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A Type System for Computationally Secure Information Flow

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Fundamentals of Computation Theory (FCT 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3623))

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Abstract

The paper presents a novel type system for checking the security of information flow in programs containing operations of symmetric encryption. The type system is correct with respect to the complexity-theoretic security definitions of the encryption primitive.

Partially supported by Estonian Science Foundation, grant #6095.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tartu University,  

    Peeter Laud & Varmo Vene

Authors
  1. Peeter Laud
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  2. Varmo Vene
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Theoretische Informatik, Universität zu Lübeck, Germany

    Maciej Liśkiewicz

  2. Institut für Theoretische Informatik, Universität zu Lübeck, Ratzeburger Allee 160, 23538, Lübeck, Germany

    Rüdiger Reischuk

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Laud, P., Vene, V. (2005). A Type System for Computationally Secure Information Flow. In: Liśkiewicz, M., Reischuk, R. (eds) Fundamentals of Computation Theory. FCT 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3623. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11537311_32

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11537311_32

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28193-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31873-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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