Abstract
An encryption scheme is non-malleable if the adversary cannot transform a ciphertext into one of a related message under the given public key. Although providing a very strong security property, some application scenarios like the recently proposed key-substitution attacks yet show the limitations of this notion. In such settings the adversary may have the power to transform the ciphertext and the given public key, possibly without knowing the corresponding secret key of her own public key. In this paper we therefore introduce the notion of completely non-malleable cryptographic schemes withstanding such attacks. We show that classical schemes like the well-known Cramer-Shoup DDH encryption scheme become indeed insecure against this stronger kind of attack, implying that the notion is a strict extension of chosen-ciphertext security. We also prove that, unless one puts further restrictions on the adversary’s success goals, completely non-malleable schemes are hard to construct (as in the case of encryption) or even impossible (as in the case of signatures). Identifying the appropriate restrictions we then show how to modify well-known constructions like RSA-OAEP and Fiat-Shamir signatures yielding practical solutions for the problem in the random oracle model.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Barak, B.: Constant-Round Coin-Tossing With a Man in the Middle or Realizing the Shared Random String Model. In: Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2002), IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2002)
Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Optimal Asymmetric Encryption — How to Encrypt with RSA. In: De Santis, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1994. LNCS, vol. 950, pp. 92–111. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)
Blake-Wilson, S., Menezes, A.: Unknown Key-Share Attacks on the Station-to-Station (STS) Protocol. In: Imai, H., Zheng, Y. (eds.) PKC 1999. LNCS, vol. 1560, pp. 154–170. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Di Crescenzo, G., Ishai, Y., Ostrovsky, R.: Non-interactive and Non-Malleable Commitment. In: Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC) 1998, pp. 141–150. ACM Press, New York (1998)
Di Crescenzo, G., Katz, J., Ostrovsky, R., Smith, A.: Efficient And Non-Interactive Non-Malleable Commitment. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 40–59. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: A Practical Public Key Cryptosystem Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 13–25. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Dolev, D., Dwork, C., Naor, M.: Non-Malleable Cryptography. SIAM Journal on Computing 30(2), 391–437 (2000)
Fischlin, M., Fischlin, R.: Efficient Non-Malleable Commitment Schemes. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 414–432. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Fischlin, M., Fischlin, R.: The Representation Problem Based on Factoring. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) CT-RSA 2002. LNCS, vol. 2271, pp. 96–113. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Fujisaki, E., Okamoto, T., Pointcheval, D., Stern, J.: RSA-OAEP is Secure Under the RSA Assumption. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, p. 260. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Schemes. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)
Kaliski, B.: On Hash Function Firewalls in Signature Schemes. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) CT-RSA 2002. LNCS, vol. 2271, pp. 1–16. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Menezes, A., Smart, N.: Security of Signature Schemes in a Multi-User Setting. In: Designs, Codes and Cryptography, vol. 33, pp. 261–274. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Pointcheval, D., Stern, J.: Security Arguments for Digital Signatures and Blind Signatures. Journal of Cryptology 13(3), 361–396 (2000)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Fischlin, M. (2005). Completely Non-malleable Schemes. In: Caires, L., Italiano, G.F., Monteiro, L., Palamidessi, C., Yung, M. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3580. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11523468_63
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11523468_63
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-27580-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31691-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)