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Operational Semantics of Security Protocols

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Scenarios: Models, Transformations and Tools

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 3466))

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Abstract

Based on a concise domain analysis we develop a formal semantics of security protocols. Its main virtue is that it is a generic model, in the sense that it is parameterized over e.g. the intruder model. Further characteristics of the model are a straightforward handling of parallel execution of multiple protocols, locality of security claims, the binding of local constants to role instances, and explicitly defined initial intruder knowledge. We validate our framework by analysing the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, NL-5600 MB, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Cas Cremers & Sjouke Mauw

Authors
  1. Cas Cremers
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  2. Sjouke Mauw
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Konstanz, D-78457, Konstanz, Germany

    Stefan Leue

  2. Department of Software Systems, Tampere University of Technology,  

    Tarja Johanna Systä

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Cremers, C., Mauw, S. (2005). Operational Semantics of Security Protocols. In: Leue, S., Systä, T.J. (eds) Scenarios: Models, Transformations and Tools. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3466. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11495628_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11495628_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26189-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32032-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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