Welcome to the InfoSci Platform
Reference Hub1
An Approach to Co-Dependent Value Based Internet Advertisement Auction

An Approach to Co-Dependent Value Based Internet Advertisement Auction

Satoshi Takahashi, Tokuro Matsuo, Roger Y. Lee
Copyright: © 2013 |Volume: 1 |Issue: 2 |Pages: 15
ISSN: 2166-7160|EISSN: 2166-7179|EISBN13: 9781466633179|DOI: 10.4018/ijsi.2013040101
Cite Article Cite Article

MLA

Takahashi, Satoshi, et al. "An Approach to Co-Dependent Value Based Internet Advertisement Auction." IJSI vol.1, no.2 2013: pp.1-15. http://doi.org/10.4018/ijsi.2013040101

APA

Takahashi, S., Matsuo, T., & Lee, R. Y. (2013). An Approach to Co-Dependent Value Based Internet Advertisement Auction. International Journal of Software Innovation (IJSI), 1(2), 1-15. http://doi.org/10.4018/ijsi.2013040101

Chicago

Takahashi, Satoshi, Tokuro Matsuo, and Roger Y. Lee. "An Approach to Co-Dependent Value Based Internet Advertisement Auction," International Journal of Software Innovation (IJSI) 1, no.2: 1-15. http://doi.org/10.4018/ijsi.2013040101

Export Reference

Mendeley
Favorite Full-Issue Download

Abstract

A structure of the Internet advertisement is that the service providers decide order of placement of many advertisements and advertising fees by auctions when advertisers offer their promotions. It is known that Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) mechanism is the most efficient auction mechanism of the advertisement auction. Searching engine companies employ GSP mechanism basically. There are a lot of researches on GSP in order to analyze and clarify its feature and advantages. However, these researches assume that traded advertisements are mutually independent. That is means that each advertisement does not influence other advertisements. Also these researches do not consider a value of advertisement, which means some criterions of a name value of a company, effectiveness and an importance, that is dependently each other. This paper proposes a new advertisement auction mechanism based on GSP with considering the value of advertisement. The authors analyze the auctioneer's profit in comparison between normal GSP, normal VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism) and their proposed mechanism.

Request Access

You do not own this content. Please login to recommend this title to your institution's librarian or purchase it from the IGI Global bookstore.