It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which message secrecy in communication is desirable. In such scenarios, encryption is a crucial tool. Unfortunately, encryption of message contents by itself may not be sufficient. Even if the contents of sensitive messages are protected, much can be inferred merely by the fact that one party is sending a message to another party. If an authoritarian regime already suspects that one party to a communication is a dissident, then the other parties to the communication become suspect as well. Accessing a crisis hotline or a patent database is a strong clue about the intentions of the user, even if the exact wording of the query remains secret. In settings where encryption is rare, the mere fact that certain messages are encrypted may cause increased scrutiny.
In 1981, Chaum [3] published a beautifully simple and elegant method to protect the identities of communicating parties: “mix networks.” The basic functionality of a mix network is to...
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Franklin, M.K. (2005). Mix Networks. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA . https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-23483-7_257
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