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On the Complexity of Uniformly Mixed Nash Equilibria and Related Regular Subgraph Problems

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Fundamentals of Computation Theory (FCT 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3623))

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Abstract

We investigate the complexity of finding uniformly mixed Nash equilibria (that is, equilibria in which all played strategies are played with the same probability). We show that, even in very simple win/lose bimatrix games, deciding the existence of uniformly mixed equilibria in which the support of one (or both) of the players is at most or at least a given size is an NP-complete problem. Motivated by these results, we also give NP-completeness results for problems related to finding a regular induced subgraph of a certain size or regularity in a given graph, which can be of independent interest.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer and System Sciences, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Via Salaria, 113, 00198, Rome, Italy

    Vincenzo Bonifaci, Ugo Di Iorio & Luigi Laura

Authors
  1. Vincenzo Bonifaci
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  2. Ugo Di Iorio
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  3. Luigi Laura
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Theoretische Informatik, Universität zu Lübeck, Germany

    Maciej Liśkiewicz

  2. Institut für Theoretische Informatik, Universität zu Lübeck, Ratzeburger Allee 160, 23538, Lübeck, Germany

    Rüdiger Reischuk

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bonifaci, V., Di Iorio, U., Laura, L. (2005). On the Complexity of Uniformly Mixed Nash Equilibria and Related Regular Subgraph Problems. In: Liśkiewicz, M., Reischuk, R. (eds) Fundamentals of Computation Theory. FCT 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3623. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11537311_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11537311_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28193-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31873-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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