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Optimal Strategy in Queueing Systems in Emergency Department

Optimal Strategy in Queueing Systems in Emergency Department

Zeng Hui, Tian Ruiling, Liu Yupeng, Hou Yumei
Copyright: © 2018 |Volume: 13 |Issue: 1 |Pages: 12
ISSN: 1554-1045|EISSN: 1554-1053|EISBN13: 9781522542940|DOI: 10.4018/IJITWE.2018010105
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MLA

Hui, Zeng, et al. "Optimal Strategy in Queueing Systems in Emergency Department." IJITWE vol.13, no.1 2018: pp.69-80. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJITWE.2018010105

APA

Hui, Z., Ruiling, T., Yupeng, L., & Yumei, H. (2018). Optimal Strategy in Queueing Systems in Emergency Department. International Journal of Information Technology and Web Engineering (IJITWE), 13(1), 69-80. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJITWE.2018010105

Chicago

Hui, Zeng, et al. "Optimal Strategy in Queueing Systems in Emergency Department," International Journal of Information Technology and Web Engineering (IJITWE) 13, no.1: 69-80. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJITWE.2018010105

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Abstract

The authors' study a noncooperative game problem for queueing control in emergency department (ED). One of the challenges to emergency department (ED) is the control of the urgent patients and the non-urgent patients. The urgent patient which is the primary customer, can be considered as the service interruption in a queueing system. The service interruptions occur frequently and can incur significant delays for the non-urgent patients. Therefore, a non-urgent patient needs to decide whether to join the queue or leave. The scenario is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing game with server interruption where each patient wants to optimize his benefit. It is shown that the individually optimal strategy for joining the queue is characterized by a threshold of queue length. The socially optimal threshold of queue length is also obtained. To bridge the gap between the individually and socially optimal strategies, a pricing mechanism is proposed to toll the service of each non-urgent patient, thus equalizing the two optimal strategies.

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