Abstract
In this paper, we develop a secure multi-attribute procurement auction, in which a sales item is defined by several attributes called qualities, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. We first present a Vickrey-type protocol that can be used for multi-attribute procurement auctions.Next, we show how this protocol can be executed securely.
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Suzuki, K., Yokoo, M. (2005). Secure Multi-attribute Procurement Auction. In: Patrick, A.S., Yung, M. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3570. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11507840_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11507840_29
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26656-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31680-0
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