Abstract
The use of passwords in security protocols is particularly delicate because of the possibility of off-line guessing attacks. We study password-based protocols in the context of a recent line of research that aims to justify symbolic models in terms of more concrete, computational ones. We offer two models for reasoning about the concurrent use of symmetric, asymmetric, and passwordbased encryption in protocol messages. In each of the models we define a notion of equivalence between messages and also characterize when passwords are used securely in a message or in a set of messages. Our new definition for the computational security of password-based encryption may be of independent interest. The main results of this paper are two soundness theorems. We show that under certain (standard) assumptions about the computational implementation of the cryptographic primitives, symbolic equivalence implies computational equivalence. More importantly, we prove that symbolically secure uses of passwords are also computationally secure.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Abadi, M., Rogaway, P.: Reconciling two views of cryptography (The computational soundness of formal encryption). Journal of Cryptology 15(2), 103–127 (2002)
Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: A composable cryptographic library with nested operations. In: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 220–330 (2003)
Bellare, M., Namprempre, C.: Authenticated encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 531–545. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139–155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Bellovin, S.M., Merritt, M.: Encrypted key exchange: Password-based protocols secure against dictionary attacks. In: Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 72–84 (1992)
Boyko, V., MacKenzie, P., Patel, S.: Provably secure password-authenticated key exchange using Diffie-Hellman. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 156–171. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Corin, R., Doumen, J.M., Etalle, S.: Analysing password protocol security against off-line dictionary attacks. Technical report TR-CTIT-03-52, Centre for Telematics and Information Technology, Univ. of Twente, The Netherlands (2003)
Corin, R., Malladi, S., Alves-Foss, J., Etalle, S.: Guess what? Here is a new tool that finds some new guessing attacks (extended abstract). In: IFIP WG 1.7 and ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS), pp. 62–71 (2003)
Delaune, S., Jacquemard, F.: A theory of dictionary attacks and its complexity. In: Proc.of the 17th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW 2004), pp. 2–15 (2004)
Gennaro, R., Lindell, Y.: A framework for password-based authenticated key exchange. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, pp. 524–543. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Goldreich, O., Lindell, Y.: Session key generation using human passwords only. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 403–432. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: Probabilistic encryption. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 28, 270–299 (1984)
Gong, L.: Verifiable-text attacks in cryptographic protocols. In: INFOCOM 1990, pp. 686–693 (1990)
Gong, L., Lomas, T.M.A., Needham, R.M., Saltzer, J.H.: Protecting poorly chosen secrets from guessing attacks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 11(5), 648–656 (1993)
Katz, J., Ostrovsky, R., Yung, M.: Practical password-authenticated key exchange provably secure under standard assumptions. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 475–494. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Kohl, J., Neuman, C.: RFC 1510: The Kerberos network authentication service (V5) (1993) Web page, at ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1510.txt
Laud, P.: Symmetric encryption in automatic analyses for confidentiality against active adversaries. In: Proc. of 2004 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 71–85 (2004)
Lowe, G.: Analysing protocols subject to guessing attacks. Journal of Computer Security 12(1), 83–98 (2004)
Micciancio, D., Warinschi, B.: Completeness theorems for the Abadi-Rogaway logic of encrypted expressions. Journal of Computer Security 12(1), 99–129 (2004)
Micciancio, D., Warinschi, B.: Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries. In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 133–151. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Miklau, G., Suciu, D.: Controlling access to published data using cryptography. In: Proceedings of 29th International Conference on Very Large Data Bases – VLDB 2003, pp. 898–909. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco (2003)
Mitchell, J., Ramanathan, A., Scedrov, A., Teague, V.: A probabilistic polynomial-time calculus for analysis of cryptographic protocols. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 45 (2001)
Patel, S.: Number theoretic attacks on secure password schemes. Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, 236–247 (1997)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Abadi, M., Warinschi, B. (2005). Password-Based Encryption Analyzed. In: Caires, L., Italiano, G.F., Monteiro, L., Palamidessi, C., Yung, M. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3580. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11523468_54
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11523468_54
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-27580-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31691-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)