining piece is $[0, x_i - \epsilon]$ and $\mu_i([0, x_i - \epsilon]) < (k - 1)\mu_i([0, x])/k$. Let $x_{i+1} = x_i - \epsilon$. After that, player $P_j (j = i + 2, i + 3, \dots, i + k - 1)$ calls ‘stop’ at point x_j such that $\mu_i([x_j, x_{j-1}]) = \mu_i([0, x])/k$. If P_i calls ‘stop’ before $x_j (j > i + 1)$, P_i obtains less than $\mu_i([0, x])/k$. If P_i does not call ‘stop’ and obtains the last remaining piece $[0, x_{i+k-1}]$, the utility of P_i , $\mu_i([0, x_{i+k-1}])$, is less than $\mu_i([0, x])/k$. Therefore, not calling ‘stop’ at the true point can be worse than telling the truth.

Note that the moving-knife protocol is not a discrete protocol. A protocol is presented by Endriss [8] shown in Fig. 2 that makes the protocol discrete.

It seems that this protocol is the same as the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol, but it is actually not. In this protocol, all players know the cut point of the other players. The cut point information can offer a hint to a player and the player can obtain more utility by behaving dishonestly. Suppose that $n = 3$ and the density functions for the utility of the players are as follows.

$$u_1(z) = \begin{cases} 4/5 & 0 \leq z \leq 5/6 \\ 2 & 5/6 < z \leq 1 \end{cases}$$

$$u_2(z) = 1(0 \leq z \leq 1),$$

$$u_3(z) = \begin{cases} 2 & 0 \leq z \leq 1/3 \\ 1/2 & 1/3 < z \leq 1 \end{cases}$$

The utility of P_i for $[x, y]$, $\mu_i([x, y])$, is calculated by $\int_x^y u_i(z)dz$. Since $\int_0^1 u_i(z)dz = 1 (i = 1, 2, 3)$, these density functions satisfy the conditions of the utility functions.

At the first round, each player declares $c_1 = 5/6$, $c_2 = 2/3$,

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1: begin
2: Each player,  $P_i$ , simultaneously declares  $n - 1$  points  $x_{i,j} (1 \leq j \leq n - 1)$  such that  $\mu_i([x_{i,j}, x_{i,j+1}]) = 1/n (0 \leq j \leq n - 1)$  (Note that  $x_{i,0} = 0$  and  $x_{i,n} = 1$ ).
3: Let  $y \leftarrow 0$ .
4: for  $k = 1$  to  $n - 1$  do
5:   begin
6:   Let  $z \leftarrow \min x_{i,k}$ , where the minimum is taken among the remaining players.
7:   Let  $P_j$  be the player who declares  $z$ .
8:    $P_j$  obtains  $[y, z]$  and exits the protocol.
9:   Let  $y \leftarrow z$ .
10:  end
11: The remaining player obtains the rest of the cake  $([y, 1])$ .
12: end.

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Fig. 3 Sgall-Woeginger protocol.

and $c_3 = 1/3$, since $\int_{5/6}^1 u_1(z)dz = 1/3$, $\int_{2/3}^1 u_2(z)dz = 1/3$, and $\int_{1/3}^1 u_3(z)dz = 1/3$. Since $5/6 > 2/3 > 1/3$, P_1 obtains $[5/6, 1]$ and exits the protocol. The next round is performed by P_2 and P_3 with the remaining cake $[0, 5/6]$. The honest declaration, c'_2 , at the next round by P_2 is $5/12$, since $\int_{5/12}^{5/6} u_2(z)dz = 1/2 \int_0^{5/6} u_2(z)dz = 5/12$. Since $\int_{11/48}^{5/6} u_3(z)dz = 1/2 \int_0^{5/6} u_3(z)dz$, P_3 will declare $11/48$ as the cut point c'_3 , for the next round.

Although P_2 cannot know c'_3 in advance, it knows that $c'_3 < c_3$ is satisfied for any utility function. Thus, P_2 can declare a false value $1/3 (= c_3)$, instead of the true value of $5/12$ as c'_2 , if P_2 knows that the declared value by P_3 in previous round is c_3 . When P_2 declares false value $1/3$, P_2 wins in this round and obtains $[1/3, 5/6]$. The utility of P_2 is $1/2$, which is larger than utility $5/12$ when P_2 declares the true cut point, $5/12$.

Thus knowledge of the declared values of other players destroys the truthful characteristic of the protocol. The trimming protocol [21], which also achieves simple fairness by a discrete protocol, has the same problem about truthfulness, since a player might be able to know all other players’ cut points in the previous round.

Sgall and Woeginger [20] showed an asynchronous protocol in which the number of cuts is $n - 1$, shown in Fig. 3.

This protocol achieves simple fairness. When $k = 1$, player P_i who obtains piece $[0, z]$ satisfies $z = x_{i,1}$, thus $\mu_i([0, x_{i,1}]) = 1/n$. Next consider the case $k > 1$. If player P_i obtains $[y, x_{i,k}]$ in the k -th round, P_i could not obtain its piece in the previous round. Thus, $y \leq x_{i,k-1}$ is satisfied for any currently remaining player P_i at line 6 and $\mu_i([y, x_{i,k}]) \geq \mu_i([x_{i,k-1}, x_{i,k}]) = 1/n$.

Since all players declare their cut points simultaneously, no player can know the other players’ cut points in advance. Thus, telling a false value such as in the Endriss protocol is not effective in this protocol. Thus the protocol is truthful.

The difference between the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol and the Sgall-Woeginger protocol is the time when the cut points are declared. The latter protocol is static, that is, every player must decide its cut points in advance. The former protocol is dynamic, that is, each player decides his cut point for currently remaining cake in each round.

4. Cryptographic Moving-knife Protocol

The important characteristics of the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol are that (1) the declaration is done round by round and (2) when a player P calls ‘stop’, no player knows the other remaining players’ cut points because the knife is moving so that the size of the cutting piece increases.

The simplest solution to keep the protocol truthful and make the protocol discrete would be to have a TTP. In each round, every remaining player privately sends its cut point to the TTP. The TTP decides the largest value and the player who gave the maximum value from the cut point information.

However, it might be difficult to have such a TTP. There might be collusion between a player and the TTP. The TTP might send the player cut point information to the colluding player.

In order to address this problem, we introduce a secure auction protocol. Secure auction protocols have been proposed in cryptography theory [1], [13], [15]. They are outlined as follows.

- Player P_i generates its share of public key and secret key, (PK_i, SK_i) of a homomorphic encryption scheme. P_i broadcasts PK_i and the public encryption key PK is calculated by any player from (PK_1, \dots, PK_n) . SK_i is the private key of P_i for decryption. Any player can execute encryption procedure Enc using PK . The ciphertext obtained by executing Enc on plaintext m is $Enc(PK, m)$.

If P_1, \dots, P_n jointly execute decryption procedure Dec with their private keys SK_1, \dots, SK_n , they can decrypt $Enc(PK, m)$ and obtain m . That is, $Dec(Enc(PK, m), SK_1, \dots, SK_n) = m$. Note that the decryption can be performed without revealing the value of SK_i to any other players.

For any set of players whose size is less than n , they cannot decrypt $Enc(PK, m)$ by themselves.

- P_i encrypts his bid b_i using the public key, that is, P_i calculates $c_i = Enc(PK, b_i)$.
- P_1, \dots, P_n jointly calculates $b_{max} = \max(b_1, \dots, b_n)$ and player P_j who bids b_{max} from c_1, \dots, c_n without directly decrypting c_1, \dots, c_n using the homomorphic property.
- During execution of the secure auction protocol, each player gives a zero-knowledge proof [11] that the player acts correctly. The proof can be verified by any other player.

The correctness of the obtained highest bid and the winning player is also given as a zero-knowledge proof. The proof can be verified by any player. That is, no player can deny its bid afterwards.

The details are shown in Refs. [1], [13], [15]. Secure auction protocols use a homomorphic encryption, in which addition of encrypted values can be accomplished without decrypting them. Homomorphic encryption has the following properties.

- There exists polynomial time computable operation \otimes and $^{-1}$ as follows. For any two ciphertext $c_1 = Enc(PK, m_1)$ and $c_2 = Enc(PK, m_2)$, $c_1 \otimes c_2 \in Enc(PK, m_1 + m_2)$. For any ciphertext $c = Enc(PK, m)$, $c^{-1} \in Enc(PK, -m)$.
- The encryption is semantically secure, that is, the advantage

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1: begin
2: Let  $k \leftarrow n$ ,  $x \leftarrow 2^m$ .
3: repeat
4:    $P_i$  decides  $x_i$  such that  $\mu_i([x_i, x]) = \mu_i([0, x])/k$ .
5:    $P_i$  encrypts  $x_i$  and broadcasts it.
6:   All players execute a secure auction protocol together and obtain maximum bid  $x'$  and player  $P$  who bids  $x'$ .
7:    $[x', x]$  is marked as the piece for  $P$  and  $P$  cannot bid any more.
8:   Let  $x \leftarrow x'$ ,  $k \leftarrow k - 1$ .
9: until  $k = 1$ .
10:  $[0, x]$  is marked as the piece for the remaining player and every player obtains his/her piece.
11: end.

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Fig. 4 Cryptographic moving-knife protocol.

of the adversary for the following game is negligible.

The adversary obtains all PK_i 's and all SK_i 's except for some SK_j . First, the adversary can repeatedly obtain $Dec(SK, c)$ for any ciphertext c that it selects. It then outputs two plaintext m_0, m_1 . Challenger randomly selects bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $c = Enc(PK, m_b)$ is given to the adversary. Then the adversary outputs b' . It wins if $b = b'$.

The advantage of the adversary is $Pr[b = b'] - 1/2$.

The first property is calculating sum of two ciphertexts without decrypting them. Using the homomorphic characteristics, it is possible to compare multiple bids without decrypting them, that is, they can obtain $C = Enc(PK, \max(b_1, \dots, b_n))$ from c_1, \dots, c_n . They jointly decrypt C and obtain the maximum bid without knowing each bid. In some secure auction protocol [15], another type of homomorphic encryption scheme is used in which multiplication of two ciphertexts are also possible.

The second property means that no player can obtain information of the plaintext from a given ciphertext if at least one of the secret keys is unknown.

The moving-knife protocol using a secure auction protocol is shown in Fig. 4. In auction protocols, the bids are considered to be an integer. Thus, we convert cake $[0, 1]$ to $[0, 2^m]$ for some large integer m and each player must bid an integer value for the cutting point. Note that m must be large enough such that for any player P_i and any $c \in [0, 1]$, $\mu_i([c \cdot 2^m / 2^m, c])$ is negligible, that is, bidding integer values is not a bad approximation.

The protocol is asynchronous, that is, no two events in this protocol need to be executed simultaneously. The number of cuts is $n - 1$, which is the minimum.

A difference between the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol and this protocol is that no player exits the protocol during the execution. If a player exits, the set of players who execute the secure auction protocol changes in each round. Changing the set of players requires that the keys be re-generated for the secure auction protocol, thus the protocol would be inefficient. Therefore, the set of players is unchanged in this protocol. However, if a player obtains a piece, the player has no incentive to execute the secure auction protocol honestly any more. Thus, in the proposed protocol, the pieces are actually assigned to the players at the end of the protocol. During the execution of the secure auction protocol, each player presents a proof that the player executes the protocol correctly. If a player misbehaves, it is detected by veri-




Fig. 5 Social surplus of the two protocols.

fying the proof and the player does not obtain the piece marked for the player. The assignment at the end of the protocol must also be done without TTP. If this protocol is executed just once, there is no way to prevent a player from misbehaving at the assignment without TTP. If this protocol is executed multiple times or some other protocol will be executed among the same players, there is a record of the proof that a player misbehaved in this execution of the protocol, and the player will be rejected from joining another protocol or another execution of this protocol. If a player wants to not be rejected, the player has an incentive to act correctly. A simple way to prove the misbehavior is that each player generates a digital signature [10] to the document that records the assignment result given by the protocol. Anyone can check the record by the verification of the digital signatures. If some player misbehaves, then anyone can know the fact by the player's obtained cake and the record with digital signatures.

Simple fairness cannot be achieved by the cryptographic moving-knife protocol because each player bids integer values. We define a cake-cutting protocol f that satisfies approximate simple fairness as follows.

For any i , $\mu_i(f_i(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n)) - 1/n$ is negligible if $\mu_i(f_i(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_n)) < 1/n$.

Theorem 1. *The protocol in Fig. 4 is truthful for risk-averse players and approximate simple fair. The number of cuts is minimum.*

Proof. These properties are achieved because the assignment is an approximation of the one of the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol. \square

5. Comparison of Social Surplus

The difference between Sgall-Woeginger protocol and cryptographic moving-knife protocol is whether the cut point declarations are static or dynamic. The difference affects the assignment results. This section compares these two protocols in the viewpoint of social surplus.

In the cryptographic moving-knife protocol, when P_i exits in the first round with obtaining $[x, 1]$, each of the remaining player

P_j obtains at least $\mu_j([0, x])/(n-1)$, which is greater than $1/n$. Since P_j did not win in the first round, $\mu_j([x, 1]) < 1/n$, thus $\mu_j([0, x]) > (n-1)/n$. Therefore, from the second round, the cake is more than $(n-1)/n$ for the remaining players. The other rounds have the same characteristic. If a player exits with a “small” (in the other players' view) portion of the cake, all of the remaining players obtain more utility.

On the other hand, in the Sgall-Woeginger protocol, when a player exits with a “small” portion of the cake, the extra part of the cake is automatically assigned to the next round's winner. For example, P_i wins in the first round and obtains $[0, x]$ and exits, remaining player P_j thinks that the remaining cake is $(n-1)/n + \mu_j([x, x_{j,1}])$, where $\mu_j([0, x_{j,1}]) = 1/n$. In the next round, the player P_k wins whose $x_{k,2}$ is smallest among the remaining players, but the value of the extra part $\mu_k([x, x_{k,1}])$ might not be large among the remaining players.

In the cryptographic moving-knife protocol, next round call is done for all of the remaining cake, thus the extra part (such as $[x, x_{j,1}]$) is also considered by the remaining players. The next round winner is satisfied with a relatively ‘small’ portion of the cake because of the extra part, thus the next round remaining cake can be larger than in the Sgall-Woeginger protocol. Thus, in the view of the social surplus, the cryptographic moving-knife protocol is more desirable than the Sgall-Woeginger protocol.

We verified the above presumption through a computer simulation. In the simulation, a random utility function is generated for each player as follows. The interval $[0, 1]$ is divided into k random intervals $[x_j, x_{j+1}]$ ($j = 0, \dots, k, x_0 = 0, x_{k+1} = 1$). The utility density function u_i for each interval is randomly set between $[0, 1]$. $u_i(x) = r_i$ for $x_i \leq x \leq x_{i+1}$, that is, the utility is uniform for each interval. The utility is normalized such that the total utility $\int_0^1 u_i(x)dx = 1$. Uniform utility function is commonly used in the discussion of cake-cutting protocols [5], [16] and any random function can be approximated by a set of uniform functions if the intervals are small. In this experiment we set $k = 100$ but we obtain similar results for larger and smaller k ($k=10$ and $k=200$). For the same set of players, static protocol

(Sgall-Woeginger protocol) and dynamic protocol (cryptographic moving-knife protocol and Endriss protocol with truthful players) are executed. Note that the assignment result of Endriss protocol is just the same as the one of cryptographic moving-knife protocol when every player is truthful.

For each number of players, 3,000 instances are executed. Social surplus is the sum of utilities each player obtained. Figure 5 shows the average of social surplus of 3,000 time experiments when n , the number of players, is changed from 2 to 10. Note that when $n = 2$ the assignments are the same. The error bar is standard deviation. According to the t-test there is a significant difference between the mean social surplus by the two protocols for each of $n = 3$ to 10 ($P < 0.001$).

Figure 5 shows the social surplus of cryptographic moving-knife protocol is better than that of the Sgall-Woeginger protocol. The difference increases when the number of players increases. The simulation result matches with the above presumption.

6. Conclusion

This paper proposed a cryptographic cake-cutting protocol. The protocol is discrete and truthful. It achieves approximate simple fairness with the minimum number of cuts. Its social surplus is better than the Sgall-Woeginger protocol.

Further study will include the use of cryptography in other cake-cutting protocols.

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