As a guest user you are not logged in or recognized by your IP address. You have
access to the Front Matter, Abstracts, Author Index, Subject Index and the full
text of Open Access publications.
Recently Bai and Lagunoff [1] have studied the question of Faustian Dynamics (FD) of policy and political power using a formal game theoretic framework. Specifically, they studied the conflict between implementing a (personally) optimal policy and maintaining political power. However, these works assumed that the policy makers come from the same population that empowers them. In contrast, in this paper we study a society that has a political class, hence policy makers are detached from the general population. Specifically, we study a society where members of the political class compete via pre-election propaganda campaigns – a competition form characteristic to modern democracies. We assume that the society is characterised by an inherent cyclical Faustian dynamics, such as the Sarkar Cycle, and concentrate on the strategic behaviour of the political class members. We show that their propaganda over time tends to become extreme (single issue oriented). In addition, the equilibrium behaviour of the political class members precludes them from adopting a persistent agenda. Rather, to optimise their political gain over time, they must lack any permanent agenda or views.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.
This website uses cookies
We use cookies to provide you with the best possible experience. They also allow us to analyze user behavior in order to constantly improve the website for you. Info about the privacy policy of IOS Press.