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Usurping Double-Ending Fraud in Real Estate Transactions via Blockchain Technology

Usurping Double-Ending Fraud in Real Estate Transactions via Blockchain Technology

Atefeh Mashatan, Victoria Lemieux, Seung Hwan (Mark) Lee, Przemysław Szufel, Zachary Roberts
Copyright: © 2021 |Volume: 32 |Issue: 1 |Pages: 22
ISSN: 1063-8016|EISSN: 1533-8010|EISBN13: 9781799859086|DOI: 10.4018/JDM.2021010102
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MLA

Mashatan, Atefeh, et al. "Usurping Double-Ending Fraud in Real Estate Transactions via Blockchain Technology." JDM vol.32, no.1 2021: pp.27-48. http://doi.org/10.4018/JDM.2021010102

APA

Mashatan, A., Lemieux, V., Lee, S. H., Szufel, P., & Roberts, Z. (2021). Usurping Double-Ending Fraud in Real Estate Transactions via Blockchain Technology. Journal of Database Management (JDM), 32(1), 27-48. http://doi.org/10.4018/JDM.2021010102

Chicago

Mashatan, Atefeh, et al. "Usurping Double-Ending Fraud in Real Estate Transactions via Blockchain Technology," Journal of Database Management (JDM) 32, no.1: 27-48. http://doi.org/10.4018/JDM.2021010102

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Abstract

This paper discusses the problem of double-ending fraud in real estate transactions – a type of transactional fraud wherein agents handling real estate transactions unfairly benefit (e.g., by simultaneously representing both the buy and sell side of a real estate transaction in a manner that unfairly boosts the commission they receive, or colluding to increase their commission in a real estate transaction at the expense of the buyer and/or seller of the real property). The paper proposes a unique blockchain solution design that leverages blockchain's properties of transparency and ability to create tamper-resistant audit trails to reduce opportunities for double-ending fraud and increase real estate market participants' trust in the handling of their transactions. The paper discusses the implementation of a prototype of the solution based on hyperledger fabric and sails; it presents the results of an agent-based modelling simulation validating that the inherent transparency of the proposed design offers optimal allocation for both sellers and buyers.

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