Security Basics for Computer Architects

Synthesis Lectures on Computer Architecture

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ABSTRACT

Design for security is an essential aspect of the design of future computers. However, security is not well understood by the computer architecture community. Many important security aspects have evolved over the last several decades in the cryptography, operating systems, and networking communities. This book attempts to introduce the computer architecture student, researcher, or practitioner to the basic concepts of security and threat-based design. Past work in different security communities can inform our thinking and provide a rich set of technologies for building architectural support for security into all future computers and embedded computing devices and appliances. I have tried to keep the book short, which means that many interesting topics and applications could not be included. What the book focuses on are the fundamental security concepts, across different security communities, that should be understood by any computer architect trying to design or evaluate security-aware computer architectures.

The book is also written to be accessible to a more general audience interested in the basic security technologies that can be used to improve cyber security. By understanding the concepts behind the security terminology, the interested reader would understand more clearly the frequent security breaches being reported in the news and be able to critique or even help propose effective security solutions.

KEYWORDS

Contents

Preface

There are certain security fundamentals that underlie the design of secure systems for computation, storage and transmission of digital information. It is essential to understand these basic concepts and learn the terminology used by the security community. They will inform our design of secure computer architectures. This book attempts to summarize for computer architects some of the most important security basics, usually taught in separate classes on cryptography, operating systems security and network security.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

In Chapter 1, we introduce threat-based design for computer architects, complementing the current performance-based, power-based, area-based and cost-based design approaches. We define the cornerstone security properties of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. We also define fundamental access control, as well as other desirable security properties. We define what we mean by a *security-aware computer*, which we also call a *trustworthy computer*. We also propose a systematic security architecture design methodology.

In Chapters 2 through 6, we introduce the computer architect to important security technology regarding security policies, access control mechanisms, cryptographic techniques and security protocols. A unique aspect of this book is that we give examples of how computer architects have used these security techniques in the design of trustworthy computers.

Chapter 2 describes security policy models for both multi-level and multi-lateral security. This helps the computer architect learn the terminology and understand how to think about security policies for protecting confidentiality or integrity. The use of security policy models enables us to focus on the basic concepts, rather than the myriad other details in real-life security policies.

Chapter 3 describes basic access control, comprising authentication and authorization mechainisms. While these mechanisms have typically been implemented by Operating Systems (OS), they may have to be implemented by trusted hypervisors or hardware, especially when the OS is compromised.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide an introduction to cryptography. This is a highly developed field that provides invaluable cryptographic primitives that the computer architect can use. We describe it as a new way of thinking where instead of restricting access (as in many of the security policy models and access control mechanisms in Chapters 2 and 3), the idea is to allow free access to

cryptographically protected information, except restricting the access to the cryptographic keys that allow making sense of the encrypted material.

Chapter 4 describes symmetric-key ciphers and cryptographic hash algorithms, which can be used to facilitate protection of confidentiality and integrity, respectively, in computer systems.

Chapter 5 describes public-key cryptography, which can be used to provide longer-term digital identities. Digital signatures, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Certificates and Certificate Authorities (CAs) are discussed, as well as the dangers of man-in-the-middle attacks and misunderstanding public-key cryptography.

Chapter 6 presents security protocols, which are used to establish secure communications across the network, and between computers. They can also be used to describe interactions between components within a computer. Security protocols are essential aspects of a security architecture, cutting across its software, hardware and networking components. The use of strong cryptography becomes useless, if the protocols used to interact between the sender and the recipient are not secure.

Chapter 7 summarizes the topics covered, points to some interesting application areas and hardware-related security topics, and the road ahead for designing security-aware architectures.

A reader who just wants to understand the basic security concepts, but not to design a secure computer, can skip the architecture design examples. One who just wants to understand or implement simple cryptographic processing can skip Chapters 2 and 3. However, any computer architect seriously considering designing for security should read the entire book. It describes fundamental security concepts that enable us to converse with the security community and understand how to approach threat-based design.

For expediency, I have often used as examples the architectures we have designed at PALMS (Princeton Architecture Lab for Multimedia and Security, palms.ee.princeton.edu) to illustrate how the security concepts presented in this book can be used in the design of hardware-software security architectures. These examples are very familiar to me and hence easier for me to write about quickly. I also give some examples of other designs and extensive lists of references to related work in some areas. A subsequent book will discuss specific new security research topics for computer architects. The goal of this book is to condense the vast amount of security basics into a short tutorial. Hence, the topics I have chosen are fundamental ones for understanding some of the dimensions and nuances of security, and can inform new work in the design of security-aware systems.

Computer architects used to building systems must now also learn to think about how systems can be broken or exploited by attackers. We need to learn how to design proactively to thwart such malicious acts. The basic security concepts described in these chapters provide us with a rich starting set of ideas and techniques for thinking about the design of new hardware-software security architectures.