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We introduce the first near-optimal polynomial algorithm for obtaining the mixed safety level value of an initially unknown multi-stage game, played in a hostile environment, under imperfect monitoring. In an imperfect monitoring setting all that an agent can observe is the current state and its own actions and payoffs, but it can not observe other agents' actions. Our result holds for any multi-stage generic game with a “reset” action.
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