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Keil, G. (2005). How the Ceteris Paribus Laws of Physics Lie. In: Faye, J., Needham, P., Scheffler, U., Urchs, M. (eds) Nature’s Principles. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3258-7_7
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