The Problem of Time's Passage: Using Historical Arguments to Inform the Debate

The Problem of Time's Passage: Using Historical Arguments to Inform the Debate

Cameron D. Brewer
Copyright: © 2019 |Volume: 10 |Issue: 1 |Pages: 13
ISSN: 1947-3451|EISSN: 1947-346X|EISBN13: 9781522566588|DOI: 10.4018/IJT.2019010103
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MLA

Brewer, Cameron D. "The Problem of Time's Passage: Using Historical Arguments to Inform the Debate." IJT vol.10, no.1 2019: pp.24-36. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJT.2019010103

APA

Brewer, C. D. (2019). The Problem of Time's Passage: Using Historical Arguments to Inform the Debate. International Journal of Technoethics (IJT), 10(1), 24-36. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJT.2019010103

Chicago

Brewer, Cameron D. "The Problem of Time's Passage: Using Historical Arguments to Inform the Debate," International Journal of Technoethics (IJT) 10, no.1: 24-36. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJT.2019010103

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Abstract

While the B-theory of time seems to fit with the current physical theory, it also seems to require treating temporal passage as an illusion. The aim of this article is to show that by understanding cases of apparent motion in a particular way, one can maintain the B-theory while also retaining the privileged status that the phenomenon of temporal passage plays in human experience. However, to understand these cases correctly, one should turn to arguments in the history of philosophy. More specifically, arguments from Russell, Kant and Hume can be used to make the B-theory more plausible.

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