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Nash Equilibria, the Price of Anarchy and the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture

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Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3580))

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Abstract

Motivation-Framework. Apparently, it is in human’s nature to act selfishly. Game Theory, founded by von Neumann and Morgenstern [39, 40], provides us with strategic games, an important mathematical model to describe and analyze such a selfish behavior and its resulting conflicts. In a strategic game, each of a finite set of players aims for an optimal value of its private objective function by choosing either a pure strategy (a single strategy) or a mixed strategy (a probability distribution over all pure strategies) from its strategy set. Strategic games in which the strategy sets are finite are called finite strategic games. Each player chooses its strategy once and for all, and all players’ choices are made non-cooperatively and simultaneously (that is, when choosing a strategy each player is not informed of the strategies chosen by any other player). One of the basic assumption in strategic games is that the players act rational, that is, consistently in pursuit of their private objective function. For a concise introduction to contemporary Game Theory we recommend [25].

This work has been partially supported by the DFG-SFB 376 and by the European Union within the 6th Framework Programme under contract 001907 (DELIS).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Mathematics, University of Paderborn, Fürstenallee 11, 33102, Paderborn, Germany

    Martin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Burkhard Monien & Karsten Tiemann

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  1. Martin Gairing
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  2. Thomas Lücking
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  3. Burkhard Monien
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  4. Karsten Tiemann
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. CITI / Departamento de Informática, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal

    Luís Caires

  2. Dipartimento di Informatica, Sistemi e Produzione, Università di Roma “Tor Vergata”, via del Politecnico 1, 00133, Roma, Italy

    Giuseppe F. Italiano

  3. Departamento de Informatica, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516, Caparica, Portugal

    Luís Monteiro

  4. Ecole Polytechnique, Rue de Saclay, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France

    Catuscia Palamidessi

  5. Computer Science Department, Google Inc. and Columbia University, 1214 Amsterdam Avenue, NY 10027, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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Gairing, M., Lücking, T., Monien, B., Tiemann, K. (2005). Nash Equilibria, the Price of Anarchy and the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture. In: Caires, L., Italiano, G.F., Monteiro, L., Palamidessi, C., Yung, M. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3580. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11523468_5

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