Abstract
This paper is a continuation of the proposal of the linked authenticated dictionaries usage for certificate revocation. Usage of specific data structures allows preparing online certificate status verification protocol, in which status servers are unauthorized entities. Additionally this scheme provides possibility of generating certificate status requests dependent on time and achieving responses about status of archival certificates
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6 References
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Maćków, W., Pejaś, J. (2005). Unauthorized servers for online certificates status verification. In: Saeed, K., Pejaś, J. (eds) Information Processing and Security Systems. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26325-X_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26325-X_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-25091-5
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