Abstract
Anonymous message transmission should be a key feature in network architectures ensuring that delivered messages are impossible—or at least infeasible—to be traced back to their senders. For this purpose the formal model of the non-adaptive, real-time PROB-channel will be introduced. In this model attackers try to circumvent applied protection measures and to link senders to delivered messages. In order to formally measure the level of anonymity provided by the system, the probability will be given, with which observers can determine the senders of delivered messages (source-hiding property) or the recipients of sent messages (destination-hiding property). In order to reduce the certainty of an observer, possible counter-measures will be defined that will ensure specified upper limit for the probability with which an observer can mark someone as the sender or recipient of a message. Finally results of simulations will be shown to demonstrate the strength of the techniques.
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Tóth, G., Hornák, Z. (2005). Measuring Anonymity in a Non-adaptive, Real-Time System. In: Martin, D., Serjantov, A. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3424. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11423409_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11423409_14
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