Abstract
For over a decade, agent research has shown that social commitments support the definition of open multiagent systems by capturing the responsibilities that agents contract toward one another through their communications. These systems, however, rely on the assumption that agents respect the social commitments they adopt. To overcome this limitation, in this paper we investigate the role of sanctions as elements whose enforcement fosters agents’ compliance with adopted commitments. In particular, we present a model of flexible social commitments to which sanctions are attached, and where the enforcement of sanctions act as a social control mechanism for the satisfaction of commitments.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Hewitt, C.: Open information systems semantics for distributed artificial intelligence. Artificial Intelligence 47, 76–106 (1991)
Castelfranchi, C.: Commitments: from individual intentions to groups and organizations. In: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS 1995), San Francisco, CA, pp. 41–48 (1995)
Singh, M.P.: A social semantics for agent communication languages. In: Dignum, F.P.M., Greaves, M. (eds.) Issues in Agent Communication. LNCS, vol. 1916, pp. 31–45. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Flores, R., Kremer, R.: Bringing coherence to agent conversation. In: Wooldridge, M.J., Weiß, G., Ciancarini, P. (eds.) AOSE 2001. LNCS, vol. 2222, pp. 50–67. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
McBurney, P., Parson, S.: Agent ludens: games for agent dialogues. In: Proceedings of the Workshop on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents (2000)
Pasquier, P., Bergeron, M., Chaib-draa, B.: DIAGAL: A generic ACL for open systems. In: Gleizes, M.-P., Omicini, A., Zambonelli, F. (eds.) ESAW 2004. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 3451, pp. 152–165. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Fornara, N., Colombetti, M.: Defining interaction protocols using a commitment-based agent communication langage. In: Rosenchein, J.S., Sandholm, T., Wooldridge, M., Yokoo, M. (eds.) Proceedings of the second Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agents Systems conference (AAMAS 2003), pp. 520–527. ACM Press, New York (2003)
Pasquier, P., Chaib-draa, B.: The cognitive coherence approach for agent communication pragmatics. In: Proceedings of The Second International Conference on Autonomous Agent and Multi-Agents Sytems (AAMAS 03), pp. 544–552. ACM Press, New York (2003)
Flores, R., Kremer, R.C.: A principled modular approach to construct flexible conversation protocols. In: Tawfik, A.Y., Goodwin, S.D. (eds.) Canadian AI 2004. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 3060, pp. 1–15. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Yolum, P., Singh, M.P.: Flexible protocol specification and execution: Applying event calculus planning using commitments. In: Castelfranchi, C., Johnson, W. (eds.) Proceedings of the 1st International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS), Bologna, Italy, pp. 527–534 (2002)
Excelente-Toledo, C.B., Bourne, R.A., Jennings, N.R.: Reasoning about commitments and penalties for coordination between autonomous agents. In: Müller, J., Andre, E., Sen, S., Frasson, C. (eds.) Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Autonomous Agents, pp. 131–138. ACM Press, New York (2001)
Dignum, F., Kinny, D., Sonenberg, L.: From desires, obligations and norms to goals. Cognitive Science Quarterly 2, 407–430 (2002)
Sandholm, T.W., Lesser, V.R.: Advantages of a leveled commitment contracting protocol. In: Proceedings of the Thirteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Portland, OR (1996)
Vogel Carey, T.: How to confuse commitment with obligation. The Journal of Philosophy, 276–284 (1975)
Martindale, D.: The theory of social control. In: Roucek, J. (ed.) Social Control for the 1980s: A Handbook for Order in a Democratic Society, pp. 46–58. Greenwood Press, Westport (1978)
Hechter, M., Opp, K.D.: Introduction. In: Hechter, M., Opp, K.D. (eds.) Social Norms, vol. xi–xx. Russell Sage Foundation, Thousand Oaks (2001)
Levinson, D.J.: Collective sanctions. Public law research paper no. 57, NYU Law School, Ctr for Law and Business Research (2003)
Posner, R.A., Rasmusen, E.B.: Creating and enforcing norms, with special reference to sanctions. International Review of Law and Economics 19, 369–382 (1999)
Bates, J.: The role of emotion in believable agents. Communications of the ACM 37, 122–125 (1994)
Vold, G.B., Bernard, T.J., Snipes, J.B.: Theoretical Criminology, 5th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2002)
Beccaria, C.: On Crimes and Punishments. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey (1963)
Bentham, J.: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. The Athlone Press, London (1970)
Polinsky, M., Shavel, S.: Punitive damages. In: Newman, P. (ed.) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and The Law, vol. 3, pp. 192–198. Macmillan Reference Limited, London (1998)
Singh, M.P.: An ontology for commitments in multiagent systems: Toward a unification of normative concepts. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7, 97–113 (1999)
Artikis, A.: Executable Specification of Open Norm-Governed Computational Systems. PhD thesis, Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Imperial College London (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Pasquier, P., Flores, R.A., Chaib-draa, B. (2005). Modelling Flexible Social Commitments and Their Enforcement. In: Gleizes, MP., Omicini, A., Zambonelli, F. (eds) Engineering Societies in the Agents World V. ESAW 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3451. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11423355_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11423355_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-27330-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31887-3
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)