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A complete and consistent modal set theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Frederic B. Fitch
Frederic B. Fitch*
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Extract

1.1. The aim of this paper is the construction of a demonstrably consistent system of set theory that (1) contains roughly the same amount of mathematics as the writer's system K′ [3], including a theory of continuous functions of real numbers, and (2) provides a way for expressing in the object language various propositions which, in the case of K′, could be expressed only in the metalanguage, for example, general propositions about all real numbers. It was not originally intended that the desired system should be a modal logic, but the modal character of the system appears to be a natural outgrowth of the way it is constructed. A detailed treatment of the natural, rational, and real numbers is left for a subsequent paper.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , June 1967 , pp. 93 - 103
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1967

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References

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